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The primary focus of this dissertation is the doctrine of the Providence of God
and it is approached from a distinctive perspective – that of the doctrine of the
Trinity. Its fundamental thesis is that the adoption of a trinitarian perspective
on Providence provides us with a conceptual paradigm in which varying
theological emphases, which often divide understandings of Providence, are
best understood in a form of paradoxical tension or creative balance with each
being correctly understood only in the context that the other provides.
To demonstrate this, it addresses four issues of Providence that have on
occasion divided understandings of Providence in the past and which have
become significant issues of contention in the contemporary debate on
Providence occasioned by a proposal known as Open Theism. These issues
concern the nature of divine transcendence, sovereignty, immutability and
impassibility and how each should be understood in the context of divine
Providence. Through a detailed examination of three recent trinitarian
theologies, which have emanated from the three main communities of the
Christian church, it argues that a trinitarian perspective is able to provide
significant illumination and explication of these identified issues of Providence
and of the tensions that are often intrinsic to this doctrine.
In relation to these identified issues of Providence, it affirms tensional truths in
our understanding of the issues of Providence and an articulation that
necessarily incorporates a binary form of language – that is, utilising language
of both-and rather than either-or. In other words, it posits that divinetranscendence ought to be held in paradoxical tension with divine immanence;
divine sovereignty ought to be held in paradoxical tension with human
responsibility; and divine immutability and impassibility ought not to be
understood as immobility or impassivity but as affirming the paradoxical
tension of active constancy. The articulation of these tensional truths is
followed and completed by an examination of how they might be applied
pastorally in the specific area of prayer and its relationship to Providence.
Consequently, this dissertation not only constructively impacts our
understanding of divine Providence but also significantly advances the
contemporary debate on Providence concerning Open Theism.TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Introductory
Considerations2
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
THE DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE
The Christian doctrine of the Providence of God (de providentia Dei) concerns
itself with the relationship between the Creator and the created – that is,
between the reality of God and the reality of the cosmos. It is the theological
explication of the point of encounter that exists between the actions of God
toward and in his creation and the actuality of that creation before its God.
Accordingly, the doctrine of Providence may be defined as the Christian
understanding of God’s continuing action by which all creation is preserved
and governed by God’s purposes and plans for that creation.
1 This is the
fundamental understanding of the nature of divine Providence that is adopted
by this dissertation and assumed throughout.
2 Furthermore, Catholic, Orthodox
                                                
1 This definition is a modification of, and may be compared with, the definition supplied by
McKim: “The Christian understanding of God’s continuing action by which all creation is
preserved, supported and governed by God’s purposes and plans for human history and for
human lives” – see D. K. McKim, Westminster Dictionary of Theological Terms (Louiseville,
Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), p. 226. The reason for my modification
above is that McKim’s definition, although universal in its scope (“all creation”), betrays an
inherent anthropocentricity in that it appears to limit the divine intentionality to human affairs
only. I will argue in Chapter Three that the universality of the concept of Providence
necessarily requires a divine intentionality that similarly encompasses both human and non-
human creation. However, the particular focus of my research, which will shortly become
clearer, is in fact concerned with the God-human relationship within Providence.
Consequently, in this dissertation, it is unavoidable that there will be an emphasis upon the
human, yet without denying the non-human, aspect of Providence. For an interesting
perspective on anthropocentricity in relation to the doctrine of creation and, by implication, the
related doctrine of Providence, see R. Page, God and the Web of Creation (London: SCM,
1996).
2 Of course, such an adoption and assumption requires justification and the early stages of
Chapter Three will provide this. For now, though, it is presented in this introduction for the
purpose of clarity.3
and Protestant communities of the Christian church carry similar
understandings concerning the essential nature of this doctrine although, and
as we shall see, significant differences do exist both between and within these
traditions.
3
This dissertation’s focus is the doctrine of Providence. In particular, it seeks
both to consider and illuminate the nature of God’s providential activity in the
world and how that is related to human activity. Though affirming that the
universality of divine Providence necessarily encompasses both human and
non-human creation,
4 our concern is more with the human dimension – that is,
with the nature of the God-human relationship. As such, this research
addresses profound and searching questions concerning both God and
humanity. Some of these questions relate more directly to God: for example,
how are we to understand the nature of God within himself and how is that
nature reflected in his providential intentions and actions toward his creation?
5
                                                
3 The content of these similarities and differences, and the possible implications for our
research, will be addressed in Chapter Three of this dissertation. For now, we must simply
note their existence and leave them at face value. Some representative examples include, (1)
Roman Catholic – “The notion of providence sums up God’s relationship to the world as he
knows, wills and executes his plan of universal salvation and leads the world to the end
decreed by him” – see E. Niermann, “Providence” in K. Rahner (ed.), Encyclopedia of
Theology: A Concise Sacramentum Mundi (London: Burns & Oates, 1975), p. 1313; (2)
Orthodox – “Divine providence is the constant energy of the almighty power, wisdom and
goodness of God, by which he preserves the being and faculties of his creatures, directs them
to good ends, and assists all that is good; but the evil that springs from departure from good he
either cuts off, or corrects it, and turns it to good results” – see “The Longer Catechism of the
Eastern Church” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of Christendom with a History and Critical
Notes Vol. II (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1877), p. 465 and (3) Protestant – the “…
preservation, superintendence, and teleological direction of all things by God. It is the divine
governance whereby all possible events are woven into a coherent pattern and all possible
developments are shaped to accomplish the divinely instituted goal” – see G. W. Bromiley,
“Providence” in G. W. Bromiley (ed.), The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, Vol. 3, 1986), p. 1020.
4 Gunton comments that Providence’s “outworking embraces not only the human world, but
also all creation” - C. E. Gunton, The Christian Faith: An Introduction to Christian Doctrine
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p. 32.
5 A clarifying note must be made at this point concerning the use, throughout this dissertation,
of masculine language with reference to God, as well as to the first two persons of the Trinity.4
Other questions are more related to humanity: for example, what is the human
involvement in God’s providential actions – ultimately, are we partners or are
we pawns?
The fact and the nature of these questions flow from the point of encounter
spoken of above. On the one hand, believers often develop theological
conceptions of divine Providence (and thereby implicit conceptions of the
nature and character of the God of Providence) in the light of the divine self-
revelation. But, on the other hand, believers who exist both in and as a part of
the Creator’s creation are simultaneously faced with the so-called “real world”
of human history and human existence. In other words, those who confess the
Christian God as the object of their worship are faced with their understanding
of God’s providential purposes and actions toward his creation sometimes
juxtaposed with their perceptions of the actual condition of that creation before
its God.
                                                                                                                               
The challenge of sexist language in our talk about God is a profoundly difficult one. Certainly
it is true that both masculine and feminine images are used in Scripture to describe God – for
example, a father (Psalm 103:13) and a mother (Isaiah 49:15). However, to move away from
how God has revealed himself in the economy of salvation – as Father, Son and Holy Spirit –
is, in my view, to introduce confusion rather than illumination. Furthermore, the substitution
of schema such as Creator, Redeemer and Sanctifier are helpful only to a point. The non-
existence in English of a non-gendered personal pronoun adds to the difficulty (assuming that
the neuter “it” is unsuitable as a reference to a personal God). Alternatively, a dual usage of
male and female pronouns, or an alternate usage, leaves us with what Lyles describes as “the
disturbing image of a God-Who-Suffers-From-Gender-Confusion.” Yet, it must be
acknowledged that masculine language can be used, as it has sometimes has been, as a basis
for denying women their rightful equality as God-imaged human beings. While
acknowledging this, and seeking to find ways in which our language does not perpetuate it
(by, for example, adopting terms such as “humanity” and “personhood” where appropriate), it
is nevertheless my view that we are better served by retaining the language whereby scripture
witnesses to the triunity of God. The Lyles’ quotation and many of the above points are
derived from Jewett’s helpful discussion in P. K. Jewett, God, Creation and Revelation: A
Neo-Evangelical Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), pp. 44-48.5
Such juxtaposition often raises seeming incongruities that lead inevitably to
questions that are ultimate in nature.
6 Affirmations that have long been a part
of orthodoxy – for example, that God continues to preserve, sustain and direct
his creation toward his purposed ends – are aligned with human experiences
that would question such divine involvement. Some compare the apparent
reality of evil in the world with a theological understanding of a God who is
loving and powerful and questions are raised as to the reality and nature of
such evil or the reality and nature of God’s love and power.
7 Still others
ponder upon what they perceive as human freedom to choose, and the
responsibility that this entails, and then seek to assimilate this with theological
understandings concerning divine sovereignty and foreknowledge. Such are
the types of questions intrinsic to this point of encounter and any doctrine of
the Providence of God, if it seeks to be at all beneficial, must at the very least
articulate clearly the issues involved and suggest possible avenues by which
we may gain better understanding.
                                                
6 Boice comments, “There is probably no point at which the Christian doctrine of God comes
more into conflict with contemporary world views than in the matter of God’s providence” –
see J. M. Boice, The Sovereign God (Foundations of the Christian Faith; Downers Grove: IVP,
1978), p. 229.
7 Although this dissertation is not a theodicy, it is inevitable that aspects of our discussion of
Providence will intersect with the problem of evil. This so-called “problem of evil” was once
enunciated by Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), whom Feuerbach regarded as his teacher, as a
trilemma: if God were good, he would destroy evil; if God were powerful, he could destroy
evil and yet, evil exists – as cited in N. L. Geisler and J. Y Amanu, “Evil,” in S. B. Ferguson
and D. F. Wright (eds), New Dictionary of Theology (Leicester: IVP, 1988), p. 242. It should
be noted that unless omniscience is considered to be part of omnipotence, the problem of evil
is actually a quadrilemma. Otherwise, one could argue that God simply didn’t know of the
reality of evil in the world. Yet, the problem of evil remains for whatever the orientation of the
issue, unless our understanding of each statement is either modified or nuanced, then on
logical and moral grounds we end up with something which is at best a problematic synthesis
and at worst an unworkable contradiction. The moral and logical problem that this presents to
the Christian theist is highlighted in Küng’s statement, “Either God cannot prevent evil – and
then is he really all-powerful? – or he will not – and then is he still holy, just and good? Or he
cannot and will not – and then is he not both powerless and resentful? Or, finally, he can and
will: but then why is there all the wickedness in the world?” – see H. Küng, On Being a
Christian (London: Collins, 1977; German orig., 1974), p. 428.6
Yet, despite our desire for greater clarity and understanding of the doctrine of
Providence, we must acknowledge, particularly at this early juncture, both the
limitations and the possibilities of our theological investigation – and arguably
of theological inquiry in general. In relation to the limitations of theological
inquiry, we would do well to recognize the difference that exists between
approaching theology as a problem to be solved rather than as a mystery to be
discerned and illuminated. In his recent examination of the doctrine of the
impassibility of God, Weinandy points out this difference.
8 He comments,
Many theologians today, having embraced the Enlightenment
presuppositions and the scientific method that it fostered, approach
theological issues as if they were scientific problems to be solved
rather than mysteries to be discerned and clarified. However, the
true goal of theological inquiry is not the resolution of theological
problems, but the discernment of what the mystery of faith is.
Because God, who can never be fully comprehended, lies at the
heart of all theological enquiry, theology by its nature is not a
problem solving enterprise, but rather a mystery discerning
enterprise.
9
In making this distinction, Weinandy is not questioning the possibility of
theological enquiry, for he explicitly adopts Augustine’s and Anselm’s dictum
of “faith seeking understanding,”
10 but rather the nature of theological
                                                
8 T. G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000), p. 31. See particularly
the development of his argument in pp. 30-36.
9 T. G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? p. 32.
10 T. G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? p. 28. Augustine mentions this idea, translated by A. W.
Haddan and W. G. T. Shedd as “[we] ought to believe before we understand” – see Augustine,
“On the Trinity,” in P. Schaff (ed.), A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the
Christian Church Series I, Vol. III (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956), p. 119 (VIII.V.8).
Anselm used the famous Fides quaerens intellectum (“faith seeking understanding”) as the
formal title of his apology which was later named Proslogium (“discourse, allocution”) for
short. The companion slogan credo ut intelligam (“I believe in order to understand”)
summarizes a major theme of his writings – see Anselm, “Proslogium,” in S. N. Deane (ed.),
St Anselm: Proslogium; Monologium; An Appendix in Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilon; and
Cur Deus Homo (Chicago: Open Court, 1930), p. 1. It is uncertain whether Augustine, whom
Anselm appears to have followed, based his understanding upon Isaiah 7:9b (LXX) – kai« e˙a»n
mh\ pisteu/shte oujde« mh\ sunhvte (“unless you believe, you will not understand”). If he did,
it is likely that he used the Old Latin (Vetus Latina) text that gives intelligetis (“understand
thoroughly”) as the translation of sunhvte. However, OT scholarship appears to have
established that this is a misreading based upon damage to the text. The correct sense, it is
argued, is reflected in the Vulgate which uses the phrase non permanebitis (“you will not7
enquiry. Working from a clear apprehension of the inability of the finite to
ever fully comprehend the infinite, Weinandy is seeking to outline the inherent
limits of theological inquiry and thereby place it in more appropriate
perspective. Certainly, greater understanding can and should be attained
(particularly in the light of divine revelation), but total or complete
comprehension will always remain beyond us.
11 As Weinandy puts it, “The
mystery, by the necessity of its subject matter, remains.”
12 In my view,
Weinandy’s deliberations on this theme are both helpful and timely and cause
us to be circumspect in our theological deliberations. In relation to the focus of
my research, it is my view that although the intention is to bring greater clarity
and understanding of divine Providence, there will nevertheless always be an
element of mystery that remains simply due to the fact that we are inquiring
into divine Providence.
Yet, alongside the recognition of the inherent limitations of theological
inquiry, there is also a sense in which we should likewise recognize its
possibilities. In other words, although theological inquiry by its very nature is
                                                                                                                               
remain”). Hence, we have in the NIV, “If you do not stand firm in your faith, you will not
stand at all.” For a fascinating discussion of the issues, see G. W. Menzies, “To What Does
Faith Lead? The Two-Stranded Textual Tradition of Isaiah 7.9b,” Journal for the Study of the
Old Testament 80 (1998): 111-128. See also textual comment in H. Wildberger, Isaiah 1-12
(Continental Commentaries; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), p. 285.
11 It can be argued that even beyond this life there will still be an element of mystery.
Although 1 Corinthians 13:12 suggests a perfection of knowledge in heaven, I am persuaded
that this fullness of knowledge should be understood as “the full extent that a redeemed finite
human being can know and in a way similar in kind [not same] to the way the Lord in his
infinite wisdom fully and infinitely knows me” (italics and parentheses mine) – see W. H.
Mare, “1 Corinthians,” in F. E. Gaebelein (ed.), The Expositor’s Bible Commentary Vol. 10
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1976), p. 270. Grosheide also comments that the kaqw»ß kai«« of
verse 12b “does not imply a full equality.” Rather, Paul intends to “…cut off every thought
that our knowing would be divine. Even in the realm of glory, as vs. 13 points out, man
remains distinct from God” – see F. W. Grosheide, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (The
New International Commentary on the New Testament; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953), p.
312.
12 T. G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? , p. 31.8
concerned with divine mystery, it is still, to borrow the earlier Augustinian and
Anselmian phrase, faith seeking understanding. That is, divine mystery and
human understanding are not mutually exclusive or incompatible in a total or
complete sense. Alongside the awareness of divine mystery stands the
possibility of greater understanding, clarification and discernment, but not total
comprehension, of that mystery and this needs to be done for each successive
generation. In the succinct words of Tillich, theology needs to be “answering
theology” – it needs to address adequately the questions that are a part of
humanity’s reality. According to his “method of correlation,” theology needs
to move between the poles (and ultimately unite the poles) of the “message” of
the eternal truth of the Christian message and the interpretation of that truth for
the “situation” of every new generation.
13
Thielicke also expresses similar sentiments to Tillich and seems to share his
burden for theology that speaks to present reality, yet he differs vastly from
him over how the latter develops his “method of correlation” and the question
of what constitutes the content of the “message.” In contrast to Tillich,
Thielicke’s approach places more emphasis on the fact that any contemporary
re-interpretation must not “revoke” the older interpretations, as Tillich at times
seems to, but must “invoke” them. In other words, the re-interpretations of the
past “… will not be revolutionary then. They will not set aside the past. They
will seek continuity with it and bear witness to the identity of revealed truth.”
14
                                                
13 P. Tillich, Systematic Theology (London: James Nisbett and Co, 1968), pp. 3-9
14 H. Thielicke, The Evangelical Faith Vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974, German orig.
1968), p. 121 (but see entire section on pp. 119-128). Pinnock similarly finds Tillich’s
application of his correlative method wanting. He states that, “one must point out that Tillich’s
own practice fell far short of his stated method of correlation. His theology lacks biblical9
In a similar way, this dissertation’s inquiry into divine Providence is a
demonstration of the possibility of theological inquiry in that it is seeking to
articulate the central issues of the doctrine and suggest avenues by which
greater understanding can be attained. While being aware of the impossibility
of total comprehension of divine Providence, I am seeking to understand how
the Christian church has understood it in past generations, with a view to
articulating it more clearly to this present generation that now faces its own
unique problems and issues.
15 In other words, I desire to show the greatest of
respect for those who have gone before us, which is really the theological
equivalent of “honouring your father and mother,” while seeking to
appropriate their insights for the present – faithful to the past, relevant to the
present.
16
As such, one can say that this dissertation has a double purpose or, perhaps
more accurately, a single intention with two layers or levels. The first is the
intellectual or cognitive level. It seeks to provide a systematic theological
formulation that will both aid our awareness and develop our conceptual
understanding of the issues intrinsic to the doctrine of God’s Providence. The
second level, however, is concerned more with the application of this
conceptual understanding to human society and human life – or, in Tillich’s
words, the uniting of the poles of message and situation.
                                                                                                                               
substance” – C. H. Pinnock, “Building the Bridge from Academic Theology to Christian
Mission,” Themelios 9/3 (1984): 3, footnote 1.
15 See Pinnock’s discussion of what he calls “the test of cruciality” – that is, is an
interpretation of Scripture both true to the original meaning and pertinent to the present
situation? – C. H. Pinnock, “Biblical Texts – Past and Future Meanings,” Journal of the
Evangelical Theological Society 43/1 (2000): 71-81.
16 In a similar way, Studer’s study of patristic theology leads him to conclude that although the
Gospel “has not essentially changed,” it has nevertheless “been understood anew in each new
period of church history” – B. Studer, Trinity and Incarnation: The Faith and the Early
Church (London: T & T Clark, 1993), p. 239.10
The assumption that lies behind this approach is that theology, in its deepest
sense, is the study of God that is fully integrated. Similarly with Gunton, for
example, I seek an integration of theory and practice.
17 In other words, what is
sought is an understanding of God that is characterized by integration both
between and within internal and external dimensions. The internal dimension
is evidenced by integration of both intellectual and emotional planes – both
head and heart. Theology that does not speak to human existence at its deepest
emotional level has the potential to become cerebral and detached.
Alternatively, theology that does not speak to human understanding at its
highest intellectual level has the potential to become emotive and shallow. But,
beyond the internal dimension, the external dimension is evidenced by the
integration of these deliberations, conclusions and convictions with external
praxis. In other words, what is sought is an integration of head, heart and hand
– a unified whole between what is thought and believed and what is practised
and lived.
18
                                                
17 Gunton comments on this integration when he writes that theology “… is often understood
as both a theoretical and a practical discipline, the theoretical aspects centring on an enquiry
into the meaning and truth of the Christian faith, and so of the world in which we live, the
practical on the training of people for ordination in the church or assisting them to find
meaning in their lives” – C. E. Gunton, “Doing Theology in the University Today,” in Gunton,
Holmes and Rae (2001), p. 442.
18 Barth’s awareness of this integration is seen, in the context of “Dogmatics as Ethics,” in his
comment, “Therefore dogmatics loses nothing more nor less than its object, and therefore all
meaning, if it is not continually concerned as well with the existence of man and the realities
of his situation, if its problem concerning the purity of doctrine and the Word of God in
Christian preaching is not also the problem of the Christian life of man, i.e., the life of man as
determined by the Word of God: the problem what we ourselves must do” – K. Barth, Church
Dogmatics Vol. I/2 (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1956). Webster believes that this conviction
underlies all of the Church Dogmatics. He writes, “For Barth, ethical questions are not tacked
on to dogmatics as something supplementary, a way of exploring the ‘consequences’ of
doctrinal proposals or demonstrating their ‘relevance.’ Dogmatics, precisely because its theme
is the encounter of God and humanity, is from the beginning moral theology” – see J. Webster,
Barth’s Moral Theology: Human Action in Barth’s Thought (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998),
p. 8. In a similar vein, and nearly a century ago, Augustus Hopkins Strong wrote, “Theology is11
TRINITY – A PERSPECTIVE ON PROVIDENCE
To achieve its stated purpose, this dissertation approaches the doctrine of
Providence from a distinctive perspective – that of the doctrine of the Trinity.
It argues that a consideration of Providence from the perspective of God as
immanently
19 and economically triune provides a helpful and constructive
theological key, as it were, for illuminating and explicating the theological
issues and tensions that I will argue are intrinsic to the doctrine of Providence.
This dissertation’s fundamental thesis is that the adoption of a trinitarian
perspective provides a conceptual paradigm whereby varying theological
emphases in the doctrine of Providence are understood in a form of creative
tension or balance, with each being correctly understood only in the context of
the other. In other words, it provides a perspective that is not only a reasonable
                                                                                                                               
a science which can be successfully cultivated only in connection with its practical
application” – see A. H. Strong, Systematic Theology (Philadelphia: Judson Press, 1907), p. xi.
19 A clarifying comment needs to be made here in relation to the use of the expression
“immanent” Trinity. Traditionally, the terms that theologians have used to differentiate
between the actions or functions of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit as against their eternal
being in relation to each other have been respectively the “economic” Trinity and the
“immanent” Trinity. The potential difficulty with this is the connotations that are normally
associated with the theological word “immanent.” In theological and philosophical discourse,
to “be immanent” means to reside in or indwell. Hence, we speak of the “immanence” of God
in that he is present in and with the created order. It is usually contrasted with the
“transcendence” of God in that he is over and beyond the created order. Consequently, the
expression “immanent” Trinity can be potentially misleading in that it conjures up the image
of the triune God residing in or indwelling the creation, yet that is precisely not what the
expression means. Other theologians have recognized the potential for misunderstanding here
and have offered suggestions. LaCugna prefers to use the expressions oikonomia and theologia
as a helpful paradigm. Hill opts to speak of the “economic” Trinity and the “transcendent”
Trinity while Fiddes muses upon the terms “economic” Trinity and “essential” Trinity. But,
both of these appear only to repeat the problem for the replacement words “transcendent” and
“essential” bring with them their own unique theological baggage. However, despite these
difficulties, it is my judgement that it is better to continue using the traditional expression
“immanent Trinity” when speaking of God in his own triune being (though ensuring that we
are defining it clearly), rather than introducing another technical term (for example,
“ontological Trinity”) - see C. M. LaCugna, God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (San
Francisco: Harper Collins, 1991), p. 4; E. Hill, The Mystery of the Trinity (Introducing
Catholic Theology; London: Billing and Sons, 1985), p. 46 and P. S. Fiddes, The Creative
Suffering of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 112.12
reflection of the diversity of the biblical witness, but is also helpful in
elucidating the seemingly paradoxical philosophical and theological issues
involved.
Though a distinctive approach, trinitarian perspectives on theological issues
and subjects are by no means unique. Schwöbel, for example, recognizes the
potential of trinitarian reflection upon other areas of theology when he makes
the comment, “it is difficult to point to any one area of theological reflection
that is not potentially affected by being viewed from a trinitarian
perspective.”
20 Similarly, in his admirable work on the church as an image of
the Trinity, Volf notes that, “considerations concerning the one and many
indicate that the way one thinks about God will decisively shape not only
ecclesiology, but the entirety of Christian thought.” He further comments that
both Moltmann and Pannenberg have, each in their own way, “understood all
of theology as an explication of the doctrine of the Trinity.”
21
In a similar way, I am utilizing the reality of the divine Trinity as a
foundational epistemological principle in our consideration of divine
Providence. This is not to suggest that a trinitarian perspective is the only one
that could or should be utilized, but I am affirming that trinitarian theology is
nevertheless central not only to our understanding of God but also for
illuminating his relationship with the world.
22 Indeed, Grenz argues that
                                                
20 C. Schwöbel, “The Renaissance of Trinitarian Theology: Reasons, Problems and Tasks,” in
C. Schwöbel (ed.), Trinitarian Theology Today (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995), pp. 1-2.
21 M. Volf, After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1998), p. 193.
22 Fermer questions the application of trinitarian theology as a methodological paradigm, such
as is seen in the writings of Zizioulas and Gunton and argues that, though trinitarian13
theology has as its central interest the reality and actions of God, and
consequently, “rather than being mere speculation, therefore, unpacking the
eternal trinitarian relations is endemic to the theological task.”
23 Put another
way, I am facing what O’Donnell calls the “God-world relation” and exploring
the question that he himself puts: “Is a trinitarian perspective the one which
ultimately renders this relationship intelligible?”
24 To that end, I am affirming
that an epistemological correlation, a fundamental agreement, exists between
God as he is in his triune self and God as he relates to the world in Providence.
In other words, the way in which God relates to the cosmos in Providence, and
particularly to humanity, is to some extent reflective of the interrelationships
of the triune divine life. This affirmation is similar to that which is often made
concerning God and his self-revelation. That is, that the Deus revelatus is not,
in an ultimate sense, other than the Deus absconditus. God has revealed
himself and that revelation is specific, sufficient and salvific.
25 He has not
revealed all that he is, but certainly not other than he is.
26 I am likewise
positing that a similar correlation exists between God within his triune self and
God in Providence – there is a consistency between divine essence and divine
action.
                                                                                                                               
perspectives and analogies should be included in theological discussion, “too little attention
has been paid to its limits” – R. M. Fermer, “The Limits of Trinitarian Theology as a
Methodological Paradigm,” Neue Zeitschrift Für Systematische Theologie und
Religionsphilosophie 41/2 (1999): 184 (italics his).
23 S. J. Grenz, “Articulating the Christian Belief-Mosaic: Theological Method after the Demise
of Foundationalism,” in Stackhouse (2000), p. 130.
24 J. J. O’Donnell, The Mystery of the Triune God (London: Sheed and Ward, 1988), p. 159.
25 Lewis writes, “There is a gulf between ourselves and God which can be bridged only from
the divine side. The message of Scripture is that God has crossed that gulf and made himself
known, not vaguely but specifically, not just informatively but savingly, in words of his choice
to people of his choice” – P. Lewis, The Message of the Living God (The Bible Speaks Today
[Bible Themes] series; Leicester: IVP, 2000), p. 18.
26 H. D. McDonald, “The Changing Emphasis in the Doctrine of Providence,” Vox Evangelica
(1964): 73. See also P. K. Jewett, God, Creation and Revelation, pp. 85-88, as well as text of
sermon by M. Shuster, “A Fire and a Name,” in same volume, pp. 220-226.14
Indeed, the relationship between the divine essence and the divine attributes
speaks to this. Pannenberg comments that, “if there are no qualities, there is no
divine essence to bear them. If the cloak falls, the duke falls with it.”
27 In other
words, the divine attributes are not accidental to God’s nature but essential –
they are predicated of him and define him as he is.
28 This means that a
fundamental correlation exists between the divine essence and the divine
attributes. In the words of Bloesch, “If we continue to speak of essence and
attributes, we must insist that the essence of God is reflected in his attributes;
the attributes, on the other hand, are manifestations of his essence.”
29
However, not all affirm such a connection or correlation. For example,
Schleiermacher sees no such correlation and contends that the divine attributes
do not describe God as he is but rather our human apprehension of him.
30 This
is a consistent approach for Schleiermacher to take for he, along with others,
desires to use human experience as a starting point for theology.
31 His well
known utilization of “a feeling of absolute dependence” as a necessary starting
point that in his view leads us inevitably to God is evidence of this.
32
                                                
27 W. Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991, German
edition, 1988), p. 364.
28 G. R. Lewis and B. A. Demarest, Integrative Theology Vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan,
1996), p. 197.
29 D. Bloesch, God the Almighty: Power, Wisdom, Holiness and Love (Christian Foundations;
Downers Grove: IVP, 1995), p. 41.
30 Schleiermacher begins his discussion of the divine attributes with the following, “All
attributes which we ascribe to God are to be taken as denoting not something special in God,
but only something special in the manner in which the feeling of absolute dependence is to be
related to Him” – see F. D. E. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (Edinburgh: T & T Clark,
1928, German orig. 1830), p. 194.
31 McGrath believes that “many theologians regarded experienced-based theologies as
providing an escape from the impasse of Enlightenment rationalism, or from difficulties
relating to the alleged particularity of Christian revelation” – see A. E. McGrath, Christian
Theology: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2
nd ed., 1997), p. 230.
32 Schleiermacher comments, “The common element in all howsoever diverse expressions of
piety, by which these are conjointly distinguished from all other feelings, or, in other words,
the self-identical essence of piety, is this: the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or,15
Consequently, in Schleiermacher’s view, attributes such as omniscience and
omnipotence describe the human experience of God as he relates to us rather
than God as he is.
Against Schleiermacher, however, I affirm that the divine attributes are far
more than a mere human apprehension and do indeed reveal and define God as
he is within himself.
33 Indeed, the divine attribute of faithfulness has relevance
here. It has been often asserted that God is not only faithful to his promises
and to his people, but he is faithful to himself – that is, his actions are
consistent with his essence. The divine essence is prior to, and ultimately
directs and defines, the divine existential activity – if God is holy, then his
actions, by definition, are holy. Therefore, he has not, does not, will not and,
indeed, cannot act in a way contrary to his nature. Indeed, Jesus himself spoke
of the correlation that exists between essence and action (Matthew 7:16-20).
34
Faithfulness is indicative of the divine being in the same way that love and
holiness are and this means that God’s actions toward others are, in a
fundamental sense, concordant with his very being. In the same way that a
sense of indivisibility exists between God’s essence and his attributes, I am
arguing also for a consistency, a oneness, between God’s essence as a triune
being and his actions in Providence. There is a consistency between divine
essence and divine action, the way God is within (ad intra) is reflective of the
                                                                                                                               
which is the same thing, of being in relation with God” – see F. D. E. Schleiermacher, The
Christian Faith, p. 12.
33 Bavinck states that, “Scripture never discusses God’s being apart from his attributes.
According to the Bible, God is what he reveals himself to be” – see H. Bavinck, The Doctrine
of God (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1951), p. 113.
34 “By their fruit you will recognize them. Do people pick grapes from thornbushes, or figs
from thistles? Likewise every good tree bears good fruit, but a bad tree bears bad fruit.  A
good tree cannot bear bad fruit, and a bad tree cannot bear good fruit. Every tree that does not
bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire. Thus, by their fruit you will recognize
them” (NIV).16
way he is without (ad extra). As Gunton comments, “It follows that the
characteristics that God displays in relation to the world are rooted in, are
indeed expressions ‘outward’, of what the Father, Son and Spirit are
immanently in their relations to one another.”
35
Consequently, the correlation between Trinity and Providence I am drawing in
this dissertation is essentially twofold. Firstly, I am positing that a consistency
or correlation exists between the triune economy and the triune ontology. The
God who has revealed himself as a triune economy of Father, Son and Holy
Spirit is not other than the God who self-exists as a triune ontology of Father,
Son and Holy Spirit. But, secondly, I am also positing that there is a
consistency or correlation between the way God self-exists as an ontologically
triune being and the way he relates to the world in Providence. Again, there is
a consistency between divine essence and divine action. A fuller justification
and explication of this fundamental twofold affirmation takes up much of this
dissertation.
At its heart, therefore, this dissertation brings together two doctrines – that of
Trinity and Providence. Although it is noteworthy that neither the word
“Trinity” nor “Providence” appear explicitly in Scripture, orthodoxy has
almost always affirmed that each can be clearly inferred from Scripture. For
centuries now Christian scholars have expended their energies on evaluating
the biblical data and producing systematic formulations of both doctrines and
related theological issues. But what is of particular interest to our present
                                                
35 C. E. Gunton, The Christian Faith, p. 190.17
discussion, and which gives impetus to this dissertation, is the contemporary
re-emergence of both trinitarian and providential theology.
In relation to trinitarian theology, it has been commented that after some years
of what has been described as relative neglect, the “central doctrine of the
Trinity has attracted much theological attention as the second Christian
millennium draws to an end.”
36 This revival seems to have continued into the
present third millennium and has brought with it some unique and arguably
profound insights as the contemporary church has sought to re-articulate its
doctrine of God as triune.
37
In relation to the doctrine of Providence, there has been a similar
contemporary resurgence of scholarly debate concerning issues that,
                                                
36 G. O’Collins, “The Holy Trinity: The State of the Questions,” in S. T. Davis, D. Kendall and
G. O’Collins (eds), The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 1. Feenstra and Platinga also comment, “What is therefore
remarkable is that the last couple of decades have hosted a vigorous resurgence of trinitarian
interest. Its roots are hard to isolate, and the styles of theology within it vary widely, but the
current trinitarian revival itself seems unmistakable” – see R. J. Feenstra and C. Plantinga Jr,
“Introduction,” in R. J. Feenstra and C. Plantinga Jr (eds), Trinity, Incarnation and Atonement
(Library of Religious Philosophy, Vol. 1; Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1989), p. 3.
37 Some representative titles of this resurgence include D. Brown, The Divine Trinity (London:
Duckworth, 1985); M. J. Erickson, God in Three Persons: A Contemporary Interpretation of
the Trinity (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1995); C. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian
Theology (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993); R. P. C. Hanson, The Search for the Christian
Doctrine of God (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1988); E. Hill, The Mystery of the Trinity
(Introducing Catholic Theology; London: Billing and Sons, 1985); W. J. Hill, The Three-
Personed God (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1982); R. W. Jenson, The
Triune Identity: God according to the Gospel (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982); C. M. LaCugna,
God for Us: The Trinity and the Christian Life (San Francisco: Harper, 1991); J. Moltmann,
The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God (London: SCM, 1981); W. Pannenberg,
Systematic Theology Vol. 1; T. F. Peters, God as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in the
Divine Life (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1993); K. Rahner, The Trinity (London:
Burns & Oates, 1970; German orig., 1967); C. Schwöbel (ed), Trinitarian Theology Today:
Essays on Divine Being and Act (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995); B. Studer, Trinity and
Incarnation: The Faith of the Early Church (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995); J. Thompson,
Modern Trinitarian Perspectives (New York: Oxford Univesity Press, 1994); T. F. Torrance,
The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being, Three Persons (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996); J.
Zizioulas, Being and Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (London: Darton,
Longman & Todd, 1985).18
sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly, fall under the theological
purview of Providence. Indeed, the doctrine of Providence can be likened to a
point of convergence – a type of theological vortex into which a wide range of
theological issues are drawn. Debate over these issues has also brought with it
some unique and arguably profound insights as the contemporary church has
sought to re-articulate these issues – of how God acts in the world.
38 Certainly,
many of these issues concerning the nature of the relationship between God,
the world, humanity and history have arisen in various theologies. For
example, theologies of Process and of Liberation have often addressed the
types of theological issues that connect directly and indirectly with the
                                                
38 Some representative titles of this resurgence include D. Basinger and R. Basinger,
Predestination and Free Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom
(Downers Grove: IVP, 1986); D. Basinger, The Case for Freewill Theism: A Philosophical
Assessment (Downers Grove: IVP, 1996); J. K. Beilby and P. R. Eddy (eds), Divine
Foreknowledge: Four Views (Downers Grove: IVP, 2001); G. A. Boyd, God at War: The
Bible and Spiritual Conflict (Downers Grove: IVP, 1997); G. A. Boyd, God of the Possible: A
Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 2000); G.
A. Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Warfare Theodicy (Downers Grove:
IVP, 2001); G. A. Boyd, “Christian Love and Academic Dialogue: A Reply to Bruce Ware,”
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 45/2 (2002): 233-243; R. B. Chisholm Jr.,
“Does God ‘Change His Mind?” Bibliotheca Sacra 152/608 (October-December 1995): 387-
399; J. M. Frame, No Other God: A Response to Open Theism (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P &
R, 2001); N. L. Geisler and H. W. House, The Battle for God: Responding to the Challenge of
Neotheism (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2001); P. Helm, The Providence of God (Contours of
Christian Theology; Downers Grove: IVP, 1994); C. H. Pinnock, R. Rice, J. Sanders, W.
Hasker and D. Basinger, The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional
Understanding of God (Downers Grove: IVP, 1994); C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A
Theology of God’s Openness (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster, 2001); C. H. Pinnock, “There is
Room For Us: A Reply to Bruce Ware,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 45/2
(2002): 213-219; J. Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence (Downers Grove:
IVP, 1998); J. Sanders, “Be Wary of Ware: A Reply to Bruce Ware”, Journal of the
Evangelical Theological Society 45/2 (2002): 221-231; T. R. Schreiner and B. A. Ware (eds),
Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace (Grand
Rapids: Baker Books, 2000); T. Tiessen, Providence and Prayer: How Does God Work in the
World? (Downers Grove: IVP, 2000); B. A. Ware, “Despair Amidst Suffering and Pain: A
Practical Outworking of Open Theism’s Diminished View of God,” The Southern Baptist
Journal of Theology 4/2 (2000): 56-75; B. A. Ware, God's Lesser Glory: A Critique of Open
Theism (Leicester: Apollos, 2000); B. A. Ware, “Defining Evangelicalism’s Boundaries
Theologically: Is Open Theism Evangelical?” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society
45/2 (2002): 193-212; S. J. Wellum, “Divine Sovereignty-Omniscience, Inerrancy and Open
Theism”, Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 45/2 (2002): 257-277; R. K. M.
Wright, No Place for Sovereignty: What’s Wrong with Freewill Theism (Downers Grove: IVP,
1996); A. Young, “Divine Omniscience and Future Contingents …”, Evangelical Review of
Theology 26/3 (2002): 240-264.19
doctrine of Providence.
39 However, on the contemporary Evangelical
theological scene, a notable debate has arisen that addresses these issues in a
particularly direct way.
40 Going beyond a mere continuation of disagreement
between Calvinist and Arminian views on divine Providence and their
differing conceptions of God and reality, the contemporary Evangelical
theological debate has been characterized by an arguably new and innovative
perspective known as Open Theism.
41 This perspective has strikingly
provoked a re-examination of many issues related directly and indirectly to
Providence and thereby is a helpful vehicle for our research. Consequently,
although acknowledging that consideration of these issues is not in any way
unique to Evangelicalism, it is nevertheless largely in the context of this
Evangelical debate on Open Theism that this dissertation will advance its
thesis.
Although clearly having roots in Arminianism,
42 Open Theism is advancing a
conception of God and thereby a model of Providence that has significant
                                                
39 For helpful introductory summaries of Process thought and its relevance to issues of
Providence, see J. B. Cobb Jr and D. R. Griffin, Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition
(Belfast: Westminster Press, 1976), particularly pp. 63-76; C. R. Mesle, Process Theology: A
Basic Introduction (St Louis: Chalice Press, 1993), pp. 7-64. For a critique of this thought, see
R. H. Nash (ed.), Process Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1987). For a helpful
introductory summary of Liberation thought, see G. Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation:
History, Politics and Salvation (London: SCM, 1974) and C. Rowland (ed.), The Cambridge
Companion to Liberation Theology (Cambridge: CUP, 1999).
40 For example, the significance of the debate was recently reflected in that the editorial team
of the well-known Evangelical journal, Christianity Today, saw fit to focus two recent editions
toward it – see dialogue in C. A. Hall and J. Sanders, “Does God Know Your Next Move?”
Christianity Today 45/7, 2001: 39-45 and Christianity Today 45/8, 2001: 50-56.
41 Arguably the volume which sparked much of the contemporary debate was the multi-
authored work, C. H. Pinnock, R. Rice, J. Sanders, W. Hasker and D. Basinger, The Openness
of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove: IVP,
1994).
42 Clark Pinnock, one of the leading proponents for Open Theism, acknowledges that the
openness model “has intellectual roots in Wesleyan-Arminian thinking prior to the rise of
process thought” and believes Open theists “…have made Arminian thinking sharper and
clearer.” Certainly, its critics recognize an Arminian influence as is evidenced by comments
such as, “We have before us a hybrid theology – ultra-Arminianism grafted onto a Socinian-20
differences from classical Arminian theology. Indeed, the main point of
departure between Open Theism and classical Arminianism appears to be over
the nature and extent of divine foreknowledge.
43 In many ways, it is seeking to
move beyond the traditional polarities of classical Calvinist and Arminian
theologies and present what it considers to be a more intellectually coherent
and biblically faithful conception of God and his action in and over the
cosmos. Although Open theists have sometimes addressed the doctrine of
Providence explicitly, as can be found in Sanders’ “risk” model of
Providence,
44 the type of arguments being advanced by other Open theists fall
well within the theological purview of divine Providence.
45 The following
summarizing paragraph, written as part of the preface to The Openness of God:
A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God, demonstrates
the relevance of Open Theism to considerations of divine Providence:
This book presents an understanding of God’s nature and
relationship with his creatures, which we call the openness of God.
In broad strokes, it takes the following form. God, in grace, grants
humans significant freedom to cooperate with or work against
God’s will for their lives, and he enters into dynamic, give-and-
take relationships with us. The Christian life involves a genuine
interaction between God and human beings. We respond to God’s
gracious initiatives and God responds to our responses … and on it
goes. God takes risks in this give-and-take relationship, yet he is
endlessly resourceful and competent in working toward his
ultimate goals. Sometimes God alone decides how to accomplish
these goals. On other occasions, God works with human decision,
adapting his own plans to fit the changing situation. God does not
                                                                                                                               
root stock and planted in the barren soil of human autonomy” – see C. Pinnock, Most Moved
Mover, p. 12 (including footnote 36) and quotation from F. S. Leahy as cited on p. 15.
43 For example, Picirilli begins his article with the following comment, “My purpose in this
paper is to respond, from within the Arminian camp, to the denial of the unlimited
omniscience of God by Clark Pinnock and others associated with him” – see R. E. Picirilli,
“Foreknowledge, Freedom, and the Future,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society
43/2, 2000: 259. See also the publication from Craig, another well-known Arminian – W. L.
Craig, The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom
(Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1987).
44 J. Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence (Downers Grove: IVP, 1998).
45 Ware, a critic of Open Theism, sees this clearly and writes, “At the heart of the openness
proposal is a new model of divine providence” – B. A. Ware, God’s Lesser Glory, p. 14.21
control everything that happens. Rather, he is open to receiving
input from his creatures. In loving dialogue, God invites us to
participate with him to bring the future into being.
46
As a consequence of the nature and number of the questions being asked by
Open theists and the answers being proffered by them, a variety of issues are
back on the theological agenda in relation to the doctrine of Providence. Of
particular note are those theological affirmations that are sometimes
emphasized to the extent that theological camps are arguably identified by
their emphases one way or the other.
47 These affirmations include, for
example, divine transcendence and divine immanence; divine sovereignty and
human responsibility; divine foreknowledge and human freedom; divine
predestination and human free will; divine impassibility and divine passibility;
divine immutability and divine mutability and so on. Furthermore, the debate
being generated by Open Theism, and in particular the conception of God
being advanced, has also seen the development of some interesting interaction
and dialogue between different theological schools – schools which, in the
past, have not often had much in common of which to speak. Of particular
note are the discussions between Open theists and some Process theologians in
the tradition of Whitehead and Hartshorne.
48
                                                
46 C. H. Pinnock et al, The Openness of God, p. 7.
47 For example, Pinnock recognizes that the critics of Open Theism perceive it as emphasizing
immanence at the expense of transcendence. Yet, he and fellow Open theists argue that the
traditional view has been guilty of the opposite – C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, p. 10 and
p. x respectively.
48 Pinnock himself acknowledges that much of the dialogue for Open or Free Will theists has
been with the Evangelical/Fundamental wing of the church, whereas Process theologians have
often dialogued with those on the Liberal wing or those outside the church. However, both
camps realize that “we share many convictions and find much to appreciate in the other” – see
C. H. Pinnock, “Introduction,” in J. B. Cobb Jr and C. H. Pinnock (eds), Searching for an
Adequate God: A Dialogue between Process and Free Will Theists (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2000), p. ix.  See also G. A. Boyd, Trinity and Process: A Critical Evaluation and
Reconstruction of Hartshorne’s Di-Polar Theism Towards a Trinitarian Metaphysics (New
York: Peter Lang, 1992).22
Although operating in two different spheres of theological inquiry, this
dissertation contends that a careful reading of the contemporary developments
in both trinitarian and providential theologies is able to identify a sense of
congruency or of common ground. In other words, there appears to be a
theological heartbeat that is consistent between the two and has become more
pronounced in recent years. Although this heartbeat will be treated more fully
later in this dissertation, it can nevertheless be stated at this introductory stage
that there appears to be a strong emphasis on a highly relational model of
Christian Theism. That is, some of the emphases both in trinitarian and
providential theologies have been on portraying relationships both within the
triune Godhead and externally between the triune God and humanity, in social
language that emphasizes dynamism and relationality. There appears to be a
theological heartbeat that identifies not only a highly relational and mutually
penetrating model of inter-trinitarian perichoresis, but posits similar emphases
in the context of God’s providential relationship with the world. That is, there
is a similar identification and emphasis upon relationality, of mutuality, of
dynamism, of genuine partnership and so on.
Put in simple terms, there appears to be a shift toward emphasizing God “for
us” or “with us” and thereby counterbalancing, or in some instances even
perhaps replacing, the concept of God “over us.” Bloesch similarly recognizes
this shift and comments,
It is becoming increasingly clear that a palpably different
understanding of God and his relationship to the world is steadily
pressing itself upon the modern consciousness. A new
immanentalism is displacing the transcendentalism that has23
hitherto characterized both Catholic and Protestant theology. The
emphasis today is not on the almightiness of God but on his
vulnerability. Attention is given to God’s empathy with the world
rather than his majesty, his pathos rather than his infinite beatitude.
The idea of a suffering God is supplanting the idea of an
impassible God, vigorously defended in the Christian tradition.
God is no longer the infinite supreme being beyond world history
but now ‘the Infinite in the finite’ (Schleiermacher). God is no
longer a static Infinite but a dynamic Infinite… .
49
This shift, to differing extents, can be identified in recent theologies of Trinity
and Providence. Certainly, it should not be discounted out of hand as an
unwelcome deviation from orthodoxy for it may turn out to be a welcome
corrective. The question is whether such a shift is justifiable biblically and
theologically and much of Part Three is spent in addressing these matters.
However, for the moment we simply note this apparent shift in theological
thinking and the existence of possible implications for our research.
50
It is largely in the context of this, at times, volatile Evangelical debate on
divine Providence that this dissertation will advance its thesis – that is, that a
trinitarian perspective provides a theological key that illuminates and
explicates the varying theological and philosophical emphases so characteristic
of consideration of this doctrine. I will argue that the adoption of a trinitarian
perspective as a conceptual paradigm of understanding Providence brings
                                                
49 D. G. Bloesch, God the Almighty, p. 17. John Frame appears to be recognizing a similar
shift when he comments, “Modern theology praises things that are dynamic and demonizes
anything static” – see J. M. Frame, No Other God: A Response to Open Theism (Phillipsburg,
New Jersey: P & R, 2001), p. 20. Similarly, also, Blocher when commenting in the context of
divine immutability, “But a complete reversal has taken place. Now the Unwertung! The
epithet ‘static,’ which suits Being, has become distinctly pejorative. Dynamically to be on the
move now holds supreme value” – see H. Blocher, “Divine Immutability,” in N. M. de S.
Cameron, The Power and Weakness of God: Impassibility and Orthodoxy (Edinburgh:
Rutherford House Books, 1990), p. 1.
50 It appears that much of the debate concerns the extent to which Greek philosophy, or
Hellenism as some put it, has affected, or maybe infected, Christian theology. Certainly,
Bloesch refers to his desire to “disengage biblical insights from the ontological categories of
Hellenism” – see D. G. Bloesch, God the Almighty, p. 14. See also C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved
Mover, p. 27.24
about a situation whereby many of the emphases in varying theologies of
Providence, which so often stand in disagreement with each other, are
understood dialectically in a form of theological tension. I will argue that the
adoption of such a theological posture necessarily leads to a form of binary
theological articulation. That is, it incorporates language of “both-and” rather
than “either-or.”
In advancing this thesis, I will not be advocating the adoption of a theology of
contradiction.
51 Indeed, my theological approach to consideration of
Providence, which finds its basis in consideration of God as triune, is one that
for want of better terms could be arguably described as a theology of paradox
or dialectical theology. If it is the former, paradox should be understood as “a
statement or proposition seemingly self-contradictory or absurd, and yet
explicable as expressing a truth.”
52 The key aspects of this definition are the
employment of the terms “seemingly” and “explicable” – for paradox only
“seems” contradictory at first glance but is “explicable” as expressing a truth.
Defined in this way, paradoxical statements are not contradictory – they are
reconcilable in the sense that they are capable of some explicability even in the
context of limited human capacity seeking to comprehend divinity. For
                                                
51 Boyd, a prominent Open theist, similarly seeks to avoid contradiction in theology. He
writes, “Scriptural revelation goes beyond reason, but I do not believe it ever goes against
reason. Scripture may lead us to accept paradoxes (such as the incarnation and the Trinity),
but it never requires that we accept contradictions, which are devoid of meaning” – G. Boyd,
Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy (Downers
Grove: IVP, 2001), p. 21. Henry, who holds a traditional view of Providence, is also
concerned that theology avoid contradiction. He writes, “The person who renounces the
importance of noncontradiction and logical consistency sponsors not only the suicide of
theology, but also the demotion of intellectual discrimination” – C. F. H. Henry, God,
Revelation and Authority: God Who Speaks and Shows Vol. I (Waco: Word, 1976), p. 233.
52 A. Delbridge (ed.), The Macquarie Dictionary (Sydney: The Macquarie Library, 2
nd ed.,
1985), p. 1236. McKim defines paradox as “a true statement that appears to be contradictory”
– D. K. McKim, Westminster Dictionary of Theological Terms, p. 200.25
example, to state that the triune God is both one and three in the same sense
would be contradictory. But the paradoxical mystery of God as triune is that he
is one in one sense (essence) and three in another sense (persons). God is
complex but not contradictory.
53
This draws us back again to the work of Weinandy that was discussed earlier –
that theological inquiry and discourse is the articulation and illumination of
that which is primarily a mystery. We are seeking articulation, illumination
and better understanding of this mystery (which is the possibility of theological
inquiry), while simultaneously recognizing that we will fall short of total
comprehension (which is the inherent limitation of theological inquiry). It can
be argued that the early church recognized this distinction clearly and hence
appeared more concerned to preserve (which includes providing clarity and
illumination of doctrine) than to resolve. As Jewett comments, “… the church
did not define the doctrine of the Trinity in order to resolve the mystery of the
divine nature but rather to preserve it.”
54 Consequently, if we likewise
recognise this distinction, we should not be surprised to discover that finite
human consideration of infinite divine reality will at some point reach a point
of exhaustion. Although human language is able to speak of divine reality, we
should also recognize its limitations. Jüngel points to this with his comment
that, “human speech as such is not suited to speak about God.”
55
Consequently, we should at least allow the possibility that our descriptions of
divine reality may involve the utilization of theological affirmations that
                                                
53 R. L. Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith (Nashville: Thomas
Nelson, 1998), p. 109.
54 P. K. Jewett, God, Creation and Revelation, p. 273.
55 E. Jüngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity: God’s Being is in Becoming (Edinburgh: Scottish
Academic Press, 1976), pp. 94-95.26
appear to be in tension with each other. But, alongside this, we must also
recognize that our own ability to comprehend such divine reality will be
exhausted because the object of our consideration is by definition ultimately
beyond human comprehension.
Alternatively, if the term dialectic is employed to describe this approach, it
should be identified as dialectic more characteristic of Kierkegaard than of
Hegel. The reason for this distinction is that the Hegelian dialectic of thesis-
antithesis-synthesis is primarily one of reason or logic – it is primarily about a
process rather than a person. By contrast, the dialectic characteristic of
Kierkegaard, and indeed of Barth and others, is primarily about a person rather
than a process.
56 It affirms a dialectical tension in the arena of faith in God –
that which appears opposite is, in a sense, “synthesized” in God as the supreme
subject.
57 But care needs to be taken here. I do not mean that theological
affirmations about God amalgamate into some form of higher synthesis, as is
the case in Hegel’s dialectic, but rather that the two poles remain, as it were, in
creative tension with each other. Theological affirmations about the triune
God, and consequently about how he acts in Providence, are given in tension
or balance – there is a mutuality, a reciprocity, between them. Each is affirmed
and distinguished from the other, yet each can only be understood fully in
relation to and in the context of the other – there is a complementarity between
them. In this vein, Weinandy comments, “To address the mysteries of faith as
true mysteries is to clarify why two or more seemingly incompatible truths are
                                                
56 For discussion of the dialectic of Hegel and Kierkegaard, see E. B. Koenker, Great
Dialecticians in Modern Christian Thought (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1971),
pp. 75-100.
57 H. R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology (The Fontana Library – Theology and
Philosophy; London: Collins, 1937), pp. 255ff.27
not incompatible, and why they actually complement one another.”
58 The
result, to use an expression coined by Cross, is a form of “epistemological
perichoresis.”
59 There is a mutual interpenetration and interrelationship,
simultaneous with a clear distinction, between theological affirmations. In the
words of Baxter, “It seems as if there is dialectic in God himself, in his way of
relating to the world, and therefore necessarily in our way of talking about
him.”
60
As stated earlier, I will argue that such a trinitarian perspective on divine
Providence is not only potentially helpful in elucidating the issues involved,
but also shows genuine promise in moving the debate forward. As such, much
of the discussion will be understandably with theologians and philosophers of
religion who hold Evangelical presuppositions, for that is where the
contemporary debate is primarily centred. Yet, this dissertation will also seek
to look further afield, particularly in relation to the doctrine of the Trinity, and
will interact with scholars not only across the theological presuppositional
spectrum but also across the main Christian traditions of Catholicism,
Orthodoxy and Protestantism. As Pinnock himself has stated, “A dialogue
needs to happen because each position has assets that the other can appropriate
and each can be stimulated by the other’s acumen.”
61
                                                
58 T. G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? p. 37.
59 T. L. Cross, Dialectic in Karl Barth’s Doctrine of God (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), p.
206.
60 C. A. Baxter, “Dialectical Theology,” in S. B. Ferguson and D. F. Wright (eds), New
Dictionary of Theology, p. 198.
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Finally, the worth, or otherwise, of a research dissertation is to a large extent
dependent upon the adoption of a methodology which is both appropriate to
the subject being researched and effective in fulfilling its stated intention. It is
to this question of method that we now turn.29
CHAPTER TWO
METHODOLOGY
The question of methodology in theological research continues to attract
scholarly debate. In particular, some are recognising that the “problem of
perspective,” though to an extent unavoidable, can give rise to a form of
intellectual myopia in which we tend to see the object of our studies from a
singular and perhaps increasingly stagnant perspective. Writing in the context
of the renewed dialogue between theological science and the natural sciences,
1
Padgett states,
All of our knowing arises from our location, our point of view and
our cultural context. Even the natural sciences are located in
culture, language and history. None of us has a God’s eye view, a
‘view from nowhere.’
2
Consequently, Padgett recommends an epistemological and methodological
approach in which other perspectives are utilised to help inform and illuminate
                                                
1 For example, some representative publications of this dialogue have included W. M.
Richardson and W. J. Wildman (eds), Religion and Science: History, Method, Dialogue (New
York: Routledge, 1996); M. C. Banner, The Justification of Science and the Rationality of
Religious Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); J. S. Wicken, “Theology and
Science in the Evolving Cosmos: A Need for Dialogue,” Zygon: Journal of Religion and
Science 23/1 (1988): 45-55; W. Van Huyssteen, “Experience and Explanation: The
Justification of Cognitive Claims in Theology,” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 23/3
(1988): 247-261; P. D. Miller, “Theology and Science in Conversation,” Theology Today 55/3
(1998): 301-304. Even Clark Pinnock, who features prominently in this dissertation, has
written indirectly on the matter in C. H. Pinnock, “Climbing Out of a Swamp: The Evangelical
Struggle To Understand the Creation Texts,” Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology
43/2 (1989): 143-155. A notable recent contribution has been from McGrath who seeks to
advance the scholarly dialogue by developing the agenda originally set by T. F. Torrance in
Theological Science (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) – see A. E. McGrath, The
Foundations of Dialogue in Science and Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 34. Since
then, McGrath has produced a three-volume set – A. E. McGrath, Nature (A Scientific
Theology, Vol. 1; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001); Reality (A Scientific Theology, Vol. 2;
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002); and Theory (A Scientific Theology, Vol. 3; Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2003).
2 A. G. Padgett, “Dialectical Realism in Theology and Science,” Perspectives on Science and
Christian Faith 54/3 (2002): 184-185.30
the particular subject under discussion. In relation to the theological
science/natural science dialogue, he calls this approach “dialectical realism”
and argues that any approach that hopes to grasp the object of our studies
should make use of “contrasting, alternative points of view on that object.”
3
In a similar way, I am seeking to utilise the perspective of trinitarian theology
to illuminate the primary object of our discussion – the doctrine of Providence.
Whilst seeking continually to measure theological constructions of Providence
and Trinity against the witness of scripture,
4 I am seeking to interact with
contemporary debate on divine Providence with a view to understanding how
and as far as possible why certain conclusions are being reached; to evaluate
these conclusions in the light of contemporary scholarship; to investigate the
extent to which the perspective of trinitarian theology may be helpful in
resolving some of the dilemmas; and to think creatively about how our
understanding of Providence can consequently be advanced or illuminated. To
that end, the methodology adopted by this dissertation may be described as a
critical interaction with and evaluation of the theological and biblical bases for
varying understandings of divine Providence from the perspective of the
divine triunity. In other words, the level of coherence and persuasiveness of
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Christian Faith: 185.
4 By this it is simply meant that an intention of our research will be to look again at the
diversity of the biblical witness in relation to Providence and Trinity and ask again the
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debate on Providence is occurring within Evangelical circles and adherence to biblical
authority is a presupposition of Evangelicalism. For example, “Evangelical Theology – a
transdenominational movement … that stresses the need for a personal relationship with Jesus
Christ and the proclamation of the gospel … It is variously defined, emphasizing biblical
authority and Jesus as Saviour” – see D. K. McKim, Westminster Dictionary of Theological
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arguments being posited in the debate on Providence are evaluated and
theological concepts drawn from trinitarian theology are brought into the
debate for the purpose of both its clarification and advancement.
This methodological approach receives structure in the following way. Chapter
One above, which is the first half of Part One, broadly defines the focus of this
dissertation and comment is made concerning the contemporary resurgence of
issues of both trinitarian and providential theology. The theological debate
concerning the perspective known as Open Theism is introduced as a helpful
context in which many of the issues of Providence can be addressed. This
gives the grounding for an introductory statement and brief explanation of the
fundamental thesis of this dissertation. Explanation for the appropriateness of
utilising different perspectives, in particular trinitarian perspectives, on
Providence is discussed in this present chapter. As Padgett has stated, “The
key to dialectics is the notion that important insights can be gained from
contrasting perspectives.”
5
The remainder of the dissertation is divided into four parts. Part Two is
entitled “Tensions in Theology” and seeks to introduce a trinitarian
perspective on divine Providence. As the fundamental focus of this dissertation
is the doctrine of Providence, any critical evaluation necessitates the awareness
of contemporary scholarship on this subject and so the first half of Part Two,
Chapter Three, provides a critical survey of various theological formulations
on divine Providence, particularly with reference to the Open Theism
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proposal. It will largely be in the context of this proposal that the varying
emphases that are a part of consideration of divine Providence will be
identified. Attention will be paid to those distinctive emphases or issues that
often differentiate theological understandings of Providence – for example,
those between deterministic and non-deterministic models. In particular, those
issues which have some form of correlation with trinitarian theology, or that
show potential in being considered from a trinitarian perspective, are
identified.
The second half of Part Two, or Chapter Four, is similar in both approach and
intention to the third chapter, but it shifts from consideration of Providence
and focuses upon varying theological formulations of the doctrine of the
Trinity. In a similar way, it provides a survey of varying formulations and also
seeks to identify those distinctive emphases that may have some correlation
with varying theologies of Providence. Although these trinitarian formulations
are drawn from a wide range of sources – both ancient and modern and from
across the theological presuppositional spectrum – they focus particularly upon
three contemporary formulations that derive from the three great Christian
traditions. Hence, our interaction is primarily with Zizioulas (Orthodox),
LaCugna (Catholic) and Fiddes (Protestant). Consequently, Part Two serves to
lay the foundation for what follows in that it articulates the distinctive issues in
theologies of Providence, particularly with reference to the Open Theism
debate, and identifies “points of contact” with issues or emphases in trinitarian
theology.33
Parts Three and Four are reflective of my conviction, commented on in
Chapter One, that theology as its best is fully integrated. We seek an integrated
whole – a sense of consistency and mutuality between what is thought and
what is lived. Consequently, Parts Three and Four present two major strands in
our investigation of what at this stage can be called trinitarian Providence. The
former is concerned more with the articulation of a trinitarian perspective on
Providence, the latter with the application of such a perspective in Christian
living. Consequently, the three chapters that make up Part Three address
themselves to the distinctively theological implications of trinitarian
Providence and these receive elucidation under the title “Tensions in
Thinking.” Chapter Five articulates a trinitarian perspective on divine
Providence by addressing the nature of divine transcendence. Chapter Six
addresses the nature of divine sovereignty and Chapter Seven addresses the
combined issues of divine immutability and divine impassibility. The intention
here is to demonstrate how a trinitarian perspective on divine Providence
illuminates and interprets this doctrine’s differing theological emphases.
The application of a trinitarian perspective on Providence is the particular
focus of Part Four of this dissertation. As such, it addresses itself to the
distinctively pastoral implications of trinitarian Providence and these receive
elucidation under the title “Tensions in Living.” Chapter Eight, which forms
the entirety of Part Four, focuses upon how this perspective informs the
Christian life in the particular area of prayer. The final chapter, Chapter Nine,
forms Part Five of this dissertation and draws it to a close. Entitled
“Concluding Reflections,” it provides a conclusion for our research through34
primarily providing a recapitulation of our critical interaction with and
evaluation of various theological formulations and the ways in which
consideration of God as triune provides both conceptual and practical
assistance in consideration of divine Providence. Furthermore, comment is
also made concerning possible avenues for further research into trinitarian
perspectives on issues connected with Providence.PART TWO
Tensions in Theology
Advancing a Trinitarian Perspective
on Divine Providence36
CHAPTER THREE
THE PROVIDING GOD
In the first chapter above, I introduced and described in broad strokes the
general subject and the fundamental thesis of this dissertation. This thesis is
that the adoption of a trinitarian perspective on Providence provides a
conceptual paradigm whereby varying theological emphases are understood in
a form of creative tension or balance, with each being correctly understood
only in the context the other provides. The second chapter above discussed
various aspects of the particular methodological approach thought most
appropriate to provide the framework for our investigation. I found this to be
the utilisation of differing perspectives, in this case particularly a trinitarian
perspective, as a means of illuminating the issues and advancing our
understanding of Providence. In this present chapter, I begin the task of
presenting the evidence and arguing the case in support of the above thesis.
To do this, this chapter seeks to lay a foundation by achieving three particular
aims. Firstly, I address the concept of Providence itself and how the Christian
church has traditionally expressed its understanding of this doctrine. This is
done by surveying doctrinal statements on Providence that have been
advanced by differing individual theologians and by investigating creedal
statements that have emanated from Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant
communities of the Christian church. My intention here is to gain a sense of
those understandings of Providence that are largely or generally shared across37
Christian traditions. This is an important step in the construction of my
argument for it provides us with a level foundation, as it were, and enables us
to move toward identifying and addressing those aspects or emphases in
theologies of Providence about which there is perhaps less agreement.
The second aim of this present chapter is to address directly some of those
aspects of disagreement by providing a survey of the contemporary debate
over Providence that has been occasioned by the Open Theism proposal. As
mentioned earlier, this proposal has strikingly provoked a reaction, particularly
within Evangelicalism, and the nature, volatility and contemporaneousness of
this debate means that is a helpful vehicle for my research.
1 In particular, it
provides an important step in the construction of my argument by bringing into
clearer focus the nature of many of the issues of Providence – particularly
those that divide understandings.
The third and final aim of this present chapter is to provide an excursus
focussing upon the centrality of God and the necessity of faith. This excursus
provides an important link between this present chapter and the one to follow
for I will contend that how one understands God within himself is central,
even prescriptive, in how one understands his providential relationship with
his creation. Consequently, this will lead to the contention that how one
understands God as specifically triune is central, even prescriptive, in how one
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understands his providential relationship with his creation. Questions that may
point to the heart of the matter might include: if one’s theology emphasises the
one at the expense of the three are we left with a type of divine monad, and
what implications does this have for our understanding of the divine/human
relationship in Providence? Similarly, what implications are there if one’s
theology of Trinity emphasises the three at the expense of the one?
Furthermore, what implications for our understanding of Providence are there
in how one perceives the intra-trinitarian relations – is there both ontological
and economic mutuality and equality between the divine persons or is there
some form of economic superordination and subordination? Questions such as
these are dealt with more specifically in Part Three, but the foundation for
asking them is partially laid in this present chapter.
But, first, we must bring the focus of our research more clearly into view and
address ourselves to the concept of Providence itself and how it has been
generally understood within the Christian church and it is to this subject that
we now turn.
THE CONCEPT OF PROVIDENCE
The word “Providence” is drawn from the Latin providere and means
etymologically, “to foresee.” Yet, the doctrine of divine Providence goes far
beyond the concept of a mere pre-vision of what is to come. Although the idea
of foresight has traditionally been an integral part of the doctrine, it also
includes a sense of providing for or planning for a need or result that is39
envisaged.
2  In this way, then, pre-vision has developed into pro-vision.
3 In the
context of divine Providence, this provision has been traditionally understood
in an extensive and comprehensive sense. That is, there is a divine provision
for all things, a divine foresight of all things and a divine overruling of all
things – God’s provision includes not only the divine envisaging of what is to
come but also the divine direction of all that is to come.
4 The
comprehensiveness of Providence means that God’s attention is concentrated
everywhere and for all time – his care is microscopic as well as telescopic.
5
Such is the all-encompassing nature of the traditional understanding of divine
Providence that it is somewhat surprising to discover the scarcity of the
appearance of the actual word in scripture. Helm, in his introduction to his
volume on Providence, comments, “After all, the word ‘providence’ does not
appear in scripture … any more than does the word ‘Trinity.’”
6 Strictly
                                                   
2 Bavinck comments, “The word providence means that God supplies the world with what it
needs” – H. Bavinck, Our Reasonable Faith: A Survey of Christian Doctrine (Grand Rapids:
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3 G. W. Bromiley, “Providence,” in G. W. Bromiley (ed.), International Standard Bible
Encyclopedia Vol. 3 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), p. 1020. Some theologians have noted
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meanings of both – see, for example, A. H. Strong, Systematic Theology (Philadelphia: Judson
Press, 1907), p. 419.
4 We will leave for the moment the question as to whether God’s “direction” of all things
should be understood as a “primary or first cause” only, or whether “second causes” are part of
the equation. For example, the Westminster Confession draws just such a distinction within
God’s overall direction of all things – “Although in relation to the foreknowledge and decree
of God, the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet by the same
providence he ordereth them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes, either
necessarily, freely or contingently” – “The Westminster Confession of Faith” in P. Schaff
(ed.), The Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant Churches (The Creeds of Christendom with a
History and Critical Notes, Vol. III; New York: Harper and Brothers, 1877), p. 612 (Chapter
V.II).
5 A. H. Strong, Systematic Theology, p. 420.
6 P. Helm, The Providence of God (Contours of Christian Theology; Downers Grove: IVP,
1993), p. 16. Concerning the non-appearance of “Trinity,” Humphreys comments, “Let us
begin with a frank confession: the New Testament does not teach the doctrine of the Trinity …
the Bible testifies to the facts for which the doctrine of the Trinity attempts to give an account”40
speaking, though, the word “providence” does appear in some English
translations of the scriptures, but not in any consistent way. It would seem that
the appearance or non-appearance of the word depends largely upon the
textual critical judgements of the translators and these judgements vary from
translation to translation. For example, it does appear in the NIV and KJV but
in different locations – being Job 10:12
7 and Acts 24:2
8 respectively. The
former uses it to translate hD;düqVÚp which can carry the meanings of “oversight,
visitation”
9 and the latter uses it to translate pro/noia which can carry the
meanings of “to give attention beforehand, to have in mind to do, foresight.”
10
What is interesting is that the noun pro/noia, and its cognate verb pronoe÷w
(which occurs in Romans 12:17; 2 Corinthians 8:21 and 1 Timothy 5:8), occur
only in the context of human providence rather than divine Providence.
Two things result from this situation. Firstly, we note that the near absence of
the explicit terminology does not in itself immediately negate the existence of
the implicit reality. In other words, the scarcity of the word’s occurrence
simply alerts us to the possibility that the concept of Providence is one that is
implicit in scripture rather than explicit. Indeed, Providence as a doctrine is not
derived primarily from a particular word or word group, but rather is drawn
                                                                                                                                         
– F. Humphreys, Thinking About God: An Introduction to Christian Theology (New Orleans:
Insight Press, 1977), pp. 220-221.
7 Job 10:12 (NIV) – “You gave me life and showed me kindness, and in your providence
watched over my spirit.”
8 Acts 24:2 (KJV) – “And when he was called forth, Tertullus began to accuse him, saying,
‘Seeing that by thee we enjoy great quietness, and that very worthy deeds are done unto this
nation by thy providence.’”
9 F. Brown, S. R. Driver and C. A. Briggs, A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old
Testament (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) in Gramcord Accordance 5.7c [CD-
ROM] (Washington: The Gramcord Institute, 2003).
10 J. P. Louw and E. A. Nida, Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic
Domains (New York: United Bible Society, 2
nd ed., 1989), in Gramcord Accordance 5.7c
[CD-ROM] (Washington: The Gramcord Institute, 2003).41
from the context, ideas and overall meaning of passages.
11 Secondly, the
implicit nature of biblical evidence for Providence means that our study is able
to avoid the pitfalls of an over-reliance upon etymological word studies in
theological development. Such over-reliance has sometimes led, particularly in
the Biblical Theology movement, to convoluted theological conclusions.
12 It
was Barr, in particular, who pointed out the misleading nature of this type of
approach and how it can lead to some at times comically absurd conclusions.
13
Consequently, then, we can say that the doctrine of Providence is in a sense
drawn from scripture in general rather than scripture in particular. It is often a
doctrine that is perceived in the background of what the scripture is portraying
rather than the foreground. On occasion, a facet of Providence is indeed
brought to the fore in an explicit way – for example, “In him we were also
chosen, having been predestined according to the plan of him who works out
everything in conformity with the purpose of his will” (Ephesians 1:11 NIV).
However, more often than not it continues as an implied, necessary backdrop
to the entire biblical storyline. Cottrell summarises the situation in these
words,
What this means is that the idea of providence is not really derived
from any particular Biblical terminology. It is rather a doctrine or a
concept that appears on nearly every page of Scripture, to which
the term providence has been appropriately attached. Our
                                                   
11 For a very helpful summary of the biblical material, see J. Cottrell, God the Ruler (What the
Bible Says series; Joplin, USA: College Press Publishing Company, 1984), pp. 90-101, 117-
159.
12 A particular example of this was J. A.T. Robinson’s noting of the Pauline usage of two
Greek words sa»rx (flesh) and sw◊ma¿ (body), as against the Old Testament’s need for only
one Hebrew word rDcD;b (flesh). He concluded from this that sa»rx and sw◊ma are, in Pauline
thought, synonymous and representative of a common Hebrew original. Put another way,
Paul’s anthropology is fundamentally “Hebraic” rather than “Greek” – J. A. T. Robinson, The
Body (London: SCM, 1952), p. 12f.
13 J. Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp.
35-37.42
understanding of providence comes from a thorough study of the
teaching of Scripture as a whole, and not from the way a few words
are used.
14
Shared Understandings Concerning the Doctrine of Providence
Certainly, as the Christian church has studied those scriptures over the
centuries it is noteworthy the extent to which it has reached common
agreement over its understanding of Providence. For example, the definitions
of Providence advanced by different theologians and communities of the
Christian church, although somewhat different in choice of specific
expressions or words, are largely consistent in relation to the fundamental
content or idea of the doctrine.
15 That is, there are elements of belief that
usually come within the purview of the doctrine of Providence that are
fundamentally shared between Christian traditions. This in no way ignores the
significant differences which have existed and do exist between Christians
concerning their understandings of Providence, but there does appear to be a
sense of a core of shared belief. In much the same way that Vincent of Lérins,
writing in the fifth century (probably 434CE), stated that, “Moreover, in the
Catholic Church itself, all possible care must be taken, that we hold that faith
which has been believed everywhere, always, by all,”
16 so also is there a core
                                                   
14 J. Cottrell, God the Ruler, p. 10.
15 J. Cottrell, God the Ruler, p. 11.
16 Vincent of Lérins, “A Commonitory,” in P. Schaff and H. Wace (eds), A Select Library of
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church Series II, Vol. XI (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1955), p. 132 (Chapter II.6). It is interesting to note that Vincent further states that
such adherence to orthodoxy occurs through recognition of the preeminent authority of
scripture, followed by the traditions of the church. He writes, “That whether I or any one else
should wish to detect the frauds and avoid the snares of heretics as they rise, and to continue
sound and complete in the Catholic faith, we must, the Lord helping, fortify our own belief in
two ways; first, by the authority of the Divine Law, and then, by the Tradition of the Catholic
Church” – see p. 132 (Chapter II.4).43
of understanding concerning Providence that is largely shared across
traditions.
This core of understanding can be seen as we compare a number of theological
statements about Providence. Bloesch writes that Providence refers to the “…
mysterious interplay of divine action and human reaction that brings the divine
plan to fruition.”
17 Oden enlarges upon this by stating that, “Providence is the
expression of the divine will, power, and goodness through which the Creator
preserves creatures, cooperates with what is coming to pass through their
actions, and guides creatures in their long-range purposes.”
18 Erickson states
that, “By providence we mean the continuing action of God by which he
preserves in existence the creation which he has brought into being, and guides
it to his intended purposes for it.”
19 Leith places an emphasis upon the
personal nature of the God of Providence when he writes, “The doctrine of
providence is the conviction that God is personal and that God is personally
active in all his creation, in nature and in history, preserving, sustaining, and
governing the created order.”
20 Barth writes of Providence as the dealings of
God with his creation as he “… maintains and governs in time this distinct
reality according to the counsel of His own will.”
21 Niermann sees Providence
with a salvific dimension and describes it as “…God’s relationship to the
world as he knows, wills and executes his plan of universal salvation and leads
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18 T. C. Oden, The Living God (Systematic Theology, Vol. 1; San Francisco: Harper San
Francisco, 1987), p. 270.
19 M. Erickson, Christian Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985), p. 387.
20 J. H. Leith, Basic Christian Doctrine (Louisville, USA: Westminster/John Knox Press,
1993), p. 81.
21 K. Barth, Church Dogmatics Vol. III/3 (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1969), p. 3.44
the world to the end decreed by him.”
22 In a similar vein, Brunner places
human history alongside Heilsgeschichte
23 and states that Providence is “…
that present activity of God in the world, which is only indirectly, not directly,
related to the redemption of the world.”
24 Lewis has a similar salvific emphasis
when he comments that Providence is God’s “sustaining power, keeping our
world in being, making human history possible, guaranteeing a future in spite
of our past … [and] his rule, his government, his ordering of events toward a
final victory of good over evil, grace over sin, salvation over our universal fall
and condemnation.”
25
Across these varying theologians we see a fairly consistent understanding of
the core of what is meant by Providence. Although there is difference in
language utilised, there is still a clear sense that Providence involves God’s
upholding of the created order, his working with and/or over his creatures and
his guidance of history toward a consummation. For example, the two
following definitions, one Protestant and the other Catholic, display general
agreement concerning the centrality of God as the divine provider; the
enmeshment of God’s care and direction with human agency and the presence
of a divine plan, goal or purpose. Bromiley, a Protestant, sees Providence as
                                                   
22 Although his language is suggestive, it should be noted that Niermann is not advocating
Universalism. By “universal salvation” he is referring to the availability of salvation and the
explicit desire of God that all be saved (e.g. 1 Timothy 2:1-6) – E. Niermann, “Providence,” in
K. Rahner (ed.), Encyclopedia of Theology: A Concise Sacramentum Mundi (London: Burns
& Oates, 1975), p. 1313. For an explanation of “universal salvific will,” see Rahner’s article in
the same volume – K. Rahner, “Salvation: Universal Salvific Will,” in K. Rahner (ed.),
Encyclopedia of Theology: A Concise Sacramentum Mundi, pp. 1499-1504.
23 Heilsgeschichte (or “holy history”) understood as “a term used by some biblical scholars to
mark the history of Israel and the subsequent Christian church as God’s ‘salvation history’
being worked out as God’s plan in the midst of human history as a whole” – D. K. McKim,
Westminster Dictionary of Theological Terms, p. 126.
24 E. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption (Dogmatics, Vol. II;
London: Lutterworth Press, 1952), p. 148.
25 P. Lewis, The Message of the Living God (The Bible Speaks Today [Bible Themes] series;
Leicester: IVP, 2000), p. 295.45
the “…preservation, superintendence, and teleological direction of all things
by God. It is the divine governance whereby all possible events are woven into
a coherent pattern and all possible developments are shaped to accomplish the
divinely instituted goal.”
26 Wright, a Catholic, sees it as “… the divine care of
the world, God’s guidance of history and human affairs toward the
achievement of his purpose.”
 27
When we turn to creedal and confessional statements on the doctrine of
Providence, we note a similar sense of unity within diversity – that is, there is
a core of understanding largely shared across Catholic, Orthodox and
Protestant communities of the Christian church. Although each of these
traditions differ somewhat in the authority ascribed to confessions or creeds,
28
these statements of belief nevertheless give insights into what is and what is
not shared understanding in relation to the doctrine of Providence. Some of
these confessional statements address themselves directly to the doctrine of
Providence, others indirectly. This is understandable for all of them are
historically situated and thereby sensitive to the particular theological climate
                                                   
26 G. W. Bromiley, “Providence,” in G. W. Bromiley (ed.), The International Standard Bible
Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, Vol. 3, 1986), p. 1020.
27 J. H. Wright, “Providence,” in J. A. Komonchak, M. Collins and D. A. Lane, The New
Dictionary of Theology (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1987), p. 815.
28 Schaff comments that Protestantism has traditionally given confessions a relative and
limited position. That is, they are not co-ordinate with, but subordinate to, the Bible. Roman
Catholicism and Orthodoxy have traditionally posited the Bible and tradition as two co-
ordinate sources of truth and have thereby given much authority to confessions of faith. They
differ in that Orthodoxy accepts the first seven ecumenical councils – from Nicaea I (325) to
Nicaea II (787) – as authoritative whereas Catholicism extends this through various councils to
Trent (1545-1563), and now to Vatican I (1869-1870) and Vatican II (1962-1965), as well as
the ex cathedra papal decisions on questions of faith and morals – see P. Schaff (ed.), The
History of Creeds (The Creeds of Christendom with a History and Critical Notes, Vol. 1; New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1877), pp. 7-8 and G. L. Bray, “Councils,” in S. B. Ferguson and
D. F. Wright (eds), New Dictionary of Theology (Leicester: IVP, 1988), pp. 169-173.46
of the time,
29 yet in spite of this they still make some helpful and
representative statements.
Three examples, one from each faith community, may suffice at this stage to
give us an initial indication of this shared understanding. Among the Dogmatic
Decrees of the Vatican Council (1870CE), or Vatican I, the following assertion
is made, “God protects and governs by his providence all things which he hath
made, ‘reaching from end to end mightily, and ordering all things sweetly.’
30
For ‘all things are bare and open to his eyes,’
31 even those which are yet to be
by the free action of creatures.”
32 From the Orthodox community of the
Christian church, we find the following question and answer in the Longer
Catechism of the Eastern Church:
What is divine providence? Divine providence is the constant
energy of the almighty power, wisdom, and goodness of God, by
which he preserves the being and faculties of his creatures, directs
them to good ends, and assists all that is good; but the evil that
springs from departure from good he either cuts off, or corrects it,
and turns it to good results.
33
Among the Protestant confessions we find the Westminster Confession of
Faith presenting us with a carefully worded, explicit and all-encompassing
statement. It reads,
                                                   
29 For example, no explicit statement is made in the Canons and Decrees of the Council of
Trent, for its focus was more upon those areas of concern for the Catholic Reformation –
particularly scripture and tradition, original sin, justification and the sacraments – “The
Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Greek and
Latin Churches (The Creeds of Christendom with a History and Critical Notes, Vol. II; New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1877), pp. 77-206.
30 Wisdom 8:1.
31 Hebrews 4:13.
32 “Dogmatic Decrees of the Vatican Council,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Greek and
Latin Churches, pp. 239-240 (Chapter I).
33 “The Longer Catechism of the Eastern Church,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Greek
and Latin Churches, p. 465 (Question 127). It goes on to delineate between what it describes
as general and special providence. The distinction between them is that the former pertains to
God’s providential care over the creatures and the latter over humanity. The biblical
foundation for general providence is drawn from the Sermon on the Mount, particularly
Matthew 6:26, and for special providence from the entire contents of Psalm 91 (Question 128).47
God, the great Creator of all things, doth uphold, direct, dispose,
and govern all creatures, actions, and things, from the greatest
even to the least, by his most wise and holy providence, according
to his infallible foreknowledge and the free and immutable counsel
of his own will, to the praise of the glory of his wisdom, power,
justice, goodness, and mercy.
34
I am simply seeking to make the point that, despite differences in
understandings of various issues within the doctrine of Providence (which are
investigated more thoroughly shortly and which become the major focus of
this dissertation), there is nevertheless a core of shared understanding that is
found across the spectrum of Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Protestantism.
Providence is consistently perceived as the upholding and direction of all
things by God.
Articulating Agreement Concerning the Doctrine of Providence
By consulting a broader range of confessional and doctrinal statements, it is
possible to articulate more specifically this core of understanding by stating it
in negative and positive ways – that is, by identifying that which it stands
against and that which it affirms. In respect of the former we note, firstly, that
the doctrine of Providence as generally expressed stands against any emphasis
upon divine transcendence that would lead to a deistic understanding of the
God/world relationship. In other words, there is usually an assumption that an
                                                   
34 “The Westminster Confession of Faith, 1647,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the
Evangelical Protestant Churches, p. 612 (Chapter V.I). The Westminster Shorter Catechism’s
questions 7, 8 and 11 are further instructive – “Question 7: What are the decrees of God?
Answer: The decrees of God are his eternal purpose according to the counsel of his will,
whereby, for his own glory, he hath fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass. Question 8: How
doth God execute his decrees? Answer: God executeth his decrees in the works of creation and
providence … Question: 11: What are God’s works of providence? Answer: God’s works of
Providence are his most holy, wise, and powerful preserving and governing all his creatures,
and all their actions” - “The Westminster Shorter Catechism,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of
the Evangelical Protestant Churches, pp. 677-678 (Questions 7, 8 and 11).48
ongoing relationship exists between Creator and created – that is, that God
continues to be involved actively with his creation. On occasion, this
assumption is made explicit. For example, the Second Helvetic Confession
states, “We therefore condemn the Epicureans, who deny the providence of
God, and all those who blasphemously affirm that God is occupied about the
poles of heaven, and that he neither sees nor regards us or our affairs.”
35
But, secondly, this core of shared belief or understanding concerning divine
Providence is likewise set against an over-emphasis in the opposite direction.
That is, it opposes a perspective which would over-emphasise divine
immanence to the extent of embracing a pantheistic understanding of the
God/world relationship. In relation to this, it is interesting to note that one
confessional statement from Catholicism identifies pantheistic views of
Providence as errors that ought to be stigmatised.
36 In “The Papal Syllabus of
Errors” (1864) we find the following description of this error – that, “There
exists no supreme, most wise, and most provident divine being distinct from
the universe, and God is none other than nature, and is therefore subject to
change.”
37 In other words, a distinction is drawn between God and the
creation.
                                                   
35 “The Second Helvetic Confession, 1566,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Evangelical
Protestant Churches, p. 840 (Chapter VI).
36 It states in its preamble, “The Syllabus of the principal errors of our time, which are
stigmatized in the Consistorial Allocutions, Encyclicals, and other Apostolical Letters of our
Most Holy Lord, Pope Pius IX” – see “The Papal Syllabus of Errors,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The
Creeds of the Greek and Latin Churches, p. 213.
37 “The Papal Syllabus of Errors,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Greek and Latin
Churches, p. 213 (I.1).49
Thirdly, this core of shared understanding concerning Providence stands
against a fatalistic understanding of the God/world relationship.
38 That is,
alongside statements concerning the governing or over-ruling of all things by
God there stand statements likewise emphasising the actions of humanity who
are held responsible for such actions. For example, again from the Second
Helvetic Confession, we find the following statement,
Wherefore we dislike the rash speeches of such as say that if all
things are governed by the providence of God, then all our studies
and endeavours are unprofitable; it shall be sufficient if we leave or
permit all things to be governed by the providence of God; and we
shall not need hereafter to behave or act with carefulness in any
matter.
39
In other words, divine Providence involves an enmeshment or
interrelationship, as it were, of both divine and human aspects.
40 The presence
of a God who overrules history and reality does not in itself induce a type of
human passivity. Humanity is still seen to be, in some sense, free and
responsible and, in some sense, standing alongside the divine Provider.
Although we recognise that this raises large issues, some of which will be
examined in Part Three, it is sufficient at this point to simply note that any
conception which disallows the efficacy of a human dimension, as Fatalism
does, stands in contrast to this core of shared belief concerning Providence. As
                                                   
38 By Fatalism is meant, “The philosophical view that events occur as the outworking of an
impersonal force and that these events cannot be changed by human decisions or actions” –
see D. K. McKim, Westminster Dictionary of Theological Terms, p. 102.
39 “The Second Helvetic Confession,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Evangelical
Protestant Churches, p. 840 (Chapter VI). It goes on to argue from Scriptural examples –
specifically, Paul and the shipwreck in Acts 27 and the teaching in James 4:13-15 – that
fatalism is ruled out.
40 The existence of a divine sovereignty/human responsibility tension in scripture is the
fundamental thesis of Carson – see D. A. Carson, Divine Sovereignty and Human
Responsibility: Biblical Perspectives in Tension (Marshalls Theological Library; London:
Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1981).50
Weber has categorically stated, “… in the encounter with the living God, every
possibility of believing in fate is destroyed.”
41
Having identified Deism, Pantheism and Fatalism as perspectives which are
incompatible with the church’s general understanding of divine Providence,
we now turn to those aspects of Providence that appear to be affirmed. Firstly,
we note that the universality of divine Providence is emphasised – the scope of
Providence is understood as encompassing all things. Every aspect of life and
of reality falls under the providential care of the Creator.
42 We may recall the
words of the Westminster Confession noted earlier,
God, the great Creator of all things, doth uphold, direct, dispose,
and govern all creatures, actions, and things, from the greatest
even to the least, by his most wise and holy providence.
43
This wideness in God’s Providence appears as a consistent theme and thereby
stands against any form of anthropocentricity in our understanding of
Providence.
44 Consistently we read expressions such as “all things” in the
context of God’s providential oversight,
45 and these include things that are
both good and evil;
46 human, animal and vegetable life;
47 things in heaven and
                                                   
41 O. Weber, Foundations of Dogmatics Vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981), p. 510.
42 Outler argues that the all-inclusive understanding of Providence was one motive for the
development of the doctrine of the Trinity against the reductionism evident in Marcionism and
Arianism – A. C. Outler, Who Trusts in God: Musings on the Meaning of Providence (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 33.
43 “The Westminster Confession of Faith, 1647,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the
Evangelical Protestant Churches, p. 612 (Chapter V.I).
44 The central issue that Page addresses in her book is the effect of anthropocentricity upon the
doctrine of Creation and, by implication, the related doctrine of Providence – R. Page, God
and the Web of Creation (London: SCM, 1996). See also the textual comments on Romans
8:18-25 on the inclusion of creation in God’s salvific intentions – E. F. Harrison, “Romans,” in
F. E. Gaebelein (ed.), The Expositor’s Bible Commentary Vol. 10 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan,
1976), pp. 93-95.
45 For example, “Dogmatic Decrees of the Vatican Council,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of
the Greek and Latin Churches, pp. 239 (Chapter I).
46 “The Longer Catechism of the Eastern Church,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Greek
and Latin Churches, p. 465 (Question 127).51
things on earth;
48 and things visible or invisible.
49 Indeed, the Heidelberg
Catechism is careful to enunciate that it is by the “Almighty and everywhere
present power of God”
50 that he sustains all things.
Secondly, we are able to detect an emphasis upon what might be called the
continuity of divine Providence. Indeed, the universality of God’s Providence
implies a dimension of continuity. That is, God does not enter into the world in
spasmodic or intermittent activity, but continually sustains, preserves, guides
and governs the cosmos. Certainly, provision is made for special or
extraordinary providences, but these are seen as part of the backdrop of a
general, constant or ordinary providence.
51 For example, the Longer
Catechism of the Eastern Church notes that it is “the constant energy” of God
that preserves and directs.
52 The exact method by which this “constant energy”
is displayed is often explained in terms of the demonstration of God’s
attributes. For example, there are references to “almighty power, wisdom and
                                                                                                                                         
47 “The Heidelberg Catechism,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant
Churches, p. 316 (Question 27).
48 “The Second Helvetic Confession, 1566,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Evangelical
Protestant Churches, pp. 840-841 (Chapter VI).
49 J. N. W. B. Robertson, Acts and Decrees of the Synod of Jerusalem (London: Thomas
Baker, 1899) [http://www.catholicity.elcove.net/ConfessionofDositheus.html; accessed 12
th
November, 2002].
50 “The Heidelberg Catechism,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant
Churches, p. 316 (Question 27 – italics mine).
51 The category of miracle is that which is often subsumed under the rubric of extraordinary or
special Providence. By this it is meant that God is, in a sense, able to “inject” special or
extraordinary operations of his power into the ordinary web of cause and effect relations. For a
recent treatment of “miracle” in the context of Providence – see C. J. Collins, The God of
Miracles: An Exegetical Examination of God’s Action in the World (Leicester: Apollos, 2001).
Collins has also investigated the concept of miracle, or what he calls “design imposed” action,
in the context of natural scientific research into “intelligent design” – see C. J. Collins,
“Miracles, Intelligent Design, and God-of-the-Gaps,” Perspectives on Science and Christian
Faith 55/1 (2003): 22-29.
52 “The Longer Catechism of the Eastern Church,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Greek
and Latin Churches, p. 465 (Question 127).52
goodness”
53 and “wisdom, power, justice, goodness and mercy”
54 – as well as
other references including concepts such as foreknowledge, omnipresence,
omnipotence and the divine will. In other words, the continuity of Providence
is consistently described in terms that emphasise the centrality of God and the
public demonstration of his attributes – because God is constant both in who
he is and what he is like, so also is his activity toward his creation. This is
significant for our research for it draws a clear correlation between
conceptions of the nature of God with conceptions of the nature of Providence.
A third aspect of this doctrine that appears to be generally affirmed is that
which can be called the dimensionality of divine Providence. That is,
Providence is expressed as having essentially two dimensions in which God
acts. Both dimensions are often placed in juxtaposition with each other,
although the exact terminology varies. For example, we read that God
“protects and governs,”
55 “preserves … [and] directs,”
56 “doth uphold, direct,
dispose, and govern,”
57 and that he exercises a “providential care and
superintendence … and governs the world.”
58 Alongside these we find
concepts such as ordering, assisting, turning, correcting, permitting and over-
ruling. Stated in this way, we are able to discern these two dimensions of
Providence – one is concerned with the sustenance of all that exists and the
                                                   
53 “”The Longer Catechism of the Eastern Church,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Greek
and Latin Churches, p. 465 (Question 127).
54 “The Westminster Confession of Faith,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Evangelical
Protestant Churches, p. 612 (Chapter V.I).
55 “Dogmatic Decrees of the Vatican Council,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Greek and
Latin Churches, p. 239 (Chapter I).
56 “The Longer Catechism of the Eastern Church,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Greek
and Latin Churches, p. 465 (Question 127).
57 “The Westminster Confession of Faith,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Evangelical
Protestant Churches, p. 612 (Chapter V.I).
58 “The Confession of the Free-Will Baptists, 1834, 1868,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of
the Evangelical Protestant Churches, p. 749 (Chapter III).53
other with the direction of all that exists. The former utilises the language of
“preservation” – sustains, assists, upholds, protects – whereas the latter utilises
the language of “government” – directs, disposes, superintends, over-rules,
permits, turns, corrects, guides.
Consequently, theologians often divide consideration of Providence into these
two dimensions of preservation and government, but this is by no means
consistent. For example, Strong draws a distinction between what he terms
“preservation” and “providence” and writes, “As Creation explains the
existence of the universe, and as Preservation explains its continuance, so
Providence explains its evolution and progress.”
59 Chafer follows Strong and
writes, “God is revealed in providence as the sovereign One who, that his
eternal purposes may be revealed, moulds all events both moral and physical.
While preservation continues the existence of things, providence directs their
progress. It extends to all the works of God.”
60 Although both concepts are
present, both Strong and Chafer limit the term “Providence” to the idea of
government only. This is perhaps an unnecessary limitation on the word
“Providence” for it may lead to the impression that the divine preservation of
all things is in some sense not providential. The universality and continuity of
Providence, which we have already noted, would argue against such a
limitation.
Aside from these two examples above, the term “Providence” is generally
utilised as a rubric under which are positioned the concepts of preservation and
                                                   
59 A. H. Strong, Systematic Theology, p. 419.
60 L. S. Chafer, Systematic Theology Vols 1 and 2 (Grand Rapids: Kregel Publications, 1993),
p. 255.54
government, although there are differences in terminology. Cottrell, for
example, is content to treat the concepts of preservation and government as
two dimensions of Providence, but prefers the expressions “general
Providence” and “special Providence.”
61 Oden states that God “upholds” and
“guides.”
62 Garrett writes of Providence as sustenance (God and Nature) and
as sovereignty (God and History).
63 Weber opts for  “conservation”
(conservatio) and “governance” (gubernatio).
64 Charles Hodge, however,
explicitly prefers the terms preservation and government.
65 Charles’ son, A. A.
Hodge, follows his father’s lead when he writes, “Providence includes the two
great departments (a) of the continued Preservation of all things as created,
and (b) of the continued Government of all things thus preserved, so that all
the ends for which they were created, are infallibly accomplished.”
66 The same
distinction and terminology is found in Erickson
67 and in Grudem.
68
The final aspect of divine Providence is a sense of intentionality – that is, a
divine purpose or overall plan is portrayed, either implicitly or explicitly, as
lying behind Providence. In other words, the earth is not perceived as an entity
floating meaninglessly through a universe of uncertainty, but that God has a
purpose in relation to his creation that he intends to carry out.
69 Concepts such
                                                   
61 J. Cottrell, God the Ruler, p. 89.
62 T. C. Oden, The Living God, pp. 270-271.
63 He also includes a third section to deal with the problem of evil, entitled “Providence as
Theodicy (God and Suffering)” – see J. L. Garrett, Systematic Theology, pp. 323-338.
64 He also includes “concurrence” (concursus), which will be dealt with shortly – see O.
Weber, Foundations of Dogmatics Vol. 1, pp. 514-522.
65 C. Hodge, Systematic Theology Vol. 1 (London: James Clarke and Co, 1960), p. 575.
66 A. A. Hodge, Outlines of Theology (London: Banner of Truth Trust, 1972), p. 258.
67 M. Erickson, Christian Theology, p. 387.
68 W. Grudem, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), p. 315.
69 Lewis and Demarest comments, “The present chapter interacts with what most Christians
perceive to be true: persons are not pawns in the grip of a blind, immoral power, and
ultimately life and history are not meaningless but are invested with purpose and direction by55
as governing, ordering, directing, assisting, turning, correcting, permitting,
over-ruling, which are scattered throughout the confessions, support this. Yet,
as we saw previously, this concept of a divine plan does not in itself imply a
sense of fatalism, for appropriate emphasis is also placed upon the reality of
human involvement and responsibility. What the concept of a divine plan does
do is to negate the idea that chance has a place in Providence. Indeed, the
Heidelberg Catechism explicitly states, “… yea, all things, come not by
chance, but by his fatherly hand.”
70 As such, the doctrine of Providence, as
generally understood by the Christian church, seeks to emphasise that life does
indeed have ultimate meaning and is not subservient to the haphazard vagaries
of chance or accident. As Brunner categorically states, “The idea of Divine
Providence is also the absolute denial of the idea that the universe has no
meaning, that things only happen ‘by accident.’”
71
In drawing together the different aspects of divine Providence that have been
noted, we recognised earlier that Providence can be defined and articulated
both by what it stands against and by what if affirms. In relation to the former,
we observed that it explicitly stands against the triple positions of Deism,
Pantheism and Fatalism. In relation to the latter, it affirms aspects of God’s
relationship with the cosmos in terms of its continuity, its universality, its
dimensionality and its intentionality. Indeed, each of these aspects of
Providence can be seen in this dissertation’s adopted definition of Providence
(Chapter One). Hence, “The Christian understanding of God’s continuing
                                                                                                                                         
virtue of the eternal plan of a wise and loving God” – G. R. Lewis and B. A. Demarest,
Integrative Theology Vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1987), p. 293.
70 “The Heidelberg Catechism,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant
Churches, p. 316 (Question 27).
71 E. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 155.56
action (continuity) by which all creation (universality) is preserved and
governed (dimensionality) by God’s purposes and plans for that creation
(intentionality).” Again, there does appear to be a core of shared understanding
concerning Providence.
72
Continuing Questions Concerning Issues of Providence
Yet, despite this broad agreement about the essential nature of Providence, a
consideration of theological statements and of creeds also gives intimation of
issues over which there is perhaps less agreement or areas within which some
flexibility of understanding is allowed. This is so for many of the statements
either assume certain understandings of individual issues or leave unexplained
just how some issues can be reconciled. Many of the statements made by
theologians that we surveyed earlier, though having a consistent theme, give us
an initial indication of some of these issues. For example, there are issues of
transcendence and immanence – in what sense/s is God working with and/or
over the creation? There are issues of divine sovereignty – in what sense/s is
                                                   
72 The Heidelberg Catechism, along with Luther’s Smaller Catechism, while characteristically
earthy in their expressions, also articulate a consistent sense of God the provider. “The
Almighty and every where present power of God, whereby, as it were by his hand, he still
upholds heaven and earth, with all creatures, and so governs them that herbs and grass, rain
and drought, fruitful and barren years, meat and drink, health and sickness, riches and poverty,
yea, all things, come not by chance, but by his fatherly hand” –  “The Heidelberg Catechism,”
in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant Churches, p. 316 (Question 27).
Luther, drawing on the framework of the Apostles’ Creed, explains the first article, “I believe
in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth,” in the following way, “I believe that
God has created me and all that exists; that he has given and still preserves to me body and
soul, eyes, ears, and all my limbs, my reason and all my senses; and also clothing and shoes,
food and drink, house and home, wife and child, land, cattle, and all my property; that he
provides me richly and daily with all the necessaries of life, protects me from all danger, and
preserves and guards me against all evil; and all this out of pure paternal, divine goodness and
mercy, without any merit or worthiness of mine; for all which I am in duty bound to thank,
praise, serve, and obey him. This is most certainly true” – see Luther’s Small Catechism,
1529,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant Churches, p. 78 (Part II,
Article I).57
God upholding and guiding his creation? Is the sovereignty absolute, relative
or somewhere in between? There are issues of human freedom and
responsibility – does the divine guidance of history allow for a level of
creaturely “say-so”? There are issues of immutability – while upholding
creation arguably implies a sense of constancy, should this constancy be seen
in a passive or active sense? In other words, although there are lines drawn that
seek to define what is and what is not “orthodox” belief concerning
Providence, some of the secondary language used raises questions.
In a similar vein, we noted earlier the statement from Vatican I affirming that
“God protects and governs by his providence all things which he hath made …
even those which are yet to be by the free action of creatures.”
73 However,
what is noticeable about this statement is the readiness with which a dual
affirmation concerning Providence is made. Not only is it asserted that God
“governs by his providence all things,” which we have noted clearly implies
universal divine sovereignty, but this governing also encompasses the activity
of creatures which is somewhat paradoxically described as “free action.”
Evidently, creaturely freedom is posited as able to exist in some way within or
alongside divine sovereignty. What, then, is the nature of divine sovereignty
that this statement is assuming? Furthermore, what is the assumed status of
human or creaturely freedom – does it coexist with divine sovereignty in a
form of partnership, as in libertarian freedom, or does the latter somehow
incorporate the former, as in compatibilistic freedom?
74
                                                   
73 “Dogmatic Decrees of the Vatican Council,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Greek and
Latin Churches, pp. 239-240 (Chapter I).
74 Libertarian freedom is often contrasted with Compatible freedom. Compatibilism is the
belief that free will is somehow compatible with or can be reconciled with divine sovereignty,58
Furthermore, we can detect implicit assumptions concerning the nature of
divine omniscience. We are told that God’s providential care incorporates his
foreknowing the “free” action of creatures. But does this foreknowledge
logically entail some form of determinism – for does not foreknowing
something make it certain? Or does a distinction need to be made so that
foreknowledge is able to avoid deterministic overtones?
75
We see similar issues and assumptions in the already quoted Longer
Catechism of the Eastern Church.
76 What is significant about this confession is
that the divine sovereignty it affirms is understood to be so universal and
absolute that even evil somehow falls under its control. Yet, the responsibility
for such evil is not ascribed to God but only its correction. Presumably, God’s
sovereign Providence is such that he is able to control the effects of evil and
yet is able to avoid responsibility for their actual existence. However, such a
dual affirmation appears, at face value, to necessarily involve a tension. Evil
effects seem to be simultaneously both independent of God, in that he is not
                                                                                                                                         
understood in a deterministic sense. It usually means that someone is free if they are free to
choose according to their own desires and motives, but these desires and motives are
sovereignly determined by God. By contrast, Libertarianism (or the power of contrary choice)
is the belief that a person must have alternative choices and the ability to actualize more than
one choice. A person may be influenced by desires and motives, but the decision is not
determined by these. For a defence of Libertarianism, see J. Cottrell, God the Ruler, pp. 191-
195. For a critique of Libertarianism and an advocacy of Compatibilism, see J. M. Frame, No
Other God: A Response to Open Theism (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P & R, 2001), pp. 119-
141.
75 As is the case of Picirilli who draws a careful distinction between the “certainty” and the
“necessity” of foreknown events – see R. E. Picirilli, “Foreknowledge, Freedom, and the
Future,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 43 (2000): 259-71. We see a similar
careful qualification in the Confession of the Free-Will Baptists (1834 and 1868). It states that
although God foreknows all things “his knowledge of them does not in any sense cause them,
nor does he decree all events which he knows will happen” – “Confession of the Free-Will
Baptists, 1834, 1868,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant Churches,
pp. 749-750 (Chapter III.3).
76 “The Longer Catechism of the Eastern Church,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the Greek
and Latin Churches, p. 465 (Question 127).59
responsible for them, and not independent of God, in that they somehow fall
under his sovereign Providence. Similar sensitivity to the problem of evil, and
a similar tension, is also found in the “Confession of Dositheus” otherwise
known as the “Eighteen Decrees of the Synod of Jerusalem” (1672CE).
77
But alongside these issues of Providence, we should also note at this stage the
existence of some statements on Providence that intimate a trinitarian
dimension. For example, we noted earlier that some theologians placed a
distinctively salvific emphasis in their understanding of Providence. This
emphasis, however, is not restricted to individual theologians. Indeed, at
Vatican II (1962-1965CE) we find the doctrine of Providence not addressed
directly but rather utilised as a backdrop to statements in other areas – in
particular, salvation. In the “Dogmatic Constitution on the Church” the
doctrine of Providence is advanced as the theological explanation of the basis
upon which the unevangelised might yet find salvation. It states,
Those who, through no fault of their own, do not know the Gospel
of Christ or his Church, but who nevertheless seek God with a
sincere heart, and, moved by grace, try in their actions to do his
will as they know it through the dictates of their conscience –
those too may achieve eternal salvation. Nor shall divine
providence deny the assistance necessary for salvation to those
                                                   
77 The tension expressed here is again between seeking to affirm divine sovereignty over evil
and yet refusing to ascribe to God blame for such evil. Its fifth decree states, “We believe all
things that are, whether visible or invisible, to be governed by the Providence of God; but
although God foreknoweth evils, and permitteth them, yet in that they are evils, He is neither
the contriver nor their author. But when such are come about, they may be over-ruled by the
Supreme Goodness for something beneficial, not indeed as being their author, but as
engrafting thereon something for the better. And we ought to adore, but not curiously pry into,
Divine Providence in its ineffable and only partially revealed judgements. Albeit what is
revealed to us in Divine Scripture concerning it as being conducive to eternal life, we ought
honestly to search out, and then unhesitatingly to interpret the same agreeably to primary
notions of God.” This juxtaposition appears to be addressed through an appeal to mysterium –
J. N. W. B. Robertson, Acts and Decrees of the Synod of Jerusalem (London: Thomas Baker,
1899) [http://www.catholicity.elcove.net/ ConfessionofDositheus.html; accessed 12
th
November, 2002]. Original Greek and Latin in “The Confession of Dositheus,” in P. Schaff
(ed.), The Creeds of the Greek and Latin Churches, pp. 406-407 (Decretum V).60
who, without any fault of theirs, have not yet arrived at an explicit
knowledge of God, and who, not without grace, strive to lead a
good life.
78
What is interesting about this is that Vatican II has therein explicitly linked
Providence with soteriological considerations. Similarly with Brunner and
many others, a connection has been drawn between salvation history and
general history. The significance of a christological dimension to Providence is
that, by implication, it introduces a trinitarian aspect to Providence. After all,
the scriptures explicitly say that all things were created by him and through
him and in him all things hold together.
79 Furthermore, it is toward the
consummation of all things in him that history is moving.
80 Consequently, we
are presented with a clear point of contact between Providence and Trinity. Put
another way, the God who providentially sustains and governs the cosmos is
the same God who has revealed himself in a divine trinitarian economy of
Father, Son and Holy Spirit; and his providential guidance of human history
can potentially be understood, to some extent, in the context of this triune
God’s salvific purposes in the Son. As Bromiley comments, “The
interweaving of salvation-history into general history, the shaping of general
history to serve salvation-history, is providence par excellence.”
81 This will be
discussed more fully in Part Three.
                                                   
78 “Dogmatic Constitution on the Church,” in A. Flannery (ed.), Vatican Council II: The
Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents (Vatican Collection, Vol. 1; Northport, New York:
Costello Publishing Company, 1988), pp. 367-368. It is mentioned also, again as a necessary
background, as a theological explanation of the founding of particular churches by the apostles
and their successors – see p. 377.
79 Colossians 1:16-17 (NIV) – “For by him all things were created: things in heaven and on
earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all things were
created by him and for him. He is before all things, and in him all things hold together.”
80 Ephesians 1:10 (NIV) – “to be put into effect when the times will have reached their
fulfillment — to bring all things in heaven and on earth together under one head, even Christ.”
81 G. W. Bromiley, “Providence,” in G. W. Bromiley (ed.), International Standard Bible
Encyclopedia Vol. 3, p. 1021.61
Furthermore, we may note a potential trinitarian dimension in the insistence,
found in statements by individual theologians and creedal confessions, that the
God of Providence is constant in his provision. This language clearly points to
the sense of God’s unchangebleness or, in its theological terminology, God’s
immutability. Although this constancy could be construed as implying a sense
of inertness or passivity, we likewise note that the constancy and
unchangeability of God’s Providence is consistently expressed in what can
only be described as “active” terms.
82 Hence, what is the nature of God’s
immutability that is being assumed here and how is it to be articulated? Is it
accurate to the biblical revelation, for example, to speak in theological tension
– affirming both dynamic activity and faithful constancy? Is it possible, not to
mention coherent, to speak of changeable unchangeableness? The nature of
this issue appears as a potential point of contact with trinitarian theology for an
investigation of the nature of God’s triunity may illuminate how we should
understand this divine constancy.
Finally, it is noteworthy that in the context of Providence there are references
to the impassibility of God. For example, in The Thirty-Nine Articles of the
Church of England, the God who is described as “the maker and preserver of
all things visible and invisible” is also described as being “without body, parts,
or passions.”
83 Although the doctrine of the impassibility of God has been
“accepted virtually as axiomatic in Christian theology from the early Greek
                                                   
82 Brunner similarly links the constancy of divine Providence with the attributes of God,
particularly divine faithfulness. Furthermore, this faithfulness is described in active rather than
passive terms – E. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 152.
83 “The Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England,” in P. Schaff (ed.), The Creeds of the
Evangelical Protestant Churches, p. 487 (Article I).62
Fathers until the nineteenth century,” it has experienced increasing criticism
during the last century.
84 Its inclusion here in the context of describing
Providence raises questions as to the nature of God’s providential preservation
– in what sense/s is it true to speak of God as being impassible and what
implications does this have for how we understand Providence? Does
impassibility mean to be unfeeling in a passive Stoic sense or can impassibility
incorporate notions of care and “feeling”? Certainly, this may be a point of
contact with trinitarian theology for a closer examination of the nature of the
trinitarian divine life may give us a perspective on the question of
impassibility and Providence.
Therefore, from our survey of a limited number of theologians and creedal
statements we have made some initial and, in some cases, tentative
conclusions concerning aspects of Providence over which there is agreement
and issues over which there is perhaps less agreement. We have noted that
there appears to be general agreement that Providence should not be
understood in a deist, pantheistic or fatalistic construct. We also noted
agreement over aspects of Providence, including its universality, continuity,
dimensionality and intentionality. However, we have detected assumptions or
understandings over various issues, some explicit and some implicit, which
provoke questions. In particular, we have noted issues concerning the nature of
                                                   
84 R. Bauckham, “‘Only the Suffering God Can Help’: Divine Passibility in Modern
Theology,” Themelios 9/3 (1984): 6. Some representative titles of the discussion include B. R.
Brasnett, The Suffering of the Impassible God (London: SPCK, 1928); P. S. Fiddes, The
Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); K. Kitamori, Theology of
the Pain of God (London: SCM, 1966); J. Moltmann, The Crucified God (London: SCM,
1974); J. Moltmann, History and the Triune God (London: SCM, 1991); J. K. Mozley, The
Impassibility of God: A Survey of Christian Thought (Cambridge: CUP, 1926). A more recent
addition to the discussion, this time vigorously defending the notion of divine impassibility, is
the previously cited T. G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000).63
divine transcendence, sovereignty (including omniscience), immutability and
impassibility. It is not surprising, therefore, that the debate over Providence
occasioned by the Open Theism proposal, which will be dealt with shortly, has
strikingly brought to the fore each of these issues.
However, we also noted that many of the statements concerning Providence
appeared necessarily to involve a dual affirmation – a form of theological
tension or paradox. In a sense this must be so for, as we have seen, Providence
is a doctrine that draws together many theological assertions that appear at
face value to compete with each other for dominance. Indeed, Brunner
intimates this as he introduces his treatment of Providence. He writes,
Here then we have to discuss the relation between God and Nature,
between the divine action and the course of History, between
divine and human action, between human freedom and divine
over-ruling, between events which are determined by human aims,
and those controlled by the Divine Purpose.
85
Hence, we are confronted by this interfacing of emphases. The contention of
this dissertation is that the dominance of one assertion over the other need not
be the case. In fact, the dominance of one assertion over the other actually
skews our understanding of both. My argument is that an alternative is to hold
them in creative tension and the foundation for this is found in viewing them
from a trinitarian perspective.
86 However, before I move toward articulating
more clearly this thesis, it is appropriate at this point to bring more sharply into
                                                   
85 E. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption (Dogmatics, Vol. II;
London: Lutterworthy Press, 1952).
86 Collins’s comment has pertinence here. He writes, “At the end of the day, the difficulty is
that the Bible has a number of emphases that are in potential tension with each other, and we
have to decide just how we are going to relate them. We may take the approach of some and
declare that the Bible is self-contradictory, and that hence it is our task to choose those
emphases we can support from other sources. Or we can try to find a pattern of harmony that
respects the communicative intent of the various texts” – C. J. Collins, The God of Miracles, p.
51.64
focus the nature of the Open Theism proposal and why it is provoking many of
the issues concerning divine Providence.
THE OPEN THEISM PROPOSAL
The volatility of the theological debate concerning Open Theism has resulted
in an already substantial number of written contributions. Furthermore, this
number seems destined to increase with further works being published
regularly and others forthcoming.
87 As we engage with the Open Theism
proposal throughout this dissertation, we will seek to interact with as much of
this literature as possible. However, for the sake of brevity, we will generally
focus upon but not limit ourselves to six representative contributions to the
debate – three in favour of Open Theism and three arguing against it.
88 Taken
together, these six contributions are a fair reflection of the main points at issue
and the main arguments being presented in the debate. Other contributions will
be utilised when it is appropriate to clarify a point or an argument.
Put simply, the Open Theism proposal has been offered as an alternative that
lies between “process theism” and what it describes as “classical theism” (or
                                                   
87 See Chapter One, note 38.
88 The three arguing for Open Theism are C. H. Pinnock, R. Rice, J. Sanders, W. Hasker and
D. Basinger, The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of
God (Downers Grove: IVP, 1994); C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s
Openness (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster, 2001); J. Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of
Providence (Downers Grove: IVP, 1998). The three arguing against are J. M. Frame, No Other
God: A Response to Open Theism; P. Helm, The Providence of God (Contours of Christian
Theology; Downers Grove: IVP, 1994); B. A. Ware, God's Lesser Glory: A Critique of Open
Theism (Leicester: Apollos, 2000). Although Helm’s volume does not address the Open
Theism proposal explicitly, it does address the concept of Providence as “risk” or “non-risk”
and engages with Open theologians such as William Hasker, one of the contributing authors to
C. H. Pinnock et al, The Openness of God. Consequently, Helm’s volume has great relevance
to a consideration of the issues that Open Theism is provoking.65
traditional theology).
89 On the one hand, Open Theism is drawn to the
relational aspects of the Process concept of God and this similarity in emphasis
has led Open and Process theologians to enter into dialogue with each other in
their search for “an adequate God.”
90 Yet, despite similarities, this dialogue
has also highlighted the concern Open Theism has with some aspects of
Process thought, particularly concerning its implications for God’s self-
existence (aseity) and otherness (transcendence). In other words, one of the
most obvious points of departure between Open and Process theologies
concerns the latter’s conception that God has freedom to create any world, but
must create some world if he is to exist as a deity.
91 Open Theism, however,
does not hold that the Creator and created are mutually dependent in a
panentheistic sense. Rather, God created the world out of freedom and not
necessity.
Interestingly for our purposes, the basis for Open Theism’s drawing of such an
orthodox ontological distinction between God and the world is found in the
nature of the triune divine life. Pinnock comments, “As triune, God is
antecedently and internally relational and more than self-sufficient. God has no
need of an external world to supply experiences of relationality because God
experiences it within himself apart from any world.”
92 Though God is one who
reaches out to humanity to draw us into relationship with himself, this reaching
                                                   
89 “… proponents of two other views of God, classical theists and process theologians, both
sometimes speak as though they have the only two models of God. This books presents an
understanding of God that is distinctively different from each of them” – C. H. Pinnock et al,
The Openness of God, p. 9.
90 J. B. Cobb Jr and C. H. Pinnock (eds), Searching for an Adequate God: A Dialogue Between
Process and Free Will Theists (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000).
91 D. Bloesch, God the Almighty, p. 311.
92 C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, p. 29.66
out should not be construed to mean that there is a lack in God, but rather it
serves as an ad extra reflection of the loving ex-centredness or otherness that
characterizes the perfect relationality that is the trinitarian divine life.
On the other hand, however, Open Theism is also drawn to much of classic or
traditional theology and in many ways is closer to it than to Process theology.
Despite this, though, Open Theism is nevertheless concerned about a certain
inertness that it perceives in the classic concept of God. This inertness is seen
as being part of a tradition that runs through both Augustinian and Thomistic
theology and which has, in its view, dominated much Evangelical theology
since the Reformation. Consequently, this dissatisfaction with both Process
and classic concepts of God has prompted Open Theism to present itself as an
alternative –  “a superior paradigm in light of the relevant biblical, theological,
philosophical and practical material.”
93
Since the original publication of The Openness of God though, much of the
debate has been with opponents within Evangelicalism and particularly with
those who espouse a Reformed or Calvinistic view of God and Providence.
94
In one sense this is not surprising for, in the view of Open theists, this latter
perspective posits a view of Providence in which every aspect of life, no
matter how minute, is seen as ultimately controlled by a radically sovereign,
                                                   
93 C. H. Pinnock et al, The Openness of God, p. 9.
94 The Openness of God volume is significant in that it explicitly seeks to present the Open
perspective and to address, in an introductory way, its scriptural, historical, systematic,
philosophical and practical groundings. However, seeds of Open thought can be located in two
earlier works, both overtly from an Arminian perspective and both edited by Pinnock – C. H.
Pinnock (ed.), Grace Unlimited (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1975) and C. H. Pinnock (ed.),
The Grace of God, the Will of Man: A Case for Arminianism (Grand Rapids: Zondervan,
1989).67
transcendent, omniscient, immutable, impassible and omnipotent deity.
95 By
contrast, the proponents of Open Theism are seeking to advance an
understanding of the God/human relationship based upon an “open” model in
which God relates and interacts with humanity in an authentic “give and take”
relationship. To the Openness theologian, God is not some solely transcendent,
immutable, impassible and “wholly other” being, but is rather one who relates
and interacts with humanity, creating a God-human relationship of genuine
collaboration. As such, Open Theism seeks to emancipate the traditional
conception of God from philosophical and metaphysical presuppositions
drawn, it claims, from neo-Platonism.
96
Consequently, openness theology presents a “risk” model of providence
97 in
that history is not seen as the outworking of a foreordained, exhaustive and
meticulously planned agenda by God, but is rather the result of moving and
changing decisions and interactions between God and humanity. In other
words, there is no cosmic blueprint of human history.
98 Humanity has genuine
“say-so,” to use a phrase popular with Boyd, a prominent Open theist.
99
Although seeking to affirm such orthodox beliefs as God’s transcendence,
                                                   
95 C. H. Pinnock et al, The Openness of God, pp. 11-15.
96 C. H. Pinnock et al, The Openness of God, pp. 127-134. Link, although not writing from an
Open Theism perspective, sees a Stoic influence upon classical conceptions of Providence – C.
Link, “Providence: An Unsolved Problem of the Doctrine of Creation,” in H. G. Reventlow
and Y. Hoffman (eds), Creation in Jewish and Christian Tradition (Journal for the Study of
the Old Testament Supplement Series 319; London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002), p. 272.
97 Hence the title of the previously mentioned book by Sanders, a leading Open theist – J.
Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence (Downers Grove: IVP, 1998).
98 G. Boyd, The Myth of the Blueprint (Downers Grove: IVP, forthcoming).
99 For example, “If God is perfectly wise, then, all free agents have some degree of irrevocable
say-so, but none of them individually, nor all of them taken together, possess say-so greater
than or equal to God’s.” Again, “In my view, therefore, God genuinely faces in every
particular situation a reality distinct from himself that has some say-so over and against
himself. By giving every free agent an irrevocable domain of genuine say-so in the flow
history, God has to that extent limited his own unilateral say-so in the flow of history” – G. A.
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy (Downers
Grove: IVP, 2001), pp. 187 (italics his) and 213.68
sovereignty and omniscience, Open Theism nuances how these should be
understood. The aim of Open Theism is to avoid the inertness it perceives in
classical theism and to advance a more dynamic and relational concept of God.
This latter concept, it posits, is more accurate to the biblical portrayal of God
and of his dealings with humanity and the world.
The Relational Heart of Open Theism
At its heart, therefore, Open Theism is a relational theism. It seeks to
emphasise not only that God is a dynamically relational being, but that this
dynamism also characterises the relationship between God and humanity. As
Pinnock has so colourfully put it,
Some people have gotten the impression that God is an unblinking
cosmic stare or a solitary metaphysical iceberg, and they naturally
have difficulty relating to God as a loving interacting Person.
100
In Open Theism’s view, this relationality necessarily must encompass
modifications of how traditional theism has conceived issues such as divine
transcendence, sovereignty, immutability, impassibility and omniscience. For
example, if God is sovereign, it must be a limited (that is, self-limited) or
general sovereignty for the alternative would in their view make a mockery of
human freedom and hence responsibility and be simply a misnomer for divine
coercion. No such situation could be described as “relational” in any
meaningful way. However, and as we shall see, their opponents reject the idea
that traditional theism must be understood in a non-relational way. It is
                                                   
100 C. H. Pinnock as cited in J. Sanders, The God Who Risks, p. 1. The expression “unblinking
cosmic stare,” as used by Pinnock, is cited by him to have come originally from D. Willard,
The Divine Conspiracy: Rediscovering Our Hidden Life in God (San Francisco: Harper,
1998), p. 244-245 – see C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, pp. 1-2.69
conceded that it may be possible to portray a traditional theism that is non-
relational, but that it is not necessary to do so.
101 Hence, there has been
substantial opposition to the Open proposal.
Indeed, Open theists are not surprised that their proposal has brought
opposition. From some, mainly those from the free-will tradition that has
flourished in the Arminian, Wesleyan and Pentecostal circles of Protestantism,
the opposition is minimal. This is so for Open Theism is seen as sharing much
with that tradition and the challenges it has brought (such as over the extent of
divine foreknowledge and the nature of eternity) are perceived as the ground
for positive discussion.
102 From others, however, the opposition is more
pronounced. Pinnock himself recognizes this and comments, “For those with
the conventional presuppositions found in Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Luther
and Calvin the model was too radical and impossible to accept … How could
one expect criticism of central pillars of conventional theology – in particular,
the strong immutability central to the Thomistic model and the all-controlling
sovereignty fundamental to the Calvinist view – to escape controversy?”
103
Yet, he still desires “… an amicable conversation about the nature of God and
God’s relationship with the world.”
104
                                                   
101 C. J. Collins, The God of Miracles, p. 51. Collins believes that Open Theism commits the
abusus usum non tollit fallacy (“abuse does not take away proper use”). He writes, “At the
strongest, the texts adduced by Rice serve as a warning not to frame a doctrine of God that
excludes the relational side of God. But this not a problem that traditional theism necessarily
suffers from” (italics his).
102 C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, pp. x-xi.
103 C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, p. xi. See also p. 4 in which he states that God “… is a
loving person who seeks freely chosen relationships of love with his creatures; he is not a
pillar around which everything else moves (Thomas Aquinas) or an all-controlling despot who
can tolerate no resistance (Calvin).”
104 C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, p. xi. It should also be said that, even among some of
the more vocal opponents, there is also a similar desire to debate and discuss the issues in an70
In articulating the Openness perspective on Providence, Sanders outlines four
major points that characterise the model – what he calls “the core of relational
theism.”
105 The four points are, firstly, that God loves humanity and desires us
to enter into reciprocal relations of love with both himself and each other. In
doing this, we are able to participate in and respond to the divine triune love.
Secondly, God’s sovereignty is one in which he has chosen to make some of
his actions contingent – that is, they are conditional upon what we do. Thirdly,
God’s providence is one that is general rather than meticulous. He has allowed
“space” for us to operate and he is creatively resourceful as he works with us.
Finally, personal relationships of love necessarily demand that humanity be
granted libertarian freedom. Hence, this model involves “risk” on God’s part
for with libertarian freedom, “we are capable of letting God down.”
106
Much of the basic disposition of Open Theism flows, as the first point above
indicated, from an emphasis upon the love of God. Indeed, Open theologians
seek to affirm that the statement God is love is “as close as the Bible comes to
giving us a definition of the divine reality.”
107 Further, “Love … is the one
                                                                                                                                         
attitude of amicability and respect – see, for example, B. A. Ware, God’s Lesser Glory, p. 9
and J. M. Frame, No Other God, p. 12.
105 J. Sanders, The God Who Risks, p. 282.
106 J. Sanders, The God Who Risks, p. 282.
107 C. H. Pinnock et al, The Openness of God, p. 18. As Rice himself notes (p. 176, n. 11),
Pannenberg identifies the statement “God is Spirit” as also one of the few biblical sayings that
characterize the divine essence. However, in Pannenberg’s view, “God is love” is the
statement “which summarizes the whole event of God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ, goes
beyond the statement that God is Spirit, though not, of course, contradicting it” – see W.
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991, German edition,
1988), pp. 395-396. Yet, if one wishes to work from explicit “God is …” statements,
presumably one would need to include “God is light” (1 John 1:5) as another. Such a
statement, particularly in its context, argues for the contention that holiness is central to the
divine character. The question of giving precedence to one biblical statement over another, in
the context of describing the primary nature of God, will be addressed in the following
chapter.71
divine activity that most fully and vividly discloses God’s inner reality.”
108
Indeed, “Expressing and expanding the unfathomable triune love that God
eternally is was the chief end for which God created the world.”
109
Consequently, the God who is love “created the world out of his triune love
with the goal of acquiring for himself a people who would participate in and
reflect the splendour of his triune love.”
110 One of the conditions for the
realisation of this divine goal is that this love must be freely chosen – that is, a
reciprocal loving response to an offer of love can never be forced, it must be
given freely and not taken coercively. Hence, another condition is that such a
situation involves “risk,” for the freedom to say “yes” to love must
metaphysically entail the freedom to say “no.” It is only in the presence of
such freedom and risk that human moral responsibility can make any sense.
111
This stress upon the essentiality of love in the divine being underpins the
relational emphasis of Open Theism.
                                                   
108 C. H. Pinnock et al, The Openness of God, p. 19. Similar sentiments are found in Boyd
when he writes, “God is love … His essence is constituted by perfect love eternally shared
between the Father, Son and Holy Spirit” – see G. A. Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, pp.
50-51.
109 G. A. Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, p. 51.
110 G. A. Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, p. 51.
111 These three points are reflected in Boyd’s articulation of an Open perspective on the
problem of evil – what he calls a “trinitarian warfare theodicy.” He summarizes the first three
of the overall six structural theses of his theodicy in the following way, “Just as love requires
freedom (TWT1) and freedom requires risk (TWT2), risk entails moral responsibility
(TWT3). For better or for worse, the potential to love or not is intrinsically relational” (italics
his) – see G. A. Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, p. 165. See also Pinnock’s discussion of
freedom in relation to divine love in C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, pp. 126-129.72
Open Theism and the Triunity of God
However, what is particularly significant for our research is the
characterisation of this divine love as triune love. An extended quotation from
Sanders is instructive here. He writes,
A trinitarian metaphysic is illuminating in this regard. Beginning
with a trinitarian God of love who enters into loving personal
relations with his creatures gives some direction to the doctrine of
Providence. The Father, Son and Holy Spirit love one another.
They are involved in a tripersonal community in which each
member of the triune being gives and receives love from the
others. Relationality is an essential aspect of God. The tripersonal
God is the perfection of love and communion – the very antithesis
of aloofness, isolation and domination. God is no solitary potentate
forcing his will on others. The members of the Trinity mutually
share and relate to one another. In this view personhood is the
ultimate ontological category. Personhood, relationality and
community – not power, independence and control – become the
center for understanding the nature of God. Whereas the main
motif of the Neoplatonic God concept is that of distance and
unrelatedness, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity asserts that to
be God is to be related in love.
112
In other words, Sanders sees an epistemological foundation for the Open
model of Providence in the triune nature of God. Furthermore, he argues that
the essential relationality of this triune nature stands in stark contrast to the
decidedly non-relational attributes of the God of classical or traditional theism
– attributes such as immutability and impassibility. Pinnock argues similarly
when he writes,
The loving relational essence of the Trinity – three persons in a
caring, sensitive and responsive communion – is central to the
open view of God. God’s very being is an open and dynamic
structure, a relational ontology of loving persons. God is the power
of love and not just sheer almightiness. Relationality belongs to
God’s very essence because at the heart of reality is shared life,
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God’s own life, characterized by spontaneity and giving. Such an
essence implies dynamism, both internal and external to God.
113
What is perhaps surprising is that no critic of Open Theism, as far as I am
aware, has ever directly challenged the depiction of the Trinity given above,
although they do challenge the implications of the nature of the God-human
relationship that have been drawn from it. It is for this reason that a closer
examination of the nature of this triune love, and the legitimacy of the
implications that can be drawn from it in relation to Providence, is needed.
114
Some of the concern that Open Theism has with the traditional model of
Providence derives from what it describes as the partial Hellenization of
Christian doctrine.
115 It argues that the early church amalgamated Greek
philosophical thought with its own doctrinal development and the result was a
“biblical-classical synthesis.”
116 Open Theism does not argue that the
Hellenization of Christian doctrine was complete or even one-sided, in fact it
went both ways, but it does argue that it was significant and influential.
Indeed, it perceives positive aspects of the utilisation of Greek philosophical
constructs on Christian doctrine but believes that, for the present day
particularly, the negatives far outweigh the positives.
117 In its view, this
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116 C. H. Pinnock et al, The Openness of God, p. 60.
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resources of Greek philosophy in formulating the Christian conception of God. On the
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providence, allowing the church to make progress in clear and rigorous thinking about God74
negative influence has had and continues to have an impoverishing effect upon
the church’s understanding of the God-human relationship. Rather than an
emphasis upon relationality, dynamism, freedom and love, which Open
Theism asserts more accurately reflects the biblical revelation and more
adequately answers the human situation, the biblical-classical synthesis as
found in traditional or classical theology leads to an impoverishing emphasis
upon non-dynamism, inflexibility and inertness.
Open Theism and Issues of Providence
Hence, it is perhaps not surprising that Open Theism challenges the classical
understandings of issues of Providence such as divine transcendence,
sovereignty (including omniscience), immutability and impassibility. Indeed,
whereas traditional or classical theology might arguably emphasise the
transcendence of God, Open Theism sees an imbalance here and seeks to
redress it by emphasising divine immanence. Whereas traditional theology
would arguably emphasise divine sovereignty, and that in a meticulous sense,
Open Theism seeks to emphasise a general sovereignty which leaves room for
human freedom and action – a God who macromanages rather than
micromanages. While traditional theology might arguably present God’s will
as irresistible, Open Theism believes that the Fall in itself is ample evidence of
the resistibility of the divine will. If traditional theology desires to emphasise
God’s will as the final explanation of everything that occurs, Open Theism
                                                                                                                                         
that might otherwise have been impossible to achieve. But it is clear that great discernment
was required in applying philosophical conceptions to the biblical God, and we need not
assume that the church fathers made the correct decisions in every case” – C. H. Pinnock et al,
The Openness of God, p. 194, n. 1.75
sees a synergistic combination of divine and human wills. Whereas traditional
theology asserts the exhaustive divine knowledge of the past, present and
future, Open Theism asserts an exhaustive divine knowledge of the past and
the present only – the future remains partially “open” and contingent upon the
free decisions of human beings.
118  Whereas traditional theology affirms the
immutability of God, Open Theism seeks to portray God in dynamic and non-
apophatic terms. Whereas traditional theology seeks to affirm the impassibility
of God, Open Theism argues for his passibility.
Although we will critically engage with each of these differences and issues in
Part Three of this dissertation, what we can note at this point is the
unmistakable heartbeat of Open Theism – it desires to emphasise the essential
relationality that characterises both God himself and his conduct toward
humanity.  It regards as central the biblical portrayal of a triune God who in
his essence is a loving, dynamic community of persons who calls humanity
into relationship with himself. Although a critic of Open Theism, Ware
nevertheless identifies clearly the dynamic and relational emphases within it.
He writes, “At its heart, open theism understands the relation between God and
the world as being dynamic, interactive, and mutually engaging.”
119 But,
further to this, what is also clear is that this emphasis upon relationality has
produced an understanding of the Providence of God that is derived from a
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of God, p. 122.
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particular understanding of the God of Providence. It is clear, both from our
survey of creedal and confessional statements and from our introduction to the
Open Theism proposal, that questions concerning the nature of God are central
to questions concerning the nature of Providence, and so it is to this subject
that we now turn in a short excursus.
EXCURSUS – THE CENTRALITY OF GOD
AND THE NECESSITY OF FAITH
In the 1626 edition of his Compendium theologiae Christianae, Johannes
Wolleb wrote, “To deny providence is to deny God.”
120 In stating this, Wolleb,
and presumably Weber who cites him approvingly,
121 not only places God at
the centre of Providence but further asserts that they are mutually inclusive –
to believe in Providence is to believe in God, to deny Providence is to deny
God. Indeed, the definition of the doctrine of the Providence of God, as
adopted by this dissertation, not only presupposes the existence of a divine
being but also affirms that this being sustains and preserves his creation and
governmentally guides it to his purposed ends. In the alliterative words of
Henry, the God of Providence is one who not only “stands” (eternally exists)
and “stoops” (creates the cosmos and redeems his fallen creation) but also
“stays” (preserves, renews and finally consummates his purposive creation).
122
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121 O. Weber, Foundations of Dogmatics Vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981), p. 502.
122 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation and Authority: God Who Stands and Stays Vol. VI/2
(Waco: Word, 1983), p. 455.77
Put simply, the foundational issue of the doctrine of Providence is the nature
of God. As we have seen from our survey of various theologians and creedal
statements and of the debate over the Open Theism proposal, the way
Providence is described and articulated, almost without exception, derives
from the way God himself is described and his attributes articulated. For
example, throughout the confessions we find lists of divine attributes that are
posited in the context of describing Providence. The implication here is that
because God is like this, he therefore acts in Providence like that – there is a
correlation between God’s nature and God’s actions. Therefore, the centrality
of God in understandings of Providence demands that we keep the divine
aspect of divine Providence clearly in view throughout.
At its heart, therefore, the doctrine of Providence seeks to affirm the centrality
of God. As such, this understanding of Providence stands in sharp contrast to
the humanistic speculations of philosophers such as Feuerbach and other
Enlightenment rationalists. In Feuerbach’s view, faith in Providence is nothing
more than “… faith in personal immortality” – it is simply evidence of “… the
conviction of man of the infinite value of his existence.”
123 Such a view of
Providence places humanity and not God starkly at its centre – Providence is
seen as nothing more than a human projection of the centrality of humanity.
As Feuerbach himself summarises,
God concerns himself about me; he has in view my happiness, my
salvation; he wills that I shall be blest; but that is my will also:
thus, my interest is God’s interest, my own will is God’s will, my
own aim is God’s aim – God’s love for me nothing else than my
self-love deified. Thus when I believe in Providence, in what do I
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believe but in the divine reality and significance of my own
being?
124
It is not without reason that Barth calls Feuerbach’s writings an “anti-
theology.”
125 Humanity is at the centre, God is nothing more than a human
projection – human “self-love deified.” Indeed, Feuerbach concludes one
section of his work with the proclamation,
Our most essential task is now fulfilled. We have reduced the
supermundane, supernatural and superhuman nature of God to the
elements of human nature as its fundamental elements. Our
process of analysis has brought us again to the position with which
we set out. The beginning, middle and end of religion is MAN.
126
Contrary to this human-centred approach, of which Feuerbach is an exemplar,
orthodoxy has consistently affirmed the centrality of God in Providence. It is
God who is the subject – it is he who provides for his creation. Humanity, as a
part of and the supreme example of that creation, exists as an object of that
provision.
Providence and the Doctrine of Creation
With this orientation in mind, one might expect the doctrine of Providence to
be systematically treated under the rubric of the doctrine of God – that is,
theology proper. Yet, we note that many systematic theologies traditionally
treat this doctrine in relation to the doctrine of creation rather than the doctrine
of God and there are conceptual and logical reasons for this systematic
linkage.
127  For example, Barth notes that the Medieval Scholastics treat the
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127 For example, Pannenberg includes his systematic treatment in the chapter entitled “The
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doctrine in direct relation to the doctrine of God for it deals with aspects of
God’s eternal decrees such as predestination. But he argues that, “Providence,
however, belongs to the execution of the decree.” As such, it “… presupposes
the work of creation as done and the existence of the creature as given.”
Consequently, he follows “Post-Reformation dogmatics” and places his
treatment of Providence at the beginning of Volume III of his Church
Dogmatics, the volume concerned with the doctrine of creation.
128 In other
words, although Barth on the one hand can state categorically that, “Creation
and providence are not identical,” he does on the other hand recognize their
close conceptual and logical relationship.
129 Indeed, Bavinck sees what he
describes as a “gradual transition” from creation to Providence rather than
some form of conceptual leap over a “gulf or breach.” He concludes, “For just
as the creatures, because they are creatures, cannot come up out of themselves,
so too they cannot for a moment exist through themselves. Providence goes
hand in hand with creation: the two are companion pieces.”
130 There is a sense,
then, of Providence being more than just contiguous with creation. There is
both a logical and conceptual interrelationship.
But further to this logical and conceptual connection, there are some who
argue for an even closer interrelatedness that derives from the very nature of
                                                                                                                                         
Preservation, and Rule of the World,” thereby linking creation and Providence directly – W.
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998, German edition,
1993), pp. 35-59. Brunner locates his treatment of Providence in Volume Two of his
Dogmatics, rather than Volume 1, thereby shifting it from the doctrine of God to the doctrine
of creation and redemption – E. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption,
pp. 148-192. Hefner also treats Providence as part of the fourth locus on creation and entitles
it, “The Continuing Work of Creation – P. J. Hefner, “The Continuing Work of Creation,” in
C. E. Braaten and R. W. Jenson (eds), Christian Dogmatics Vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1984), pp. 341-352.
128 K. Barth, Church Dogmatics Vol. III/3, pp. 3-5.
129 K. Barth, Church Dogmatics Vol. III/3, p. 8.
130 H. Bavinck, Our Reasonable Faith, p. 177.80
God’s creative action. That is, they argue that there is a sense in which
Providence can be understood as God’s continuing work of creation.
131 For
example, working from his characteristically trinitarian and eschatological
paradigm, Pannenberg sees creation as an overarching act that incorporates
origination, preservation and governance. He summarises his position with the
following,
The creation, preservation, and rule of the world are related aspects
of the one divine act by which the three persons of the Trinity
together bring forth the reality of the creaturely world that is
distinct from God. In this regard we saw that the concept of
creation relates to the overarching unity of the divine act, that the
concept of preservation relates the existence of creatures to their
beginning, and that the divine rule aims at the future
consummation.
132
He argues that God did not create the world out of capricious whim or
arbitrary resolve. Rather, it should be understood as an act of divine freedom
with its basis in the inner life of God and that this act should not be limited to
the beginning of the world only – “the eternity of the act of creation offers a
presupposition for the understanding of God’s preserving activity as continued
or continuous creation” (creatio continua).
133 We find similar affirmations in
Hefner when he argues,
The creation-affirmation has never been solely a statement of
protology, of how things were at the beginning. It has also
confessed God’s active presence throughout history, leading to
divine consummation of the world at the end. That the term
‘creation’ or ‘new creation’ is used to describe this presence is an
important witness to the Christian sense that the One God deals
with the world in a manner that is consistent with God’s original
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creative and beneficent intention. We ordinarily use the term
‘providence’ to express this confession.
134
However, though we may acknowledge the close interrelationship between
God’s originating act in creation and continuing action in Providence, we must
be careful not to blend our understanding of creation and Providence to the
extent that we struggle to distinguish between them. For example, Macquarrie
comes close to failing to make such a distinction when he writes that, “in the
present system, the assertion of God’s providence is just another way of
asserting his constant creating and sustaining energy.”
135 By contrast, Gunton
recognises the interrelatedness of creation and Providence, as has Barth,
Pannenberg, Hefner and others above, yet along with them seeks also to make
a clear distinction between them. He writes,
The chief difference between the concepts of creation and
providence is, then, first that providence presupposes creation,
presupposes that there is something to provide for; while, second,
creation presupposes providence, for although it is a finished act, it
is not the finished act of the deist machine maker, but of one who
has in view the care for and governing of the creation. There are
thus different forms of divine relationship to the creation: one
which, because it is concerned with origination, distinguishes the
creator from the creation; and the other which brings them together
in an active co-existence … Providence is what God makes of the
created world which has been given its own being distinct from
him. There is a different form of relationship: interaction as
distinct from origination.
136
Indeed, Hodge is particularly cognisant of the dangers of blurring such a
distinction of relationship. He is prepared to recognise and agree with the
fundamental point, often held by Reformed theologians, that preservation in
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Providence means that, “the world owes its continued existence to the
uninterrupted exercise of the divine power.”
137 That is, God is as active in
Providence as he was in his originating act of creation. But, he holds a deep
reservation that the two doctrines might become confounded if the point is
pushed further. In particular, he lists those aspects that distinguish Providence
from creation. Firstly, creation is calling into existence that which previously
had no existence, whereas Providence continues, or causes to continue, that
which already has existence. Secondly, in creation there can be no
cooperation, but in Providence he posits that there is a divine-human
concurrence of first and second causes.
138 If we define Providence as a
continuous creation then God becomes the sole cause in the universe and
second causes are denied. He is concerned that this will lead to a denial of
responsibility – “no sin and no holiness.”
139 But further to this, he is concerned
that the idea of continuous creation will destroy the idea of continuity of
existence. That is, “If God creates any given thing every moment out of
nothing, it ceases to be the same thing. It is something new, however similar to
what existed before.”
140 Finally, he expresses concern that between this
understanding and Pantheism, “there is scarcely a dividing line. Pantheism
merges the universe in God, but not more effectually than the doctrine of a
continuous creation.”
141
In my view, such criticism should provoke a sense of caution in our expression
of the relationship between creation and Providence. Hodge’s opposition to the
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idea of continuous creation, as evidenced by his final comment above, carries
merit if continuous creation is understood as God recreating the universe in
every single moment of time. That is, that Creation is continually ceasing to be
and so God must continually cause it to be, as was taught by Heim.
142 An
alternative and in my view more appropriate perspective is to affirm, along
with Hodge, a logical and conceptual relationship – that is, that creation and
Providence are linked not only in that one follows logically from the other but
that God’s activity and dynamic involvement in his originating creative act
does not end at its completion. As Gunton indicated above, God remains active
and dynamically involved over and within the cosmos. It is a matter of
recognising and simultaneously maintaining both the connection and
distinction that exists between creation and Providence. If we are able to keep
this balance, we are able to avoid the extremes of a deistic absentee Creator on
the one hand and an overly immanent pantheistic Creator on the other.
143 In
the context of Old Testament theology, Dyrness has commented,
Here we are struck with the same tension of independence and
dependence that we noted earlier. On the one hand, Genesis 2:2-3
implies that in some sense God ended his work. But this does not
mean that God turned away from creation (as deists believe), but
rather that he turned toward it. God’s relationship to creation is
changed, but it is not less intimate.
144
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Providence and the Doctrine of God
Yet, although one may accept that a logical and conceptual relationship exists
between the doctrines of creation and Providence, one may similarly notice, as
we did with the earlier survey of theological and confessional understandings
of Providence, that the statement and justification of this linkage is often
grounded in the nature of God himself. For example, Pannenberg asserts that
creation and Providence are actions of God and that these actions derive from
his own existence and nature.
145 Oden affirms Providence as, “the expression
of the divine will, power and goodness,” thereby linking the nature of
Providence with the nature of God.
146 Brunner links his understanding of
Providence with God’s loving nature and its focus in his salvific intentions in
the Son, as does Niermann.
147 In other words, although Providence is related to
creation, there appears to be general recognition that this doctrine, in a
fundamental and epistemological sense, receives its ultimate shape from the
doctrine of God – that is, and as mentioned earlier, there is an implication that
because God is like this he therefore acts in Providence like that. As Brunner
states, “Everything that happens has its final ground in God.”
148
Consequently, the foundational understanding one adopts in relation to the
doctrine of God significantly impacts, perhaps even prescribes, one’s
corresponding theological understanding of the nature and application of
God’s providential relationship with his creation. We noted earlier the extent
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to which the Open Theism debate on models of Providence is, in essence,
debate concerning different conceptions of God. In almost every conceivable
way, the doctrine of God provides the structure and shape for theological
reflection. Indeed, Erickson notes that the doctrine of God “… serves as the
framework for the rest of theology.”
149 Furthermore, since the doctrine of
Providence stands as a form of focal point where foundational and often
deeply-held theological convictions meet, it appears clear also that any
adoption of a particular conception of God and thereby of his providential
preservation and guidance of his creation will necessarily impact upon a
myriad of other theological issues. In the context of the Open Theism debate,
Ware recognizes the potential impact that this model of divine Providence can
have on other areas of thought and life. He comments, “To get it wrong here is
to create a thousand related problems, both theological and practical.”
150 It is
therefore of paramount importance that any consideration of divine Providence
constantly keeps its understanding of God in view and recognises the extent to
which it informs and guides the discussion. Consequently, the centrality of
God in the doctrine of Providence provides ample justification in itself for this
dissertation’s adoption of a trinitarian perspective and is its distinctive and
specific way of keeping the divine in divine Providence in clear view.
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Providence and Faith
However, recognition of the centrality of God to our understanding of
Providence also means that belief in Providence is an affirmation of faith –
that is, belief in Providence derives ultimately from belief in God. If
Providence is understood as being related to creation then we recognize that it
is by faith that we affirm God as the Creator.
151 Indeed, it is only when one
looks upon history through the eyes of faith that one is able to be “certain” of
the providential hand of God.
152 It is toward this recognition that Hefner
comments that,
… the necessity for creation to be linked with faith is even more
vividly brought home to us when we consider Providence. Only
faith could look on this world and call it ‘creation.’ Similarly, only
such a faithful reflection could look on the ongoing processes of
nature and history and call them ‘creatio continua, concursus,
gubernatio – providence.’
153
In affirming the same, Berkouwer draws a distinction between what has been
called “mixed articles” and “pure articles.”
154 In other words, he asks – is
divine Providence something that can be known through natural means as well
as supernatural revelation (a mixed article)? Or can it only be known through
faith derived from special or supernatural revelation (a pure article)? Put
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another way – is it possible to come to belief in divine Providence, even in a
very general sense, outside of the Christian faith? Some theologians, for
example Bavinck, would question whether such a basic conception of
Providence derived from the created world would bear any resemblance to a
biblical and Christian understanding of Providence. He points out that non-
Christian conceptions of Providence are often more theoretical than actual and
sometimes oscillate between chance and fate.
155 Furthermore, it could be
argued that an understanding of Providence derived from natural means often
ends up affirming little more than a sense of personal or corporate destiny or
of a sense of leading or ruling by some supreme being or an impersonal
“uncaused cause,” something akin to Aristotle’s “Unmoved Mover.”
156 Such
conceptions are far-removed from the biblical and Christian understanding of a
personal God who creates and then continues to sustain and guide. Alongside
these concerns could be added the noetic problem of our knowledge of God –
that is, it can be argued that this view seems to have a too high regard for the
integrity and capability of human reason and fails to fully grasp the damaging
effect of sin both upon human reasoning itself and upon the observed created
order.
157
In my view, it appears more likely that belief in divine Providence is what
Berkouwer would call a “pure article” in that it derives primarily from a
response to divine revelation that is expressed in faith and trust in God. It is
God who has revealed himself to be a providential God – he is the one who
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sustains, preserves and guides the cosmos. Consequently, belief in the notion
of Providence derives from belief in the God of Providence. Rather than
finding its foundation in human philosophical constructions, a belief in divine
Providence finds its foundation in divine revelation.
158 Barth similarly
recognises this fact – he knew that, from a human standpoint, we sometimes
struggle to see the providential hand of God in human affairs. Yet, he answers
this human lack with an emphatic “Nevertheless” – that is, from the standpoint
of faith Providence can be seen. He writes,
The faith awakened at the one point by the revelation of God, being
faith in God the Lord, is necessarily faith in His lordship even at
points where there is no such revelation, where to all appearances
we have to do only with creaturely occurrence, where the order and
contingencies of nature, the works of caprice and the cleverness or
folly, the goodness or badness of men seem to be the only reality.
Nevertheless, God Himself is He who is freely and graciously and
mightily present and active at these points too as the One who is
prior to all creaturely occurrence, supreme over it and at work in it.
This Nevertheless is the problem of the belief in providence and the
doctrine of providence. It can only be Nevertheless ... There can be
no question of a transparency proper to this occurrence as such, or
of an inherent ability of man to see through it ... If he did not begin
with faith in God’s providence, he might try to interpret this
movement and development in different ways. But he certainly
could not maintain and confess that God is the Lord who is prior to
this occurrence, supreme over it and at work in it. The belief in
providence maintains and confesses this with its Nevertheless.
159
                                                   
158 Indeed, I would argue that divine revelation, whether it be of Providence, Trinity or
whatever, is able to thereby avoid the objection that our conceptions of God and his actions are
nothing more than human projections. This was the fundamental criticism of Feuerbach
toward what he considered to be the repressive orthodoxy of the 19
th century. In his view, “the
secret of theology is nothing else than anthropology – the knowledge of God nothing else than
a knowledge of man!” – see L. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (New York: Harper &
Row, 1957), p. 207. This view finds an echo in Karl Marx, who was significantly influenced
by Feuerbach, with his statement, “Man makes religion, religion does not make man” – see K.
Marx, “Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” in C. E. Gunton, S. R. Holmes
and M. A. Rae, The Practice of Theology: A Reader (London: SCM, 2001), p. 356. Far from
being a human construction – or, as Feuerbach puts it, “in revelation man goes out of himself,
in order, by circuitous path, to return to himself!” (p. 207) – this dissertation assumes that God
has indeed revealed himself and he has done so accurately and sufficiently.
159 K. Barth, Church Dogmatics Vol. III/3 (Edinburgh: T & T Clarke, 1960), p. 44.89
In many ways it was this fundamental faith aspect of Providence that was the
turning point in the understanding of this doctrine by the sixteenth century
Reformer, John Calvin. Earlier in Calvin’s theological journey one can detect a
largely positive appraisal of Stoicism’s view on Providence – that is, that the
world is not floating aimlessly but is under divine control.
160 Yet, by at least
the late 1540s, he seems to experience a reversal of his once positive
assessment of what he perceives to be a human philosophical construct.
161 This
leads him in turn to the acknowledgement that recognition of divine
Providence derives not from philosophy but from faith. Reardon makes the
comment,
To begin with, he no longer regards Providence as a philosophical
theory, but as a truth known only by faith. Christian Providence,
after all, must preserve two basic truths: God is all-governing and
man is free. According to Calvin it is impossible for the human
mind to maintain both ideas conceptually. It is a matter for faith.
Both insights must ‘converge in God.’ In man’s mind they do not
converge, but remain a contradiction surpassed only in faith …
philosophy could not arrive at the proper understanding of
Providence: it was a doctrine known only from the Word of
God.
162
In one sense, then, Barth and Calvin would be in agreement with Macquarrie
when he writes, “It has to be insisted that this doctrine begins as an act of faith
                                                   
160 This is particularly noticeable in his first published work, his commentary on Seneca’s de
Clementia, in which, among other things, he speaks of “Mistress Reason”; interjects a Stoic
expression into a quotation by Plato (thereby Stoicising on Plato); speaks of the body being the
servant of the soul; speaks positively of the Stoic virtue of moderation – see P. H. Reardon,
“Calvin on Providence: The Development of an Insight,” Scottish Journal of Theology 28/6
(1975): 518-519.
161 The difficulties that broke Calvin’s appreciation of Stoicism appear to have been the
fatalistic overtones he began to sense as well as his dissatisfaction with the Stoic
understanding of the virtue known as apatheia. In relation to the latter, Reardon comments,
“He had apparently become aware that apatheia was not recommended in the Gospels and the
example of Jesus. Did not Jesus display those very emotions which the Stoics eschewed?” –
see P. H. Reardon, “Calvin on Providence: The Development of an Insight,” Scottish Journal
of Theology: 521.
162 P. H. Reardon, “Calvin on Providence: The Development of an Insight,” Scottish Journal of
Theology: 523-524.90
and hope … it does not begin as a speculation about the world.”
163 Yet, though
there is agreement that Providence is primarily a revealed doctrine and is only
appropriated through faith, differences do arise between them concerning the
mode of such revelation. For example, Calvin’s emphasis is upon the written
Word of God, brought to life in the believer’s experience through the Holy
Spirit.
164 Barth’s emphasis is upon the personal revelation of God in Christ that
awakens faith within.
165 Macquarrie’s emphasis is upon the existential basis of
belief in Providence in which we become aware of the presence of Being.
166
Despite these differences, it remains agreed that belief in Providence is exactly
that – an expression of faith in response to divine revelation.
167
Furthermore, it should be noted that if an awareness of divine Providence is
primarily a matter of faith-response to revelation, then it follows that this
awareness or knowledge is linked with Christ. This must be so for the
revelational aspect of divine Providence is indissolubly linked with the
foundational Christian assertion that God’s revelation of himself is found
primarily and supremely in the person of Christ. As Weber has put it, “Faith in
providence … is faith in Christ.” 
168 Later in his exposition, he enlarges upon
this statement by asserting that, “The Christian belief in providence differs
                                                   
163 J. Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p. 222.
164 J. Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion Vol. 1 (The Library of Christian Classics, Vol.
XX; London: SCM, 1960), pp. 69-81.
165 “It’s [Providence’s] revelation is not world-occurrence itself, but the Word of God, Jesus
Christ … Hence the object of the belief in providence can only be God Himself, as God
Himself in His revelation in Jesus Christ is its only basis” – K. Barth, Church Dogmatics Vol.
III/3, p. 20.
166 Macquarrie writes, “Belief in Providence, like belief in creation itself, is founded
existentially … [we] become aware of the presence of Being, acting on us and in us, and
giving itself to us” – J. Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, p. 220.
167 Henry comments, “The effort to vindicate divine providence apart from the biblical
revelation of God and his creative and redemptive relation to the universe, and solely by
emperical observation nature and history, is therefore futile” - C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation
and Authority Vol. VI/2, p. 458.
168 O. Weber, Foundations of Dogmatics Vol. 1, p. 506.91
from every other view of the course of the world and of life in that it is derived
from the perception of the divine Yes to his creature, that is, from the event of
the incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection of Jesus Christ.”
169 In other
words, recognition of divine Providence is derived from faith that is a response
to divine revelation and that divine revelation is found primarily in a faith
encounter with Jesus Christ. Similarly, Berkouwer declares, “The only
conclusion is that in the doctrine of Providence we have a specific Christian
confession exclusively possible through a true faith in Jesus Christ.”
170
Consequently, just as we may speak of the centrality of God to our
understanding of Providence so also may we speak of the primacy of Christ to
our understanding of the God of Providence.
Certainly, from a scriptural point of view there would appear to be an
emphatic witness to the primacy of Christ that includes the biblical concept of
divine Providence. As noted earlier in this chapter, the scriptures say not only
that all things were created by him and through him and in him all things hold
together (Colossians 1:16-17), but that it is toward the consummation of all
things in him that history is moving (Ephesians 1:10). Bromiley asserts that
this “christological reference” in Providence is in fact, “providence par
excellence.”
171 Indeed, to consider Providence independently of Jesus Christ
runs the risk of reductionism. This is so for if Providence is concerned with the
relationship between God the creator and his creation, then it must be
acknowledged as paradigmatic that it is through Christ’s redemptive work that
                                                   
169 O. Weber, Foundations of Dogmatics Vol. 1, p. 509.
170 G. C. Berkouwer, The Providence of God, pp. 44-45.
171 G. W. Bromiley, “Providence,” in G. W. Bromiley (ed.), International Standard Bible
Encyclopedia Vol. 3, p. 1021.92
God’s restoration of relationship with estranged humanity is accomplished.
172
It is for this reason that both the Heidelberg and Belgic confessions, for
example, identify the Christian confession of divine Providence with the
redemption that is found in Christ.
173 As such, this christological aspect of
divine Providence is a clear point of contact with trinitarian theology and
therefore will be investigated in Part Three of this dissertation.
It is necessary, at this point, to summarise our investigation of Providence in
this present chapter. We have surveyed various theological formulations on
divine Providence, particularly with reference to the Open Theism proposal,
and have identified some of the major emphases or issues that both unite and
divide understandings. In particular, we have noted those issues that have
some form of correlation with trinitarian theology or that show potential in
being considered from a trinitarian perspective. These issues are the nature of
divine transcendence, sovereignty (including omniscience), immutability and
impassibility. Hence, these issues will form the structure of Part Three of this
dissertation. Finally, we have considered the centrality of God and the
necessity of faith in theological understandings of Providence. We have found
that an understanding of the nature of God is a significant, if not primary,
influence upon understanding the nature of Providence. This, in turn, leads us
necessarily to a consideration of the nature of God as a specifically triune
being. Consequently, we are now in a position to shift our attention from the
God who provides to the God who is triune.
                                                   
172 J. Cottrell, God the Ruler, p. 120.
173 C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation and Authority Vol. VI/2, p. 478.93
As mentioned in Chapter One, there has been a remarkable resurgence in
trinitarian theology in recent years
174 and some of it appears to have a similarly
strong emphasis upon a highly relational model of Christian theism. Just as
Open Theism seeks to emphasise a highly relational model of Providence –
that is, between God and the world – so also certain aspects of recent
trinitarian theology have a highly relational model of illuminating the intra-
trinitarian divine life. Consequently, it is a necessary step in our investigation
to discuss more fully aspects of this developing trinitarian emphasis upon
relationality before we begin to articulate a distinctive trinitarian doctrine of
Providence, and so it is to this subject that we now turn.
                                                   
174 R. J. Feenstra and C. Plantinga Jr, “Introduction,” in R. J. Feenstra and C. Plantinga Jr
(eds), Trinity, Incarnation and Atonement (Library of Religious Philosophy, Vol. 1; Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), p. 3.94
CHAPTER FOUR
THE TRIUNE GOD
“Everything depends on the doctrine of God; and for Christian theology that
means that everything hangs on the doctrine of the Trinity. But, as at least the
last two centuries have shown, there are trinities and there are trinities.” So
wrote Gunton in an editorial introducing some recent articles on trinitarian
theology.
1 It is with some representatives of such “trinities” that this chapter is
concerned and is thereby the next developmental step in the construction of
my argument in support of my thesis.
As outlined earlier, the intention of Part Two of this dissertation is to advance
or introduce a trinitarian perspective on divine Providence by surveying and,
in a preliminary sense, interacting with developments in recent theologies of
Providence and Trinity. At this stage of my investigation, this interaction is
necessarily limited for I am simply seeking to establish a level foundation by
identifying some of the central issues of Providence which show promise for
clarification and illumination if viewed from a trinitarian perspective. A more
detailed and rigorous engagement of these issues waits until Part Three where
I will seek to articulate more clearly a trinitarian perspective on Providence.
                                                
1 C. E. Gunton, “Editorial,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 5/1 (2003): 1.95
However, at this stage I am particularly concerned with identifying what is a
common heartbeat in recent theologies of Providence and Trinity – that is, an
emphasis upon a highly relational model of Christian theism – and then
drawing out its implications. As we saw in the previous chapter, the Open
Theism proposal is one that seeks to reflect an essential relationality between
God and humanity and some of the basis for this derives from a consideration
of God in his triune self. Consequently, with this developmental trajectory in
view, this present chapter builds upon the previous by similarly providing a
survey and preliminary interaction with various theological formulations,
though this time shifting the focus from the God who provides to the God who
is triune. For reasons of brevity, this survey is also similarly limited in that I
focus particularly upon three recent treatments of trinitarian theology – drawn
from the Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant communities of the Christian
church – and my interaction with each concentrates upon those aspects or
emphases which potentially impact upon my primary study of the doctrine of
Providence.
2 Of specific interest to me are those aspects of trinitarian theology
that centre upon any interaction or reflection between God as he is in his
ontological self and God as he is in his action toward his creation. The
identification of such emphases in trinitarian thought not only provides a fresh
perspective on issues of divine Providence, but also shows promise in
advancing the contemporary debate outlined in the previous chapter.
                                                
2 For more general historical summaries of Trinitarian controversies and the development of
Trinitarian theology, see E. J. Fortman, The Triune God: A Historical Study of the Doctrine of
the Trinity (Theological Resources; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1972); C. B. Kaiser, The
Doctrine of God: An Historical Survey (Foundations for Faith; Marshall, Morgan and Scott,
1982); J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds (London: Longmans, 2
nd ed., 1960) and Early
Christian Doctrines (London: Black, 5
th ed., 1977).96
The Profit and Peril of Trinitarian Theological Reflection
Any careful approach to a discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity should be
accompanied with a requisite sense of cautious apprehension. This is so for we
are embarking upon inquiry into a subject that contains aspects that have
perplexed generations of thoughtful believers and we are acutely aware of the
dual dangers of overstating or understating aspects of this doctrine.
3 Yet, we
are also simultaneously conscious of the enormous potential benefit –
spiritually, intellectually and practically – which derives from a reverent
consideration of God as Trinity. As both Letham and Toon have noted, it
would benefit us to be mindful of the words of Augustine,
And I would make this pious and safe agreement, in the presence
of our Lord God, with all who read my writings … which inquire
into the unity of the Trinity of the Father and the Son and the Holy
Spirit; because in no other subject is error more dangerous, or
inquiry more laborious, or the discovery of truth more profitable.
4
Such Augustinian advice as to the potential benefits and simultaneous
potential dangers of inquiry into the triune God leads me to make the
observation that the early centuries of the Christian church were characterised
by the actualisation of both potentials. In other words, significant
                                                
3 Indeed, Pseudo-Dionysius, probably writing from Syria in the late fifth or early sixth century,
recognized the essential musth/rion of the Trinity and the limitation of human faculties to
describe it. He wrote, “But no unity or trinity, no number or oneness, no fruitfulness, indeed,
nothing that is or is known can proclaim that hiddenness beyond every mind and reason of the
transcendent Godhead which transcends every being” – Pseudo-Dionysius, “The Divine
Names,” 13.3, in J. Farina (ed.), Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works (The Classics of
Western Spirituality; New York: Paulist Press, 1987), p. 129.
4 Augustine, “On the Trinity,” in P. Schaff (ed.), A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers of the Christian Church Series I, Vol. III (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956), p. 19
(I.III.5). Part or all of this quotation is cited in both R. Letham, “The Trinity – Yesterday,
Today and the Future,” Themelios 28/1 (2002): 28 and P. Toon, Our Triune God: A Biblical
Portrayal of the Trinity (Wheaton, USA: Bridgepoint, 1996), p. 11.97
breakthroughs and widespread errors in trinitarian theology occurred in these
early centuries.
In a sense, this simultaneous actualisation should not surprise us for although
the reality of heresy is an intrinsically negative phenomenon,
5 the existence of
these various early century heresies had the positive influence of forcing the
rest of the Christian church to be more precise in its orthodox formulations.
6
Indeed, this interrelationship of heresy and orthodoxy raises the question of
chronological precedence. For example, one might argue with Brown that the
existence of heretical viewpoints presupposed the existence of orthodox belief.
In other words, orthodoxy did not follow heresy as a reaction to it but, rather,
preceded it. It was heresy that followed orthodoxy and reacted to it.
7 Yet, if
one accepts this assessment of heresy being subsequent to orthodoxy, it still
does not negate the clarifying influence that heresy has upon orthodoxy. In
many ways, heresy does precipitate a reaction in orthodoxy in that the
Christian church is forced to state or restate doctrinal belief with a higher
                                                
5 Etymologically, “heresy” (or aiºresiß) originally carried the simple and neutral meaning of
“faction” or “party” (hence, its meaning in Acts 5:17, 15:5 and 26:5). Josephus and other
writers of antiquity, used the word in this way – see O. Skarsaune, “Heresy and the Pastoral
Epistles,” Themelios 20/1 (1994): 9. However, it later came to be used of those who had
separated or who had moved away from orthodoxy (as in 1 Corinthians 11:19 and Galatians
5:20). Heresy began to indicate more than just simple doctrinal disagreement, but “…
something that undercut the very basis for Christian existence” – see H. O. J. Brown,
Heresies: Heresy and Orthodoxy in the History of the Church (Grand Rapids: Baker Book
House, 1984), p. 2.
6 Wells argues that “orthodoxy” can be used in two ways – to describe the apostolic teaching
or tradition and to describe the church’s clarification of what was involved in believing the
teaching of scripture. The former is a “fixed, static, enduring, unchanging body of truth which
is to be believed and obeyed.” The latter, something that is “fluid and open to revision.” He
names the former “biblical orthodoxy” and the latter “ecclesiastical orthodoxy” – D. F. Wells,
The Person of Christ: A Biblical and Historical Analysis of the Incarnation (Foundations for
Faith; Westchester, Illinois: Crossway Books, 1984), p. 86.
7 H. O. J. Brown, Heresies, p. 5. This perspective is reflected in Studer’s comment, when
discussing the role of heresies in the early church, that, “…one of the main concerns of the
Church was to safeguard the apostolic tradition” – see B. Studer, “A Search for a Synthesis of
Biblical Thought,” in A. Di Berardino and B. Studer (eds), History of Theology: The Patristic
Period (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1996), p. 392.98
degree of precision.
8 Even Augustine recognized the value of heresy, even
characterising it as a “gift of divine providence,” for it provokes both the
seeking and expounding of truth.
9 This interfacing of orthodoxy and heresy,
therefore, has both a positive and negative side. The negative side is bound up
in the very existence of heresy – of false or incorrect articulation of belief –
that stands in opposition to orthodoxy. Yet, the positive side is seen in the
subsequent clarification and illumination that often comes from this
interfacing. As Carson comments, “Theological reflection and precision,
ripening orthodoxy, are often triggered by heresy.”
10
In connection with this, it can be argued that the early centuries of Christian
theological development were marked with a capacity for theological
creativity.
11 That is, as the church sought to formulate orthodox belief, often in
response to heretical challenges, it is an inevitable part of that process that
                                                
8 Indeed, Brown admits as much in his later discussion on Marcion and Montanus when he
writes, “The church existed, real enough, and it had something like a generally accepted canon
or standard of faith. But – as our discussion has indicated – in the second century these things
were more implicit than explicit. Christianity did not work them out in detail and express them
with clarity until after they had been challenged by dynamic leaders such as Marcion and
Montanus” – H. O. J. Brown, Heresies, p. 70. When considering the early church’s
deliberations over trinitarian theology, Kaiser reaches a similar conclusion as to the clarifying
“value” of heretical viewpoints when he writes, “As the teachings of Arius and his followers
had led to the Nicene definition that the Son was of one substance with the Father, the
teachings of Marcellus of Ancyra (c 335) led to the general acceptance of the idea of three
hypostases” (Marcellus had interpreted the term oJmoousioß in a quasi-Sabellian fashion) – C.
B. Kaiser, The Doctrine of God, p. 69.
9 When commenting on 1 Corinthians 11:19, in which Paul states that the divisions and
factions among the Corinthian believers shows more clearly those who are genuine, Augustine
states, “Let us also make use of that gift of divine providence [that is, heretics]. Men become
heretics who would have no less held wrong opinions even within the Church. Now that they
are outside they do us more good, not by teaching the truth, for they do not know it, but by
provoking carnal Catholics to seek the truth and spiritual Catholics to expound it” – see
Augustine, “Of True Religion,” in J. H. S. Burleigh (ed.), Augustine: Earlier Writings (Library
of Christian Classics, Vol. VI; London: SCM, 1953), p. 233.
10 D. A. Carson, The Gagging of God: Christianity Confronts Pluralism (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1996), p. 356.
11 Studer comments that the Fathers “arrived at new insights, that they succeeded in placing
the baptismal faith in ever new perspectives” and “adapted the gospel to their time … thereby
also opened up to faithful knowledge depths of the divine mysteries unknown until then” – B.
Studer, Trinity and Incarnation: The Faith and the Early Church (London: T & T Clark,
1993), p. 245.99
creative steps had to be taken by some as they sought to propose new or
innovative perspectives to make better conceptual sense of God’s revelation of
himself.
12 For example, in the context of discussing the divine persons,
Aquinas recognises the need for creativity in theological development when he
writes that, “We have to look for new words about God which express the old
faith because we have to argue with heretics.”
13 Equally inevitably, some of
these early creative steps proved to be “oversteps” and so on occasion
orthodoxy had to rein in such development by demonstrating how and why the
steps taken were unwise, unbiblical, unfruitful or simply wrong-headed. Yet,
the very presence of creative steps in the process of theological development
brought about the situation in which greater precision and illumination of
Christian belief was the result.
In a similar sense, one wonders whether much current theological controversy
derives from this existence of creative steps in theological development – that
is, in the tension of seeking to be faithful to the revelation of God in scripture
and yet being creative in the articulation of it to the contemporary church.
Indeed, in current times Gunton has gone so far as to ask, “But what is
                                                
12 Nestorius, a preacher from Antioch who became bishop of Constantinople in 428CE, is a
case in point. Although proclaimed a heretic at Ephesus in 431CE, it remains a perennial
question as to whether he indeed believed that for which he has been condemned (that two
persons – one divine and one human – exist in juxtaposition, without any organic union, in the
person of Christ). It can be argued that his chief error was his desire for precision – he refused
to accept the term qeotokoß (God-bearing one) to describe Mary for he believed it gave the
impression that Christ was not human. On occasion, he allowed it so long as it was used in
conjunction with the term ajnqrwpotokoß. He even proposed the term Cristotokoß as a
way out of the controversy. Yet, possibly as the result of the excessive zeal and vindictiveness
of Cyril of Alexandria, Nestorius’ creativity and desire for precision arguably resulted in his
banishment to exile somewhere in the East – see H. O. J. Brown, Heresies, pp. 172-175 and D.
F. Wells, The Person of Christ, pp. 106-108.
13 T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ Vol. 6 (London: Blackfriars, 1965), p. 55 (1a.29.3).100
theology apart from intellectual risk?”
14 Certainly, the reaction to the Open
Theism proposal, summarised in the previous chapter, is a case in point.
Although contemporary theological discourse would usually avoid the use of
terms such as “heresy,” due to its emotiveness and the anachronistic baggage
that sometimes comes with it,
15 many of the critics of Open Theism would yet
accuse it of having “overstepped” and moved into error, particularly
concerning its position on divine foreknowledge.
16 While this may indeed
prove to be the case, other more charitable assessments may see in the Open
Theism proposal the presence of some creative steps as theologians have
thought through their understanding of God and the world.
17 Some may even
see some Open Theists as positive change agents, something akin to those
described by Küng as “young Turks.”
18 The extent to which Open Theists may
have overstepped remains to be seen, but the fact that their taking a step has
generated renewed thinking in some circles is beyond doubt. The positive
aspect of such creativity in theological development is that it provokes deeper
                                                
14 C. E. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1991), p. vii.
15 For example, Jewett similarly believes such language should be avoided and he deplores the
“anathemas” of the ancients and the “epithets” of the Protestant Reformers. Yet, he does not
want a swing in theological language to the opposite extreme where nothing is said with
conviction, for he likewise commends “the enthusiasm, power and eloquence with which they
wrote on the grand themes of ‘the faith once delivered to the saints’.” He concludes, “In a day
of religious tolerance and theological pluralism, there are still some things that need to be said
with vigor and conviction” – P. K. Jewett, God, Creation and Revelation: A Neo-Evangelical
Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), p. 49.
16 Although it must be said that some critics of Open Theism have not shied away from the
label “heresy” – see C. A. Hall and J. Sanders, Does God Have a Future? A Debate on Divine
Providence (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 2003), pp. 169-175. Letham believes that
Open Theism “is close to heresy” – R. Letham, “Is God Omniscient?” Reformation Today 187
(2002): 32.
17 For example, R. E. Olson, “Has God been held hostage by philosophy?” Christianity Today
39/1 (1995): 30-32 and his discussion of the interface between “traditionalists” and
“reformists” in R. E. Olson, “The Future of Evangelical Theology,” Christianity Today 42/2
(1998): 40-42, 44, 47-48. See also,
18 Küng describes the “young Turks” as those who often bring change both in natural science
and theology – H. Küng, Theology for the Third Millennium: An Ecumenical View (London:
Doubleday, 1988), pp. 123-169.101
awareness and clearer thinking amongst others.
19 In the context of Open
Theism, Pinnock himself has stated,
Will the open view of God be widely accepted? Perhaps not, given
the hostility of certain Calvinists and the suspicion of many
Arminians. But even if it is not accepted, it is a good discussion we
are having and the model can prove fruitful even if it does not
entirely succeed. In words that our critics like to use: let the will of
the Lord be done.
20
When one considers recent development in theologies of Trinity one can also
note how some presentations have provoked reactions. Some of these reactions
are negative in that some presentations of trinitarian theology are perceived as
misguided “oversteps” and a deviation from orthodoxy. For example, Blocher
considers the contributions of Moltmann, Jüngel and Pannenberg to be less
than helpful and characterised by a fidelity to the Zeitgeist rather than to
scripture and tradition. He even utilizes Lessing’s “ugly ditch” terminology
21
and argues that, “The wide gulf, or ‘ugly ditch,’ that lies between orthodox
doctrine and the new trinities should not be minimized.”
22 Similarly,
Wainwright perceives some feminist, deistic and religionist constructions as
                                                
19 See Grenz’s discussion on “boundaried” and “centred” groups in theological discussion – S.
J. Grenz, “Die begrenzte Gemeinschaft (‘The Boundaried People’) and the Character of
Evangelical Theology,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 45/2 (2002): 301-316.
20 C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness (Carlisle, UK:
Paternoster, 2001), p. 186.
21 Lessing writes of an “ugly, broad ditch” that exists, in his mind, between what he terms
“accidental truths of history” and the far superior, “necessary truths of reason” – G. E.
Lessing, “On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power,” in H. Chadwick (ed.), Lessing’s
Theological Writings (Library of Modern Religious Thought; London: Adam & Charles
Black, 1956), p. 55.
22 Blocher further comments, “We may be forgiven for asking a naïve question. For all their
artful and learned presentation, whether in the more ‘user-friendly’ version of Moltmann or
the more sophisticated one of Jüngel, or through the tensions and twists of Pannenberg, would
any of these post-Hegelian constructions of the Trinity lead readers to believe in a One God,
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, apart from the memory of church dogma? They draw their
persuasive power from the compromise between external continuity with theological tradition,
including the use of trinitarian formulae, and philosophical concordance with the Zeitgeist” -
H. Blocher, “Immanence and Transcendence in Trinitarian Theology,” in K. J. Vanhoozer
(ed.), The Trinity in a Pluralistic Age: Theological Essays on Culture and Religion (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), p. 116.102
“… seeking such revisions of the inherited doctrine of the Trinity that their
success might in fact mean its abandonment, or at least such an alteration of its
content, status, and function that the whole face of Christianity would be
drastically changed.”
23 Other reactions, however, are positive and see in some
proposals new awareness, deeper thinking and genuine insight.
An Attitude of Charitable Discretion
With all of this in mind, I would argue that we should approach theological
proposals, whether they are concerned with Providence, Trinity or whatever,
with an attitude of charitable discretion – both interpreting them in their best
light while remaining prudent concerning their theological and biblical
foundations and the implications that are being drawn.
24 Just as Paul adjured
the Ephesian church to “speak the truth in love” (Ephesians 4:15),
25 so must
there also be a balance of truth and love, of discretion and charity, of caution
and openness, in our consideration of theological proposals.
26 To borrow from
my own Australian cultural context, this approach is the theological equivalent
of giving someone a “fair go.” It is with this posture in mind that, in this
present chapter, we now consider three recent contributions to trinitarian
theology. These are from John Zizioulas (Orthodox), Catherine LaCugna
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24 This approach has great similarity with what Sanders calls the practising of “dialogical
virtues.” These virtues include honesty, integrity, empathy, teachableness, persistence,
precision, articulateness and foresight - C. A. Hall and J. Sanders, Does God Have a Future?
pp. 191-192.
25 Literally, “truthing in love” (aÓlhqeu/onteß de« e˙n aÓga¿phØ).
26 Concerning the Pauline text, Stott comments, “The apostolic command is clear. We are to
‘maintain the truth in love,’ being neither truthless in our love, nor loveless in our truth, but
holding the two in balance” – J. Stott, Christ the Controversialist (London: Tyndale, 1970), p.
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(Catholic) and Paul Fiddes (Protestant). Although my treatment of each will
focus particularly upon the major individual written work produced by each on
the subject of the Trinity, it will not be limited to these works only.
Furthermore, I will treat each in the chronological order of their publication. In
Zizioulas’ case, it is the 1985 publication of his Being and Communion:
Studies in Personhood and the Church; with LaCugna it is the 1991
publication of her God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life; and with
Fiddes, it is the 2000 publication of his Participating in God: A Pastoral
Doctrine of the Trinity. Although seeking to identify the salient points of each,
and their relevance to Providence, we will spend the majority of our time with
Fiddes. This is so for Fiddes not only draws upon the work of both Zizioulas
and LaCugna (who draws upon Zizioulas), but the implications he draws from
his particular trinitarian study for the God/human interface is stark in its
similarities with Open Theism.
“BEING AS COMMUNION”
THE TRINITARIANISM OF JOHN ZIZIOULAS
At the time of publication of Being and Communion: Studies in Personhood
and the Church, Metropolitan John D. Zizioulas was Professor of Systematic
Theology at the University of Glasgow and had lectured widely, including the
Gregorian University in Rome and King’s College, London. Since then he has
been appointed titular Bishop of Pergamon and “is considered one of the most
influential Orthodox theologians of the present.”
27 As the title of the book
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suggests, the fundamental thrust of Zizioulas’ work is to investigate the notion
of conceiving “being” in terms of “communion.” Although the particular
application of his research is anthropological and ecclesial, in that he seeks to
apply this notion of communal being to what it means to be personal and to be
the church, his findings also bear upon issues of divine Providence.
28 In
particular, his emphasis upon the essential relationality of God as triune
provides a paradigm that can be suggestive of ways in which we might
conceive of this God guiding and providing for the world.
Drawing upon the writings of the early Fathers, in particular the Cappadocians,
Zizioulas advances the thesis that “the being of God is a relational being:
without the concept of communion it would not be possible to speak of the
being of God.”
29 Furthermore, “It would be unthinkable to speak of ‘one God’
before speaking of the God who is ‘communion,’ that is to say, of the Holy
Trinity. … The substance of God, ‘God,’ has no ontological content, no true
being, apart from communion.”
30  The creation of this communal ontology is,
in Zizioulas’ opinion, “perhaps the greatest philosophical achievement of
patristic thought.”
31 It came about as the Fathers sought to avoid the monistic
ontology of ancient Greek philosophy (in which the being of the world and of
God formed an “unbreakable unity”) and the disjointed ontology of
Gnosticism (in which the being of the world and of God were separated by a
                                                
28 For critical interaction with his thought in the context of ecclesiology, see the detailed
examination provided in M. Volf, After Our Likeness, pp. 73-123.
29 J. D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood,
USA: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985), p. 17.
30 J. D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 17.
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“gulf”).
32 In Zizioulas’ view, the early pastoral theologians, such as
Athanasius, Ignatius of Antioch and Irenaeus, brought focus to the
development by approaching the being of God from the perspective of the
church – that is, “ecclesial being.” Such an approach brought to light the
understanding that God as triune is a communion or “fellowship”
33 of persons
who, though distinct from human persons, calls others into relationship with
him and thereby become part of the communion or fellowship of the church.
The understanding that God is a relational being, which is the heart of
Zizioulas’ ontology of communion, developed in the early centuries as the
church moved from a Greek to a Christian conception of ontology. In
Zizioulas’ view, much of this development revolved around the divergence of
meaning that the word uJpo/stasiß came to experience. Formally, uJpo/stasiß
had been almost synonymous with oujsi÷a for both referred to the concept of
being. However, over time, uJpo/stasiß began to be disassociated from oujsi÷a
and took on relational dimensions when it was conjoined with pro/swpon – a
distinctly relational term. Generally speaking, I am inclined to agree with
Zizioulas’ identification of this development. Indeed, as Studer comments, it
was probably Basil of Caesarea who was the first to distinguish clearly
between oujsi÷a and uJpo/stasiß.
34 However, this development should not be
seen as clear-cut. The reality of the situation, which Zizioulas himself
acknowledges, was that uJpo/stasiß continued to enjoy a certain elasticity of
meaning depending on the context in which it was being utilised. For example,
                                                
32 J. D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 16.
33 Zizioulas himself appears to see “fellowship” as a suitable synonym for “communion” for
the Greek word koinwni÷a, usually translated as “fellowship,” is translated by him as
“communion” – see J. D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 145.
34 B. Studer, Trinity and Incarnation, p. 142.106
Athanasius himself seems to show a remarkable flexibility in his usage of the
term.
35
Relationality and Divine Ontology
Yet, what is significant in this divergence of meaning is that for Christian
theology relationality had entered the realm of ontology. In terms of Greek
philosophy, Zizioulas describes this development as nothing short of
revolutionary.
36 In fact, this development was evidence of a continuing process
whereby the Fathers utilised appropriate aspects of Greek ontology and
modified them along biblical lines. Zizioulas comments that conceptualising
substance or being with communion “was significant progress towards an
ontology founded on biblical premises, a decisive step towards a
Christianization of Hellenism.”
37 Indeed, one can see this relational ontology
developing as the Fathers grappled with expressing ontologically the triunity
of God, particularly in relation to the Son. For example, when the Fathers
concluded that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, they were thereby
implying “that substance possesses almost by definition a relational
character.”
38 The conclusion to this development in patristic theology is
summarised by Zizioulas in one phrase: “To be and to be in relation becomes
identical.”
39
                                                
35 See excursus  of J. H. Newman, “On the meaning of the phrase e˙x eJte÷raß uJposta¿sewß h£
ouJsi÷aß in the Nicene Anathema,” in P. Schaff and H. Wace (eds), A Select Library of Nicene
and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church Series II, Vol. IV (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1957), pp. 77-82.
36 J. D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 36.
37 J. D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 86.
38 J. D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 84 (italics his).
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What is particularly striking about Zizioulas’ positive assessment of this
“Christianization of Hellenism” is that he appears at no stage, as far as I am
able to establish, to suggest that the opposite occurred – that is, that Christian
theology was affected or infected with Greek ontological categories. This is
notable for one of the criticisms that Open Theism has levelled against the
traditional or classical understanding of Providence is that it is negatively
influenced by Hellenistic philosophical categories which is evidenced by
affirmations concerning divine immutability, impassibility, transcendence and
so on. In other words, Greek thought has so infected Christian theology that
we have developed an overly transcendent, inert and non-relational
understanding of God.
40 Yet, Zizioulas himself appears to see the utilization of
Hellenistic constructs in a positive light for he believes that Christian theology,
in a biblically informed way, developed and modified them rather than
remained captive to them. In fact, he argues that it was this very development
that ushered in the philosophically revolutionary idea of conceiving being as
communion. We will more fully investigate the question of Hellenistic thought
and its appropriation by the Fathers, particularly in how we might understand
immutability and impassibility in the context of Providence, in Part Three of
this dissertation.
However, to return to Zizioulas again, it is in the context of this highly
relational and communal understanding of the triune being of God that he
writes of the possibility of humanity participating in God. Although the idea of
                                                
40 For example, C. H. Pinnock et al, The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the
Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove: IVP, 1994), pp. 59-100 and C. H.
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communion (koinwni÷a) conjures up images of a “two-way” mutuality,
Zizioulas points out that the Fathers wrote of participation (metoch\) as being
essentially a “one-way” phenomenon. That is, it denotes that which occurs
with creatures in their relation to God and not for God in relation to his
creatures.
41 While we may participate in God, he does not need to participate
in us. Zizioulas calls the former communion by participation and the latter
communion without participation. The reason for this is that it reflects the
distinction between divinity and humanity – “God and the world cannot be
ontologically placed side by side as self-defined entities.”
42 Whereas God is
self-existent, we are God-dependent. As such, we are called to participate in
him, not him in us. Such “participation” is identified by Zizioulas as theosis or
“divinisation” and is not to be understood in a pantheistic way – “participation
not in the nature or substance of God, but in His personal existence.”
43 For
him, the idea of theosis is the “quintessance of salvation” and is made
available through the economy of salvation – in short, in Christ. He writes,
“Christ, the incarnate Christ, is the truth, for He represents the ultimate,
unceasing will of the ecstatic love of God, who intends to lead created being
into communion with His own life, to know Him and itself within this
communion-event.”
44
In a sense it is not surprising to see the idea of theosis occupying a central
place in Zizioulas’ theology and in particular his thesis of conceiving being as
communion, for divinisation (or deification or participation in God) has been
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43 J. D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, pp. 49-50.
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seen by some to be the “controlling doctrine” of Orthodox theology.
45 Indeed,
Clendinin has gone so far as to comment, “it is not too much to say that the
divinisation of humanity is the central theme, chief aim, basic purpose, or
primary religious ideal of Orthodoxy.”
46 In fact, “For Orthodoxy, deification is
‘the very essence of Christianity’.”
47 In this way, divinisation, deification or
participation in the God who is communion is actually a response to the
ecstatic love of God expressed in Christ. Just as the relationality of God’s
being is expressed definitively in the Incarnation, in the sense that the
Incarnation is an expression of the “overflow” of God’s triune love, so our
response to that love in a sense reverses the process. In other words, “when
God descended, assumed humanity, and was ‘incarnated,’ he opened the way
for people to ascend to him, assume divinity, and become ‘in-godded’.”
48
The heart of theosis, and why it is so central in Zizioulas’ theology, is that it
reflects the relationality that he believes defines God’s trinitarian being – a
being that is communion. Indeed, such is the intensity of this trinitarian
relationality and, therefore, such is the strength of this ecstatic triune love that
invites humanity to participate in the divine communal life, that Zizioulas
believes that the Incarnation itself was, in a sense, proactive rather than
reactive. That is, the Incarnation should not be seen primarily as a divine
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the Evangelical Theological Society 40/2 (1997): 257.
46 D. B. Clendinin, Eastern Orthodox Christianity: A Western Perspective (Grand Rapids:
Baker, 1994), p. 120. See also H. Alfeyev, “The Deification of Man in Eastern Patristic
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reaction to the Fall, but as something which flows directly out of the divine life
and could not but have occurred. He writes, “All things were made with Christ
in mind, or rather at heart, and for this reason irrespective of the fall of man,
the incarnation would have occurred.”
49 In other words, the Incarnation is
simply evidence of the highly relational and “other-centred” nature of the
triune God as he reaches out to his creatures, desiring to draw them into
participation with himself. It should be noted that this notion of eternal
incarnational intentionality appears to be characteristic of highly relational
understandings of God as triune and can be found, among others, in Gunton,
50
Pannenberg
51 and Torrance.
52 We have already noted the primacy that Christ is
given within consideration of divine Providence in that salvation history, or
Heilsgeschichte, is seen by many as interweaving with general history and
indeed shaping the latter so that it serves the former.
53 In many ways, Christ is
a type of “mirror” of Providence.
54
A Sense of Imbalance -  jOusi÷a and  JUpostasiß
Yet, despite the vigour with which Zizioulas espouses his perspective on
“being as communion,” there are aspects of his treatment that appear
problematic. Firstly, it is difficult not to detect a sense of imbalance in
Zizioulas such is his insistence upon the ontological pre-eminence of
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uJpo/stasiß. Certainly, it should be acknowledged that, in the West particularly,
many believe that there has been an emphasis or priority given to the idea of
oneness or substance, as evidenced by centuries of dogmatics that have treated
the one being of God and have then moved to consider God as triune as a type
of addendum. Yet, Zizioulas is almost too predisposed in the other direction.
Indeed, Wilks has commented, “His entire attitude to the ousia is so negative
that it is difficult to see that he can actually support the one ousia, three
prosopa statement that he quotes.”
55 This leads me to wonder whether
Zizioulas’ understanding of uJpo/stasiß, as against oujsi÷a, as the primary
ontological principle is in fact an over-reaction and an unnecessary one at that.
Williams certainly thinks he has over-stated the case, particularly concerning
his view of Western trinitarianism’s alleged emphasis on the oujsi÷a being “the
expression of the ultimate character and the causal principle (aÓrch\) in God’s
being.”
56 Further compounding the issue are questions concerning the
accuracy of Zizioulas’ claimed patristic, in particular Cappadocian, support for
his views.
57 It would appear that the Fathers are not quite as keen to discount
the idea of oujsi÷a as Zizioulas would perhaps desire.
Rather than caricaturing the idea of oujsi÷a as somehow suggestive of inertness
or non-relationality, which Zizioulas at times appears to do, I submit that it
would be advantageous to note more closely the example of the Cappadocians
themselves. In my view, their approach is consistently to articulate oujsi÷a in
                                                
55 J. G. F. Wilks, “The Trinitarian Ontology of John Zizioulas,” Vox Evangelica 25 (1995): 82.
56 J. D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 88. Williams demands, “who on earth says that the
divine ousia has a causal relation to the persons of the Trinity?” – R. Williams, Book Review,
Scottish Journal of Theology 42/1 (1989): 104 (italics his).
57 J. G. F. Wilks, “The Trinitarian Ontology of John Zizioulas,” Vox Evangelica 25 (1995): 79-
82. Williams also questions whether an alleged patristic norm does indeed support Zizioulas -
R. Williams, Book Review, Scottish Journal of Theology 42/1 (1989): 104-105.112
the context of uJpo/stasiß and vice versa. For example, in a letter to
Amphilochius, Basil writes that he confesses one essence or substance so as
“not to give a variant definition of existence,” yet on the other hand he
confesses three hypostases so that “our conception of Father, Son and Holy
Spirit may be without confusion and clear.”
58 Elsewhere, in a letter to his
brother Gregory, he writes,
He who perceives the Father, and perceives Him by Himself, has
at the same time mental perception of the Son; and he who
receives the Son does not divide Him from the Spirit, but, in
consecution so far as order is concerned, in conjunction so far as
nature is concerned, expresses the faith commingled in himself in
the three together … But the communion and the distinction
apprehended in Them are, in a certain sense, ineffable and
inconceivable, the continuity of nature being never rent asunder by
the distinction of the hypostases, nor the notes of proper distinction
confounded in the community of essence.
59
The point here is that rather than collapsing oujsi÷a into uJpo/stasiß, Basil is
careful to give each in balance and each in the other’s context. My concern
with Zizioulas’ ideas is that when he conceives of “being as communion,” that
is, oujsi÷a in terms of uJpo/stasiß, what he actually means by that is really pure
uJpo/stasiß. In other words, contrary to Basil and others, Zizioulas sometimes
appears to be avoiding allowing the opposite to occur – that is, conceiving
uJpo/stasiß in terms of oujsi÷a. Put simply, I sense one-sidedness in Zizioulas’
trinitarianism.
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A Sense of Imbalance – God is Love
My sense of imbalance in Zizioulas is compounded when he begins to write of
the love of God. In other words, Zizioulas’ notions of being as communion; of
the ontological priority of personhood over substance; of triune relationality;
of theosis or participation in God; of eternal incarnational intentionality, derive
in some way from affirming love as constitutive of the divine being. Just as
love is that which produces fellowship or communion between and among
persons, so also does love define constitutively who God is. As such, Zizioulas
writes of love being the “supreme ontological predicate” – that is, the
expression “God is love” (1 John 4:16) demonstrates that love is not secondary
to God or a property of God but is “constitutive of His substance, i.e. it is that
which makes God what He is.”
60 This is pertinent for our consideration of
Providence for such language is mirrored in the writings of Open Theists who
also desire to espouse a relational, dynamic understanding of God and, hence,
of his relationship with the world. For example, Rice states that, “From a
Christian perspective, love is the first and last word in the biblical portrait of
God … The statement God is love is as close as the Bible comes to giving us a
definition of the divine reality.”
61 Pinnock states that, “The tri-personal God is
the very model of love, a community where each gives and receives love,
which is the antithesis of aloofness and indifference. Paradoxically, although
the doctrine uses the language of Hellenic reflection, in confessing the Trinity
we affirm a God who is nearly everything that the Greeks denied.”
62 Further,
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“The open view of God emphasizes that he is a loving person; love is the very
essence of his being.”
63
What is important to note is that highly relational understandings of God and
of his activity toward and in the world, such as we find in Zizioulas and in
Open Theism, have as a primary characteristic a strong affirmation of the
priority of “love” in the divine being. Yet my earlier intimated concerns with
this emphasis derive from the extent to which such prioritisation of love is
reflective of God’s revelation in scripture. Certainly, the scriptures state that
the initiative of the giving of the Son derives from the fact that “God so loved
the world” (John 3:16). Furthermore, they do say emphatically that, “God is
love” (1 John 4:16). Yet, as mentioned in the previous chapter, if one wishes to
work from explicit “God is …” statements, then statements such as “God is
light” (1 John 1:5) and “God is spirit” (John 4:24) need also to be taken into
account. Indeed, if one were to give priority to the statement “God is light,”
then one could argue that such a statement, particularly in its context, supports
the contention that “holiness” rather than “love” is central or constitutive of
the divine character.
64
My point is this: the advancement of one aspect of God’s revelation of himself
without recourse to the context in which it was given and the context of the
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other aspects of God’s revelation runs the risk of skewing our understanding of
God. We must ask, in what sense/s does the scriptures speak of God’s love?
For example, what does the holiness, sovereignty or wrath of God tell us about
the love of God? Is it better to conceive of God’s love as a holy love, and of
his holiness as a loving holiness? The reality is that some, on their reading of
scripture, would question not only the nature of the priority being given to
love, such as we find in Zizioulas and Open Theism, but also the proferred
descriptions of this divine love.
65  It is my view that fidelity to the entire and
diverse narrative of scripture requires an understanding of love that is more
multi-dimensional than other somewhat simplistic presentations might have us
believe. A balance needs to be struck which takes seriously how the divine
love is described and demonstrated in scripture – divine love should be neither
caricatured as warm and indulgent sentimentalism nor as assenting yet cold
formalism. For example, Fackre seems to strike the correct balance – a balance
which, in my view, fidelity to the full narrative of scripture requires. While
affirming wholeheartedly that, “within and without, ‘God is love’” and that
this love is indeed “finally grounded in the inner-trinitarian Life itself,” he can
simultaneously state that,
The divine love is not divine indulgence. The God who invites
response is the God who holds the world responsible. The God
who beckons into relationship holds accountable those who choose
to turn aside. This is a righteous God with whom we have to do, a
holy Love whose call is also expectation.
66
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The alternative approach would run the risk of constructing a god in our own
philosophical or psychological image. Such “Leggo” theology might give us a
God who we like or want to be like, but it does not necessarily take us any
closer to the God revealed in the Bible. Further, we run the risk of skewing our
understanding of Providence for, as I argued in the previous chapter,
understandings concerning the nature of God are central or even prescriptive in
understanding the nature of divine Providence. God is indeed love, but he is
love in the context of how that love is biblically portrayed and demonstrated
and in the context of his other revealed attributes. As Collins argues, “a
balanced view of God recognises that a single attribute is not adequate to
describe him.”
67
A Sense of Imbalance – Equating the Human with the Divine
This concern I have with what I suspect is an imbalance in Zizioulas’
conception of divine trinitarian love revolves around my sense that he tends to
impose human conceptions upon divine conceptions. That is, he seems to
equate too often and too closely the human with the divine – what Calvin calls
“[to] mingle heaven and earth”
68 – and I am not alone in stating this. For
example, Russell comments that, among other things, Zizioulas has “an
underemphasis on the discontinuity between divine and human personhood.”
69
As such, there is an inadequate doctrine of sin in that its gravity is not taken
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seriously enough and, consequently, there is a danger of reductionism
concerning his theology of the cross.
70 A similar equating of human and divine
can be seen in his under-emphasis upon the raw earthiness of human existence.
As such, “His overemphasis on the continuities between divine and human
persons … lends itself to a tendency to be dismissive towards the body,
physicality and the boundaries of the self.”
71
In my view, this closeness of equating human with divine tends to be
characteristic of highly relational understandings of God. We have just
discussed how such a relational emphasis has the potential to skew our
understandings of divine attributes, in Zizioulas’ case divine love, but it also
has implications for other aspects of God’s divine self-disclosure.  For
example, I submit that highly relational understandings of God – both internal
in the triune self and external between God and humanity – have innate within
them an inclination away from conceptions of divine transcendence and
toward conceptions of divine immanence. In other words, rather than
emphasising how God is unlike us, there is an inclination toward how God is
like us. The problem with such an inclination – such a relational emphasis – is
that, unless it is carefully tempered and articulated, it is open to be construed
as overly immanent in its understanding of God and his relationship with the
world. Much of this discussion of imbalance in theology, particularly in
reference to Providence, will be developed in Part Three.
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However, what makes Zizioulas’ proposal noteworthy is that he is seeking to
reformulate the doctrine of the Trinity in such a way that it is meaningful to
today’s society. Although I have reservations concerning some of his claims
about relational ontology and the extent to which the patristics provide support
for his proposal, he has certainly raised awareness of the relationality that is
inherent in the triune God and has sought to explore what implications this
might have for what it means to be human and what it means to be the church.
As a consequence, it has given us some points of contact with our identified
issues in Providence that we will explore in Part Three of this dissertation.
“GOD FOR US”
THE TRINITARIANISM OF CATHERINE LACUGNA
After the 1991 publication of God For Us, the late Catherine LaCugna’s
seminal work on trinitarian theology, it was described as “one of the best
books on the Trinity in years” which “articulates the revolutionary
implications of a relational understanding of God for the whole of theology.”
72
In some ways, God For Us enlarges upon the theological agenda presented in
an earlier article by LaCugna.
73 In its simplest form, LaCugna’s thesis is that
“the doctrine of the Trinity is ultimately a practical doctrine with radical
consequences for Christian life.”
74 What lies behind this thesis is a theological
conviction that the doctrine of Trinity is not primarily about God in se (in
Godself) but about God pro nobis (for us). That is, trinitarian theology is “the
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language of relationality par excellence … God is God by being internally
(eternally) related and externally (historically) related.”
75 She summarises,
“The doctrine of the Trinity is ultimately therefore a teaching not about the
abstract nature of God, nor about God in isolation from everything other than
God, but a teaching about God’s life with us and our life with each other.”
76
Foundational to LaCugna’s theology is the all-encompassing relationality of
the triune God.
Oikonomia and Theologia – Economy and Ontology
What follows from this theological conviction is a methodological decision –
that economy (oikonomia) must take methodological precedence over
ontology (theologia). In other words, we must “root all speculation about the
triune nature of God in the economy of salvation (oikonomia), in the self-
communication of God in the person of Christ and the activity of the Holy
Spirit.”
77 This rooting of trinitarian theology in the reality of salvation history
is for LaCugna the “guiding principle of this book.”
78 She believes that such
an approach is really the “only option for Christian theology” for it must be
able to answer the questions and criticisms that have been directed at classical
theology. In her view, the problem has been that when people wonder whether
we can believe in God after Auschwitz, or whether a male saviour can save
women, or whether God predetermines the fate of everyone to the point that
freedom is illusory, classical theism has often sought to take refuge in the
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metaphysical properties of God such as omnipotence, omniscience,
impassibility, incorporeality and simplicity. But it is “these very attributes that
seem dubious.” Hence, critiques of classical theism “cry out for soteriology”
 –
for a return to understanding and experiencing who God is through
oikonomia.
79 Indeed, LaCugna sees a parallel in this approach with the
methodological questions that have become a part of Christology in recent
years – in particular, Christologies “from above” (descending or metaphysical
Christology) and “from below” (ascending or functional Christology). Just as
there is a contemporary trend toward a more biblical and historical approach to
Christology (from below), so also should classical trinitarian theologies be
revised with a clearer awareness of who God is for us rather than primarily
about who God is in himself.
Although she realises that the doctrine of the Trinity is more than the doctrine
of salvation, her view is that the pattern of salvation history must in some way
be correlative with the eternal being of God. Yet, despite the methodological
priority given to oikonomia, LaCugna is careful to ensure that this should not
be taken to signal a divorce between oikonomia and theologia. She writes,
Theologia and oikonomia belong together; we cannot presume to
speak about either one to the exclusion of the other. A theology
built entirely around theologia produces a nonexperiential,
nonsoteriological, nonchristological, nonpneumatological
metaphysics of the divine nature. A theology built entirely around
oikonomia results in a skepticism about whether how God saves
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through Christ in the power of the Holy Spirit is essentially related
to who or what God is.
80
It must be said that LaCugna’s emphasis upon oikonomia, and the resultant
methodological approach she adopts, has much to commend it. Indeed, the
early centuries of the Christian church seem to reflect such an approach. For
example, when the Fathers began to express their understandings concerning
God, it was evident that they needed to move beyond what is arguably the
simple monotheism of the Old Testament. No longer were they able to worship
God in the context of the Shema only,
81 for as God’s revelation of himself had
progressed and defined itself ultimately in the person of Jesus Christ, the
Christian church began to struggle with describing an experience of
multiplicity. Indeed, Stackhouse argues that the disciples’ encounter with Jesus
Christ and their recognition of him as the divine Lord led to a binitarian
understanding of God that then, as Christian thought matured, developed into a
trinitarian understanding.
82 That is, although they still worshipped the one God
of the Old Testament, they knew him now as God the Father, God the Son and
God the Holy Spirit.
83
Consequently, the early church in general, and the early Fathers in particular,
sought ways of articulating their faith in the triune God and they did this by
working upwards, as it were, from the God who had acted in history and
definitively in Jesus Christ to God as he always had been. In other words, the
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Fathers began with the actions of God in the world and in the economy of
salvation and used this as a type of exemplar to consider God as he is in his
ontological self. The assumption here was that there was a fundamental
correlation between the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity. In other
words, God in his economic self accurately reveals and sufficiently explicates
God in his ontological self. The God who “does” is not other than the God
who “is.”
Such a methodological decision is not without its supporters. For example,
Kaiser argues persuasively that, “… theological method is to follow the
contours of living faith and not be imposed from without.”
84 Indeed, in
Kaiser’s view, this approach can be seen in Barth’s theological methodology
in that a double movement in theology appears to be employed. The first
movement begins with the revelation of God in Christ and in the economy of
salvation and then, in a sense, moves upward into considerations of God
within himself. The second movement, however, is downward as the doctrine
of God is then explicated in his actions toward his world. In fact, according to
Kaiser, this double movement is reflected in how Barth arranged his Church
Dogmatics. Volume I concerns itself with the doctrine of the Word of God.
This then leads upward to consideration of the doctrine of God in Volume II.
The downward movement comes in Volumes III and IV as Barth moves to
consideration of the doctrines of Creation and Reconciliation. In this way, the
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structure of the Dogmatics reflects this double movement, with Volume II
providing the pivot.
85
This idea of movements is suggestive for in some ways I am following a
similar path in my research into Providence from a trinitarian perspective,
although I see the two movements as actively rather than statically directional.
In one sense, there is a movement “from below” in that consideration of the
economy of salvation (economic Trinity) moves us upward into consideration
of the inter-trinitarian divine life (immanent Trinity). In another sense, there is
a movement “from above” as understandings concerning the inter-trinitarian
divine life, which have been informed by our initial consideration of the
economic Trinity, are applied to consideration of God’s continuing
providential action in the world and history. Yet, in my view, neither
movement should be seen as distinct from the other nor complete in itself –
each perspective, whether from above or below, continues to inform and guide
the other. That is, there is an informational mutuality in that consideration of
the economic Trinity leads us to tentative conclusions concerning the
immanent Trinity, which then, in turn, leads us to reconsider the economic
Trinity with particular reference to Providence. This mutuality is sustained as
each perspective continues to inform and guide the other.
Obviously pertinent to this discussion is the oft-quoted maxim of Rahner, “The
‘economic’ Trinity is the ‘immanent’ Trinity and the ‘immanent’ Trinity is the
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‘economic’ Trinity.”
86 LaCugna interacts with Rahner and believes that his
axiom, though fundamentally correct, is open to being misintepreted and
misapplied.
87 For example, if it means literally that A=A then LaCugna
believes it is almost pantheistic. Although LaCugna accepts that Rahner does
not mean this, she nevertheless does want to question the “vice versa” aspect
of his axiom. The point at which she diverges from Rahner is over his
insistence that the distinctions in the economic Trinity – that of Father, Son
and Spirit as experienced in the history of salvation – must also belong to the
immanent Trinity. For example, Rahner states that these distinctions “must
belong to God ‘in himself,’ or otherwise this difference, which undoubtedly
exists, would do away with God’s self-communication. For these modalities
and their differentiation either are in God himself … or they exist only in us …
Hence, there occurs no self-communication, God himself is not there.”
88
LaCugna, however, believes that there is an inherent asymmetry between the
economic and immanent Trinity. For her, the economic Trinity does not reflect
in a mirror dimly the immanent Trinity’s inner relations but is actually “God’s
concrete existence in Christ and Spirit.” That is, “the economy is the
‘distribution’ of God’s life lived with and for the creature. Economy and
theology are two aspects of one reality: the mystery of divine-human
communion.”
89 Hence, she suggests that we should, “abandon the misleading
terms, economic and immanent Trinity,”
90 or at least redefine or clarify them.
In her view,
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Oikonomia is not the Trinity ad extra but the comprehensive plan
of God reaching from creation to consummation, in which God
and all creatures are destined to exist together in the mystery of
love and communion. Similarly, theologia is not the Trinity in se,
but, much more modestly and simply, the mystery of God …
Theologia is what is given in oikonomia and oikonomia expresses
theologia. Since our only point of access to theologia is through
oikonomia, then an ‘immanent’ trinitarian theology of God is
nothing more than a theology of the economy of salvation.
91
The Epistemological Priority of Oikonomia and the Ontological Priority of
Theologia
A number of evaluative comments should be made at this point. Firstly, it is
my view that LaCugna’s methodological approach should be judged as
fundamentally correct to the extent that it appropriately recognizes the
epistemological priority of the economic Trinity. In other words, from the
standpoint of humanity, standing in time and space in a created world, we have
no recourse but to engage with God’s self-revelation as Father, Son and Holy
Spirit in the economy of salvation. This means, therefore, that consideration of
triune ontology must be grounded in triune economy. For example, Torrance
argues that we must “keep a constant check on these refined theological
concepts and relations to make sure that they are in definite touch with the
ground level of God’s actual self-revelation to us and our evangelical
experience of his saving activity in history.”
92 Indeed, this is Fee’s point when
he writes, in the context of the apostle Paul’s trinitarian theology, that,
Finally, whatever else we learn from Paul’s kind of trinitarianism,
we need to recognize that if Rahner is right, that the economic and
immanent Trinity are one, then our trinitarianism is terribly
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defective if we spend our labours on the ontological questions in
such a way as to lose the essential narrative about God and
salvation that raised those questions in the first place.
93
In my view, Torrance’s and Fee’s comments are both valid and constructive
for if we divorce the “God who is” from the “God who does” then we run the
peril of constructing a god in our own philosophical image.
94 LaCugna’s
methodology is one that recognizes this danger and on this point is to be
commended.
Yet, despite this positive aspect of LaCugna’s theology, is her emphasis upon
economy problematic? It appears to me that LaCugna’s trinitarianism is open
to the criticism that she has, in effect, collapsed the immanent Trinity into the
economic Trinity. That is, such is her desire to hold tightly together oikonomia
and theologia, and her redefining of the latter as simply “the mystery of God,”
she has in effect done away with the possibility of knowing anything about
God’s inner life. But, this is in fact LaCugna’s point – that we can know
nothing about God beyond what we see revealed in the economy.
95
Interestingly for our discussion, LaCugna’s view is supported by the
comments of Open Theist John Sanders. He writes,
All that is possible for us to know is what God is like in relation to
us. God may be different in himself (in se) than God is with us
(quoad nos), but we can have no knowledge of that difference. The
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Lord our Creator and Redeemer is what God is really like in
relation to us. If God is different in himself we cannot say.
96
However, while I recognize and accept LaCugna’s point concerning the
epistemological priority of the economic Trinity over the immanent Trinity, I
would seek to make the further point that there is a sense in which the
immanent Trinity is nevertheless ontologically prior to the economic Trinity.
That is, prior to the economy of salvation, God eternally existed as a triune
being. This, I think, is Jewett’s point when he comments, in the context of
discussing the incarnation, “first he was the Son, then he became incarnate as
the Son.”
97 The same sentiment is reflected in the Apostles Creed with its
statement that the begotten Son of God was “begotten of the Father before all
worlds.” He did not become the Son in the economy of salvation, he eternally
was the Son who then became incarnate – divinity put on humanity not
personhood. My point is that rather than collapsing the immanent into the
economic, as LaCugna appears to, it is preferable to draw a distinction
between them while not dividing them.
In many ways, Torrance argues for a similar approach to that which I am
advocating. On the one hand, he argues that in a constitutive sense triune
ontology precedes triune economy. He writes,
All of this warns us that we cannot think of the ontological Trinity
as if it were constituted by or dependent on the economic Trinity,
but must rather think of the economic Trinity as the freely
predetermined manifestation in the history of salvation of the
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eternal Trinity which God himself was before the foundation of the
world, and eternally is.
98
Hence,
This means that the stratified structure must finally and properly
be understood the other way round, not from the bottom upward
but from the top downward in accordance with God’s self-
revelation to us, for that is actually how its truth-content is
ontologically constituted...
Yet, Torrance is careful not to allow such a distinction to appear to divide the
immanent from the economic, for he completes the above statement in the
following way: “…although it is empirically derived from below where God’s
self-revelation is actually mediated to us in the history of salvation.”
 99
We find the same perspective in Blocher when he argues for the primacy of
the immanent Trinity. He states that,
… he alone is non-correlative and autarcic: first and last, having
life in himself and all fullness, needing no environment or partner
to fulfil himself. The doctrine of the immanent or ontological
Trinity, in its precedence over the trinitarian economy of creation
and salvation, proclaims this truth indeed – the treasure of our
faith.
100
Furthermore, I believe that such ontological priority of the immanent Trinity
over the economic Trinity is presupposed by the concept of divine revelation.
That is, if the concept of divine self-disclosure is to mean anything, it must
mean that in some sense prior to the economy of salvation God eternally
existed as a triune being. Certainly, we might grant that the economy of
salvation does not reveal all that there is to know about God, but I affirm,
along with Torrance, that the ontologically prior immanent Trinity is
                                                
98 T. F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, pp. 108-109.
99 T. F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 87.
100 H. Blocher, “Divine Immutability,” in N. M. de S. Cameron, The Power and Weakness of
God (Edinburgh: Rutherford House Books, 1990), p. 21.129
nevertheless “imprinted” upon the economic Trinity.
101 It is for this reason that
Erickson states that, “there are not two different Trinities.” While, at a
metaphysical level, the immanent Trinity and economic Trinity are the same,
at an epistemological level Erickson argues that the economic Trinity is part of
the immanent Trinity but does not exhaust it.
102
As noted above, the positive points of LaCugna’s proposal are that it rightly
recognizes the epistemological priority of oikonomia and includes within it an
appropriate awareness of the mystery of God, his “beyondness.” Yet, it is
nevertheless my view that such is her desire to unite theologia and oikonomia,
which in effect redefines what is meant by immanent Trinity, that she is
potentially weakening the concept of, not to mention the trustworthiness of,
the divine self-disclosure. The effect of this is that she is perhaps
unintentionally driving a wedge between the God we experience in the
economy of salvation and the God who eternally exists. The irony is that her
stated intention is to do the opposite. Fiddes is helpful here – “God in himself
is holy mystery, but we can be confident that the being of God corresponds to
his self-revelation.”
103
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A Secure Trinitarian Ontology
Furthermore, such is LaCugna’s emphasis upon economy that one is left
wondering if God is left ontologically insecure rather than ontologically
secure.
104 That is, LaCugna’s redefining of the immanent Trinity as simply
“the mystery of God” leaves us with more questions than answers concerning
divine ontology. Certainly there is mystery in God, but LaCugna seems very
unwilling to allow much economic light to shine in the ontological darkness. It
is interesting to note the comment of Wilks in relation to Zizioulas’ similar
emphasis upon divine economy (remembering also that Zizioulas has
influenced LaCugna’s thought).
105 He writes,
There is, however, a danger with the idea of returning to the
economic Trinity: that of equating it so completely with the
immanent Trinity that the latter could be regarded as superfluous.
In the face of today’s problems we are in greater, not lesser, need
of a secure ontology.
106
Molnar is similarly concerned about the type of approach adopted by
LaCugna. In his view, such an approach denies the freedom of God to exist
eternally as a triune being. He writes,
When the doctrine of the Trinity is reduced to a description of our
experiences of salvation then that is one more indication that the
immanent Trinity has been confused with or collapsed into the
economic Trinity. Such thinking reduces God to God’s relations
with the world precisely because it denies his freedom to exist
eternally as the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
107
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Although it may be perhaps arguable whether LaCugna is necessarily guilty of
confusing the immanent with the economic Trinity or of collapsing the former
into the latter, it must be said that the language she employs on occasion is
certainly suggestive of exactly that, although she does seek to nuance her
position. In my view, however, it is important to recognize that the primary
point LaCugna is making is methodological. That is, she does not deny that
there is an immanent Trinity, but she does believe that speculation as to the
nature of God’s so-called “inner life” is pointless if it is not derived from what
is known through the economic Trinity. Hence, she comments, “Still, inquiry
into the immanent ground of the missions of Son and Spirit remains a
legitimate theological enterprise provided this inquiry is understood properly
and modestly, that is, as reflection on God’s self-disclosure in the person of
Christ and the activity of the Holy Spirit.”
108 On this point I am in agreement
with her. But, I believe she can make the same point without such a “revising
[of] the framework of trinitarian theology.”
109 In other words, it is possible to
draw theologia and oikonomia together without reverting to a dismissal of
gaining some understanding or knowledge of an immanent Trinity or by
redefining it as a nebulous “mystery of God.” For example, Torrance is a
theologian whose trinitarianism is deeply rooted in the economy, yet he has no
reservations in equating this, to some extent, with the divine ontology. He
writes,
Moreover, it is only in Christ in whom God’s self-revelation is
identical with himself that we may rightly apprehend it and really
know God as he is in himself, in the oneness and differentiation of
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God within his own eternal Being as Father, Son and Holy Spirit,
for what God is toward us in his historical self-manifestation to us
in the Gospel as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, he is revealed to be
inherently and eternally in himself.
110
Furthermore, Torrance argues that it is indeed “the trinitarian relations
immanent in God himself which lie behind, and are the sustaining ground of,
the relations of the economic Trinity.”
111
Gunton similarly finds the trinitarianism of LaCugna wanting on this very
point. In fact, he describes proposals like LaCugna’s as “unsatisfactory
attempts … to minimize or abolish the doctrine of the immanent Trinity.”
112
Although he acknowledges that some treatments of the immanent Trinity are
such that they appear “to float free from the God who becomes present to
history in his Son and Spirit,” proposals such as LaCugna’s are nevertheless an
overreaction for they “effectively or explicitly deny the need to move beyond
the economy.”
113 He concludes,
If we can give no answer to the question of the identity of this
supposedly eternal God, are we right to make the kind of claims
that we do in the first place for his action? That is not to say that
we should speculate about the ‘inner being’ of God in any way that
takes us away from the implications of his action. The point of the
doctrine of the immanent Trinity is to provide a ground for the
theology of the economy, but to go no further than is licensed by
his revelation.
114
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Indeed, in a particularly cutting editorial, Trueman laments the “overwhelming
emphasis upon the economy of salvation that it neglects these ontological
aspects of theology.” He believes such an emphasis takes us away from
reflecting upon the biblical text and church tradition and from “…our Christian
commitment to the notion of the existence of a God who has revealed himself
yet whose existence is prior to that revelation.” He believes that such an
approach,
… is ultimately self-defeating: divine economy without a divine
ontology is unstable and will collapse. Trinitarianism will dissolve
into modalism; the theological unity of the Bible will be
swallowed up and destroyed by its diversity because it has no
foundation in the one God who speaks; and Christian exclusivism
will be sacrificed to a meaningless pluralism.
Interestingly, it is in the context of this emphasis on economy instead of
ontology that he goes on to comment on Open Theism. He states, “I suspect
that ‘openness theism’ is merely the most well known heresy to have been
nurtured in the anti-doctrinal, anti-tradition world of contemporary
evangelicalism; it will certainly not be the last.”
115 Apart from the obvious
rhetoric, Trueman nevertheless sees such emphases on divine economy as an
imbalance and thereby a weakening of divine ontology.
A Question of Trinitarian Balance
What is interesting to note in all of this, especially in relation to our primary
focus upon the doctrine of Providence, is that highly relational models of
Christian theism, such as we find in LaCugna and in Open Theism, do appear
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to be characterized by a trinitarianism that has an emphasis away from the
immanent Trinity and toward the economic Trinity. We may recall my earlier
noting of Sanders’ support, as an Open Theist, for LaCugna’s agnosticism as
to what can be known about God in se. Furthermore, this emphasis away from
immanent and toward economic also seems to correlate with what we noted
earlier in relation to Zizioulas’ trinitarianism – that is, that highly relational
models of trinitarian theology seem to have innate within them an inclination
away from divine transcendence and toward divine immanence. Just as
LaCugna inclines away from God in himself (immanent Trinity) and toward
God for us (economic Trinity), so Zizioulas inclines away from God over us
(divine transcendence) and toward God with us (divine immanence). That this
“heartbeat” correlates so closely with Open Theism, and its highly relational
understanding of God and his action in Providence, is hardly surprising.
To that end, it is also perhaps not surprising to note LaCugna seeking to
reinterpret some of the issues of Providence that we identified earlier in
Chapter Three – such as immutability and impassibility. She writes, “If the
Christian doctrine of God is to be trinitarian, which is to say, derived from and
checked against the economy of redemption, these attributes stand in need of
reinterpretation.”
116 In relation to immutability, she states that, “God is
immutably personal.”
117 That is, he cannot change in relation to his very being,
for his being is personal – he cannot revert to a non-personal or pre-personal
existence. As LaCugna puts it, “God cannot be anything but personal … If
God ceased to be love, God, and everything else, would cease to exist. God
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alone is perfectly consistent with Godself; God’s ousia is perfectly
hypostatic.”
118 Yet, being personal means to be in relationship and so within
this immutability of personality there is a mutability of interaction – of acting
upon and being acted upon by other persons. This is significant for my thesis
for LaCugna here appears to be affirming senses in which both immutability
and mutability are descriptive of God. Immutability is to be understood as
fidelity, not inertness – God is unchanging in that he is true to himself, but he
is also true to us: as God and as God-for-us.
Furthermore, LaCugna’s relational understanding of the triune God leads her
to assert that God’s immutability should not be construed as demanding
impassibility. Indeed, like Open Theism, she would prefer not to allow an
axiom of Greek philosophy to guide theological conclusions but, rather, to
“revise or overturn the premise of God’s impassibility in light of the Cross.”
119
This is understandable for if the economy of salvation is made central in one’s
trinitarianism, as it is in LaCugna’s, then from the Cross one may conclude
that, in some sense (and this needs to be clearly articulated), God does
experience suffering. As such, LaCugna’s proposal is helpful in that it ensures
that our understanding of God and of his providential care of this world must
take into account what has been revealed in the economy of salvation. Issues
of Providence – such as transcendence, sovereignty, immutability and
impassibility – must therefore be interpreted in the light of that economy.
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Consequently, LaCugna’s proposal is helpful in that it has sought to shine a
trinitarian light on aspects of the divine/human interface and consequently
upon issues of Providence. Furthermore, I find particularly commendable her
deep insistence that the doctrine of the Trinity must be understood as a
practical doctrine that has consequences for living the Christian life. As I
discussed in Chapter One, theology needs to integrate the head (intellect),
heart (emotion) and hand (application). Though I find aspects of LaCugna’s
trinitarianism problematic, I nevertheless desire to affirm wholeheartedly her
overall vision to see thinking about trinitarian faith be completed by and
culminate in “Living Trinitarian Faith.”
120
“PARTICIPATING IN GOD”
THE TRINITARIANISM OF PAUL FIDDES
Paul Fiddes is a Professor of Theology at Oxford University and is Principal of
Regents Park College, Oxford. The title of Fiddes’ book on the Trinity reflects
the fundamental thrust of his work – the idea that the Christian life is to be
understood as participation in God. His concern is to explore the pastoral
dimensions of trinitarian theology by considering how pastoral practice shapes
our doctrine of God, “and conversely how faith in the triune God shapes our
practice.”
121 In particular, however, he desires “… to pursue the more difficult,
but potentially more enriching path, of asking how participation in this triune
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God affects both our images of God and our acts.”
122 In essence, Fiddes
desires to focus upon a relational understanding of God and to move beyond
merely talking about God to actually participating in God. Consequently, he
argues that, “talk about personal relations in God is then, I suggest, not an
observational form of language (‘so that is what God is like’), but the language
of participation,”
123 and he finds the basis for such an approach in a
consideration of God as triune. Consequently, it is a “dynamic image of God”
that he is “commending for a pastoral theology.”
124
Fiddes begins his articulation of this dynamic and participatory view of the
Trinity by outlining what he considers to be three major achievements of the
early church theologians. In much of this he follows the argument of Zizioulas.
The first achievement concerns the development of the formula often
expressed in English as “one essence, three persons.” The Greek theologians in
the East expressed this formula by making a distinction between the words
oujsi÷a and uJpo/stasiß. In Greek philosophy, the two words had been almost
indistinguishable and had both carried the meaning of “being,” although oujsi÷a
could carry a more universal sense of ontology than uJpo/stasiß.
125 The dispute
with Arius forged an agreement among Greek Christians that uJpo/stasiß would
mean that “‘otherness’ or distinct identity of Father, Son and Spirit, while
oujsi÷a would denote the one divine nature with which each was identified.”
126
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In the Latin West, the words substantia and personae corresponded to the
Greek but, as is often the case with differing languages (in particular, the use
of philosophical terms), misunderstandings occurred.
127 Furthermore, the
exposition of this trinitarian formula meant that the West often made as its
starting point the one essence whereas the East began with the three persons.
128
In an effort to define more clearly what was meant by abstract terms such as
oujsi÷a and uJpo/stasiß, and to answer the pointed questions of the Arians,
Athanasius found the distinction of the persons “in their relationship of origin
to one another.”
129 Hence, he spoke of the Father being “other” (eJteroß) in that
he begets the Son, the Son is “other” in that he is begotten and the Spirit is
“other” in that he proceeds from the Father. This insight was later expanded by
the Cappadocians in the East and by Augustine in the West and led to what
Fiddes’ describes as the second achievement of the early church theologians –
that is, that the concept of “person” began to be equated with the concept of
“being.”
130 The idea of “person,” which both Platonic and Aristotelian
thinking had placed as something outside of or additional to the core of one’s
being, was now being made a matter of “being” or ontology. As such, the idea
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of relationality, which is central to the idea of person, was now an ontological
category – that is, “the notion of ‘being’ itself was made relational: as
Zizioulas aptly sums this up, ‘to be and to be in relation becomes
identical.’”
131 As I noted earlier, Zizioulas describes this development in
Greek philosophy as revolutionary.
132 Fiddes argues that this then led to the
third achievement – that is, to be a person, which is a part of being, is to be
free. In other words, “now the church fathers were rooting prosopon in
hypostasis or being, so what had seemed a futile freedom of the human person
was being claimed to have its basis in the ultimate freedom of God. As the
modern theologian Karl Barth puts it, a person is ‘one who loves in
freedom’.”
133
Divine Persons as Divine Relations
Fiddes desires to return to these insights of the Fathers for he is concerned that
their idea of person, by which they mean a distinct identity or otherness that
only makes sense in relationship, has suffered from a form of reductionism.
That is, person or otherness in relationship has morphed into an alone
individuality – “there is a long history in Western culture of the reduction of
the person in relationship to the individual subject.”
134 Consequently, and here
we come to the heart of Fiddes’ thesis, we must recover the early Father’s
insights by conceiving God’s triunity not as three persons in relationship but
as three persons as relationships. In other words, the relationality within God
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should not be understood as that which exists between the persons of the
Godhead but, rather, the persons themselves are the relations. Fiddes
comments, “If we use the term hypostasis as the early theologians did for a
‘distinct reality’ which has being, then the relations are hypostases. There are
no persons ‘at each end of a relation,’ but the ‘persons’ are simply the
relations.”
135 Consequently, Fiddes wants to move away from the idea of
“three individual subjects who have relationships” to the idea that God is
relationship.
136 He is a “movement of relationships” or “three movements of
relationship subsisting in one event.”
137
It is this fundamental relational understanding of God as triune that drives the
rest of Fiddes’ pastoral theology for it is clear that he believes that the ideas of
understanding God as relationship and humanity participating in God are
mutually inclusive concepts. He states,
Identifying the divine persons as relations brings together a way of
understanding the nature of being (ontology) with a way of
knowing (epistemology). The being of God is understood as event
and relationship, but only through an epistemology of
participation; each only makes sense in the context of the other.
We cannot observe, even in our mind’s eye, being which is
relationship; it can only be known through the mode of
participation.
138
Furthermore,
Only by bringing together being as relation, and knowing as
participation, will we begin to overcome the view of the human
subject stemming from the Enlightenment, in which observation is
the basic paradigm of knowing.
139
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It is with this in mind that Fiddes looks to the concept of the “divine dance” of
perichoresis – “the permeation of each person by the other, their coinherence
without confusion”
140 – to demonstrate his thesis of divine triune relationality
which calls us to “participate in God.” Although recognising that the concept
of perichoresis presents the strongest case for a relational unity of three divine
subjects,
141 as characterised by the theologies of Volf and Moltmann, he
nevertheless finds that conceiving the divine persons as nothing other than
relations shows more potential in clarifying what Christ meant when he
prayed, “as you, Father, are in me, and I am in you, may they also be in us”
(John 17:21 NRSV).
142 The result of such “participation in God” is to conceive
of salvation as being essentially “divinisation (theosis), which means not
becoming God, but being incorporated into the fellowship of the divine
life.”
143 This thought echoes the early Fathers and was also highlighted by
Zizioulas earlier.
144
Consequently, Fiddes finds the image of the dance as helpful in articulating his
proposal – “In fact, I suggest that the image of the dance makes most sense
when we understand the divine persons as movements of relationship, rather
than as individual subjects who have relationships … So the image of the
divine dance is not so much about dancers as about the patterns of the dance
itself, an interweaving of ecstatic movements.”
145 Again, Fiddes’
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understanding of God’s triunity is not that there are three persons who relate,
but that the relations themselves are the persons – persons as relationships
rather than persons in relationship.
Fiddes’ proposal is both creative and provocative – on the one hand, it presents
a creative way of conceiving of the inner-relationality of the Trinity and, on
the other hand, it provokes a range of questions concerning our conceptions of
what it means to be “personal” or to be a “person.” The most attractive part of
Fiddes’ proposal is his emphasis upon the essential relationality of the triune
God – that the three divine persons do not, indeed cannot, exist in isolation
from each other. To be personal means to be in relationship. As such, the
divine persons should never be perceived as distinct from this relationship – as
non-relating individual subjectivities. Indeed, I would argue that to speak of
“non-relating persons” is to utter a contradiction in terms.
146 Even on the
human level, to be a person is to be in relationship.
147 The concept of “person”
demands the idea of “relating” with another person. It is this understanding
that Buber sought to emphasize with his “Dialogical Personalism,” his Ich und
Du, in which he drew distinctions between personal relations (“I-Thou”) and
impersonal relations (“I-It”).
148 Put simply, for a person to be a person, that
person needs to be in relationship with other persons. This is truth towards
which Fiddes’ proposal points.
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A Confounding of the Divine Persons?
However, is Fiddes’ conception of “persons as relations” rather than “persons
in relationship,” while creative, potentially problematic? It appears to me that
his proposal is potentially open to criticism in two ways and it may be helpful
to identify each to get a clearer picture of the import of Fiddes’ perspective.
The first potential criticism is in relation to what the Athanasian Creed refers
to as “neither dividing the substance, nor confounding the persons.”
149 Is there
a sense in which the divine persons are being confounded in Fiddes’ proposal?
Such is his emphasis upon coinherent relationality, upon perichoretic
interweaving, that some might suppose that the distinction between the persons
appears at one level to be lost or, at the least, blurred. Put another way, should
not the notion of personhood include the concept of some form of individual
subjectivity – a sense of “this-ness”?
150 For example, Pannenberg’s
understanding of the divine persons, which Fiddes acknowledges, is as “living
realisations of separate centres of action.”
151 In other words, then, the
relationality is conceived of existing between individual subjects rather than
being defined as them. Certainly it must be acknowledged that the inherent
danger of this sort of approach, by which I mean an approach that seeks to
emphasise the individual subjectivity of the divine persons, is that it must
always guard against being construed as tritheistic. However, some might see
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in Fiddes’ proposal a tendency in the opposite direction – that is, toward a
form of unitarianism. The assertion that the divine persons are relations has
the potential to render intangible the individuality of a person without which
we have no basis from which to speak of relationality or communion. In other
words, the distinction between the divine persons is blurred.
Yet, although I will discuss shortly how I find Fiddes’ proposal ultimately
unconvincing, it does appear to be not completely susceptible to this first
criticism. Indeed, the criticism that his proposal confounds the persons into a
form of relational unitarianism is in fact anticipated by Fiddes. His response is
to state that the divine relations “are not absorbed”
152 – that is, though the
persons are relations, their distinction is not absorbed into a unitary
relationality. In fact,
…understanding the persons in God as relationships precisely
recognises their ‘concrete particularity.’ There can be nothing
more distinct from each other than a movement of relationship like
that from a father to a son (‘Father’), a movement like that from a
son to a father (‘Son’), and an opening up of these relationships to
new depths and new possibilities (‘Spirit’).
153
In affirming this, Fiddes is in good company – particularly that of Aquinas
and, possibly, Augustine. In seeking to find his way through what other
medieval theologians designated as the ineffabilis pluralitas, Aquinas appeals
to the ideas of “subsistence” and “relation” – indeed, he explicitly states that, a
“‘divine person’ signifies relation as something subsisting.”
154 In this appeal to
the idea of subsistence rather than simple existence to describe the divine
persons, Aquinas is seeking to avoid a substantive understanding of person –
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for example, as that advocated by Boethius
155 – with its individualistic, and
hence tritheistic, leanings. His alternative is to speak of the persons subsisting
– that is, “to be in a certain manner, form or state, as white ‘subsists’ in
snow.”
156 Yet, though affirming that each of the divine persons subsist in the
one Godhead, Aquinas is careful nevertheless to draw distinctions between
them. This is why he and others, for example Calvin,
157 write of each divine
person’s nature of subsistence as being “incommunicable” – that is, there is an
incommunicable quality of subsistence peculiar or unique to each divine
person. Though each person shares the quality of deity, this unique quality of
subsistence designates what is not shared.
It is in the context of this distinction between the persons, their unique
incommunicable qualities of subsistence, that Aquinas utilises the idea of
relation. We may recall his affirmation that a “‘divine person’ signifies
relation as something subsisting.”
158 In other words, according to Aquinas, the
distinction between the divine persons is to be understood at a relational level.
He writes, “Therefore, there must be real distinction in God, not indeed when
we consider the absolute reality of his nature, where there is sheer unity and
simplicity, but when we think of him in terms of relation.”
159 Importantly for
our research, he goes on to pose a “point of inquiry” as to “whether relation is
the same as person.” He answers this query in the following way: although
acknowledging that there is some difference of opinion on the matter in that
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some see the idea of relation as attendant (that is, accompanying or
concomitant) on the person, he states, “However, since in the reality it has in
God relation is identical with essence and essence with person, as is now clear,
relation necessarily is the same as person.”
160 In other words, it seems, the
divine persons are not in relationship but are the relations themselves. Further,
it is precisely this relationality that makes the persons distinguishable –
whether it be fatherhood, sonship or procession (paternitas, filiatio or
processio).
161
Whether Augustine, also, thought similarly is certainly possible though
perhaps debatable.
162 Fiddes suggests that Augustine is “at least moving
toward this meaning when he says … that ‘the names, Father and Son, do not
refer to the substance but to the relation, and the relation is no accident’.”
163 A
close examination of the relevant passage in De Trinitate,
164 as well as the
flow of Augustine’s argument in the surrounding text, is certainly suggestive.
Earlier, Augustine deals with what he considers to be Arianism’s most
ingenious argument – an argument resting upon the above-mentioned
Aristotelian distinction between substance and accidents.
165 The Arians argued
that God has no accidents and is therefore unchanging – a belief with which
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orthodoxy was largely in agreement.
166 However, the Nicene Creed had
affirmed that the Father was “unbegotten” and the Son was “begotten,” and
both of these pertained to their substances. Kaiser puts the dilemma presented
by the Arians like this,
All things, they argued, are said either with respect to substance or
with respect to accidents. For instance, to say that a man is a father
is to speak with respect to accidents since he was not always a
father, he might never have become a father, and he may not
always remain a father. To say that a man is human, on the other
hand, is to speak with respect to his substance. What about God,
then, the Arians asked: is he said to be Father with respect to
substance or with respect to accidents?
167
In other words, the Arians were seeking to back their orthodox opponents into
a corner by presenting the situation in which “one is what the other is not in
the substantial sense.”
168 This, of course, would argue in favour of the Arians’
reductionist views concerning the deity of the Son.
Augustine’s response was to argue that the Father is not Father in reference to
himself but in reference to the Son. Following an intricate line of argument, he
concludes, “Wherefore, although to be the Father and to be the Son is
different, yet their substance is not different; because they are so called, not
according to substance, but according to relation, which relation, however, is
not accident, because it is not changeable.”
169 In other words, the
differentiation between the Father and the Son, as designated by their names,
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is not a matter of substance nor of accidents but is solely a matter of relations.
Badcock sees this clearly and summarises Augustine’s response in the
following way,
Augustine goes on to conclude that to say that the Father is God,
and that the Son is God, and that the Holy Spirit is God does not
mean that there are three Gods, for these names do not refer to
divine substance, of which there is only one (5.8). The names
refer, rather, purely and solely to the relations between the three.
The basic Augustinian insight involved here is that in the Trinity a
person is a pure relation.
170
Furthermore, although the names Father and Son have an implicit relationality,
what can be said concerning the distinctly non-relationally sounding name,
Holy Spirit?
171 Augustine responds that the Holy Spirit should be understood
as a relation common to both Father and Son – designating a form of eternal
relational mutuality between the two. He writes that the Holy Spirit is “a
certain unutterable communion of the Father and the Son” (spiritus sanctus
ineffabilis quaedam patris filioque communio).
172 The implication of
Augustine’s argument is that, “In this relational sense, then, the necessary
distinction of the divine persons could be maintained without denying the deity
of the Son and Spirit, on the one hand, or compromising the simplicity of the
divine substance, on the other.”
173 In other words, to recall the Athanasian
Creed, Augustine’s relational understanding of the divine persons brings about
a situation in which neither the substance is divided nor the persons
confounded.
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But, pertinently for our investigation, both Augustine’s and Aquinas’ equating
of person with relation, and the fact that this not only does not confound the
persons but actually establishes them, demonstrates that Fiddes’ contention of
divine persons as relations is not totally without precedent nor is it necessarily
theologically “out of bounds.” Both the suggestive language employed by
Augustine and the more explicit language of Aquinas – that, “relation
necessarily is the same as person”
174 – appear to provide support for his
proposal.
An Undermining of Human Persons?
This leads us to a second potential criticism of Fiddes’ proposal – that is, if
persons are relations, what implications does this have for our conception/s of
what it means to be human? Put another way, how are we to conceive of
humans in personal terms, who are created imago Dei, if person is relation? Is
it not the case that each human person is ostensibly an individual subjectivity
that is evidenced by individual bodies, personalities, minds, wills and so on?
Certainly, this individuality does not negate our essential “personal,” God-
imaged nature: we do not and should not exist in isolation – as non-relating
individual subjectivities. To be a human person, just as to be a divine person,
means to be in relationship. Relationality is part of who we are because we are
created in the image of a relational triune God. However, Fiddes’ conception
of “persons as relations” and not “persons in relationship” could be construed
by some as potentially undercutting our God-imaged individuality.
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Put another way, human persons are relational beings, but we are persons who
by definition relate, not the relations themselves. Consequently, it is this
seeming lack of individual subjectivity in Fiddes’ proposal, with the
implications it may have for what it means to be a human person, which some
may find troubling. For example, Vanhoozer makes the comment,
A trinitarian approach to theological anthropology avoids defining
persons as relations, however, for such a definition would make it
difficult to speak of relations between persons. The person is rather
an irreducible ontological reality that cannot be defined in terms of
something else.
175
Furthermore, if we define human persons as relations are we then utilizing the
language of doing rather than the language of being? In other words, are we
defining human persons according to what they do rather than who they are? If
so, this would appear potentially to have serious implications in the realm of
ethics. For example, what would this paradigm imply in relation to the
personhood of an unborn child, a severely handicapped teenager or a person in
an extended and apparently unrecoverable coma?
Yet, it must also be said that the criticism that Fiddes’ proposal is potentially
undercutting such human individuality also presents its own problems,
particularly at the level of what it is assuming to be the case – that is, that
divine persons and human persons are identical or, at least, directly correlative.
Certainly, it must be acknowledged that there must be some correlation
between divine persons and human persons for the alternative would render
the concept of imago Dei meaningless. Yet, it must be likewise acknowledged
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that divine and human persons are not identical or directly correlative in an
absolute sense – a distinction must always be drawn that reflects the
distinction between deity and humanity, transcendence and limitedness,
holiness and sinfulness, spirit and corporeality.
176 Indeed, it was the utilisation
of terms such as “subsistence” when speaking of divine persons that sought to
avoid the reductionism of directly correlating human persons with divine
persons. Rather than conceiving the Trinity according to human substantive
understandings of person in which Father, Son and Holy Spirit are seen as
individual subjectivities – “that is, three Gods after the likeness of three
individual beings at a human level”
177 – the divine persons were designated as
“subsisting” in each other. Therefore, to conceive of divine persons as
relations, as Fiddes does, may not in itself necessarily present a problem for
maintaining a robust understanding of the innate personhood of God-imaged
human beings.
Articulating a Trinitarian Relationality
Yet, though an intriguing and well-argued proposal, I am not completely
persuaded that its adoption is a necessary prerequisite for affirming both the
balance of unity and distinction in the Godhead and the essential relationality
that this presupposes. Indeed, one could argue that Fiddes’ proposal raises the
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question of perspective. He seeks to emphasise the essential relationality of the
triune God and so focuses his attention upon the relations themselves. Others,
however, desire to emphasise this same relationality but prefer to focus their
attention upon the divine persons who, by definition as persons, are in
relationship.
178 Fiddes writes of relations who are persons, others write of
persons who relate. Moltmann, an example of the latter, is particularly
scathing of the concept of persons as relations. He writes,
It is impossible to say: person is relation; the relation constitutes
the person. It is true that the Father is defined by his fatherhood to
the Son, but this does not constitute his existence; it presupposes it
… Person and relationship therefore have to be understood in a
reciprocal relationship. Here there are no persons without
relations; but there are no relations without persons either.
179
He argues that a conception, such as Fiddes is proposing, has a reductionist
tendency in that it reduces the concept of person to the concept of relation, and
this a self-relation, and is therefore modalistic. He explains, if divine person is
nothing more than a relation of God to himself, then,
… God in the three Persons would be thrice himself, and the
Persons would be nothing more than the triple self-repetition of
God. This modalistic view not only dissolves the trinitarian
concept of person; it does away with the interpersonal concept of
relation as well. Moreover the number ‘three’ becomes
incomprehensible.
180
By contrast, Moltmann believes that person and relation are “genetically
connected” – that is, the “constitution of the Persons and their manifestation
through their relations are two sides of the same thing.”
181
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In many ways I am more attracted to this idea of an intrinsic or “genetic”
connection of person and relation, like that advanced by Volf and Moltmann,
than I am to Fiddes’ proposal of person as relation. Yet, whichever perspective
is adopted, it is important to note that any articulation of this perichoretic
relationality that characterises the perfect community that is the Trinity
involves, in my view demands, the utilisation of a theological conception
characterized by balance or tension.
182 Put differently, whether the divine
persons relate or whether they are the relations themselves is, in a sense,
beside the point. What is primary is that God’s triunity encompasses oneness
and threeness, unity and distinction, and is therefore inherently perichoretic
and relational. To deny this relationality from the perspective of God’s
oneness or unity is to fall into unitarianism. To deny this relationality from the
perspective of God’s threeness or distinction is to fall into tritheism. What
enables the oneness to be conceived in relation to the threeness, the unity in
relation to the distinction, is the centrality of relationality – God as triune is
indeed “perfect community” – and, more to the point, this relationality appears
to necessarily require an articulation that utilizes language of tension or
balance.
Fiddes’ Trinitarianism and Issues of Providence – Divine Transcendence
However, the particular significance of Fiddes’ portrayal of this inherent
trinitarian relationality lies in how he applies it to pastoral issues – particularly
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the issues of power and authority, the point of intercessory prayer and the
problem of suffering. In each of these areas of pastoral concern, Fiddes
outlines how his understanding of God as pure, dynamic and moving
relationality – or, as he puts it, the God who “happens, moves and comes”
183 –
impacts upon how God acts in and upon the world. Consequently, this
trinitarian conception has implications for our identified issues of divine
Providence – divine transcendence, sovereignty (including omniscience),
immutability and impassibility.
184
Perhaps the most obvious implication of Fiddes’ proposal concerns divine
transcendence. If God were irrevocably “other,” then there would be no
possibility of participating in the God who is pure participative relationship.
As we have seen, foundational to Fiddes’ understanding of God as triune is
that the divine relationality, or “love in movement, making an interweaving
dance of ‘perichoresis,’” is one in which we are summoned to be involved.
185
This necessarily encompasses a sense of engagement and thereby rules out any
sense of disconnection – of God being one-sidedly or solely transcendent. The
transcendence of God must therefore include the notion of “with-ness,” of
immanence, which then in turn opens up the possibility for which Jesus prayed
in John 17:21.
186
However, at a deeper level, alongside the transcendence-immanence
dimension that is external to God, that is, between the triune God and the
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creation, Fiddes’ conception of the divine persons as relations also suggests a
transcendence-immanence dimension that is internal to God. Put another way,
just as there is a transcendence-immanence balance “without,” Fiddes’
proposal is suggestive of a similar transcendence-immanence balance
“within.” Such an internal balance, I suggest, may look like this: on the one
hand, we may speak of a dimension of transcendence existing within the
Trinity in that the divine persons are distinct from each other, yet on the other
hand, we may simultaneously speak of a dimension of immanence existing
within the Trinity in that the divine persons inter-penetrate, subsist or are
“with” each other. In other words, the external transcendence-immanence
tension is, in a sense, a reflection of an internal trinitarian transcendence-
immanence tension.
As such, this conception has relevance for our primary focus of considering
divine Providence from a trinitarian perspective. If the immanent Trinity
correlates with the economic Trinity, as Rahner, Gunton, Torrance and others
have argued, and if in that immanent Trinity we may conceive of a
transcendence-immanence dimension or balance, then is it not the case that
such a dimension or balance would therefore be to some extent reflected in the
triune economy – of God’s actions in the world? Fiddes himself acknowledges
that the immanent Trinity is not other than the economic Trinity when he
writes that, “there appears to be no gap between the ‘immanent’ and the
‘economic’ Trinity, that is, between God in God’s own self and God for us.”
187
Consequently, if we can conceive of a transcendence-immanence tension in
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God’s own self, should we not consider that as being to some extent reflective
of the same tension present in God for us? Of course, some careful distinctions
will need to be made here in that an intra-trinitarian dimension of
transcendence cannot refer to an ontological distinction between the divine
persons, for that would lead to subordinationism. However, it may still be
possible to speak of a dimension of transcendence to the extent that there are
clear distinctions drawn between the persons in that each is “other” and in
relation with others. We will draw out this line of thinking in more detail in
Part Three of this dissertation.
Fiddes’ Trinitarianism and Issues of Providence – Divine Sovereignty
Secondly, Fiddes’ proposal has implications for how we might conceive the
nature of divine sovereignty and omniscience, particularly as it relates to
Providence. In relation to divine sovereignty, Fiddes contends that some
trinitarian models present “images of domination.”
188  That is, divine
sovereignty is conceived in such a way that it portrays God as coercive in his
relations with humanity – always getting his way. In Fiddes’ view, this
understanding is antithetical to his proposal of a relational, dynamic, mutually
penetrating triune God who calls humanity into participation in the divine life.
As mentioned earlier, drawing on what he considers to be the best insights of
the early theologians of West and East, Fiddes uses the image of the “divine
dance” of perichoresis to illustrate his proposal. From the West comes the
emphasis upon “mutuality and reciprocity [which] tells us how the relations in
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God interact and shape each other.”
189 From the East comes the insight that
“the Father is alone the arche of the Son and the Spirit” and so the dance “is
not a swirling vortex of arbitrary currents. There is a direction to its flow, a
pattern which is like the movement to and from one ultimate source.”
190
Consequently, “the combination of reciprocity with a basic uni-directionality
is well illustrated by a mingling of a circle-dance with a progressive dance.”
191
It would appear that Fiddes is seeking to walk a trinitarian tightrope in his
conception of divine sovereignty. He does not want to deny sovereignty and so
affirms the directionality of the Eastern view of the divine dance (brought
about by the emphasis upon the arche of the Father). Yet, he also desires to
allow room for human freedom and so affirms the reciprocity of the Western
view of the divine dance (brought about by the emphasis upon the one
substance made up of the mutuality between the persons). However, he
ardently seeks to avoid an Eastern over-emphasis upon the Father for this runs
the danger of portraying the Father as a “dominating figure, subordinating the
other persons to him as their cause.”
192 Conversely, he also seeks to avoid a
Western over-emphasis upon the one substance of mutually reciprocating
persons for it runs the danger of portraying “God’s inner triune life as a closed
circle.”
193
The main point for Fiddes is that any such over-emphasis is a
misunderstanding of the Trinity and can result (and has resulted) in unhealthy
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expressions of coercion, domination and dependency in the world – at
political,
 ecclesiastical and social levels.
 194 For example, in the area of male
and female relationships, Fiddes sees a misunderstanding of the Trinity being
worked out in theological arguments supporting the notion of female role
subordination. He writes,
A subtle, but no less dangerous kind of theology builds on the
unity and distinction within the Trinity. Taking up the language of
the obedience of the Son to the Father, it is pointed out that while
the Son obeys the Father in all things he is no less divine in nature.
Thus the conclusion is drawn that women are no less equal as
human beings because their role is to follow the leadership of men.
It is urged that women are ‘equal in nature, but different in
function,’ and their function is to obey. They are equal in honour
but subordinate.
195
By contrast, Fiddes seeks to articulate a divine substance that is relational,
dynamic and mutual and therefore a “Fatherhood that does not oppress.”
196 In
his view, the language of Trinity “encourages the values of relationship,
community and mutuality between persons. It is about interdependence and
not domination.”
197
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Again, his concern is that any conception of divine sovereignty derived from
trinitarian theology must avoid a sense of causative coercion for this is a
mismatch with his conception of trinitarian relationality. It is for this reason
that he finds, for example, the Thomistic
198 and Calvinistic
199 “two-cause”
theory – that is, primary and secondary causes
200 – doubly problematic. Firstly,
the world “does not seem to have any real freedom; second, God appears to be
responsible for everything that happens in the world, including evil and
suffering.”
201 In this, Fiddes echoes the criticisms that Open Theism levels
against traditional or classical theism’s alleged conception of divine
sovereignty and Providence. Also, any attempt to deistically distance God as
primary cause from earthly secondary causes only results, in his view, with the
calling into question of the very reality of divine sovereignty.
202 Finally, and of
particular interest to this dissertation, Fiddes also finds unsatisfactory an
appeal to “sheer paradox” which simply places “the sovereign acts of God
alongside the world’s activities.”
203 In his view, an appeal to paradox drives a
wedge between the world-view of faith and the world-view of science.
204 As
such, it has the potential to act almost as an avoidance technique – separating
language about what God does from language about what the world does.
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While I accept that the concept of paradox or dialectic – that is, holding truths
in tension – could be perceived as avoiding the difficult questions raised by
concepts such as divine sovereignty, I am not persuaded that it necessarily
need be. My conception of theological tension is not one of “sheer paradox” in
which no link is drawn between divinity and humanity, where talk about God
and talk about humanity and the world are kept separate. Rather, my thesis is
that they are inseparable – that is, I am proposing that a way forward lies in
drawing together apparently conflicting emphases in a form of creative tension
or balance, with each being correctly understood only in the context of the
other. Further, rather than driving a wedge between God’s actions and human
activity, this approach actually connects the two and seeks to hold them in
dialectical tension. While some may find the acceptance of “restless tension”
in theological discourse difficult, it is up to the individual to judge, my concern
is more focused upon whether such an approach more accurately reflects
God’s revelation of himself and his action in and upon this world. Clearly, in
my view, it does and Parts Three and Four of this dissertation seek to
demonstrate this in more detail.
But, returning to Fiddes’ application of his dynamic, relational, mutual model
of the Trinity upon the issue of divine sovereignty, the model he proposes is
one in which divine sovereignty is characterised as persuasive rather than
coercive.
205 He writes,
We might say that God does not make us do certain things, but that
God influences and persuades us, or lures us with love, to co-
operate with the divine mission. There is no mechanical causality
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here, no inevitable link between cause and effect. God knows what
will make for the utmost satisfaction in our lives, but is humble
enough to want to entice us towards it rather than force us to
accept it. As H. H. Farmer put it, God as supremely personal does
not seek to manipulate our wills, but persuades by ‘haunting the
soul with the pressure of an unconditional love.’ God’s action, in
summary, is never unilateral.
206
Such a view leads directly from his understanding of the nature of God’s
triunity and, in particular, the idea that “persons are relations.” Fiddes’
argument is that the concept of divine persons as divine agents that are
operative on worldly objects gives the sense of things occurring “mechanically
and coercively.”
207 However, by contrast, if the persons are understood as
relations, as “currents of relationship,” then we are “involved in their
movement, we are persuaded and moved to certain ends, caught up in their
momentum. They are actions which are not characterised by domination, but
by co-operation.”
208 In this way, Fiddes desires to leave room for freedom that,
you may recall, he affirms as a characteristic of what it means to be
personal.
209 Indeed, the personal God is free in that he can have both general
aims (for the entire world) and particular aims (special or elective purposes
designed for new achievement). Human persons are free in that we are able to
respond and so, “God’s activity is thus blended with human action, giving us
the two causes we thought about earlier. But neither cause is mechanical,
having inevitable results; one is persuasive, the other responsive. There is a co-
operation, a working partnership between God and the world.”
210 Indeed, he
states that, “The view I am proposing affirms sovereignty in God, but not in
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the sense of unilateral activity.”
211 In all of this, Fiddes sounds very much like
an Open theist, although he never mentions the expression nor demonstrates
any awareness of the Open Theism debate. Indeed, one can almost hear an
echo of Fiddes when Open Theist Pinnock states, “Divine sovereignty involves
a flexible out-working of God’s purposes in history … Owing to the emphasis
in theology on almightiness, we have tended to neglect the form of power
called persuasion”
212 and “God’s sovereignty is general sovereignty because
he has set up a world order in which creatures have input into what
happens.”
213
Indeed, the similarities go further. For example, like Open Theism, Fiddes
appears to emphasise an understanding of human freedom that bears all the
hallmarks of libertarianism. Just as Open Theists refer to this freedom as “real”
freedom or “genuine” freedom (usually to contrast it with what they imply is
their opponents’ “non-real” or “non-genuine” compatibilistic understanding of
freedom), so also does Fiddes state that, “God has given the world a genuine
freedom, to share in creative activity.”
214 In other words, Fiddes’ conception of
divine sovereignty is one that gives the broad outlines of the future or, as he
calls them, “‘outline’ possibilities for the future, which will become more and
more detailed as created beings make their contribution to God’s purpose.”
215
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This developmental and synergistic understanding of the future then leads
Fiddes to make statements concerning God’s omniscience, specifically
foreknowledge, that are stark in their similarity with Open Theism. Drawing
on what appears to be a Molinist conception of divine knowledge,
216 in which
God foresees all the myriad of possibilities in all known worlds, Fiddes
nuances divine omniscience to include knowledge of possible future events
and not actual future events. He writes,
Does God know the future, if it has an openness about it – even the
limited risk I have described? With several modern philosophers of
religion, I believe we may say that God knows at any moment all
that there is to be known about the future. That is, God knows it as
the future, not as something that is either present or past to God,
and knows it perfectly in this way as we do not. So God knows all
the possibilities that exist for the world and its inhabitants, from the
least to the greatest, which we do not. God also knows the strength
of love to bring the best possibilities about, those which will make
for the greatest flourishing of life and the richest emergence of
values. But God knows these as possibilities, not as actualities,
because they have not yet happened.
217
This understanding of divine foreknowledge appears identical with Open
Theism’s understanding
218 and is the point over which the latter receives the
most criticism. In essence, this understanding argues that the traditional
understanding of divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom
to choose.
219 Furthermore, the idea that there is a successiveness or
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development in God’s awareness of actual events means that, in some sense,
time is a dimension in God. He states that, “If time means nothing to God, it is
hard to see how God can really be involved in our time and history.”
220
Consequently, he proposes that because God is an eternal movement,
subsisting in moving and interweaving relationships, then there is a type of
developmental flow in God. He writes,
This means that God has a ‘story’, some kind of successiveness in
which one thing comes after another, and so time is in God rather
than God in time; we may conclude that this is the basis for God’s
creation of our time, in which (in Barth’s phrase) ‘God has time
for us’.”
221
This is very similar to, if not identical with, Open Theism’s contention that
there is a sense of temporality in God. Pinnock writes, “God is a temporal
agent … Scripture presents God as temporally everlasting, not timelessly
eternal … To act in time God must somehow be in time … Time, in a certain
sense, must be a property of God”
222 and “In fact, God as temporal knows the
world successively and does not know future acts, which are freely chosen in a
libertarian sense.”
223
However, Fiddes’ nuancing of divine sovereignty and how it ought to be
understood in relation to divine omniscience would appear to be at odds with
the majority view of the Christian church over two millennia.
224 Furthermore,
it is my view that divine sovereignty, and indeed divine omniscience, is
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portrayed in a robust way in the scriptures. Certainly, there are many occasions
in which human responsibility is affirmed – humanity does have a part to play
– but rather than seeing this activity as therefore limiting to some extent the
nature and extent of divine sovereignty, my contention is that this affirmation
of human responsibility is placed by the writers alongside, not modifying or in
place of, the affirmation of exhaustive divine sovereignty. It is not a question
of either-or but both-and. However, the value of Fiddes’ proposal is that it
grounds in the trinitarian divine life the notion that God is indeed sovereign
and yet the nature of this sovereignty is such that legitimate human agency
exists alongside and simultaneous with it. We will revisit this point in depth in
Part Three.
Fiddes’ Trinitarianism and Issues of Providence – Divine Immutability
Furthermore, Fiddes’ understanding of the trinitarian divine life has
implications for how we might conceive of another issue of divine Providence,
in this instance divine immutability. His contention of appropriating the best
insights of the East (the arche of the Father which provides a sense of uni-
directionality in the divine life) and of the West (the reciprocity and mutuality
of the divine persons within the one divine essence) provides a trinitarian
grounding for conceiving of God’s unchangeableness in ways that incorporate
notions of dynamism and changeability. Fiddes comments,
While theological metaphysics affirmed the essential immutability
of God as ‘beyond Being,’ the idea of perichoresis in the Trinity
kept alive, within the theological system itself, a challenge to the166
image of a dominating God whose power lies in immobility and in
being secure from being affected by the changing world.
225
In other words, within the one theological system, there are two dimensions
that need to be understood in the context of each other. Fiddes’ theological
instincts are perceptive here for he recognizes that if God is indeed immutable,
even “essentially” immutable, then such immutability must be understood in
the context of the trinitarian doctrine of perichoresis. In other words,
immutable does not mean immobile. Furthermore, I would add that the
opposite is also true – if God is perichoretic and dynamic, then these
“changeable” or mutable aspects must be understood in the context of his
immutability. In other words, mutable does not mean fickle, unsettled or
unreliable.
Indeed, with additional development, I contend that conceiving of God as
triune gives solid grounding for affirming both immutability
(unchangeableness) and mutability (changeableness) in God and, by extension,
in God’s dealings with the world in Providence. For example, by developing
Fiddes’ understandings of the best insights of East and West, and utilising
further his image of the “divine dance,” there is a sense in which the
immutability of God can be seen in the constant uni-directionality of the divine
dance – there is a constancy or dependability in God. Furthermore, the
mutability of God can be seen in the fact that within this constant uni-
directionality there is the presence of dynamic, moving, perichoretic
reciprocity of the divine persons who subsist in the one essence and who invite
other persons to enter into relationship – to enter the divine dance. In other
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words, it is possible to conceive of both dimensions as existing alongside each
other, in fact interpenetrating each other, in the Trinity.
Indeed, another example of a trinitarian grounding for affirming both
dimensions can be formulated by noting that, from one perspective, the inter-
trinitarian divine life is perichoretically dynamic and therefore experiences
change in the sense that three persons in perfect relational community impact
and are impacted by each other. Furthermore, because this triune God invites
others to participate in the divine life, there is another sense in which we might
speak of God being “impacted” or experiencing a sense of change – he is not a
cosmic iceberg. Yet, from another perspective, this same dynamic trinitarian
divine life remains simultaneously beyond change for it is, to use Gunton’s
term, “ontologically secure.”
226 That is, this invitation that the triune life
extends to other persons to enter into relationship with it should never be
understood to imply “need” in God. God does not need humanity to be God, as
in some forms of Process theism, yet as a personal relational being he
nevertheless invites other persons into relationship with himself.
These points and others will also be drawn out in some depth in Part Three as
we see their implications for how we might conceive divine Providence.
However, at this stage, I would simply like to emphasise this primary point: if
we are to utilise the term “immutability” in our descriptions of God, and
therefore in our descriptions of how he acts in Providence, such immutability
should never be construed in ways that give the impression of divine inertness
                                                
226 C. E. Gunton, The Christian Faith, p. 189.168
and immoveability for this is fundamentally contrary to the nature of the
divine trinitarian life. Conversely, any emphasis upon mutability in God
should not be construed in ways that imply God is unfaithful, undependable or
capricious – the God of the Bible is both faithful and trustworthy (Psalm
111:7-8
227).
Fiddes’ Trinitarianism and Issues of Providence – Divine Impassibility
Finally, the issue of divine immutability leads us to consider our fourth
identified issue of divine Providence – divine impassibility – and how Fiddes’
relational understanding of the Trinity impacts upon it. The linkage between
the two issues derives from the fact that the notion of a suffering or “passible”
God appears necessarily also to involve the notion of change – that is, “one
must have the potential to receive some impact from outside oneself.”
228 In
many ways, this notion of change was anathema to the early Fathers for they
were concerned to demonstrate the constancy and faithfulness of the Christian
God as against the fickle and changeable gods of the Roman and Greek
pantheons. Similarly, Aquinas, and indeed other medieval Schoolmen, saw
suffering and change as inextricably linked and therefore sought to exclude
God from both.
229
Yet, great care is needed to ensure that we do not misunderstand the concerns
of the Fathers and the Schoolmen. Commendably, in my view, Fiddes does not
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suggest that the Christian thinkers of the past intended to create a remote or
non-compassionate God with their doctrine of divine impassibility, nor does he
suggest that they had been completely overtaken by philosophy, although he
does suspect that “the presuppositions of Platonism, Neoplatonism and
Aristotle did undoubtedly exercise some influence on the early church fathers
and the medieval theologians.”
230 In the light of this, Fiddes does contend that
there was a “…tendency for the God of Scripture to take on the colours of
philosophy; God’s unchanging faithfulness became an unchanging immobility,
and God’s unchanging otherness from the world (holiness) became a
philosophical otherness that effectively excluded God from the turmoil of
history.”
231 Consequently, while it may have been acceptable in the past to
speak of God’s impassibility, and indeed it may have even enabled
participation in God, in today’s climate however, in the age of the Holocaust,
Fiddes believes that to say “God does not suffer” is ultimately inhibitive to
participation in God.
This last point is deeply instructive for us for it shows that, given the right
articulation and the right context, divine impassibility need not be perceived as
a negative doctrine. Indeed, even within Fiddes’ highly relational
understanding of the Trinity, he still intimates that it may be possible to speak
of both impassibility and passibility in God and therefore in God’s dealings
with the world. For example, he acknowledges that we can speak of God’s
impassibility if by that term we mean, “God does not suffer and change in
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exactly the same way as we do.”
232 In the historical context of the early church,
such an understanding was helpful and positive for it affirmed that God was
not only above all other gods but was above and beyond all of creation. In that
context, we can perhaps understand how the articulation of such a distinction
led to negative or apophatic language. As God was “not like” this world, he
was therefore imperishable, incomparable, inexpressible, immutable and
impassible. However, in this present age with its “sensitivity to the problem of
human suffering in general,” it is Fiddes’ view that the label “impassible” is
more unhelpful than helpful for it sends “all the wrong signals in the way that
it did not do in the past.”
233 In other words, Fiddes appears to believe that
contemporary hearers would invariably understand impassibility to denote a
lack of feeling or connection, a God who is aloof from the plight of human
suffering.
Yet, I am not persuaded that this necessarily need be the case. Fiddes has
helpfully highlighted the need for theological clarity and so we must ensure
that theological terms, such as “impassibility,” are understood in the context in
which they were coined. Indeed, it is my view, which I will defend in Part
Three, that neither the early Fathers nor the medieval Schoolmen ever intended
the doctrine of divine impassibility to be understood in ways that portray God
as unfeeling or aloof. In fact, I will argue that the notion of impassibility is a
rich and robust conception which, when correctly understood, provides a
necessary presupposition for the idea that God can and does experience
suffering. However, at this stage, my main point is simply to advance the idea
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that if one uses the term “impassible,” it must be understood in the context of a
God who suffers and who has suffered supremely on the cross. Alternatively,
if one uses the term “passible,” it must be understood in the context of a God
who does not suffer in exactly the same way as we do nor is he helpless within
that suffering in the same way that we often are.
234 In many ways, there is a
sense in which God is both impassible and passible and each needs to be
understood in the context the other provides.
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Tensions in Thinking
Articulating a Trinitarian Perspective
on Divine Providence173
CHAPTER FIVE
DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE
AND IMMANENCE
It may be helpful and opportune at this point to trace our steps thus far. Having
introduced and outlined my thesis in Chapter One and then having stated my
adopted methodology in Chapter Two, I sought in Chapter Three to lay a
foundation by outlining the theological doctrine of Providence and identifying
those aspects over which there has been, and continues to be, widespread
agreement across Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant communities. In the light
of both creeds and statements from individual theologians, I argued that there
appears to be general agreement that Providence should not be understood in a
deistic, pantheistic or fatalistic construct. On the positive side, I argued that
there appears to be general agreement concerning the universality, continuity,
dimensionality and intentionality of divine Providence. However, within this
general agreement, I noted that there are issues over which there has been, and
continues to be, ongoing disagreement – particularly around conceptions of
divine transcendence, sovereignty (including omniscience), immutability and
impassibility. As a consequence, I turned to an explanation of the
contemporary Open Theism debate and noted that it is a helpful vehicle for my
research for it is strikingly provoking debate over these same issues that divide
understandings of Providence. As stated earlier, this debate will be utilized to174
the extent that it will provide much of the context of my argument in Part
Three.
However, I also noted that most, if not all, of the divided understandings of
Providence appear to derive ultimately from divided understandings of the
nature of God.
1 Indeed, in many ways the Open Theism debate is essentially a
discussion about the nature of God. Consequently, Chapter Three was
completed with an excursus investigating the centrality of God and faith in our
understandings of Providence. As the triunity of God is the particular
distinctive of this dissertation’s consideration of Providence, this excursus acts
as a type of bridge between “The Providing God” (Chapter Three) and “The
Triune God” (Chapter Four). As such, it lays the foundation for investigating
how God’s triunity might particularly illuminate our understanding of divine
Providence.
On the basis of this, I then investigated in Chapter Four the contributions of
three recent trinitarian theologies – drawn from each of the three main
Christian communities – and noted aspects that showed potential for
illuminating my identified issues of Providence. Each of the three shared
highly relational understandings of God’s triunity and I sought to point out
those areas of their treatment that I considered helpful and unhelpful. More
particularly, I sought to identify ways in which trinitarian theology might act
as a type of theological key for unlocking some of the problems that have
often beset consideration of divine Providence.
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As a consequence, this present chapter marks the beginning of seeking to
articulate in more depth my thesis that a trinitarian perspective on Providence
provides a conceptual paradigm in which varying theological emphases are
affirmed in a form of creative tension, with each being correctly understood
only in the context of the other. As we have seen, many of these emphases,
which seem to divide understandings of Providence and which have come to
the fore in the Open Theism debate, appear to revolve around the issues of
transcendence, sovereignty, immutability and impassibility. For example, as
Pinnock states,
We must let Scripture speak to our definitions of the attributes of
God. The Bible’s representation of God’s changeable faithfulness
speaks to the issue of immutability. The sufferings of God and the
cross of Christ speak to the issue of impassibility. God’s saving
activities in time speak to the issue of his eternity. God’s
vulnerability and the reality of human freedom speak to the issue of
sovereignty. God’s hesitancy about unsettled aspects of the future
speaks to the issue of omniscience … Conventional theists have
difficulty with the open view of God because it challenges certain
well-established traditions and not because it is unscriptural. It
advances notions which they have not taken seriously before, for
example the idea of God taking risks, of God’s will being thwarted,
of God being flexible, of grace being resistible, of God having a
temporal dimension, of God being impacted by the creature, and of
God not knowing the entire future as certain.
2
My thesis is that a trinitarian perspective on these issues presents us with a
theological basis for a binary affirmation – of both/and rather than either/or.
For example, rather than disagreeing over whether God is either immutable-
impassible or mutable-passible, a trinitarian perspective might lead us to
affirm that God is, in different senses, both immutable-impassible and
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mutable-passible. Furthermore, since I am arguing that there are different
senses in which there is both immutability-impassibility and mutability-
passibility in God, I am thus avoiding contradiction and am instead affirming a
tensional paradox. That is, just as orthodoxy affirms that the triune God is one
in one sense (essence) and three in another (personhood), so also is he
immutable-impassible in one sense and mutable-passible in another.
Moreover, the fact that both emphases are held in tension means that there is a
sense of mutual creativity between them – that is, each is understood in the
light of and in the context of the other. In trinitarian theology it is
commonplace to think or write of God’s oneness only in the context of his
threeness and vice versa. Similarly, if God is in one sense immutable, this
must be understood in the context that he is in another sense mutable and vice
versa – each emphasis sheds light on the other.
My intention in Part Three is to articulate more clearly this idea of theological
tension by applying it to my identified issues of Providence. Working from a
trinitarian perspective, I am asking: in what sense/s is the God of Providence a
transcendent, sovereign, immutable and impassible being? As the previous
chapters have demonstrated, we ought not to understand any of these attributes
in an absolute or starkly philosophical manner. As Gunton comments, “On a
trinitarian account … there are no absolute attributes, in so far as the term
suggests attributes that are non-relational.”
3 God is primarily a relational being
and this is evidenced by the revelation of himself as a triune being and his
desire, demonstrated in the economy of salvation, to draw humanity into
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relationship with himself. Hence, any understanding of these attributes, which
have become theological issues in discussion of Providence, must take into
account the essential relationality of God as a triune being. As such, my view
is that a way forward in the Providence debate can be found in tensional truths
– theological affirmations that complement and inform each other.
Yet, despite our desire for greater clarity and understanding, I must state again
my view that we are dealing here also with the presence of mystery. Although
the divine revelation gives us sufficient understanding so that we might be
reconciled with God, we will never have total comprehension – “Because God,
who can never be fully comprehended, lies at the heart of all theological
enquiry, theology by its nature is not a problem solving enterprise, but rather a
mystery discerning enterprise.”
4 Indeed, it is in this context that some writers
have noted the Pentateuchal statement, “The secret things belong to the LORD
our God, but the things revealed belong to us and to our children forever, that
we may follow all the words of this law” (Deuteronomy 29:29 NIV). From this
some argue that the totality of truth appears to be divided into two parts – the
“secret things” which belong to God only and the “things revealed” which also
belong to humanity.
5 This juxtaposition of “revealedness” and “hiddenness” is
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helpful as we seek to articulate tensions in theological thinking. Although the
presence of ultimate mystery is an integral, even essential, part of theological
enquiry (hence, its limitation), this verse still points beyond the necessary
“hiddenness” to the reality of “things revealed” (hence, its possibility). It is my
view that God has revealed himself as both a providing and triune God and
this revelation belongs to humanity.
Consequently, though we must by necessity remain agnostic about some
aspects of God’s being and action, for they are not revealed and remain part of
the “secret things,” we can have certainty concerning other aspects of God’s
being and action, for they are revealed and belong to us. This juxtaposition,
however, raises a distinct challenge both for the individual believer and the
broader Christian church. This challenge revolves around the ease with which
we might confuse the revealed things with the secret things and vice versa. Put
another way, it is possible to confuse those things concerning which we may
have grounds to be assertive, for they are revealed, and those things over
which it would be wise to remain agnostic, for they are secret. Stott puts it like
this, “Our troubles begin when we allow our dogmatism to invade the realm of
‘the secret things’ or our agnosticism to obscure ‘the things that are revealed’
… It is as much a sign of maturity to say ‘I don’t know’ about one thing as it is
to say ‘I know’ about another – provided that our admission of ignorance
concerns something kept secret and our claim to knowledge something
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Providence (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), p. 50.179
revealed.”
6 What is needed, therefore, is wise and careful discernment between
the two – between that which is hidden and that which is revealed.
It is my contention that aspects of both divine triunity and divine Providence
have been revealed to us and we seek illumination and discernment of these
revealed things.
7 However, it is my further contention that there are also
aspects of Trinity and Providence that remain part of the “secret things.”
Hence, it should not surprise us when we experience tensions in our
understanding and articulation of Trinity and Providence for this is simply a
reflection of the presence of both hiddenness and revealedness – of mystery
and revelation. For example, despite the certainty we may have of the reality
and efficacy of God’s Providence, it is likewise true that some of the revealed
aspects of Providence appear to stand in tension with others and no apparent or
revealed perspective enables us finally to reconcile them. They remain, in a
sense, “restless in our hands.”
8 As already stated, the presence of this
restlessness and tension is simply an indicator of the presence of the mystery
of divine hiddenness (Deus absconditus), and this hiddenness stands alongside
the divine revelation (Deus revelatus). Similarly, there are aspects of the
divine triunity which are revealed in the actions of God in history and in the
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economy of salvation as witnessed by the scriptures, but this revelation,
though sufficient, is not exhaustive. This does not mean that there are two
trinities, one hidden and one revealed, that are distinct from each other. Rather,
God has revealed himself as the one and only God who is a triune community
of persons and this revelation is consistent and reflective of his very being.
9
Jewett is helpful when he comments, “The teaching of Scripture is rather that
even as revealed, God is far from fully revealed; God remains free in his
revelation, transcendent in his condescension. We might put it this way: God
has revealed himself and consequently we know him; but though we know him
truly, we do not know him fully, as he knows us.”
10
It would appear, therefore, that the conceptual idea of holding affirmations
dialectically in a form of theological tension appears particularly suited to a
discussion of God as triune and of the theological issues that pertain to his
action in Providence. Furthermore, it is my contention that such trinitarian
truths in tension may be helpful as a way forward for illuminating these issues
of Providence. However, such a contention needs more specific articulation
and so it is to this subject that we now turn.
THE NATURE OF TRANSCENDENCE
The intention of the Open Theism proposal, as it relates to divine
transcendence in the context of Providence, is encapsulated in the succinct and
blunt words of Pinnock, “We have heard much in the past about God’s
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transcendence, we now need to hear more about God’s condescendence.”
11
The transcendence that Pinnock has in mind here is the distinction between
Creator and created – the divine “apartness” in that God is over and beyond
and superior to the created order.
12 Certainly, there have been theological
conceptions that have portrayed God as almost exclusively transcendent and
which have thereby limited or denied any concept of divine immanence. A
particular example of such a denial or limitation of divine immanence is the
17
th and 18
th century theological system known as Deism. Indeed, if one were
to place divine transcendence and immanence at opposite ends of a theological
spectrum, then Deism could arguably be placed at the radically transcendent
end.
13 Deism argues for an understanding of reality in which God remains
aloof to his creation, like a distant clockmaker who is now allowing the clock
he has created to wind down, without any further intervention from him.
14 It
has been argued that this view of an uninvolved deity derived, in part at least,
from the scientific discoveries of the 17
th and 18
th centuries, which arguably
began with the published theories of Sir Isaac Newton on gravitation and
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motion.
15 God became progressively more extraneous to our understanding of
the mechanics of our world. As Cottrell has commented, “The Newtonian
physics made it easy to think of the world as a great machine pre-set to run
with a beautiful regularity … The world had everything it needed from the
beginning.”
16 As such, it really begs the question as to whether positing an
ongoing relationship between a deistic Creator and the created can be called a
relationship in any sense in which that word would normally be used – that is,
a continuing encounter or connection between persons. The words of
Immanuel Kant are pertinent here, “… the Deist believes in a God, the Theist
in a living God.”
17
Yet, there have also been theological conceptions that have portrayed God as
almost exclusively immanent and have thereby limited or denied any concept
of divine transcendence. If Deism stands at the radically transcendent end of
the transcendence-immanence theological spectrum, then at the radically
immanent end stands Pantheism. In a general sense, the pantheistic limitation
or denial of divine transcendence has resulted in, at best, a blurring and, at
worst, an eradication of the orthodox distinction between Creator and created
and the inevitable development of a monistic view of reality. In this view, the
ongoing relationship between Creator and created is seen more as an internal
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symbiotic relationship rather than one operating externally between
distinguishable entities.
But, contrary to this sort of reductionism – be it either deistic or pantheistic –
our earlier survey found that the general understanding of divine Providence
has sought to affirm both God’s continuing involvement with his creation
simultaneously with his continuing distinction from it. On the one hand, God
is not one who creates and then steps smartly backwards. As Guthrie
categorically notes from his study of the New Testament, “No support is given
for the view that, having created the world, God left it to its own devices.”
18
On the other hand, God is not one who is somehow subsumed into the creation
or even has creation subsumed into himself. Transcendence is neither
advanced so as to deny or limit immanence, nor is immanence advanced so as
to deny or limit transcendence – though “God is in heaven and you are on
earth” (Ecclesiastes 5:2 NIV), he is also “not far from each one of us” (Acts
17:27b NIV). Indeed, it is in this context that Page has introduced, with some
regret, a new technical word to describe how she sees this relationship –
pansyntheism (“God with everything”). She states, “Everything, at all times,
stands in the divine presence, which is as omnipresent, though not as
contingent, as the air we breathe … But God, even on the most immanent
reckoning, remains God, not to be confused with finite creatures. There is
infinitely more to God than a presence in creation.”
19
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A Question of Emphasis
Though recognizing that the traditional or classical model of Providence does
not deny immanence, Open Theism nevertheless detects an over-emphasis
upon transcendence and consequently an under-emphasis upon immanence.
Though a critic of Open Theism, Davis agrees with some of its assessment
when he writes, “Reformed theologians stress God’s transcendence so much
that it is hard to imagine having a close relationship with him.”
20 Such
emphasis on transcendence leads Open Theists like Rice to describe the
traditional view as God dwelling “in perfect bliss outside the sphere of time
and space.”
21 Sanders sees the traditional view as maintaining a biblical-
classical synthesis that is so prevalent that “it functions as a pre-understanding
that rules out certain interpretations of scripture that do not ‘fit’ with the
conception of what is ‘appropriate’ for God to be like, as derived from Greek
metaphysics.”
22 The result is that we are presented with “the God of the
biblical-classical synthesis with its emphasis on divine transcendence.”
23 In
Pinnock’s words, this synthesis had led the Christian church “to a one-sidedly
transcendent deity. The side of God that is turned away from us predominates
and the side of God that has turned toward us is diminished.”
24
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(Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books, 2003), p. 115.
21 C. H. Pinnock et al, The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional
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The main concern that Open theists have with this emphasis is that they feel it
distorts the biblical portrayal of God – transcendence is presented as defining
God as he really is (independent, alone and immutable), whereas immanence
describes God as he appears to us (suffering, changeable). In other words, the
traditional view is guilty of dividing God’s attributes into higher and lower
levels.
25 This approach is caused by what Sanders has called the “biblical-
classical synthesis” of the traditional model – that is, “the loving, interactive
God of the Bible is conjoined with the static, independent God of Greek
metaphysics.”
26
The critics of Open Theism, not surprisingly, deny the charge that Greek or
Hellenistic philosophy has negatively influenced the traditional view and
produced an over-emphasis on transcendence. In fact, some of them see not so
much a redressing of the balance between transcendence and immanence in
Open Theism as an over-emphasis in the other direction. For example, George
calls the God of Open Theism a “transcendence-starved deity.”
27 Ware states
that Open Theism has “an unbalanced and excessive view of God’s
immanence.”
28 He agrees that, “God is immanent … [and] intimately involved
in the affairs of his people and in governing and overseeing the whole sweep
of human history.” However, “his immanence is from the standpoint of
undiminished and fully glorious transcendence.”
29
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In many ways, this difference in standpoint or emphasis – whether it be toward
transcendence or immanence – is analogous with a question I raised in Chapter
Four concerning the emphasis of one divine attribute over others in our
understanding of God. In that instance, I argued that the advancement of one
particular attribute beyond other attributes runs the risk of skewing our
understanding of God. I noted that Zizioulas’ trinitarianism, as an example of a
highly relational concept of God, advanced “love” as the defining attribute and
utilized the biblical statement “God is love” (1 John 4:8,16 NIV) as evidence.
Such language is echoed in the writings of Open Theists. My argument was
that such an emphasis seems to partner with an emphasis away from divine
transcendence and toward divine immanence. Furthermore, and for the sake of
illustration, I noted that one could utilize the alternative biblical statement
“God is light” (1 John 1:5 NIV) to advance “holiness” as the defining divine
attribute. This, in turn, could possibly partner with an emphasis away from
immanence and toward transcendence. One wonders where the biblical
statement “God is Spirit” (John 4:24 NIV), when advanced beyond and
without the context of the other attributes, would lead us in our understanding
of God. Furthermore, the danger of such imbalance has the potential to
increase in severity proportional to the distance any attribute is advanced
beyond the other attributes and divorced from the context they provide.
In the light of this, it is interesting to note that two fairly recent systematic
theologies – from Garrett and Jewett – structure their treatments of the divine187
attributes around the dialectic of holiness and love.
30 Indeed, Garrett states that
the method one adopts to arrange and interpret the divine attributes is
important for “method can affect the content of the attributes.”
31
Consequently, the organizing centres of his treatment are “God as Holy” and
“God as Love.” In his view, each reflects what is the emphasized attribute of
the OT and NT respectively and he further utilizes the attribute of
“righteousness” to act “as a ‘bridge’ attribute between holiness and love.”
32
Whilst recognising that such dialectic can be helpful, I am reluctant to agree
with Garrett’s view that holiness is emphasized in the OT and love in the NT.
Such a perspective has similarities with those who might argue, from a
trinitarian perspective, that the Father who is “God over us” is the God of the
OT and the Son who is “God for us” is the God of the NT – something that
could be described as a form of historical modalism. In my view, both the OT
and the NT equally testify to both the holiness and love of God.
Jewett follows a similar structure to Garrett but utilizes the headings “God is
the Holy One” and “God is Love.”
33 However, what is particularly striking
about Jewett is that he clearly recognizes the significance this dialectic has on
the issue of divine transcendence and immanence. He writes,
The paradox in our doctrine of the divine nature becomes evident
at once. Holiness speaks of God’s transcendence, his otherness,
his remoteness from us; love, of his immanence, his giving of
himself to us. The one affirmation is distance-making, the other
distance-breaking. Yet, the authors of Scripture never think of
God’s holiness and love as mutually exclusive; they rather view
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them as mutually inclusive. Not that God’s holiness and love are
ultimately synonymous; to say that God is the Holy One and that
he is Love is not to speak in tautologies. But his holiness and love
encompass each other, contain and comprise each other in a
mysterious embrace.
34
Hence, Jewett sees an emphasis upon divine holiness as reflective of an
emphasis upon divine transcendence – it is “distance-making.” Alternatively,
an emphasis upon divine love is reflective of an emphasis upon divine
immanence – it is “distance-breaking.”
35 It should not surprise us then to see
Open Theism emphasising that God is love whilst simultaneously emphasising
the divine immanence. Conversely, it should not surprise us to see some critics
of Open Theism emphasising God’s holiness and his transcendence. My view
is that it is better for each to be placed in creative tension with the other – God
is both transcendentally immanent and immanently transcendent. As Jewett
himself comments, “the theological price of … undialectical simplicity is
distortion of the truth.”
36
The Theological Tension of Divine Transcendence and Immanence
Although it is not the intention of this dissertation to argue overtly for or
against the Open Theism proposal (although I recognise that implicitly or
indirectly I cannot avoid making some judgments), the debate it has provoked
has raised this important issue of divine transcendence in the context of God’s
providential dealings with the world. As we have seen, Open Theists see the
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traditional or classical conception of the God/world relationship as excessively
emphasising transcendence. The traditional or classical theists see Open
Theism’s conception of the God/world relationship as excessively emphasising
immanence. Which is right? The possibility that I am seeking to advance is
that both are, but in different senses. It would appear that each is seeking to
preserve what they sense is the biblical dialectic of transcendence and
immanence, yet each appears to approach the dialectic from opposing sides.
Pinnock wants to hear more about God’s condescendence and so appears to
approach the dialectic from the immanent side. Alternatively, Ware desires to
preserve God’s “fully glorious transcendence” and so appears to approach the
dialectic from the transcendent side.
What is important to note as a fundamental point is that both are seeking to
articulate a theological tension – transcendence and immanence – and, in a
sense, want each to be understood in the context of the other. For example,
Pinnock comments,
The history of doctrine has seen a tilt toward divine transcendence
over against God’s immanence. Theology emphasized one set of
divine properties to the neglect of another and disturbed the
delicate balance between them. Though God is both transcendent
and immanent, theology has tended to be lop-sided … Though
acknowledging the truth of divine immanence, theologians usually
place the preponderance of their emphasis on God’s
transcendence. They prefer to speak more of God’s power than of
weakness, more of God’s eternity than of temporality, and more of
God’s immutability than of loving changeableness in relation to
us. This represents a theological distortion that must be corrected,
without being overcorrected. I hope the reader will not see my
position as an overreaction; it is not my intention.
37
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The danger, as Pinnock himself is aware, is that disagreement may cause an
over-compensation in either direction. Indeed, in their survey of 20
th century
theology, Grenz and Olson note, “… the instability introduced whenever
transcendence and immanence are out of kilter. The lopsided emphasis on one
will indeed eventually lead to attempts to redress the imbalance by moving too
far in the other direction.”
38 Yet, despite Pinnock’s care not to appear to have
over-compensated, and his explicit awareness of this danger, his critics would
accuse him of that very thing.
What can be said about this apparent standoff? Certainly, it appears that the
theological instincts of both Pinnock and Ware are correct in that they each
want to affirm transcendence and immanence. This common ground is
noteworthy and should not be undervalued. Perhaps it could be argued that
there is a theological disposition present in both that perhaps draws them to
either side of the dialectic. In other words, perhaps there is a predisposition in
which Pinnock wants transcendence understood in the context of immanence,
whereas Ware wants immanence understood in the context of transcendence.
This disposition might be seen, in Pinnock’s case, with his desire to redress an
imbalance (although he is clearly aware of the danger of overcompensation),
and, in Ware’s case, with his explicit statement that immanence must be
understood from “the standpoint of [his] undiminished and fully glorious
transcendence.”
39 Whatever the case may be, it is important to note that both
affirm transcendence and immanence and want neither side of the balance or
tension to compromise the other. In Pinnock’s words, “It is not wrong to exalt
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God’s otherness, except at the expense of divine relatedness.”
40 In Ware’s
words, “God is both transcendent and immanent yet his immanence is the
graciously and undeserved expression of his mercy towards his creatures
without any compromise of or limitation to his transcendent excellencies.”
41
The Tension from a Trinitarian Perspective
It is my view that a way forward lies in consideration of God as a triune being.
Indeed, Blocher agrees that, in the context of transcendence and immanence,
“many theologians, in order to accommodate for both, have been attracted to a
trinitarian model.”
42 Hence, rather than choosing between transcendence and
immanence, the possibility that I am advancing is that a trinitarian perspective
provides a conceptual framework whereby both transcendence and immanence
are held in theological tension with each being understood in the context the
other provides. In other words, the tension or dialectic goes both ways.
Interestingly, the earlier treatment by Jewett in his dialectical approach to the
divine attributes (holiness and love) led directly into a discussion of God as
triune. Indeed, Jewett entitled his new section “God Is a Trinity of Holy
Love,” thereby directly connecting the dialectic of “holy love” with God’s
triunity.
43 The only alternative I could suggest on this would be perhaps to
reverse the order. In other words, drawing upon the criticisms of Rahner,
Zizioulas and others concerning the priority often given to the divine Oneness
in the West, a discussion of God as Trinity could be treated first. This, in turn,
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would then provide a rich basis upon which to work out the dialectic of “holy
love” in the context of the divine attributes. In many ways, it is this latter type
of approach that I am utilizing in that I am seeking illumination of God’s
triunity and then I am seeking to shine that perspective upon issues of
Providence.
As introduced in Chapter Four, it is my view that a transcendence-immanence
tension in Providence is a reflection of, and to some extent finds its basis in, a
tension in God’s triunity in which we see dimensions of transcendence and
immanence. In other words, just as there is a tension ad intra or “within,” so is
there one ad extra or “without.” The fact that we experience the tension of
transcendence/immanence in God’s providence toward us is to an extent
reflective of how God is within himself. In its simplest form, this
understanding derives from recognizing both transcendent and immanent
dimensions in God that co-exist and, in fact, interpenetrate and inform each
other. On the one hand, there is a triune dimension of transcendence in that a
clear distinction – a sense of “apartness” – is drawn between each of the divine
persons. Although Father, Son and Spirit are God, the Father is not the Son nor
is he the Spirit. Hence, I am not referring here to an ontological distinction,
which would be subordinationist, but to a distinction at the level of the intra-
trinitarian relations. This fundamental distinction of relations between the
divine persons, or dimension of intra-trinitarian transcendence, is reflected in
the Athanasian Creed’s, “nor confounding the persons.” Yet, on the other
hand, there is a triune dimension of immanence in that a clear unity – a sense
of “withness” – exists between each of the divine persons. Each person193
subsists in the other – there is an interpenetration, a perichoretic interweaving
that unites these distinct persons. Hence, despite the clear distinction drawn
between, for example, the Son and the Father throughout the NT, Jesus can
also say, “I and the Father are one” (John 10:30 NIV). This fundamental unity,
or dimension of intra-trinitarian immanence, is reflected in the Athanasian
Creed’s, “neither dividing the substance.” Furthermore, this distinction and
unity – this transcendence and immanence – that exists within the one triune
ontology is not only reflected in the economy of salvation but also, to some
extent, in God’s action in Providence – the God who does is not other than the
God who is.
The Danger of Reductionism
However, as we draw out this proposal in more detail, it must be stated that
any trinitarian conceptualising of transcendence and immanence must be done
with extreme care. Earlier, in Chapter Four, we noted how the early centuries
of the Christian church were characterised by a capacity for theological
creativity and that this, on occasion, led to some unwise, unfruitful or
unbiblical “oversteps.” Of course, such occurrences are not peculiar to the
early centuries only and so care must characterise our approach to the task
today. Indeed, I believe it is the case that an undiscerning application of a
transcendence/immanence conception to the notion of God as triune is
particularly prone to reductionist consequences. Perhaps two examples, one
ancient and one modern, can illustrate my point.194
The ancient example of such reductionism is the theological proposal of the
early centuries known as Modalistic Monarchianism. Modalistic
Monarchianism, otherwise known as Sabellianism or simply Modalism,
44 was
primarily a misguided attempt to preserve the fundamental oneness of God –
that he is “monarch” of all that exists. Distinct from the earlier Dynamic
Monarchianism, otherwise known as Adoptionism,
45 Modalism sought to
preserve the oneness of God by asserting that the persons of the Trinity were
in reality “roles” or “modes.” In other words, the Father, the Son and the Holy
Spirit were not fully divine persons in an ontological sense but were different
manifestations or modes of the one indivisible divine person.
46
Although recognizing that Modalism was in many ways a unique and well-
intentioned conception, the Christian church of the early centuries finally
concluded that it was inadequate. The reasons justifying this conclusion were
many, but those more pertinent to our discussion can be identified. Firstly,
Modalism was found inadequate as a formulation of the biblical presentation
of the Trinity – that is, in the unfolding economy of salvation. For example, it
failed to adequately account for the biblical instances in which the three
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Persons appear simultaneously, such as at Jesus’ baptism (Matthew 3:16-17).
47
To seek to affirm that those instances should be interpreted modalistically
would rob them of their natural meaning and would, in Cottrell’s opinion,
result in hermeneutical chaos.
48 In other words, Modalism was found biblically
wanting.
Secondly, a modalistic understanding of God presents the divine economy as
almost deceptive in that God appears to be only acting – as presenting as other
than he really is. The result of this, in Cottrell’s view, is that the events of
redemptive history are presented as little more than a charade.
49 Brown
comments that such a redemptive charade is evidenced by an undermining of
the atonement. That is, if the Son is indeed not a distinct person but simply a
“mode” of the Father, then he cannot really represent us before the Father. He
further comments that we should not be surprised therefore to learn that
modalistic views on the Trinity often coincide with a denial of substitutionary
atonement or vicarious satisfaction.
50 Furthermore, Zizioulas finds in such
modalistic divine schizophrenia a movement away from relationality – that is,
Modalism undermines the possibility of a Christian relating personally with
each of the triune persons.
51
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Finally, Modalism was found wanting in that it failed to account adequately
for the seeming reality of perichoresis – the interpenetrating relationship that
exists between the divine persons. For example, the Gospels present Jesus
praying to the Father and promising to send the Spirit (John 17 and 16:7).
However, in John 14:26, we have the Father sending the Spirit in Jesus’ name
and, in John 15:26, it is Jesus again sending the Spirit but “from the Father.”
Such texts, and many others like them, point to interpenetration of subsisting
triune persons – that is, perichoresis – rather than different modes of one
indivisible divine person.
The consequence of the sort of triune reductionism that we find in Modalism is
that it instigates a movement away from understanding God as a dynamic
community and toward understanding him as a static ontology. In other words,
God is presented as one who is unable to be dynamically trinitarian – to be
three while being one – but must present in different modes at different times.
Rather than possessing a trinitarian relationality that is foundational to
perichoresis, God is reduced to a solitary ontology who can only show one
“face” at a time.
However, when we consider what implications this type of reductionism might
have for issues of Providence, particularly that of divine transcendence, we
note that Modalism presents a God who cannot be both transcendent and
immanent at the same time. In other words, God cannot be both “God over us”
and “God with us” simultaneously. Thielicke summarises well when he writes,
The God presented here is a static God in himself who remains in
inaccessible transcendence … God only ‘plays’ a dynamic role.197
He achieves movement by changing masks. In himself, however,
he remains in the background, unknowable and inaccessible. He
does not invest himself in his personae. We do not have him
totally and directly in the encounter with Christ and the reception
of the Pneuma.
52
It could be argued that the sole benefit of Modalism was that it emphasized the
deity of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Hence, it could be said that this
helped influence the church to affirm the deity of both the Son and the Spirit in
the Nicene Creed of 381CE (otherwise known as the Niceno-
Constantinopolitan Creed). As a consequence, the church avoided Ditheism
(that the Son is a secondary divinity beneath the Father), which, in essence, is
a form of dualism. It also avoided portraying the Holy Spirit as some form of
impersonal force or influence. However, Modalism’s great weakness was that
it did not recognize the Father, Son and Spirit as distinct subsisting divine
persons. Hence, he is not both transcendent and immanent at the same time –
he must be either transcendent over us (as the Father) or immanent with us (as
the Son or Spirit).
53
However, as noted earlier, such reductionism is not peculiar to the early
centuries only. In more recent times, there have been proposals that seek to
utilise the conception of transcendence and immanence in the Trinity but
through unwise misapplication end up denying the Trinity. For example,
Richardson’s theological proposal is particularly noteworthy in that his
identification of what he considers to be transcendence and immanence within
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God’s triunity leads him to dispense altogether with the Holy Spirit. He writes
that the only difference of any note in the so-called Trinity is that between the
Father and the Son.
54 Consequently, he argues that the Father and the Son
represent respectively the transcendence and immanence of God and, as such,
“no third term is necessary.”
55 Lorenzen summarises this view with the words,
“The only helpful persons would be the Father who is transcendent and the
Son who is immanent. The Spirit is unnecessary.”
56 It must be said that
reductionism which fails to appreciate the profundity of the tripersonal nature
of God and its implications is one thing, but to dispense completely with one
divine person, which is at variance with the witness of scripture and the
experience of the Christian church over two millennia, is quite another.
Articulating the Trinitarian Tension
By contrast, I am arguing that the dimensions of transcendence/immanence ad
intra incorporate, and indeed demand, the three divine persons. Furthermore,
these dimensions of transcendence/immanence are reflected ad extra as God
relates to the world in Providence. This is so for I contend, along with Rahner,
Gunton, Torrance and others, that the economic Trinity does indeed correlate
with the immanent Trinity – the God who does is not other than the God who
is; or, as Jüngel puts it, “God corresponds to himself.”
57 Hence, my argument
is that it is entirely acceptable to apply categories usually reserved for
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discussion of God’s relationship with the world, such as transcendence and
immanence, to conceptions of triune ontology. After all, if divine revelation is
to mean anything it must include the notion that God has revealed himself and
not another God. We may certainly accept the proposition that God has not
revealed all that he is, so long as we recognise that what he has revealed is not
other than he is.
It is for this reason that Erickson muses upon that for which I am contending.
He writes,
One other way of conceiving of this relationship of the three
persons of the Trinity is in terms of the categories of immanence
and transcendence, usually reserved for discussion of God’s
relationship to the created world. The three persons of the Trinity
are thoroughly immanent within each other, interpenetrating one
another. There is, however, also an element of transcendence, a
degree to which each is to be distinguished from the other,
allowing the ability to interact with one another as distinct
subjects. While total immanence would lead to a unitarian
monotheism, possibly of a modalistic type, total transcendence
would produce a tritheism of some sort. The combination of both,
rather than the exclusion of either aspect, governs here.
58
In making this statement, Erickson is utilizing the concepts of transcendence
and immanence as designating more than just an ontological distinction.
Although the notion of transcendence can certainly include ontology, it is
possible that at least a part of what it designates is at the level of relational
distinction. When considered independently of immanence, transcendence
could be taken to refer to an ontological distinction between uncreated and
created being. However, when it is compared and contrasted with immanence
in a paradoxical tension, which is how I am using it, then it must mean the
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opposite of closeness and “withness.” In other words, when related to
immanence, transcendence can be utilized at the level of describing
dimensions of relationship.
Certainly, care must be taken in how we utilize and apply the language of
transcendence and immanence, particularly in relation to the Trinity. We noted
earlier two examples, one ancient and one modern, of such misapplication.
Indeed, Erickson himself, as the quotation above demonstrates, recognizes the
reductionist potential of a misapplied transcendence/immanence tension in
context of the Trinity. Hence, we find Rahner seeking to articulate the
distinction between the divine persons but displaying concern that his
language not be interpreted as tritheistic. He writes, therefore, of the divine
persons being “relatively distinct” rather than “absolutely distinct.”
59 Rather
than three consciousnesses, Rahner writes of one consciousness that subsists in
a threefold way.
60 Alternatively, Barth seeks to avoid the term “person” and
the ideas of three self-consciousnesses or a threefold individuality. He prefers
the language of three modes of being (Seinsweise) or repetition in God.
61
Elsewhere, he states that God’s being as event is one of “dialectical
transcendence which, however strictly it may be understood, must always be
understood with equal strictness as immanence.”
62 The point is that any idea of
triune dimensions of transcendence must avoid tritheistic leanings and any
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idea of triune dimensions of immanence must avoid unitarian leanings.
Holding them in creative tension is the key – each is understood in the context
the other provides.
Fiddes’ approach to transcendent and immanent dimensions in God’s triunity
leads him to utilize a number of terms. In some instances, he employs the
terms “diversity” and “unity.” In one sense, there is diversity in God in that
there is a begetting, being begotten and proceeding. In another sense, there is
unity in God in that there is a simultaneous moment of love, will and
purpose.
63 This internal unity/diversity is, on other occasions, described
through the language of “processions” within God. Furthermore, Fiddes
comments that such, “multiplicity of action in God (‘processions’) is expressed
outwardly in a diversity of God’s actions in the world (‘missions’)”
64 and that
“this story of sending at a particular time and place in history has its roots in
an eternal sending within God.”
65 The point he is making is that just as there
are transcendence/immanence dimensions in God ad intra, so also are those
dimensions present in God ad extra. The processions within provide the basis
for and are reflected in the missions without. Hence, we should not be
surprised to see such multi-dimensionality further reflected in God’s
providential action toward the cosmos.
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Earlier, we noted Jewett’s comments on transcendence and immanence as
being “distance-making” and “distance-breaking.”
66 Though a clever turn of
phrase, the idea of distance should not be pushed further than I believe was
intended by the author. In other words, although the notions of transcendence
and immanence might conceivably include the idea of distance (for example,
of apartness and closeness/withness), it is my view that the essence of what
they are describing is centred in the idea of relationship.
67 Consequently, in the
context of God’s relationship with the cosmos, we utilize transcendence and
immanence as words to describe the different dimensions of that relationship.
From one perspective, God is transcendent in that there is a clear “apart-ness”
between the Creator and creation. From another perspective, God is immanent
in that there is a clear “with-ness” of the Creator with the creation. In neither
perspective is God’s distinction from the cosmos questioned in a pantheistic
sense. God does not cease being distinct from the creation even though he is
immanent with it. Whether transcendent or immanent, God remains God. My
point is that these terms describe distinct dimensions of the Creator-creation
(and therefore, more specifically, God-human) relationship. As Barth
comments,
Therefore God can indeed (and this is His transcendence) be
sufficiently beyond the creature to be his Creator out of nothing and at
the same time be free enough partially or completely to transform its
being or to take it from it again as first He gave it. But, if the
expression may be allowed, God can do even more than this. He can
(and this is His immanence) so indwell the other that, while He is its
Creator and the Giver of its life, and while He does not take away this
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life, he does not withdraw His presence from this creaturely existence
which is so different from His own divine life.
68
In the same way, when I utilize this same transcendence-immanence language
when speaking of God’s triunity, my intention is to describe distinct
dimensions of a relationship – in this case, the pure relationality that is the
Trinity. Furthermore, just as the transcendence-immanence tension ad extra is
one not primarily of distance but of dimensionality of relationship between
God and the cosmos, so also is this same transcendence-immanence tension ad
intra that of dimensionality of relationship within the triune Godhead. The
distinctions between the divine persons point toward the dimension of intra-
trinitarian transcendence, the unity of the divine persons points toward the
dimension of intra-trinitarian immanence.
Indeed, how we conceive of the holiness of God has relevance for a relational
understanding of divine transcendence and immanence. Webster argues
cogently that a trinitarian perspective on divine holiness leads one to conceive
it as “pure majesty in relation.”
69 That is, the triunity of God leads us to
conceive of divine holiness more as apartness for than apartness from. In
Webster’s words,
God’s holy majesty, even in its unapproachableness, is not
characterized by a sanctity which is abstract indifference or
otherness, a counter-reality to the profane; it is a majesty known in
turning, enacted and manifest in the works of God. Majesty and
relation are not opposed moments in God’s holiness; they are
simply different articulations of the selfsame reality.
70
This idea of holiness manifest as a turning toward rather than a turning away
recognizes that holiness should not be understood as something which
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distances us from God in an abstract or oppositional sense, rather it recognizes
that God is “the Holy One among you” (Hosea 11:9 NIV; also Isaiah 12:6). As
such, holiness is a relational category in that it derives from an ontologically
triune God, is manifest in that God’s revelation as triune in the economy of
salvation and culminates in his choosing a “holy nation, a people belonging to
God” (1 Peter 2:9 NIV). It is a holiness that is defined in relationship – “just as
he who called you is holy, so be holy in all you do; for it is written:  ‘Be holy,
because I am holy’” (1 Peter 1:15-16 NIV). Consequently, Webster concludes
that, “God’s holiness is not simply to be associated with his transcendence, but
equally with his condescension.”
71 Again, notions such as holiness,
transcendence and immanence are relational concepts.
As we noted earlier, some of the disagreement between classical/traditional
and Open Theist understandings of Providence revolves around this issue of
transcendence. Open Theism sees the traditional understanding of the God of
Providence as being “overly transcendent,” whereas the traditional
understanding sees the Open Theist’s God as “overly immanent” or
“transcendence-starved.”
72 My argument is that neither dimension of God’s
relationship with the world in Providence should hold sway over the other.
This is so for I contend that the nature of the Trinity gives us a pattern in
which both transcendent and immanent dimensions co-exist, without one
holding sway over the other.
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Relational Transcendence
Yet, if this understanding is to be sustained, it is important that it be able to
answer theological viewpoints that would seek to place an emphasis either
toward transcendence or toward immanence. For example, Bloesch is one
who, though explicitly desiring to affirm both divine transcendence and divine
immanence, nevertheless desires to give at least a form of priority to
transcendence. On the one hand, he writes, “We must avoid the Charybdis of
deism and the Scylla of pantheism and panentheism by affirming a dynamic
biblical theism that does justice to both God’s otherness and his
personalness.”
73 Yet, on the other hand, he gives a form of priority to
transcendence by stating that God is transcendent before he is immanent. In
other words, Bloesch desires to draw a distinction that recognizes that God is
eternally the transcendent one, while he became the immanent one at creation.
He writes,
But he is never immanent without being essentially transcendent, just
as he does not remain transcendent without making himself for our
sakes immanent. God’s immanence is an act of freedom, not a quality
of his being. Just as he freely relates to his creation, so he is also free
to withdraw from his creation. God is ‘beneath’ and ‘above,’ but he is
the latter before he is the former.
74
In other words, Bloesch recognizes in divine transcendence a necessary quality
of the divine being, whereas immanence is more an act of divine freedom.
Indeed, Bloesch considers that many of the major movements in modern
theology are in reality “sophisticated attempts to redefine transcendence.”
75
The existentialism of Tillich (God is met in the depths of human existence
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rather than the heavenly heights) and J. A. T. Robinson (God is not “out there”
or “up there” but is “in here,” in the centre of the soul); the panentheism of
Küng (God “is not separate from the world and man … he determines their
being from within”
76); process theology’s finite God; the theology of hope of
Moltmann and the early Pannenberg (transcendence is the power of the future)
and liberation theology’s locating of transcendence in the new world after the
struggle against oppression and injustice, are all, in Bloesch’s opinion,
redefinitions of divine transcendence.
77
In my view, there is truth in Bloesch’s affirmation that God is ontologically the
transcendent one – that is, God is not the world (pantheism) nor is the world in
God (panentheism), he is ontologically distinct from the world. No affirmation
of immanence must be allowed to restrain or nullify the essential “otherness”
of God. Indeed, it was a denial of such otherness that seems to have given such
impetus to Barth. Even as early as Der Römerbrief (1919) one can see the
desire to reassert the transcendence of God after a century of theological
liberalism. Jewett seeks to encapsulate the view of Barth toward the liberalism
of his day when he writes, “In brief, liberalism forgot that God is in heaven
and the theologian on earth.”
78
Yet, despite this, I do have some reservations about limiting the notion of
transcendence to conceptions of ontology only. Certainly, if by transcendence
we mean that the Creator existed prior to the creation, continues as
ontologically “other” or distinct from the creation and is not dependent upon
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the creation, then I am in agreement with those affirmations. However, my
circumspection derives from the fact that the concept of transcendence, by its
very nature, appears to point to the reality of an “other.” In other words, the
statement “God is transcendent” would, from one perspective, appear to be
meaningless or pointless if there is no “other” to whom or to which it refers.
For example, if God is described as transcendent prior to the creation of the
cosmos, then in relation to whom or to what is he transcendent? If I am
interpreting Bloesch correctly, then his use of expressions such as “essentially
transcendent” and “a quality of his being” are actually in reference to the aseity
of God – that is, by “transcendent” he is referring to God’s self-existence or
causa sui in that the ground of his existence is in himself. Hence, in this sense
of self-existence it can be said that God existed prior to the creation, continues
as ontologically “other” or distinct from the creation and is not dependent upon
the creation.
In my view, a fuller conception of transcendence can also incorporate the
concept of “other.” As Weinandy comments, “The biblical notion of
transcendence is not then a description of how God exists in himself as isolated
from the created order, but rather how he exists in relation to the created
order.”
79 Indeed, such an understanding is reinforced when we consider the
notion of transcendence from a trinitarian perspective. For example, I have
argued that there are dimensions of transcendence in the Trinity in that the
divine persons are relationally (though not ontologically) distinct from each
other. Hence, from this trinitarianly relational perspective, the idea of intra-
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trinitarian transcendence seems necessarily to imply the notion of “other.”
Indeed, when we consider the Arian challenge of the early centuries, we note
that Athanasius was moved to write of the Father being “other” (eJteroß) in that
he begets the Son and the Son is “other” in that he is begotten.
80 Later in his
discussion, he refers to this otherness by stating that the Father is “above all,”
the Son “pervades all” and the Spirit “acts in all.”
81 Augustine and the
Cappadocians further developed such thinking. The point is that the idea of
transcendence can imply the notion of “other.”
Yet, throughout this development, this “otherness” or diversity within the
Trinity was never permitted to compromise the divine unity.
82 Person was not
perceived on individualistic terms, nor was it perceived as being lost in a
collective – “it is to be both an ‘other’ and in relation with others.”
83 Hence,
the Fathers wrote of perichoresis and of subsisting, co-inhering divine persons.
For example, although the Cappadocians often went back to the Origenist view
that the Trinity is found primarily in the Father alone and mediately in the Son
and the Holy Spirit, Robertson argues that Athanasius believed that, “…the
Godhead is complete not in the Father alone, still less in the Three Persons as
parts of the one oujsi÷a, but in each Person as much as in all.” Hence, while the
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Cappadocians would use the metaphor of successive dependence, the primary
idea in Athanasius was one of “coinherence or immanence.”
84 The language
here is important. Athanasius’ understanding of the Trinity was one that
clearly apprehended a dimension of transcendence in that the divine persons
are distinct from each other. Yet, alongside and simultaneous with this was a
recognition that, in a sense, what was true for each person was also true for all.
Hence, the nature of intra-trinitarian transcendence (distinction between the
persons) was one that appears to necessarily imply intra-trinitarian immanence
(unity of co-inhering persons).
Hence, it can be argued that this notion of “otherness,” or a dimension of
transcendence within the Trinity, actually implies the idea of “withness,” or a
dimension of immanence within the Trinity and vice versa. Indeed, from our
earlier interaction with Zizioulas and Fiddes,
85 we noted the Fathers’
revolutionary usage of uJpo/stasiß in that ontology was given relational
dimensions.
86 Hence, to speak of a divine “person” was to recognize that each
divine person does not and indeed cannot exist in isolation. A person, by
definition, is in relationship.
87 Zizioulas sought to emphasize this essential
divine relationality by conceiving of divine being as a communion or
fellowship, while Fiddes advanced the conception of the divine persons as
relations. Yet, neither emphasis upon essential relationality should be
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misconstrued to the extent that any sense of distinction between the persons,
what Fiddes calls a sense of “this-ness,” be lost.
88 The point they are making is
that once divine ontology is understood relationally, then any sense of
transcendence between the divine persons (apartness or distinction) necessarily
implies a sense of immanence between the persons (withness or unity). To
affirm one is to affirm the other.
89
The consequence of recognizing such simultaneous dimensions of
transcendence and immanence within the triune divine life means that when
this triune God acts toward us in Providence, it is entirely appropriate and
consistent that his revelation of himself and our experience of him should
reflect, to some extent, the same dialectic. Just as God has dimensions of
transcendence and immanence ad intra so are those dimensions to some extent
reflected ad extra. The reason for qualifying these statements “to some extent”
is to recognize, as I have done earlier, that transcendence and immanence can
only be applied to the intra-trinitarian relations to a certain or limited extent. In
other words, it is my view that the idea of conceiving of transcendence and
immanent dimensions within God should only be to the extent of recognizing
the divine apartness – the distinction between the persons – and the divine
withness – the unity of the divine persons. An intra-trinitarian dimension of
transcendence cannot mean that the divine persons are ontologically other for
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that would be to introduce a subordinationist ontology. Yet, the relational
dimensions of apartness and withness, that I have described as intra-trinitarian
dimensions of transcendence and immanence, do provide some grounding for
illuminating how and why we experience a similar tension of transcendence
and immanence as the triune God relates to humanity and the world in
Providence. This is so for the triune God is not other than the providing God.
Furthermore, if it is indeed the case that these two intra-trinitarian dimensions
not only exist in tension with each other but actually imply each other, then so
also should these two dimensions in God’s action in Providence be seen as
implying each other. Indeed, in an article seeking to “consider how trinitarian
truth may relate to the twin attributes – not polar opposites – immanence and
transcendence,”
90 Blocher recognizes the implicational aspect of each when he
comments,
Such an immanence does not impugn transcendence. Rather, it
implies transcendence, and conversely. The pervasive and indwelling
presence, praesentia with the Latin connotations of power and
command, involves no confusion with created being: it expresses the
other side of transcendence. Both transcendence and immanence tell
of the divine more and beyond, the true akhbar. St. Augustine had his
own unsurpassed way of confessing it: Tu autem eras interior intimo
meo et superior summo meo – Thou wast more deeply within myself
than my innermost part, and higher than the highest part of my
being.
91
Furthermore, not only does Blocher recognize that transcendence and
immanence ad extra imply each other, but also that both point toward “the
divine more and beyond” – that of God ad intra.
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THE DOCTRINE OF APPROPRIATIONS
However, if there are relational dimensions transcendence and immanence in
the triune life of God that give grounding and are reflected in transcendent and
immanent dimensions in this triune God’s relationship with humanity in
Providence, what impact does the notion of “appropriations” have upon this
conception? The doctrine of appropriations was developed as a recognition
that, although the divine attributes belong to all three divine persons, there is
nevertheless a sense in which particular attributes have a peculiar affinity to
particular persons. Though particular attributes cannot be aligned with
particular persons in an exclusive sense, this doctrine affirms that there is
scriptural warrant for recognizing a “privileged affinity” or “significant
correspondence” between them.
92 In that sense, some argue that transcendence
is an attribute that has a privileged affinity with the Father whereas immanence
has a similar relationship with the Holy Spirit. For example, Blocher is one
who aligns transcendence primarily, but not exclusively, with the Father in that
he is “unbegotten, the one who sends and who is not sent, he exhibits most
obviously the divine perfection of transcendence.” By contrast, the Holy Spirit
is aligned primarily with the idea of immanence for he “is the bearer of the
divine presence … The Spirit is the indwelling presence: he is represented by
the pillar of cloud, the symbol of God’s residence in the midst of his people …
in the New Testament, the Spirit inhabits both the individual believer – whose
body is the temple of the Holy Spirit – and the community, that building which
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grows ‘to be an habitation of God through the Spirit’ (Eph. 2:21-22).”
93
However, in relation to the Son, Blocher recognizes that the second person is
like the Spirit in that he is sent into the world, yet he is also “the Father’s alter
ego, he stands face to face with the Father – pros ton theon (John 1:1).”
94 As
such, the Son in a sense draws together the transcendence and immanence of
God.
However, much care is needed here. In my view, the doctrine of appropriations
rightly recognizes a sense of ordering or structure within the triune divine life.
Indeed, when one considers the use of prepositions in the NT in relation to the
divine persons one is struck by the way in which certain aspects or attributes
are aligned with certain persons. For example, in 1 Corinthians 8:4-6, we have
a sequence or pattern given in that all things are from the Father (e˙x ou∞ ta»
pa¿nta) who is the one for whom we live (ei˙ß aujto/n), concurrent with all things
being through the Son (di∆ ou∞ ta» pa¿nta) who is the one through whom we live
(di∆ aujtouv). In the context, the point Paul is making is that “an idol is nothing”
and that there is “no God but one” (verse 4). Hence, he implies, why should we
be concerned with idols and meat sacrificed to idols?
95 Although some might
say that there are many “so-called” gods and lords (verse 5), Paul states that
the reality is that “for us there is but one God, the Father, from whom all things
came and for whom we live; and there is but one Lord, Jesus Christ, through
whom all things came and through whom we live” (verse 6 NIV).
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Furthermore, it can be argued that the designation of the Son as the Lord Jesus
Christ points to the ku/rioß of the Shema (Deuteronomy 6:4 in the LXX).
Hence, Paul is arguing that this same Lord Jesus Christ, the Son as distinct
from the Father, is himself also God. To articulate this affirmation and yet
maintain this distinction, Paul utilizes differing Greek prepositions – from/for
for the Father and through/through for the Son.
In a similar way, in Ephesians 2:18 we see the Holy Spirit incorporated into
this sequencing or patterning in that “through him (di∆ aujtouv) [the Son] we
both have access by one Spirit (e˙n e˚ni« pneu/mati) to the Father (pro\ß to\n
pate÷ra).”
96 Put in very general terms, this pattern of appropriations may be
described in the following way: the Father is the source, originator and goal
(from/out/to/for); the Son is the agent or mediator (through) and the Holy
Spirit applies, completes and energizes (in/by). Some phrase it as follows: the
Father is “over us” in that he purposes; the Son is “for us” in that he
accomplishes; and the Holy Spirit is “in us” in that he applies.
Yet, despite this sense of appropriations in that certain divine actions or roles
are portrayed as particularly appropriate to certain divine persons, one must
not ignore the many references in the NT in which the three divine persons are
placed alongside each other and indeed connected to each other.
97 Indeed, such
is their interconnection that we have the same or similar actions of God
attributed to different persons, often in the same passage – that is, a shift in
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subject is made over which the apostolic writer displays no apparent concern.
For example, in a remarkable passage in Titus 3:4-6, the assignation “saviour”
and the action of “saving” shifts in its attribution. Initially it is God (usually
understood as the Father) our Saviour (verse 4) who saves us through the
rebirth and renewal by the Holy Spirit (verse 5) who was poured out upon us
generously through Jesus Christ our Saviour (verse 6). What is deeply
instructive about passages such as this is the ease with which the apostolic
writers were able both to recognize certain appropriations within the Trinity
(which points toward a dimension of transcendence or distinction) alongside
and commensurate with a recognition that that which belongs to each belongs
also to all (which points toward a dimension of immanence or perichoretic
unity). Indeed, in the context of discussing Pauline trinitarian theology, Fee
comments concerning,
… the one God, now bringing salvation through the cooperative
work of the three divine persons: God, Christ and Spirit. At points
where the work of any or all overlaps, so could Paul’s language
tend to be flexible – precisely because salvation for him was the
activity of the one God. If his trinitarian presuppositions and
formulations, which form the basis of the later formulations, never
move toward calling the Spirit God and never wrestle with the
ontological implications of his own presuppositions and
formulations, there is no real evidence of any kind that he lacked
clarity as to the distinctions between, and the specific roles of, the
three divine persons who effected so great salvation for us all.
98
The Danger of Imbalance
In my view, the doctrine of appropriations, when correctly understood and
rightly applied, provides support for the proposition that there are transcendent
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and immanent dimensions in the triune divine life. However, an incorrect
understanding of the doctrine can potentially lead to various forms of
imbalance. For example, if one were to assign certain divine attributes to
certain divine persons in an exclusive sense, then we are left with little more
than a form of modalism. Hence, to ascribe transcendence to the Father or
immanence to the Spirit, in an exclusive sense, gives us a God who must alter
the mode in which he acts according to the divine “face” he presents – only as
Spirit can he be with us, only as Father can he be over us. Such a conception
portrays the triune God as ontologically static rather than as ontologically
relational and it is the latter, as Chapter Four demonstrates, that more
accurately reflects the nature of God’s triunity.
Furthermore, such a static conception provokes a question: if Father is the
presentation of God as he is in his transcendent being (ultimacy, origin,
infinity and so on), why then does scripture use the name Father – a name,
when understood correctly, that Cottrell argues conjures up images of
intimacy, closeness and kindness?
99 I write “when understood correctly” for it
is true that there are many human fathers who are not good models of
fatherhood and so such analogical language may unhelpfully ignite feelings of
hostility.
100 However, this should not preclude the language of “Father” for it
is not to be understood as a projection of sinful and limited human fatherhood
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but as the designation of that which true fatherhood should be and as an ideal
to which all human fathers, in the strength and following the example of their
heavenly Father, should aspire.
101 My point, however, remains: why would
scripture use the human relational term Father if this was meant to label God
as he is in his non-relating, exclusively-transcendent self?
However, such an incorrect understanding of the doctrine of appropriations, in
that the Father is seen as exclusively God-transcendent and the Spirit as
exclusively God-immanent, can lead to a second form of imbalance in that it
could potentially introduce the idea of some sort of essential or ontological
differentiation between the divine persons. That is, an imbalance that does not
recognize the perichoretic interpenetration between the persons could
potentially introduce a form of subordinationism. For example, if all things
come from the Father and return to the Father, and if all things are through the
Son, one might argue that the Son is essentially subordinate to the Father.
Similarly, if the Spirit is seen exclusively as the divine person who applies
(in/by) that which comes via the Son (through) and which finds its origin and
end in the Father (from/out/to/for), then the Spirit may be portrayed as
essentially subordinate to both the Father and the Son. The further danger here
is that such essential subordination, such imbalance, could potentially lead to
misapplication if it were to be extrapolated and applied to various issues. For
example, rather than seeing the doctrine of appropriations shine “as a jewel of
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traditional theology,”
102 some treat is with suspicion for in it they see the
potential for oppression and mistreatment – that is, for the subordination of
others at an essential or substantial level. A particularly contemporary issue
that intersects with this concern is the role of women in the church.
103
However, the doctrine of appropriations, when correctly understood, disallows
the idea of essential subordination between the divine persons. Of course, and
as we saw in Chapter Four, ontological subordinationism in the form of
Arianism was pronounced out of order at Nicaea (325CE). Although Arianism
might be described as, in one sense, “monotheistic Christianity in its purest
form,”
104 the subordination of the Son to the Father at the level of substance or
essence was seen to be, in the light of the biblical evidence, reductionism that
struck at the heart of Christian faith. Hence, Gibbon’s view that this dispute
was over the trifle of an “iota” (oJmoousioß as against oJmoiousioß) is not only
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inaccurate but a major misunderstanding of the issues involved.
105
Furthermore, not only was the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father
affirmed but so also was that of the Holy Spirit, with greater explanation and
clarification of these realities given in the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed
(381CE).
It is my view that suspicion of the doctrine of appropriations is often derived
from either misunderstanding or misapplication. Yet, both can be remedied
through a thoughtful yet unyielding affirmation that that which is true of the
Father is, in an essential “God” sense, true also of the Son and Holy Spirit.
Although, in my view, there is clearly a sense of economic or functional
subordination of the Son to the Father and of the Holy Spirit to both the Father
and the Son, this in no way implies a subordination of divine essence. As
Gunton notes, “The economic or functional subordination suggested by the
two hands imagery – the inescapable implication of the biblical story that the
Son obeys and the Spirit is sent – does not entail a correspondingly
subordinationist theology, because Son and Spirit are, as obedient and sent,
truly God.”
106 Holding trinitarian dimensions of transcendence and immanence
in appropriate tension guards against such imbalance.
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THE PRIMACY OF CHRIST
In addition to this, we may recall that Blocher, in his discussion of
appropriations, notes how the Son is both sent into the world, as is the Holy
Spirit, and yet also stands “face to face with the Father – pros ton theon.”
107
This raises the interesting idea that one aspect of the incarnate Son’s
uniqueness is that the ideas of transcendence and immanence are brought
together in him. Indeed, if the revelation of God is defined supremely and
definitively in Jesus Christ, then we know this God “over us” through his
action “for us” in Christ. That is, the transcendent One, distinct from us,
became the One “with us.” Furthermore, this remains a continuous reality for
us in that the Son who came from the Father full of grace and truth, and who
has now returned to the Father, has sent in his place the Holy Spirit, the Spirit
of Christ (Romans 8:9-11), to be with us, alongside us and in us.
Earlier, in Chapter Three, as I discussed the centrality of God to a
consideration of Providence, I noted that we may also speak of the primacy of
Christ to our understanding of Providence. In that context, I noted the passages
concerning Christ that affirm that all things were created by him and through
him and in him all things hold together (Colossians 1:16-17). Furthermore, it is
toward the consummation of all things in him that history is moving
(Ephesians 1:10). Indeed, and as we have noted, Bromiley asserts that this
“christological reference” in Providence is in fact “providence par
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excellence.”
108 His point is that to consider Providence independently of Jesus
Christ runs the risk of reductionism for Providence is concerned with the
relationship between God the creator and his creation. As such, it must be
acknowledged as paradigmatic that it is through Christ’s redemptive work that
God’s restoration of relationship with estranged humanity is accomplished. I
noted also that it is for this reason that both the Heidelberg and Belgic
confessions, for example, identify the Christian confession of divine
Providence with the redemption that is found in Christ.
109
Although I will further address the primacy of Christ to consideration of
Providence when I treat the issues of divine sovereignty, immutability and
impassibility, it can nevertheless be noted that, in the context of transcendence
and immanence, the incarnate Son is in many respects the focal point at which
both dimensions coincide. For example, when we consider the theology of
Barth, we note the primacy of Christ in both its content and structure. This has
led some to the perhaps uncharitable view that Christomonism rather than
Christocentrism characterizes his theology.
110 Yet, in my view, despite his
well-known Christocentrism, Barth is still thoroughly trinitarian and this is
reflected in that he places the doctrine of the Trinity at the forefront of his
doctrine of God.
111 Similarly, when we turn to Barth’s treatment of
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Providence, we find his treatment to be both thoroughly trinitarian and yet
centred in Christ. Indeed, he writes, “In its substance the Christian belief in
providence is Christian faith i.e. faith in Christ.”
112 The reason for this is that
Barth saw in Christ the focal point, the point of contact, which gives faith in
divine Providence embodiment. He notes that, “This ‘God with us’ and ‘God
for us’ is God in eternity, the Son.”
113 But in the light of John 14:9,
114 he
writes,
And no other, but this God, is also ‘God over us’, the eternal Father
of this eternal Son. In the belief in providence it is a matter of ‘God
over us,’ of God the Creator in His majesty, transcendence and
lordship over His creature. But God the Creator is one God. The
One who is for us as the Son is over us as the Father. As God has
elected to be for us in His Son, He has elected Himself our Father
and us His children. We are not in strange hands, nor are we
strangers, when He is over us as our Creator and we are under Him
as His children. We are His children for the sake of His Son and
with Him (in whom He is so really for us that he becomes one with
us). And it is as such that we are creatures in His fatherly hand.
This fatherly hand is the divine power which rules the world. We
can know no divine power over us, nor is there any such power,
which is not this fatherly hand. As and because it is this fatherly
hand, it is kind and friendly and loving.
115
In other words, by becoming incarnate, the Son, who is God for us and with us,
connects us with the transcendent God, who is God over us. Yet, because of
the Son, the hand of the transcendent God is the hand of the Father. As Hille
comments,
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God remains as sovereign Creator and Lord of history, who is not
apathetic to the world and to man; he is also not simply a transcendent
power of destiny to whom one must submit, and nor is he an
impersonal sphere of all being in the sense of pantheism, in which the
individual, forgetting joy and suffering, is lost to himself. Rather, he is
the loving father who offers himself in the Son.
116
Hence, it is Christ who, in a sense, gives us the other side of the transcendent
God and brings together or is the focal point of both divine transcendence and
immanence. It is for this reason that we find Fackre describing Christ as both
the partner to creation and the “companion of Providence.”
117 Similarly,
Gunton writes that, “…the Son of God in free personal relation to the world,
indeed identification with part of that world, is the basis for an understanding
of God the Father’s relations with his creation.”
118 We need to heed the words
of Parker, “We must resist the temptation to think about providence generally
and independently of Christ.”
119
Indeed, our study of trinitarian theology in Chapter Four points us toward this
understanding. The function of the teaching that the Son, as distinct uJpo/stasiß,
is also oJmoousioß with the Father, as Zizioulas and Fiddes have taught us, was
to establish what Gunton calls a “new ontological principle”
120 – that divine
being is relational. This, in fact, was the area of fundamental weakness in
Arius’ objection to the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. The
alternative that the Arian faction presented was fundamentally flawed in that it
was based upon a static rather than relational ontology. As Gunton himself
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notes, we see this non-relationality reflected in the repetitive “alone” in Arius’
own definition of God – “one God, alone ingenerate, alone everlasting, alone
unbegun” and so on.
121
However, the revelation of God in the economy of salvation points us toward a
divine ontology that is relational. As such, there is a “sharing in being”
122 that,
I have argued, is demonstrated in dimensions of transcendence and immanence
within the triune divine life that are then reflected ad extra in Providence. But,
since the Son is the supreme and definitive revelation of the triune God to
humanity, it should not surprise us to conceive that in him these ad extra
dimensions of transcendence and immanence could be said to coincide. It is in
relation to this reality, I believe, that Barth writes,
Who God is and what it is to be divine is something we have to learn
where God has revealed himself and his nature, the essence of the
divine … It is not for us to speak profoundly of the contradiction and
rift in the being of God, but to learn to correct our notions of the being
of God, to reconstitute them in the light of the fact the he does this.
We may believe that God can and must only be absolute in contrast to
all that is relative, exalted in contrast to all that is lowly, active in
contrast to all suffering, inviolable in contrast to all temptation,
transcendent in contrast to all immanence, and therefore divine in
contrast to everything human, in short, that he can and must be only
the ‘Wholly Other.’ But such beliefs are shown to be quite untenable,
and corrupt and pagan, by the fact that God does in fact be and do this
in Jesus Christ.
123
Barth’s point is that it is supremely in Christ that the transcendent God, “God
over us,” has become simultaneously the immanent God, “God with us.” It is
therefore not surprising to recall that the angelic being, who appeared to
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Joseph in a dream, designates the coming eternal Son as “Emmanuel”
(Matthew 1:23) for it is supremely in him that we see the divine ad extra
dimensions of transcendence and immanence coincide.
It is my view that the deep trinitarian faith that lies at the heart of orthodoxy is
one that recognizes and affirms that the transcendent creator God is one who,
having created, also continues with his creation as the immanent providing
God. Furthermore, such is the nature of this continuing divine transcendence
that it is not compromised by the divine immanence nor is the divine
immanence compromised by the divine transcendence. Both are
simultaneously true and some of the basis for this binary articulation is found
in the nature of the triune God himself. Just as there is a distinction between
the divine persons – or a dimension of intra-trinitarian transcendence – so is
there also a perichoretic unity of the divine persons – or a dimension of intra-
trinitarian immanence. The consequence of this transcendence-immanence
tension ad intra is that its reflection ad extra in Providence gives humanity a
God who is experienced as both distinct from us and yet “not far from each
one of us” (Acts 17:27b NIV).226
CHAPTER SIX
DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY AND
HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY
THE NATURE OF DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY
In Chapter Five I utilized the Open Theism debate on Providence as a helpful
context for our discussion on the nature of divine transcendence. I argued that
there is a transcendence-immanence tension in Providence that is a reflection
of, and to an extent finds its ground in, a transcendence-immanence tension in
God’s triunity. When we turn to the issue of divine sovereignty in Providence,
the disagreements between traditional and Open Theist conceptions become
perhaps even more pronounced. Indeed, Sanders comments, “I argue that the
key element in the debate over Providence is not the type of omniscience God
has but the kind of sovereignty God has decided to exercise.”
1 In other words,
one of the key differences between the Open Theism model and the traditional
or classical model concerns the nature of divine sovereignty. As Pinnock
states, “God is sovereign in both models, but the mode of his sovereignty
differs.”
2 In fact,
Our understanding of the Scriptures leads us to depict God, the
sovereign Creator, as voluntarily bringing into existence a world
with significantly free personal agents in it, agents who can
respond positively to God or reject his plans for them. In line with
the decision to make this kind of world, God rules in such a way
as to uphold the created structures and, because he gives liberty to
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his creatures, is happy to accept the future as open, not closed,
and a relationship with the world that is dynamic, not static.
3
The emphasis of Open Theism is upon a model of history and reality in which
God collaborates with his world in a genuinely interactive and dynamic
alliance to bring about his ultimate goals.
As a result of such an emphasis upon the essential dynamism of the ongoing
relationship between Creator and created, Open Theism’s concept of divine
sovereignty is one that seeks to emphasize ideas of partnership, freedom,
dynamism, mutual engagement and personal relationship and to avoid any
conception that might be interpreted as bringing into the equation overtones of
determinism or control. For example, Sanders explicitly states that he wants to
challenge the notion that, “divine sovereignty can only mean exhaustive
control of all things.”
4 His view is that, “God sovereignly decides that not
everything will be up to God.”
5 In other words, since “God is the sovereign
determiner of the sort of sovereignty he will exercise,”
6 the type of sovereignty
he has chosen to exercise is one of self-limitation in which he has given
“space” for humanity to operate. As such, Open Theism shares much with
classic Arminianism. For example, Cottrell writes from a classic Arminian
perspective and, though he does not agree with Open Theism’s views on
divine omniscience, nevertheless agrees with the idea of divine self-limitation
– “In a sovereign act of self-limitation God thus limited the way in which he
would exercise his own authority over the world.”
7 In Open Theism’s view,
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divine sovereignty should be understood as general rather than specific in
character – that is, God macromanages rather than micromanages. He intends
to bring about his own ends, but he sovereignly limits his own power and
allows humanity freedom to co-operate with him in bringing history into
being. As Pinnock comments, “God controls some things, but not everything.
He conducts a ‘general’ rather than a ‘meticulous’ sovereignty … God does
not manipulate the creature and does not micromanage the universe.”
8 Hence,
Open Theism understands divine sovereignty as being a partly unilateral and
partly bilateral concept.
9 As such, the Open God of Providence is one
described by Sanders as a divine “risk taker”
10 who has sovereignly created a
world in which things may not go according to his will or plan.
What Open theists are seeking to avoid is a deterministic or “no risk”
conception of divine sovereignty. In their view, the result of understanding
sovereignty in terms of deterministic control is a divine “blueprint” model of
Providence.
11 In their view, such a model renders incoherent the idea of human
freedom and, hence, responsibility and the reality of a genuinely personal
relationship between God and humanity. For example, the following
exhaustive definition of the governmental aspect of Providence, as expressed
by Hodge, is a helpful example of the type of view against which Open
Theism is reacting. It reads,
God having from eternity absolutely decreed whatsoever comes to
pass, and having in the beginning created all things out of nothing
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by the word of his power, and continuing subsequently constantly
present to every atom of his creation, upholding all things in being
and in the possession and exercise of all their properties, he also
continually controls and directs the actions of all his creatures thus
preserved, so that while he never violates the law of their several
natures, he yet infallibly causes all actions and events singular and
universal to occur according to the eternal and immutable plan
embraced in his decree. There is a design in providence. God has
chosen his great end, the manifestation of his own glory, but in
order to that end he has chosen innumerable subordinate ends;
these are fixed; and he has appointed all actions and events in their
several relations as means to those ends; and he continually so
directs the actions of all creatures that all these general and special
ends are brought to pass precisely at the time, by the means, and in
the mode and under the conditions, which he from eternity
purposed.
12
In this instance, God is the primary determiner of all that has been, is and will
be – it is primarily all of God. Indeed, Hartt argues that such a conception
derived partially from the orthodox consensus that drew a distinction between
necessary and contingent being. As God alone is necessary and therefore
cannot fail to exist, and as the world is contingent in that it did at one time not
exist and could at a future time fail to exist, the consensus concluded that the
world is absolutely dependent upon God. Hence, he comments that, “The
theological tradition holds that events great and small, cosmic and historical,
faultlessly operate to serve a divine ordination.”
13
Yet, Open Theism disputes such a schema of divine control and proffers its
own schema of divine relationality.
14 What it advocates is a conception of
divine sovereignty that is all about relationship and the basis for arguing this
derives, to a significant extent, from the triunity of God. Pinnock comments,
“The loving relational essence of the Trinity – three persons in a caring,
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sensitive and responsive communion – is central to the open view of God.
God’s very being is an open and dynamic structure, a relational ontology of
loving persons … Relationality belongs to God’s essence because at the heart
of reality is shared life, God’s own life, characterized by spontaneity and
giving.”
15 As a relational triune being, God has sovereignly chosen to limit
himself in the exercise of his sovereignty so that genuine relationship with
humanity is preserved – “Thus God exercises sovereignty by sharing power,
not by domination.”
16
DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN FREEDOM
What can be said about the apparent impasse between traditional or classical
theism and Open Theism? Firstly, it is my view that there has been some
clouding of the discussion through the presence of unhelpful caricaturing and
this seems, on occasion, to have gone in both directions. On the one hand,
those arguing for the traditional understanding of Providence and sovereignty
take exception to having it described as a “divine blueprint” akin to fatalism
and allegations that it does not leave room for genuine relationship between
God and humanity. For example, when Pinnock states that the Open view does
not “locate God above and beyond history, it stresses God’s activity in history,
responding to events as they happen, in order to accomplish his purposes,”
Campbell points out that the Calvinism of Westminster has always emphasized
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that it is “the God who is over history who has invaded history.”
17 Indeed, he
lists one of many quotations from the Confession
18 and states, “It is impossible
to argue, in the light of such a passage, that traditional theism leaves no room
for, and does no justice to, the relationship which God has with his people
through Christ.”
19 Similarly, Horton states that, “Many of us fail to recognize
Reformed theology in his [Pinnock’s] polemical descriptions of it.”
20 Collins
believes Rice caricatures classical theism’s concepts of anthropomorphism and
anthropopathism and, contrary to Rice, argues that the classical view has
always held that “they describe something meaningful, they describe
something real, and they have limitations.”
21 Carson believes that Open
Theism sometimes caricatures the classic view – in other words, constructs a
“straw man” – and utilizes misleading and demeaning language, such as when
Sanders describes the God of classical theism as partaking in “divine rape.”
22
                                                   
17 I. D. Campbell, “Open Thoughts on Open Theism,” Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical
Theology 21/1 (2003): 48.
18 Confession 12.1: “All those that are justified, God vouchsafeth, in and for his only Son
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number, and enjoy the liberties and privileges of the children of God; have his name put upon
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Bulletin of Evangelical Theology: 47.
19 I. D. Campbell, “Open Thoughts on Open Theism,” Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical
Theology: 47-48.
20 M. S. Horton, “Hellenistic or Hebrew? Open Theism and Reformed Theological Method,”
in Piper, Taylor and Helseth (2003), p. 233.
21 C. J. Collins, The God of Miracles: An Exegetical Examination of God’s Action in the World
(Leicester: IVP, 2001), p. 51.
22 D. A. Carson, “How Can We Reconcile the Love and the Transcendent Sovereignty of
God?” in Huffman and Johnson (2002), pp. 295 and 300. Sanders writes, in the context of
critiquing a “no-risk” model of salvation, that, “it may also be seen negatively as divine rape
because it involves nonconsensual control; the will of one is forced on the will of the other. Of
course, the desire God forces on the elect is a beneficent one – for their own good – but it is
rape nonetheless” – J. Sanders, The God Who Risks, p. 240. In fairness to Sanders, he has
subsequently recognized that it was a mistake and states that he inadvertently omitted
reference to some feminist theologians who had referred to meticulous providence as divine
rape – C. A. Hall and J. Sanders, Does God Have a Future? A Debate on Divine Providence
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), pp. 137-138.232
On the other hand, Open theists feel that their own view is being caricatured.
Pinnock points out how some unfairly associate Open Theism with semi-
heretical Arminianism “or, better still, with process theology, a recognized
heresy.”
23 Others find it unfair how, in their view, some writers seek to derive
a situation of “guilt by association” by pointing out similarities between Open
Theism and Socinianism.
24 Boyd accuses Ware of consistently giving
“openness views their worst possible (and often inaccurate) spin” and of using
“alarmist and inflammatory language.”
25 Hence, Sanders enjoins us to be
“wary of Ware.”
26 Consequently, Pinnock desires a discussion of respect and
recognition that we are all believing students trying to do our best, that “we
know in part” and that we should avoid caricature and ecclesiastical politics.
27
However, despite the awareness of misunderstanding, the reality is that Open
Theism and classical theism offer two divergent views on understanding the
relationship of divine sovereignty and human freedom. The dilemma, and the
reason for the debate on Providence, is that scriptural support can be found to
support conceptions of meticulous divine sovereignty as well as for the
contention that humanity is granted significant freedom to the extent that we
are held responsible for our conduct. Traditional or classical theism charges
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Socinianism is “the missing link in Open Theism’s genealogy” in that Socinus (1525-1562CE)
also denied exhaustive divine foreknowledge. He does state, however, that his intention is not
“to charge the open theists with all the heresies of Socinianism” – J. M. Frame, No Other God:
A Response to Open Theism (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P & R, 2001), pp. 32-36.
25 G. A. Boyd, “Christian Love and Academic Dialogue: A Reply to Bruce Ware,” Journal of
the Evangelical Theological Society 45/2 (2002): 243. Ware, in turn, is “nonplused” at Boyd’s
comments – B. A. Ware, “Rejoinder to Replies by Clark H. Pinnock, John Sanders, and
Gregory A. Boyd,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 45/2 (2002): 245.
26 J. Sanders, “Be Wary of Ware: A Reply to Bruce Ware,” Journal of the Evangelical
Theological Society 45/2 (2002): 221-231.
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Open Theism with advancing a conception of human freedom alien to
scripture and of reductionism concerning divine sovereignty. However, Open
Theism charges the traditional model with conceiving divine sovereignty in
such a way that human freedom becomes a chimera thus rendering the
apportioning of responsibility incoherent. Sanders states Open Theism’s view
on the situation in the following way, “One cannot simply have it both ways:
either God controls everything and the divine-human relationship is
impersonal, or God does not control everything and so it is possible for the
divine-human relationship to be personal.”
28 Yet, my view is that this is a false
dichotomy in that it presents two alternatives as though they are the only two
alternatives.
Sovereignty, Freedom and the Trinitarian Divine Life
By contrast, my thesis is that an alternative that may overcome the impasse
over divine sovereignty within Providence can be derived through a
consideration of it from a trinitarian perspective. That is, a trinitarian
perspective both illuminates and explicates the difficulty by placing both
divine sovereignty and human freedom/responsibility together in dialectical
tension, with each being understood in the context the other provides. The
general outline of this argument is that the nature of the trinitarian divine life
gives us a pattern or paradigm for affirming that God’s sovereignty is such that
it does not breach the reality of human freedom, and that human freedom is
such that it does not place limitations upon divine sovereignty. I recognize that
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such a conception places the divine and human wills together in a mysterious
embrace, but it is my view that it is just such a conception that is found in
scripture and a basis for illuminating it can be found in the nature of the intra-
trinitarian divine life.
As we have seen in Chapter Four, the nature of the intra-trinitarian divine life
is inherently relational. The Father, Son and Holy Spirit exist as perfect
relationship. Although the notion of perichoresis – of mutual interpenetration –
means that that which is true of one is, in a profound sense, also true of the
others, such mutuality does not compromise the distinction and distinctiveness
of each of the divine persons. In Chapter Five, I argued that the theological
tension of divine transcendence and immanence, that we experience in
Providence, is an ad extra reflection of an intra-trinitarian, or ad intra, tension.
Consequently, I argued for conceiving of dimensions of transcendence and
immanence as characteristic of the intra-trinitarian divine life. In a similar
way, I am proposing that a similar ad intra pattern or dimension can be found
concerning sovereignty and freedom and this pattern is also reflected ad extra
in Providence.
Indeed, my argument is that such is the nature of triune perichoretic
interweaving, that it presents a pattern of divine sovereign will that stands
alongside, indeed in tension with, divine freedom or choice. For example,
although both the filiation of the Son and spiration of the Spirit reflect the
sovereign will of the Father, in that it is he who both begets and breathes, this
does not of necessity negate the possibility that each freely chooses to be235
respectively begotten or breathed. That is, within the triune divine life we find
both sovereignty and freedom not only co-existing but also providing the
context for understanding the nature of each other. In the intra-trinitarian
context, the nature of divine sovereignty is such that it does not quench the
freedom of the particular divine persons to act and to be in accord with that
which makes each distinct. For example, although the Father begets the Son,
the Son’s freedom to be distinctly the Son is not compromised by being
begotten. In fact, the freedom of the Son to be the Son is established by the
relationship he enjoys with the Father – it is because he is in relationship with
the Father that he is the Son. In other words, to be free does not mean to act in
lonely isolation, without any connection with others. What the nature of the
triune divine life points us toward is a conception of true freedom that is
fundamentally relational in nature – that is, it points us toward understanding
“freedom as a relational category.”
29
Indeed, when we shift our focus from triune ontology to triune economy,
found supremely in the birth, life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, do we
not have a situation in which the Father willed to save the world through the
Son
30 concurrent with the Son choosing to give his own life as a ransom for
many?
31 In other words, in the scriptures we seem to be faced with texts that
affirm that the Father willed the cross, to which the Son was to be obedient,
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concurrent with the Son freely choosing to give of himself.
32 In this instance,
the Father’s sovereign will did not negate Christ’s choice but, in a sense,
establishes it. That is, in one sense, Christ’s self-giving is an act of obedience
to the sovereign will of his Father. In another sense, however, the sovereign
will of the Father is such that it establishes the freedom of Christ to act in
accordance with his own distinctiveness – his own particularity – in giving of
himself.
Sovereignty, Freedom and the Hypostatic Union
Certainly, one might argue that such sovereignty and freedom are, in this
instance, a uniquely trinitarian conception – a divine/divine relationship – that
can have no bearing upon the divine/human relationship. This is a legitimate
point and provides a timely warning not to fall into the trap of directly
correlating divine conceptions with human conceptions – which is described
by McGrath as “perichoretic dancing.”
33 We must always recognize the
distinction that exists between transcendent deity and limited humanity.
Nevertheless, I would argue that the nature of the hypostatic union found in
Christ gives legitimate theological grounds for drawing these conceptions
together. Hence, just as Christ’s divinity and humanity intertwine in a
mysterious embrace, so he draws together the tension of sovereignty and
freedom which exists in the intra-trinitarian divine life (divine-divine) with the
same tension which exists as the triune God acts toward humanity in
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Providence (divine-human). As such, we may again speak of the primacy of
Christ in the illumination and explication of Providence.
Earlier, in Chapter Three, I noted that various theologians and confessions
were clear in drawing a soteriological, and therefore christological, dimension
in understanding Providence. These included theologians such as Barth,
Brunner, Niermann, Weber, Berkouwer and others, as well as the documents
of Vatican II.
34 Indeed, Lloyd-Jones’ review of Berkouwer’s book on
Providence notes the latter’s emphasis throughout on the principle that, “…
there is an indissoluble link between Providence and soteriology, and that
Providence must never be considered apart from this grand purpose and object
of salvation.”
35 In other words, it is theologically legitimate, indeed
theologically required, to conceive Providence in the context of the person and
work of Christ.
36 Consequently, conceiving Providence in the light and context
of God’s salvific purposes means that illumination may be found for how we
might conceive some of the issues of Providence – in this instance, the nature
of sovereignty and freedom. The hypostatic union we find in Christ provides a
focal point – a point of convergence – that draws together divine and human
conceptions and illuminates how we might understand sovereignty and
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Press, 1952), p. 148; E. Niermann, “Providence” in K. Rahner (ed.), Encyclopedia of
Theology: A Concise Sacramentum Mundi (London: Burns & Oates, 1975), p. 1313; O.
Weber, Foundations of Dogmatics Vol. 1 Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981), p. 509; G. C.
Berkouwer, The Providence of God (Studies in Dogmatics; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952),
pp. 44-45; “Dogmatic Constitution of the Church,” in A. Flannery, (ed.), Vatican Council II:
The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents (Vatican Collection, Vol. 1; Northport, New
York: Costello Publishing Company, 1988), pp. 367-368.
35 M. Lloyd-Jones, book review, Evangelical Quarterly 25/2 (1953).
36 T. C. Oden, The Living God (Systematic Theology, Vol. 1; San Francisco: Harper and Row,
1992), p. 287.238
freedom existing in a mysterious embrace in that Christ both obeyed the
sovereign will of his Father and yet freely gave of himself.
Indeed, Anselm of Canterbury, to whom Gunton refers,
37 addresses this in Cur
Deus Homo (“Why God Became Man”) and in other writings. What Anselm
appears to argue for is an understanding of Christ’s death as both an act of
obedience to his Father consonant with it being an act of freedom. Hence,
Christ did indeed go to the cross “under the demand of obedience,” but such
obedience was not coerced for “God did not, therefore, compel Christ to die;
but he suffered death of his own will, not yielding up his life as an act of
obedience, but on account of his obedience in maintaining holiness.” The point
Anselm seems to be making is that freedom is to be understood relationally in
that “he [Christ] had agreed with the Father and the Holy Spirit, that there was
no other way to reveal to the world the height of his omnipotence than by his
death.”
38 Hence, Christ’s freedom is located in his being free to be truly who
he is – and his true particularity, his unique identity, derives relationally from
his connection with the Father and the Holy Spirit. It is for this reason that
Anselm, in De Libertate Arbitrii (“On Freedom of Choice”), argues that
genuine freedom is not found in the ability to gainsay – that is, to sin or act
contrarily to God’s sovereign will – but in human existence that reflects the
original intentions of the Creator. He writes, “The ability to sin, which, when
added to the will decreases the will’s freedom, and when taken away from the
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will increases its freedom, is itself neither freedom nor a part of freedom.”
39
Consequently, as human beings are created by God to walk in relationship
with him, genuine freedom is not the ability to sin but is rather found when we
act in a way that respects and honours the relationality we were created to have
with our Creator. Again, freedom is a relational category. We are only truly
free when we are in right relationship with God through Christ – “it is for
freedom that Christ has set us free” (Galatians 5:1 NIV). Furthermore, such
freedom is mediated to us by the Spirit who illuminates our understanding of
the divine will and empowers us to obey it – for “the Lord is the Spirit, and
where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom” (2 Corinthians 3:17 NIV).
Arguing from this trinitarian perspective, then, we may speak of human
freedom as being compatible with the divine sovereign will.
The Nature of Freedom
Of course, Open Theism, along with classic Arminianism and Molinism,
advocates a libertarian understanding of human freedom. In its view, freedom
can only be freedom when you have the power of contrary choice – that is,
though you may be influenced by desires and motives, your decision is not
determined by these for you have the power to actualise more than one choice.
As Boyd argues, “The possibility of saying no must be metaphysically entailed
by the possibility of saying yes to him.”
40 Yet, I wonder if the type of freedom
Open Theism is advocating – libertarianism or the power of contrary choice –
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is the best understanding of freedom from a scriptural perspective.
41 I
recognize its legitimacy at a philosophical level, but question its legitimacy at
a theological level.
42 In my view, it moves too closely to reducing the full
import of the biblical portrayal of divine sovereignty. Similarly, Bloesch
comments that, “freewill theism errs by positing a freedom that cannot be
reconciled with God’s sovereignty over human affairs.”
43 However, also
similarly with Bloesch, I question whether the alternative of understanding
divine sovereignty in terms of causation is itself also reductionistic, but this
time in relation to human freedom/responsibility. He comments, “Classical
theism errs by reducing human freedom to a chimera and explaining
everything in terms of divine causation.”
44
Although I resonate with much of the relational emphasis of Open Theism, I
question whether its advocacy of libertarianism is the most helpful approach to
adopt. Indeed, my view is that libertarian freedom carries with it an inherent
limitation in that it is defining itself according to the same parameters of the
version of freedom against which it is reacting – that is, a causal system. On
the one hand, Open Theism sees classical theism advocating freedom within a
system of causation (and argues, therefore, that it is deterministic). However, I
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wonder whether the alternative it offers suffers in that it defines itself
according to the same causal parameters – although these are stated negatively
in that libertarian freedom is defined as non-causative and non-determinative.
For example, when Aquinas argues for causa prima and causae secondae, or
when a compatibilist argues that an action may be free though determined,
Open Theism reacts against such conceptions by defining its libertarian view
of freedom in non-causative and non-determinitive terms and states that while
we may be influenced by desires and motives, these do not finally determine
or cause our decision.
45 Yet, from the trinitarian perspective I am advocating,
freedom is not to be conceived in terms of causation nor non-causation, but in
terms of relationality. An emphasis upon relationality may indeed be the intent
behind Open Theism’s rejection of classical theories of causation, but the
alternative notion of libertarianism in my view gives us an understanding of
freedom that is autonomous and individualistic rather than relational – that is,
a human person is free only if they are able to stand as individuals, distinct and
undetermined by God, and are able to choose to be or not to be in relationship
with God. By contrast, the triune conception of freedom that I am advocating
locates freedom in the relationship rather than outside it – it posits that human
beings are only free when in right relationship with the triune God.
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Indeed, Brunner is similarly doubtful over the appropriateness of the idea of
causation or non-causation in describing the Creator-creature relationship.
46
While he acknowledges that the triune God has created creatures with whom
he wills to have communion – and such communion presupposes
differentiation and independence so that the creature can return him love for
love; the nature of such independence, such freedom, is not derived from or
inherent in the creature but can only be derived from God. Hence, he
concludes, “It is not independence which constitutes the freedom based on
God the Creator, but on the contrary, it is that freedom which is identical with
complete dependence.”
47 In other words, true freedom is not derived from a
philosophically based notion of causation or non-causation, but from a
biblically informed notion of relationality – true freedom for created human
beings is defined in terms of the Creator, not in terms of the autonomous self.
Consequently, “human freedom is based on the freedom of the Creator; hence
man’s freedom is also his responsibility.”
48
In the insightful essay, “The Gift of Freedom,” Barth argues that the nature of
divine freedom is not “empty, naked sovereignty,” but is, in fact, to be
understood trinitarianly. Hence,
In God’s own freedom there is encounter and communion; there is
order and, consequently, dominion and subordination; there is
majesty and humility, absolute authority and absolute obedience;
there is offer and response. God’s freedom is the freedom of the
Father and the Son in the unity of the Spirit. Again, man’s freedom
is a far cry from the self-assertion of one or many solitary
individuals. It has nothing to do with division and disorder. God’s
own freedom is trinitarian, embracing grace, thankfulness and
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peace. It is the freedom of the living God. Only in this relational
freedom is God sovereign, almighty, the Lord of all.
49
The consequence of this understanding of freedom is that for humanity true
freedom is “his reverence before the free God who accepts him as His partner
without relinquishing His sovereignty. This event alone is the event of
freedom.”
50 For Barth, to conceive of human freedom in terms of neutrality, in
which humans choose right or wrong, is really un-freedom. By contrast, true
freedom is relationally defined and relationally regulated – “Man becomes
free and is free by choosing, deciding, and determining himself in accordance
with the freedom of God. The source of man’s freedom is also his yardstick.”
51
The Freedom of Responsible Dependence
Consequently, what a trinitarian conception of sovereignty and freedom leads
us to, with its locus in relationality, is a theological tension. To be truly free as
human beings is to be in right relationship with the God who created the world
and us and sustains both. In other words, we are left with a dual affirmation:
we are both independent – in that we are “other” from God – and dependent –
in that it is in him that we live and move and have our being (Acts 17:28).
Although such a conception is inherently challenging to articulate, it appears
that we are left with a sense of responsible dependence in that we are free, to
the extent that we are held responsible for our actions, and dependent, to the
extent that our freedom derives from, and is to be understood in the context of,
God’s sovereign freedom. It is toward articulating this tension that we find
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Paul urging the church in Philippi to, “continue to work out (katerga¿zesqe)
your salvation with fear and trembling.” Yet, this action for which they are
held responsible is only possible, “for it is God who works in you (qeo\ß ga¿r
e˙stin oJ e˙nergw◊n e˙n uJmi√n) to will and to act according to his good purpose”
(Philippians 2:12b-13 NIV).
In an attempt to phrase this tension, Farmer states that humanity and the world
have only a “relative independence of God.”
52 Consequently, he argues, we
must avoid allowing the thought of Providence to swallow up the thought of
the relative independence of humanity and the world, which lands us in
monism, or allowing human independence to swallow up the thought of
Providence, therefore giving no basis for trust and peace – “Somehow the two
thoughts have to be held together.”
53 Farmer believes that such a theological
tension between sovereignty and freedom can only be maintained when we
recognize that God “presents Himself at one and the same time as absolute
demand and final succour, the absolute demand having no meaning apart from
the independence of man, the final succour having no meaning apart from the
sovereign providence of God.”
54 It is only in the context of such relationship
that humanity can have the option to resist God,
… and yet also be controlled and directed by His manifold wisdom
and sovereign will; that God has a purpose which He is working
out in history, so that men can have genuine co-operative
fellowship with Him here and now, yet which, being God’s
purpose, transcends history altogether so that man cannot interpret
it adequately in terms of this life; that in spite of all the confusion
and heartbreak and frustration of life, the sins, follies, accidents,
disasters, diseases, so undiscriminating in their incidence, so
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ruthless in their working out, every individual may, if he will, not
in imagination but in fact, rest upon a love which numbers the very
hairs of his head – that is a conception before which the intellect
sinks down in complete paralysis. It is only possible to maintain
because in the religious awareness something deeper than intellect
is involved. Such a conviction is primarily given, as we have said,
through the primordial rapport of the soul with God, and it is
developed and deepened as that rapport is cleansed and enlarged
into true sonship to God through the Christian experience of
reconciliation.
55
Hence, we are drawn back to Weinandy’s thesis of theology being a mystery
discerning enterprise rather than a problem solving enterprise.
56 We certainly
may be able to illuminate aspects of Providence (in this case, sovereignty and
freedom), which is the possibility of theological inquiry, but we will also face
mystery, which is the limitation of theological inquiry. This is why Bloesch
seeks to strike the right balance when he writes that, “The Bible does not
present a rationally satisfying answer to this problem, but it does throw light
upon God’s dealings with humanity.”
57
In a similar way, I am seeking to strike the right balance by utilizing a
scripturally derived trinitarian perspective to “throw light” upon the subject –
that of holding divine sovereignty and human freedom in theological tension,
interpreting each in the context the other provides. Consequently, neither an
overly deterministic view, with an emphasis upon causation, nor an overly
non-deterministic view, with an emphasis upon non-causation, can
conceptually reflect the whole of the biblical presentation. Bloesch calls such
theological tension “biblical providentialism” and comments that it, “differs
qualitatively from both determinism and indeterminism because it seeks to
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hold together in paradoxical tension two seemingly contradictory realities –
God’s sovereign rule and human responsibility.”
58
An example of the balance or tension I am seeking to strike can be found in
the writings of Charles Simeon (1759-1836CE), who lived in the days when
the Calvinist-Arminian controversy was a pressing theological concern. He
defines himself as “no friend to systematizers in theology” for his primary
concern is with understanding the scriptural presentation of the divine-human
relationship rather than with constructing an internally consistent philosophical
system. Although he has no doubt that there is a “system in the Holy
Scriptures (for truth cannot be inconsistent with itself) … he is persuaded that
neither Calvinists nor Arminians are in exclusive possession of it.”
59 In the
record of a personal correspondence, he summarizes his view, “The truth is not
in the middle, and not in one extreme, but in both extremes … Sometimes I am
a high Calvinist, at other times a low Arminian, so that if extremes will please
you, I am your man; only remember, it is not one extreme that we are to go to,
but both extremes.”
60
Freedom, Love and the Notion of “Other”
Hence, in seeking to articulate such a sovereignty/freedom tension – such a
balance of two extremes – from a trinitarian perspective, it is important to note
how we might conceive the nature of freedom. Although I acknowledge that
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notions of causation are utilized by our theological predecessors and have been
helpful in seeking to conceptualise God’s sovereignty and humanity’s
responsibility, I would argue that there is greater benefit in conceiving
freedom in relational terms. Hence, although a philosophical conception of
freedom might be understood as freedom “from” the other, an intra-trinitarian
relational conception of freedom points us toward understanding it as freedom
“to” or “for” the other.
61 That is, the intra-trinitarian divine life displays the
Father as free for the Son, the Son as free for the Father in the unity of the
Spirit.
62 As such, divine freedom is not constrained or coerced but is inherently
participatory. Consequently, when we consider human freedom, such freedom
is to be understood in a participatory and relational way. Although human
freedom is derived “from” God in that he is its ultimate source, the nature of
its application is “to” or “for” God and others.
63 Furthermore, although human
freedom is derived from and enabled by God, such divine grace should not be
understood as coercive upon the human will. Rather,
… it is a will whose direction is given shape by the patterns of
relation in which it is set. It is not the freedom of empty space.
Only in relation to God and to others can we be particularly who
and what we are, and therefore only so can we be free.
64
This conception of divine sovereignty and human freedom/responsibility sees
them as intertwined in a relational, though mysterious, embrace – as though
both are, in a sense, heading in the same direction. However, can such a
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conception be seen as reflective of a relationship that could be defined as
loving? As we have seen, the emphasis of Open Theism is upon the loving
nature of the divine/human relationship. Hence, when Open Theism speaks of
sovereignty it is always done in a way that emphasizes the loving “give and
take” nature of this relationship,
65 with the utilization of words such as
partnership, mutuality and reciprocity. We find a similar emphasis in Brümmer
when he writes, “Love must by its very nature be a relationship of free mutual
give and take, otherwise it cannot be love at all.”
66 The point Brümmer seems
to be making is that love must be a “two-way” endeavour and that “its very
nature” is defined in the presence of love going, as it were, in both directions.
However, I would like to challenge this conception. If love is defined as that
which constitutes a “two-way” relationship, then this would seem to rule out of
order concepts such as unrequited love. In other words, if love is not returned
then there is no reciprocity, no mutuality, no “two-way” relationship – hence,
there is no love. Indeed, along with Vanhoozer, I wonder how Brümmer’s
conception of love can be coherent in the context of the command to love
one’s enemies.
67 Consequently, it is not immediately obvious that the notion of
love should necessarily be conceived in symmetrical or “two-way” terms.
Indeed, a symmetrical reciprocity of relationship does not, in itself, define a
relationship as loving for, as Vanhoozer asks, “What is more mutual and
reciprocal than ‘an eye for an eye’?”
68 Hence, when we speak of the divine
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sovereignty of a loving triune God, such sovereignty need not necessarily be
defined as symmetrical, reciprocal or mutual.
In fact, the trinitarianism of Zizioulas argues that participation in the triune
God, or theosis, is a “one-way” affair in that we are called to participate in
him, not him in us.
69 That is, the idea of theosis, though having both divine and
human dimensions, is not characterized by a mutuality or reciprocity between
equals. Rather, it is a differentiated mutuality in that there is an asymmetry
present which reflects the ontological differentiation between divinity and
humanity, in that the former is self-existent and the latter divine-dependent. In
a similar way, the sovereignty of God does not exist in a mutual “give and
take” relationship with humanity, as though humanity is on the same plane as
God, but is inherently “one-way.”
Yet, sovereignty so conceived is not by definition unloving or non-respecting
to those who are “other.” Rather, such differentiated mutuality means that,
even though God is sovereign in all things, it is possible for both God and
humanity to exist in a loving relationship, for the latter is truly itself, is in fact
truly free, when it is in right relationship with the Father through the Son and
in the Spirit. Rather than seeing the relationship of divine sovereignty and
human freedom as necessarily facing each other, as “two-way”, with the
advancement of one meaning the retreat of the other, a trinitarian perspective
points us toward understanding divine sovereignty and human freedom
heading in the same direction – as “one-way.” Again, freedom is a relational
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category – when we are in right relationship with the Father through the Son
and in the Spirit, and thereby in his sovereign will, we are truly free.
Consequently, a robust understanding of sovereignty can indeed be compatible
with a loving relationship.
Sovereignty, Freedom and the Divine Dance
Indeed, it is my view that conceiving of sovereignty and freedom in this
manner avoids what Fiddes calls “images of domination.”
70 In my engagement
with Fiddes’ trinitarianism in Chapter Four, I made note of his proposal of a
relational, dynamic, mutually penetrating triune God who calls humanity into
participation in the divine life. His distinctive notion of conceiving the divine
persons as relations rather than in relationship was his primary way of
articulating this proposal. Yet, I also noted his utilization of the concept of the
“divine dance” of perichoresis to illustrate his proposal. In particular, he
identified aspects of trinitarian thought from both the West and East and
sought to incorporate them into one model. From the West comes the emphasis
upon “mutuality and reciprocity [which] tells us how the relations in God
interact and shape each other.”
71 Yet, from the East comes the insight that “the
Father alone is the arche of the Son and the Spirit” and so the dance “is not a
swirling vortex of arbitrary currents. There is a direction to its flow, a pattern
which is like the movement to and from one ultimate source.”
72 Fiddes
articulates the consequence of these two insights by stating that, “the
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combination of reciprocity with a basic uni-directionality is well illustrated by
a mingling of a circle-dance with a progressive dance.”
73As such, there is both
a sense of relationality between the divine persons along with a sense of
directionality in their overall movement.
In my view, this conception of both relationality and directionality within the
triune God provides support for what I am proposing. In other words, there are
legitimate theological grounds for conceiving that the intra-trinitarian life is
characterized by a relationality in which the divine persons are free to act and
to be in accord with that which makes each distinct – their own particularity.
Yet, alongside this relationality is a directionality reflected in the sovereign
will of the Father in that there is a uni-directionality in the overall divine
movement. It is perhaps hardly surprising, therefore, when humanity
experiences a similar tension when the triune God acts toward us in
Providence. In one sense, the relationality is experienced as we commune with
the Father through the Son and in the Spirit – no longer as strangers or as
slaves, but as children and heirs.
74 In another sense, the directionality is
experienced in the “one way” orientation of divine sovereignty and human
freedom – that is, humans are truly free when we are in right relationship with
the Father through the Son and in the Spirit, and thereby in his sovereign will.
Consequently, a trinitarian perspective avoids reductionism by wholeheartedly
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affirming both a robust divine sovereignty and a robust human freedom by
grounding both in relationality.
DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY AND CONCURRENCE
The trinitarian conception of sovereignty and freedom that I am proposing has
relevance for the concept of divine concurrence (concursus divinus).
Concurrence may be defined as, “the actions of God in working in the world in
conjunction with the actions of human beings.”
75 As such, the doctrine of
concurrence seeks to articulate how we might conceive the relationship
between divine and human action and so presupposes that God, though distinct
from the world, does indeed act in the world. Earlier, in Chapter Three, I
argued that Providence is not to be understood in a fatalistic, pantheistic or
deistic construct. In other words, God does not govern the world in such a way
that human action is rendered inconsequential (fatalism); nor is God so
identified with the world that human action is, in reality, divine action
(pantheism); and, nor is God so distinct from the world that he has no
authentic involvement or engagement with the world and with human
decisions (deism). We must avoid the extremes of a dictatorial fatalistic
Creator, an overly immanent pantheistic Creator or an absentee deistic Creator.
Indeed, Bavinck recognises the implications of imbalance in this area. For
example, he argues that if God were identical with the world, as in Pantheism,
and so in “no essential way therefore to be distinguished from mankind, then
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every thought and deed of men would immediately and directly have to be
charged to God’s responsibility.”
76 Such a situation is, in his view, blatantly
unbiblical for scripture appears consistently to maintain that the cause of sin
lies in humanity and not in God and if it is to be reckoned to someone’s
account, it must be the former rather than the latter. Yet, alongside this, he also
acknowledges that, in another sense, the scriptures also appear to teach that all
things lie ultimately under the governance or rule of God. The consequence of
this is that we see, “… two lines of Holy Scripture, according to which sin,
from beginning to end, falls under God’s governance and is nevertheless
chargeable to man’s account.”
77 In Bavinck’s view, the only way that these
two lines can be reconciled is “… only if God and the world are on the one
hand not separated from each other and yet on the other are essentially
distinguished from each other.”
78 Although he recognises the riddles this
juxtaposition presents to us, and is thereby forced to appeal to the idea of first
and second causes to conceptualise it, he nevertheless maintains that, “the
confession that God and the world may never be separated but must always be
distinguished … points the direction in which the solution must be sought and
prevents us from straying either to the left or the right in our search.”
79
Certainly, the notion of holding divine transcendence and immanence in
tension is a helpful way of illuminating and explicating the divine/human
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relationship. Indeed, in the previous chapter, I argued from a trinitarian
perspective for just such a balance.
The Asymmetry of Divine Concurrence
However, what Bavinck raises here is important for our present discussion of
the nature of divine sovereignty in the context of Providence. The biblical
presentation appears to present a conceptual tension in that divine sovereignty
stands, in some sense, behind or over all things, while humans are
simultaneously held responsible for their actions. Carson comments,
Such passages are well known. Less well known, however, are
those that depict God’s sovereignty over evil. Where this occurs,
the writer’s aim is never to ascribe evil to God, but to make it clear
that even evil cannot escape God’s sway. No ontological dualism
between good and evil is allowed. Sin and rebellion exist, but no
matter how difficult the philosophical questions that are thereby
called into being, the sweep of God’s sovereignty is not curtailed or
qualified. We must face these texts without flinching.
80
Indeed, elsewhere, Carson argues strongly that the scriptures seem to portray
the relationship between divine sovereignty and human responsibility
(including evil choices as well as good), as asymmetrical in nature. That is, to
use Carson’s expression, “divine ultimacy” stands behind good and evil
asymmetrically in that God is praised for the good and not blamed for the
evil.
81 Although God’s sovereignty somehow encompasses both good and evil
(for example, in Acts 2:23),
82 the nature of such divine ultimacy is not
identical to each.
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Indeed, when we consider the nature of divine sovereignty in its relation to
soteriology, we are faced with just such asymmetry. For example, in 2
Thessalonians 2:9-17 we find Paul assuring the readers that they have been
saved “because from the beginning God chose you to be saved through the
sanctifying work of the Spirit and through belief in the truth” and that “he
called you to this through our gospel” (verses 13-14a NIV). However, the
unsaved, “those who are perishing,” are in that position “because they refused
to love the truth and so be saved. For this reason God sends them a powerful
delusion so that they will believe the lie” (verses 10-11 NIV). Although we
might debate over semantics, Paul does seem to be saying that God is
sovereignly active in both situations, yet the way God stands behind each
differs – the reality of salvation is found primarily or directly in God’s actions;
the reality of reprobation is found primarily or directly in humanity’s actions.
Although God acts in both, his sovereign action seems to be primary and direct
in relation to the saved, and secondary and indirect in relation to the perishing.
It was toward seeking to articulate such seeming asymmetry that Aquinas
produced the formula that God concurs with the effect but not the defect of our
actions.
83
Divine Concurrence and the Trinitarian Divine Life
It is toward seeking to conceptualise and systematize texts such as these that
the doctrine of concurrence exists. It seeks to give an account for the varied
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ways in which the scriptures witness to divine and human agencies appearing
to co-exist in the one apparent action. In relation to divine action, I am seeking
to avoid “reducing God to a mere physical cause on the one hand, or to an
ineffectual influence on the other”
84 and, in relation to human action, to avoid
compromising the integrity and meaningfulness of such action. In my view, to
do either would be to reduce the full significance of the scriptural presentation
of both divine sovereignty and human responsibility.
In relation to Providence, my thesis is that divine sovereignty is best
understood as standing in theological tension with human responsibility and a
trinitarian perspective provides both explication and illumination of that
tension. As such, it is my view that the nature of the intra-trinitarian relations
provides a conceptual paradigm for understanding how both divine and human
actions might be concurrent in the one action. At its simplest level, my
argument is that the notion of perichoresis gives us a trinitarian paradigm of
concurrence. That is, the perfect relationality that is the triune God means that
the three divine persons so interpenetrate each other that the action of one is, in
a mysterious and yet profound sense, also the action of the others. Hence, we
are able to say that the sovereign will of the Father to send the Son is
concurrent with the freedom of the Son to give of himself. In a sense, then, the
action of the Father is also the action of the Son. Although one could
conceivably argue that there is a sense of primacy or initiation in the Father’s
action and a sense of response in the Son’s, the distinctiveness or authenticity
of each action is not obscured by their concurrence. Although perichoresis or
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coinherence points us toward seeing a unity of sovereign divine purpose, such
unity neither obscures nor negates the distinctiveness or freedom of each
divine person in such action. The will of the Son remains the will of the Son
whilst existing concurrently with it being the will of the Father and Holy
Spirit.
One of Augustine’s particular, and perhaps most original,
85 contributions to
understanding perichoresis or circumincession is to argue that, as the Holy
Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son in that he relates to both
alike, he is the bond of love between them (vinculum caritas). That is, he holds
that “there are three things: he that loves, and that which is loved, and love.”
86
Hence, the Father is the lover, the Son the beloved and the Holy Spirit the
mutual love that passes between and proceeds from both. Such an analogy of
love is arguably Augustine’s first step toward the full development of his
psychological analogy – for example, with his utilization of mind, love and
knowledge.
87 However, although this love analogy has been developed in the
West, for example by Richard of St Victor, theologians of the East have often
criticized it for its seeming depersonalisation of the Holy Spirit. As O’Collins
comments, “After all in the I-Thou relationship, the love that two persons
bestow on each other is not a third person, or at least does not emerge as an
activity that defines the person distinct from the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou.’”
88 In the
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light of this criticism, it should be noted that Richard of St Victor’s
development of Augustine’s analogy included the designation of the Holy
Spirit as the “co-beloved” (condilectus). In his view, mutual love is perfected
when it is shared with a third person. As such, the Trinity is a movement of
loving relationship – from self-love (Father) to mutual love (Father and Son)
to shared love (Father, Son and Holy Spirit).
89 In Kaiser’s view, “Richard of St
Victor came perhaps as close as any theologian before or since to articulating
this dynamic of the inner life of the Trinity in ordinary human language.”
90
Augustine’s analogy, and its development by Richard of St Victor, points us
toward recognizing that although there is clear triune particularity in that the
Father, Son and Spirit are distinct from each other, they are nevertheless united
in relational love. This “sharing in being” ensures that divine particularity is
not compromised by divine unity nor unity by particularity. We are therefore
able to say that, at one level, when a divine person acts in accord with his own
particularity, for example the Father sending the Son or the Son sending the
Spirit, the perichoretic nature of the triune love means that the Son and Spirit
are, as obedient and sent, also acting freely in accord with their own
particularity. Furthermore, at another level, we are able to say that the
perichoretic nature of the triune love also ensures that the actions of each
divine person, whilst remaining distinct and in accord with their own
particularity, are concurrent to the extent that they reflect and form a single
unity of divine purpose. Hence, the nature of the intratrinitarian relations,
which are then reflected ad extra as God acts toward us in Providence,
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provides us with a conceptual paradigm in which the action of a particular
person, whilst remaining authentically their own action, might also be said to
be attended by or concurrent with the action of another.
When we consider the scriptural presentation of the divine-human relationship
in Providence, it is my view that we are presented with just such concurrence.
For example, Paul’s first letter to the Corinthian church includes this comment
concerning the interrelationship of divine and human action – “But by the
grace of God I am what I am, and his grace to me was not without effect. No, I
worked harder than all of them – yet not I, but the grace of God that was with
me” (1 Corinthians 15:10 NIV). We see a similar concurrence in the story of
Joseph when he recognizes both divine and human hands in the one series of
occurrences (Genesis 30-50). Although the actions of his brothers were
intended to harm, and they are held responsible for them, God’s sovereignty is
such that, without negating the authenticity of the brothers’ actions and
therefore their responsibility for them, he works concurrently alongside and
through these actions to bring about good – “the saving of many lives”
(Genesis 50:20b NIV). We should also note, particularly in reference to our
earlier discussion, that though God and Joseph’s brothers have involvement in
the one group of occurrences, their involvement is asymmetrical in nature.
That is, God’s sovereignty is such that it encompasses Joseph’s brothers’
actions and yet it does not dilute the responsibility they must take for such
actions. As Carson states, “In short, although we may lack the categories260
needed for full exposition of the problem, nevertheless we must insist that
divine ultimacy stands behind good and evil asymmetrically.”
91
My argument is that we should not be surprised by such concurrence for it is
simply a manifestation of the theological tension that exists between divine
sovereignty and human responsibility. Furthermore, this tension is a reflection
of, and finds some grounding in, an intra-trinitarian dimension of concurrence.
Indeed, along with Volf, we can say that if the triune God is “unum multiplex
in se ipso (John Scotus Erigena), if unity and multiplicity are equiprimal in
him, then God is the ground of both unity and multiplicity.”
92 Consequently,
all of reality, as reflective of such grounding, is characterized by both a unity
and multiplicity. Therefore, on the one hand, since God is one, “reality does
not … degenerate into individual scenes like a bad play.”
93 Yet, on the other
hand, since the divine multiplicity is reflected in the communion of the three
divine persons, “the world drama does not degenerate into a boring
monologue.”
94 The nature of God’s sovereignty reveals a uni-directionality in
that history is being led to an end that is reflective of the ultimate divine
purpose, while simultaneously absorbing within that purpose the multiplicity
of human actions; and yet not repudiating or negating their authenticity as
actions for which we are held responsible.
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Divine Concurrence and the Flow of History
In an attempt to explicate concurrence, Barth utilizes language and images that
are full of tension. For example, he desires to affirm that humans are
meaningfully present in God’s providential plan as it unfolds through history,
but we are in a different, reflective history. That is, “the creature is
undoubtedly present as the subject of a separate history, nor is it present in
vain as a passive spectator or mere object, but meaningfully.”
95 Drawing from
1 Corinthians 13:12,
96 Barth finally utilizes the image or metaphor of a mirror.
As a mirror of God’s primary providential history, human history cannot
repeat or imitate it – we can only reflect it. Yet, although God is under no
obligation to “co-ordinate and integrate” human action within his
Providence,
97 he sovereignly chooses to allow humanity space. Barth utilizes
the Reformers’ idea of concursus but argues that there is a praecurrit (divine
preceding) that renders the actions of creatures as God’s own – yet, “without
jeopardizing their integrity.”
98 Furthermore, alongside this praecurrit is a
concurrit (divine accompanying) which together form the one divine action –
“the concursus divinus is a concursus simultaneous.”
99 Consequently, “we
have to understand the activity of God and that of the creature as a single
action … If God the Lord accompanies the creature, what it does mean is that
He is so present in the activity of the creature, and present with such
sovereignty and almighty power, that His own action takes place in and with
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and over the activity of the creature.”
100 If I am understanding Barth correctly,
God’s preceding of human action means that it is absorbed into or forms part
of God’s one action or plan in Providence and yet his accompanying of it
through history ensures that it also stands distinct from God in its own
meaningfulness. Tanner believes that Barth’s holding of this tension ensures
that there is, “No synergism (as if God and creatures were agents on the same
plane); no monism (as if God were the only actor); no determinism (as if God
pulled creatures away from their own best inclinations).”
101
Link similarly writes of a divine “accompanying” of the world through its
history, using the model of a king. He believes that the model of a king, which
is “deeply rooted in the psalms,” is appropriate for the “king acts among his
people through the use of law, with decrees and proclamations, and not in a
directly ‘causal’ influence.”
102 He is also particularly drawn to the Process
model in which God “is ‘persuasively’ active in that he ‘offers’ past events,
newly organized, to the present.”
103 Yet, in my view, Link’s highly interactive,
relational and non-coercive conception of God also renders him as far more
limited in his sovereignty than the scriptural presentation allows. Indeed, God
is rendered as almost dependent upon the world to be God – as in Process
theology – in which a king is king only when he has a kingdom.
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By contrast, a far more promising approach is found in the proposal of Wright.
Wright recognizes the challenges that are present in a consideration of the
relationship between human and divine actions. He writes,
How, then, do we maintain the balance between God’s freedom and
actions and creaturely freedom and actions? Does God, sovereign
and omnipotent, deny creation’s activity by his own activity?
Perhaps creation, revelling in its divinely given freedom, prevents
God from acting because it is so rambunctious in its own activity.
Whose space denies whose space?
104
Along with me, he believes that understanding Providence in terms of
causation is potentially problematic. He writes, “as a means of explaining
concursus, it is surely inadequate, for it risks reducing creaturely activity to the
effect of the divine cause.”
105 He fears that it has an “unnecessary mechanical
feel to it” and, as an alternative, believes that it may be better to conceive of
God calling rather than causing – in that God calls “creation into being and
towards a response rather than to a reaction.”
106 This more personal and
relational understanding of concurrence derives from recognizing the personal
and relational triunity of God. He writes, “A trinitarian understanding of God
revives the doctrine of providence, for no longer are God and creation set up as
opposites where one spurs the other into action.”
107
From this trinitarian perspective, then, Wright argues that it is not so much a
matter of God accompanying our actions and thereby making them his own,
but of God calling us, in a sense, to accompany his. He writes,
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This means, then, that concursus is not so much God
accompanying our actions to bring about his purposes, but of God
inviting us by his Spirit to participate in his own sovereign activity.
In doing so, God does not commandeer our actions but instead acts
himself whilst giving us the opportunity to accompany him; but our
accompaniment of his activity cannot in any way be said to restrict
it, for it is an accompaniment that follows rather than leads.
108
Such a conception is derived from a trinitarian perspective in general, in that
we are called to participate by the Spirit in God’s sovereign activity, and a
christological perspective in particular, in that Christ gives us a primary
example of such Spirit-led obedience and, by the same Spirit, enables us to do
the same. Wright calls this the “participatory view of concursus”
109 and
outlines three ramifications. Firstly, God’s relationship with Creation is not
remote but intimate; secondly, it preserves the distinction between divine and
creaturely action but allows the joining or accompanying of the latter at times
with the former (“God acts, creatures act, but sometimes these two lines of
activity entwine, with God’s line allowing the creaturely line to share its
space”)
110; and, thirdly, God does not cause natural or human evil but works
good out of it by faithful believers participating in God’s work. He concludes,
“To obey God, the creature needs true discernment to see if he [God] really is
at work in a particular way at a particular time and in a particular place, and
this is done truly by participating in his activity, following him where he
leads.”
111
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I believe that Wright’s proposal is helpful and constructive. By working from
this trinitarian perspective, his “participatory view of concursus” sees divine
action and human action as complementary to the extent that at times human
action is able to follow – to accompany – God’s continuing purposive action.
There is a sense of primacy in God’s sovereign purpose, yet the perichoretic
other-centredness that characterizes the triune divine life means that, as he
takes the lead, he also invites humanity to accompany him. As such, the nature
of this concurrence is “one-way” and so links directly with my earlier
discussion concerning the nature of human freedom. In that context, I argued
that humans are truly free when we are in right relationship with the Father
through the Son and in the Holy Spirit, and thereby in his sovereign will. As
such, freedom is not seen as opposed to divine sovereignty, as “two-way,”
with the advance of one meaning the retreat of the other, but as a “one-way”
affair. In a similar way, human action’s concurrency with divine action derives
from this sense of accompanying – of a walking with God as he allows us to
work with him to fulfil his sovereign purpose. Only by walking with him can
we be said to be truly free and our actions to be directly concurrent with his.
Sovereignty, Concurrence and the Presence of Evil
Yet, what are we to make of those human actions that seem to stand in
opposition to God’s sovereign purpose and will – human actions that are sinful
or even evil? In what sense, if any, can evil action be said to be concurrent
with divine action? Earlier, I noted Farmer’s insistence that God presents to us
as absolute demand and final succour – his demand of us points to our266
independence, his succour toward us points to his sovereign providence.
112 As
such, humanity and the world have only a “relative independence of God.”
113
Consequently, in my view, evil human action cannot be said to stand in total or
absolute independence from divine action for this would compromise the full
significance of the biblical portrayal of divine sovereignty and present us with
a form of dualism. As Oden states, “One cannot even sin without
Providence.”
114 Yet, if God’s sovereign action somehow incorporates human
action – both good and evil – is not God then the author of the evil as well as
the good? My response is to appeal again to the scriptural asymmetry present
in the divine sovereignty and human responsibility tension. Although divine
sovereignty carries with it a sense of divine ultimacy, the responsibility for evil
actions is always accorded to the agents themselves and not to God. In the
words of Carson, “It is this sort of model which, however difficult it is to
formulate, best conforms to the biblical data.”
115
Following the lead of Wright above, it is my view that human action can be
said to accompany the divine sovereign purpose. Sometimes that human action
follows or accompanies the divine purpose directly in that the divine line of
action allows human action to share its space. However, when human action is
such that it seeks to stand in opposition to God’s sovereign purpose and will,
and as such is sinful or evil, such action cannot be said to accompany God’s
action directly – this line of human action is not able to share the same divine
space as that inhabited by obedient human action. In a sense, then, while
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divine ultimacy stands behind both, it does so asymmetrically – human action
that is obedient to the divine purpose is directly concurrent with it, whereas
disobedient evil action is indirectly concurrent. Although articulating such
obliquity is inherently challenging, it is my view that we are presented with
just such asymmetry in scripture and thus the use of tensional and paradoxical
language is perhaps the best way to convey it.
Divine Sovereignty that Persuades and Commands
As was mentioned earlier, it is my view that holding divine action and human
action in this form of tension avoids what Fiddes calls “images of domination”
in which God acts coercively upon the world to the extent that human action is
rendered inconsequential or insignificant.
116 His view is that the language of
Trinity “encourages the values of relationship, community and mutuality
between persons. It is about interdependence and not domination.”
117
Consequently, he prefers to understand divine sovereignty as persuasion rather
than coercion. Yet, though the nature of divine sovereignty can certainly
include the notion of persuasion, my view is that it goes beyond it. I certainly
would not say that divine sovereignty is coercive, for that conjures up images
of fatalism which stands at odds not only with the nature of the triune divine
life but also with the constant imperatives found in scripture in which God
calls on humanity to repent, obey, love and so on. My reason for conceiving
divine sovereignty as more than mere persuasion derives, in part, from a
consideration of the nature of the divine love. Although divine sovereignty is a
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loving sovereignty, we must be careful to note how such love is scripturally
expressed – for divine love is not exactly like our human love.
118
On the one hand, the nature of the triune divine love is other-centred and as
such is positively disposed toward the beloved and therefore cannot be said to
be coercive or fatalistic. The trinitarianism of LaCugna in Chapter Four sees
the triune reality as characterized not as “by-itself” or “in-itself” but as
“toward another.”
119 Yet, on the other hand, it is my view that the loving
sovereignty of God is one that not only persuades but also commands.
Although God loves us and has demonstrated it supremely in Christ, such love
brings with it a command for all people everywhere to repent (Acts 17:30b).
Hence, the love of God, which reflects the relationality of the triune God,
brings with it a call to obedience. In the words of Jesus, “If you love me, you
will obey what I command” (John 14:15 NIV).
120 My point is that God’s
sovereignty is one that is characterized by a love that is both persuasive and
commanding – the Holy Spirit who testifies within us (Romans 8:16) also
convicts us (John 16:8). God both reaches out to us in love and yet, in that
same love, demands our obedience. Hence, it is my view that a divine
preceding and a human accompanying characterize divine sovereignty. Rather
than God persuading us only, he also calls us to obedience, to follow in his
steps, to walk in his sovereign purpose. When this occurs, we experience both
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a deep sense of freedom, because freedom is defined through our relationship
with God, as well as a life characterized by the command to “keep in step with
the Spirit” (Galatians 5:25b NIV).
121
Earlier, in Chapter Five, I noted how Webster argues cogently that a trinitarian
perspective on divine holiness leads one to conceive it as a turning – a turning
toward rather than a turning away. That is, holiness is “pure majesty in
relation”
122 and, rather than distancing God from humanity, points to the fact
that God is “the Holy One among you” (Hosea 11:9 NIV). Understood in this
way, holiness is understood relationally and means less apartness from than
apartness for. In a similar way, I am arguing that a trinitarian perspective on
divine sovereignty leads one to conceive it in similar pro nobis terms. The
sovereignty of the triune God, by definition, is a relational sovereignty and as
such is an expression of the divine will for as well as the divine will over. This
is not to deny the absolute lordship that is in divine sovereignty. Rather, it is an
understanding that recognizes that the nature of this sovereignty is positively
disposed toward those who are “other.” It is a lordship that is reflected in the
Immanuel event of the Lord Jesus Christ. Though every knee shall bow and
every tongue shall “confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the
Father” (Philippians 2:10-11 NIV), it is this same Lord who “loved us and
gave himself for us” (Ephesians 5:2 NIV). This is a divine sovereignty that
both commands and persuades. Again, it is unwise to conceive of Providence
apart from Jesus Christ.
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An image that perhaps captures this sense of concurrent accompanying is that
of an eagle in the sky. An eagle seeking to gain altitude is often dependent
upon its own reserves of strength. Yet, when an eagle enters a thermal draft, it
is able to ride the rising column of air – to accompany it – and reach
breathtaking altitude. The particularity and authenticity of the eagle’s own
flight is not compromised, it is simply enhanced and forms part of a larger
picture as it follows the thermal’s path and is borne along by it. In a similar
way, God’s sovereignty is evidenced by a call to follow, to accompany, and as
our actions are given space in his divine action, we see a concurrence in which
our actions are borne along by his.
Indeed, Peter utilizes a similar image as he outlines both the human and divine
dimensions in the development of scripture. He writes, “no prophecy of
Scripture came about by the prophet’s own interpretation. For prophecy never
had its origin in the will of man, but men spoke from God as they were carried
along by the Holy Spirit” (2 Peter 1:20-21 NIV). Hence, we may speak of the
double authorship of scripture in that we hear in it both the voice of God as
well as the voice of the human authors. As Stott puts it, “Thus on the one hand
God spoke, determining what he wanted to say, yet without smothering the
personality of the human authors. On the other hand, human beings spoke,
using their faculties freely, yet without distorting the truth which God was
speaking through them.”
123  It is my view that we find the same concurrence as
we consider the nature of divine sovereignty in the context of Providence.
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When we consider the trinitarianism of Fiddes we find that it appears to
provide further support for my argument concerning concurrence – of human
action accompanying the divine sovereign purpose. In the conclusion of the
previous section, I noted that Fiddes utilizes the concept of the “divine dance”
of perichoresis. I also noted how Fiddes has employed aspects of both eastern
and western Christian traditions in that the divine dance is characterized by
both reciprocity and uni-directionality – or, to continue the image of dance, “a
mingling of a circle-dance with a progressive dance.”
124 The implication that
he himself draws from this is that there are “patterns of dance into which we
are swept up, so that our actions follow the same divine aim. We are offered,
or presented with, aims through being engaged in the purposeful flow of the
divine love.”
125 Hence, working from this trinitarian perspective, we can see
that we are invited to enter into relationship with perfect relationality – the
triune God. As we enter into such relationship we are caught up in the
“purposeful flow of divine love” and so the divine line and human line, to use
Wright’s language, are said to entwine.
126 However, to recall the point raised
by Carson,
127 there is asymmetry present in that, although divine ultimacy
stands behind both good and evil, it does not do so identically. Hence, when
we speak of concurrence, we may say that it is sometimes direct, when human
action is given space by God in his own divine action, and sometimes indirect,
when human action stands ostensibly at odds with the divine purpose and yet
is still caught up in it.
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DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE FUTURE
Presentism, Simple Foreknowledge and Middle-Knowledge
As mentioned earlier, Open Theism’s proposal concerning divine sovereignty
and the future emphasises notions of mutuality, partnership and the synergistic
development of the future. Although a similar emphasis can also be found in
those writing in the classic Arminian tradition, the point at which the Open
proposal departs most significantly from Arminianism and, many would argue,
with orthodoxy, is over the nature of divine omniscience. While Arminianism
typically affirms exhaustive divine foreknowledge (or simple foreknowledge)
to account for the perceived realities of divine sovereignty and human
freedom,
128 Open Theism affirms exhaustive divine knowledge of the past and
the present only (or presentism). The reason for this divergence relates to their
respective understandings of the implications of embracing libertarian, rather
than compatibilistic, understandings of human freedom.
129 Although both
believe that libertarianism more adequately accounts for the reality of human
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responsibility, the irony is that Open Theism agrees, in essence, with some of
the traditional criticisms that compatibilists have levelled against
Arminianism’s concept of simple foreknowledge.
130 In particular, these
criticisms have argued that if God exhaustively knows what the future holds,
then such future events are necessarily certain – in other words, they cannot
but occur – and, hence, human freedom is illusory. Arminians, however, draw
a careful distinction between the necessity and certainty of foreknown events
and argue that God’s exhaustive knowledge of a future event only renders it
certain but not necessary. Hence, human freedom and responsibility are
preserved.
131
Although simple foreknowledge is the majority view in Arminianism, it should
be noted that some Arminians have recently argued for a Molinist conception
as a rapprochement between Calvinism and Arminianism. Molinism, or
Middle Knowledge (scientia media), had its genesis in the writings of the
Spanish Jesuit, Luis de Molina (1535-1600CE), who was reacting against the
Reformers’ (particularly Luther’s and Calvin’s) affirmation of compatibilism
or the liberty of spontaneity. More recently, Plantinga and Craig have
championed Molinism.
132 Craig, in particular, argues from biblical grounds
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that foreknowledge (proginw¿skw) is not a synonym for foreordain (proori÷zw)
and that God’s foreknowledge must include knowledge of future free acts.
133
Similarly with classic Arminianism, this understanding derives from
conceiving divine foreknowledge to mean only that it will occur (certainty),
not that it must occur (necessity). He argues, “For God’s knowledge, though
chronologically prior to the action, is logically posterior to the action and
determined by it. Therefore, divine foreknowledge and human freedom are not
mutually exclusive.”
134
What marks out Molinism’s distinction from classic Arminianism, however,
concerns understanding divine knowledge as consisting in three moments –
natural, middle and free – that exist in a form of conditional priority. God’s
natural knowledge is of necessary truths (for example, truths of logic) while
his free knowledge is his exhaustive knowledge of the actual world that he has
brought into reality, including the free actions of creatures. Lying between
these two moments is his “middle” knowledge, which is his knowledge of
what possible world would become actual (including the free actions of
creatures) if he so willed to bring it to reality. The argument is that God brings
into actuality one of the possible worlds (and is therefore sovereign) and
humans freely choose their actions within that world (and are therefore
responsible). However, I remain unpersuaded that such a Molinist conception
of human freedom can be described as “free” in a libertarian sense.
135 Indeed,
if God sovereignly brings into actuality a world in which he knows (via his
                                                   
133 W. L. Craig, The Only Wise God, pp. 30-37, 48.
134 W. L. Craig, The Only Wise God, p. 74.
135 Carson agrees with this criticism – D. A. Carson, “How Can We Reconcile the Love and
the Transcendent Sovereignty of God?” in Huffman and Johnson (2002), p. 295.275
middle knowledge) what humans will choose, in what sense is this essentially
different from compatibilism?
136
Open Theism and the Future
The alternative that Open theists offer is what they believe is a more logically
consistent Arminianism. In essence, they argue that if human actions are to be
genuinely free, then they cannot be foreknown for that would render them
necessarily certain. Hence, Open Theism affirms that God is omniscient but
seeks to nuance this by stating that God knows exhaustively the past and the
present, but knows the future only as the future – that is, he knows it as
possibility and not as actuality. In other words, according to Open Theism, to
say that God knows the future as an actuality is to utter a non-sense for the
future does not exist. In the same way that many often define omnipotence as
God being able to do anything except that which is logically impossible to do
(for example, God cannot make a square circle), Open theists define
omniscience as God being able to know anything except that which is logically
impossible to know. Hence, as the future has not come into being it is
nonsense to state that God can know it.
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Therefore, the view that Open Theism has of the future is that it is partly
closed and partly open, partly settled and partly unsettled – “He is certain
about what he has decided to do and what will inevitably happen but less
certain about what creatures may freely do.”
137 That is, part of the future is
settled in the sense that God unilaterally purposes particular actions, but those
parts of the future with which humans are involved is unsettled for God does
not yet know what free humans may yet choose to do. Indeed, Pinnock argues
that the very existence of prayer “suggests that the future has not been
exhaustively settled.”
138 Indeed, according to Sanders, genuine human freedom
(by which he means libertarianism) logically demands a partial openness of the
future.
139 Similarly, Boyd argues that since the scriptures are full of examples
of people and angels saying “no” to God, it must at least imply that God
created agents with such a capacity. Furthermore, there is no evidence to
suggest that this “no” is itself part of God’s purpose – “in light of all
influences and circumstances, agents ultimately determine themselves.”
140 Yet,
God is infinitely resourceful and works with human free actions to bring about
his purposed end. Indeed, Pinnock likens God to an omnicompetent “master
chess player” who “will win, but we cannot be sure exactly how the end game
will play itself out.”
141
Interestingly, the highly relational trinitarianism of Fiddes leads him to
startlingly similar conclusions. He writes of an openness to the future in which
God is able to know all that can be known about the future – that is, “God
                                                   
137 C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, p. 47.
138 C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, p. 42.
139 C. A. Hall and J. Sanders, Does God Have a Future? pp. 137-141.
140 G. A. Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, pp. 53 and 56.
141 C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, p. 52.277
knows it as the future, not as something that is either present or past to God,
and knows it perfectly in this way as we do not.”
142 Hence, “God knows all the
possibilities that exist … which we do not [and] God also knows the strength
of love to bring the best possibilities about … But God knows these as
possibilities, not as actualities, because they have not yet happened.”
143 As a
consequence, not only does God know the future only as possibility and not
actuality but this also means that there is a form of development in God’s
awareness – a successiveness which means that time must, in some sense, be a
dimension in God. He argues that the triune God is an eternal movement,
subsisting in moving and interweaving relationships, and so is characterized by
a type of developmental flow. He writes,
This means that God has a ‘story’, some kind of successiveness in
which one thing comes after another, and so time is in God rather
than God in time; we may conclude that this is the basis for God’s
creation of our time, in which (in Barth’s phrase) ‘God has time
for us’.”
144
As I noted in Chapter Four, this is very similar to, if not identical with, Open
Theism’s contention that there is a sense of temporality in God. Pinnock
writes, “God is a temporal agent … Scripture presents God as temporally
everlasting, not timelessly eternal … To act in time God must somehow be in
time … Time, in a certain sense, must be a property of God”
145 and “In fact,
God as temporal knows the world successively and does not know future acts,
which are freely chosen in a libertarian sense.”
146
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Trinitarianism and the Future
Although I have argued that there is sense of mystery in the tension between
divine sovereignty and human responsibility, we should not underestimate the
further difficulty of linking or applying the concept of time to what is already
an inherently challenging conception. Carson believes that to do so would be
“to explain the obscure by the more obscure.”
147 Yet, does a trinitarian
perspective provide some illumination of how divine sovereignty relates to the
future? While recognizing the inherent difficulties, I believe trinitarian
theology has the potential to present some illumination of aspects of the issue.
From our earlier discussion on divine sovereignty and human freedom, I
argued that a trinitarian perspective points us away from seeing the
relationship between the two as “two-way,” with the advance of one meaning
the retreat of the other. Rather, it points us toward understanding the
relationship as “one-way” in that both are, in a sense, heading in the same
direction. That is, freedom is to be understood relationally and when we are in
right relationship with the Father through the Son and in the Spirit, and thereby
in his sovereign will, we are truly free. In the previous section, I further
developed this idea in the context of how we might conceive the relationship
between divine sovereignty and concurrence. I argued that the tension between
divine sovereignty and human responsibility recognizes, in a sense, that God
precedes us in that his action is toward the fulfilment of his divine purpose and
he calls upon humanity to accompany him in the fulfilment of that purpose.
Although such accompanying includes the totality of human action – both
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good and evil – the sense of accompanying differs between each. Sometimes
such accompanying human action is direct in that it correlates more intimately
with the divine sovereign purpose and so, to use Wright’s image, God allows
the line of such human action space in his divine line.
148 Other human action –
action that ostensibly stands at odds with the divine purpose – is also caught
up in Providence but its relationship to divine action could be said to be
indirect rather than direct.
Consequently, although there is a sense of primacy in divine sovereignty in
that God precedes us, the invitation to relate and commune with the triune God
and the call to accompany him in his divine purpose is suggestive, I would
argue, of a beckoning rather than a reckoning. God does not drive us from
behind, pushing us inexorably and coercively toward a fate in relation to which
we have simply been pawns. In the words of Vanhoozer, “the triune identity is
one that embraces others in a non-coercive way.”
149 Rather, the concept of a
divine preceding and a human accompanying of a relationally loving triune
God suggests that he beckons or calls us toward the future, drawing us to
himself and his salvific purposes for humanity, and simultaneously walks with
us through our human history toward that cosmic future. As I argued earlier,
the loving sovereignty we find in the triune God is one that both commands
and persuades. We sense the command when we read of his plan to work out
everything in conformity with his divine purpose (Ephesians 1:11); of his
intention to bring about the consummation of history (Mark 13:31-37) and the
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fulfilment of all things under the lordship of Christ (Philippians 2:9-11). If
Paul is right, then, in that sense God stands outside of time, commanding us
and calling us toward his purposed end. In another sense, though, we sense the
persuasion in that he walks beside us in our time, calling us and allowing us to
accompany him through human history. Both the incarnation and the present
ministry of the Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of Christ (Romans 8:9; 1 Peter
1:11) and glorifies Christ (John 16:14), stand as supreme examples of this
temporal dimension.
Although my argument is that God calls us toward the future and both
precedes us and walks with us, some have sought to interpret God’s
relationship with present reality by conceiving it almost exclusively in terms of
the future. That is, rather than God calling us and walking with us toward the
future, they argue that God, in a sense, calls from the future – all present and
past history must be understood from the perspective of the future. An
example of this conception of the future defining the present can be found in
the theology of hope, in particular the trinitarian and eschatological
programmes mapped out by Moltmann and Pannenberg. For example,
Moltmann states that, “God is not ‘beyond us’ or ‘in us,’ but ahead of us in the
horizons of the future opened to us in his promises.”
150 Consequently, the
future has an ontological priority over the present or past. Although the future
is chronologically posterior to the present, it is ontologically and logically
prior – the future defines the present to the extent that present possibilities and
opportunities remain open and can be superseded in the light of the future
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reality of the kingdom of God. As Moltmann puts it, theology must be
constructed in the light of its future goal – “Eschatology should not be its end,
but its beginning.”
151 Present history is understood as promise – “Under the
guiding star of promise this reality is not experienced as a divinely stabilized
cosmos, but as history in terms of moving on, leaving things behind and
striking out towards new horizons as yet unseen.”
152 Grenz argues that
Moltmann’s conception of promissory history means that present reality points
toward, and must be understood in the context of, the future reality.
153
Pannenberg similarly argues for the same ontological priority of the future
over the past and present.
154  He sees the eschatological kingdom of God,
which is the consummation of the lordship of the triune God over all of
creation, as foundational to our understanding of present human history.
155 As
such, he argues for a form of causality in reverse in that the future determines
the present. Not surprisingly, some have criticized Pannenberg’s proposal as
being fundamentally deterministic, although the alleged determinism is in the
opposite direction to what is customary – a sort of retroactive causality.
156
Furthermore, by placing the consummation of all reality in the future, others
have argued that his proposal undermines the unity of God in the present. That
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is, Pannenberg’s “eschatological postponement” means that the divine unity of
the three persons remains “hidden and obscure in the course of history.”
157
Whether these criticisms are fair or not, they do highlight the danger of so
interpreting and grounding the present in the reality of the future
consummative kingdom of God that the reality of God’s “withness” or
immanence with humanity is diluted. We noted in Chapter Five how a
trinitarian perspective points us toward holding divine transcendence and
immanence in tension. With that in mind, we must be cautious of the potential
imbalance of a weakened divine immanence brought about by a hyper-
transcendence deriving from the future.
God – Standing Both “Over” and “In” History
In contrast to such imbalance, my view is that a trinitarian perspective on
divine sovereignty points us toward understanding God as one who both stands
over history as the Alpha and Omega (Revelation 21:6; 22:13) and yet who
invites humanity to accompany him as he brings about his purposes. Again,
God’s loving sovereignty is one characterized by both command and
persuasion – he both stands over history and yet walks alongside us in that
history. Consequently, what I am suggesting is a bi-dimensionality to the
relationship between God and the space-time experience of humanity. If God’s
triunity points us toward recognizing both his transcendence and immanence –
in that he is both apart from the created order as well as with the created order
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– does it not also therefore point us toward recognizing that he is able both to
stand apart from human history as well as with human history?  That is, from
one perspective, God stands outside of time and is neither limited nor
constrained by it, while from another perspective he stands in it and allows
humanity to accompany him through the successiveness of history.
In my view, to state that God only stands outside of time and history is not
only incoherent in light of the incarnation, but presents human history as a
type of charade – as being “only apparent, not real.”
158 In this light, Gunton is
an example of one who muses upon how we might conceive of God’s
relationship to time and the future. Firstly, he rightly recognizes the difficulties
inherent in the issue. He writes, “Many are the disputes which have been
aroused by worries about whether, and in what respect, God, being outside and
the Creator of time, can know what we call the future. They do not admit
satisfactory and final answers.”
159 Secondly, however, he also recognizes that
a way forward in illuminating such difficulty lies in a consideration of the
Trinity and of the primacy of Christ. He continues, “Trinitarianly we can but
concentrate on what we are shown, and that is that Jesus Christ, being the
incarnate wisdom of God the Father, personally embodies the Father’s
‘foreknowledge’ of and provision for the redemption of all things.”
160 He
concludes by stating that Barth,
… is right in arguing that God’s eternity cannot be mere
timelessness nor his infinity the mere negation of space. In some
way or other – and here we must be agnostic about the precise
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connotations of the concepts – God’s eternity and infinity are
revealed in his capacity to become temporal and finite in Jesus of
Nazareth; indeed, in his capacity to create the world of time and
space which is the object of his providential love.
161
In other words, the fact of the incarnation renders incoherent the view that God
only stands outside of time. In some way, and there is mystery here, the
trinitarian movement in which the Father by the Spirit sent the Son into the
temporal world suggests a broader dimensionality that would otherwise be the
case. In Christ we have a junction between the atemporal and temporal – the
invisible God became visible in the incarnate Son – and so is suggestive of a
bi-dimensionality in how the triune God acts toward the world in Providence.
He both stands outside, distinct from and over time, and yet enters time,
walking with us and allowing us to accompany him toward the future.
Put another way, God has revealed himself to us in the economy of salvation
and, though this revelation is sufficient for salvation, it is not exhaustive in
what it reveals to us of the immanent triune life. Although the pattern of the
internal relations of the immanent Trinity is imprinted upon the economy, it is
not exhausted by it. Though we know him fully, we do not know him totally.
Hence, though we may speak of God’s entrance in Christ into the space-time
dimensions of human existence, it does not follow that God is then limited to
those space-time dimensions. In the words of T. F. Torrance, “In this task we
have to reckon with the fact that God reveals himself to us in Jesus Christ
within the field of our human existence in space and time, but in such a way
that the content of his self-revelation does not become netted within the
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spatial-temporal processes of our world.”
162 God enters temporality but is not
constrained by it – he both stands over history and enters history.
Indeed, this recognition of the primacy of Christ in understanding divine
sovereignty and the future is reflective of a shift that Dalferth has identified in
what is meant by eschatology. He comments that this shift has dominated the
discussion during the past century and may be summarized as, “From the
eschata to the eschaton, and from the eschaton to the eschatos.”
163 That is,
there has been a shift from understanding eschatology as the last things, to the
last thing and then to the last one – Jesus Christ. As such, this shift serves to
remind us again of the primacy of Christ in our consideration of Providence
for it is in him that we find the clearest illumination of the tensions that we
find in Providence – whether it be divine transcendence and immanence or
divine sovereignty and human responsibility. As Barth notes, God should not
be conceived in terms that emphasize that he is only “wholly other,” for “such
beliefs are shown to be quite untenable, and corrupt and pagan, by the fact that
God does in fact be and do this in Jesus Christ.”
164
Although I am arguing that it is potentially problematic to conceive of God
only standing outside of history and time, it is likewise problematic to
conceive the reverse – that is, that God only stands in history and time. In my
view, to place such temporal limitation upon God is to compromise his
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transcendence and to render uncertain the consummation of his purposed ends.
Fackre desires to strike the correct balance by stating that, “God is not in space
but space is in God. As eternal, God is not in time but time is in God.”
165 In
other words, there are senses in which God both stands outside of time and
connects with time. His conclusion is that, “‘Apophatic theology’ may be the
best way forward to deal with this enigma, using a negative statement to point
toward our meaning; God is not spatialized or time-bound.”
166 Hence, when
we consider God and the future, Fackre argues that “biblical narrative requires
us to hold together the Power of the Purpose of God, the Spirit of the Son that
bears the story along and assures its consummation, with the genuine elements
of openness and resistance that constitute narrative action.”
167 From the human
perspective, reflected in biblical narrative writing, the future appears open as
we move toward it, yet the same biblical narrative also insists upon the
security of the future. Put another way, the scriptures present, “the divine and
human decisions in an inextricable and mysterious unity … Biblical narrative
on the one hand insists on the openness of the future, and on the other on the
God who guides it to its proper end according to divine power and purpose and
not our will and ways.”
168 God both stands outside of and over time and yet,
for our sake, enters time and allows us to accompany him through it. Oden is
helpful when he comments, “God as independent, necessary being views all
times as eternal now, but God as relationally creative and redemptive amid the
world beholds and understands the process of temporal succession.”
169
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God and the Certainty of the End
Consequently, the perspective that would place God as only or exclusively in
time, in my view, brings uncertainty in relation to the end God has purposed.
Indeed, it is this issue that some see as a significant problem in Open Theism’s
views on a partially open and partially closed future. Pinnock states that, for
God, “the past is actual, the present is becoming, and the future is possible.”
170
Boyd argues that both Open Theism and classic theism believe in exhaustive
divine foreknowledge, the difference is that the latter understands it as
exhaustive definite divine foreknowledge. By contrast, Open Theism
understands exhaustive divine foreknowledge as knowledge of the future as
partially definite (which is decided unilaterally by God) and partially indefinite
(which comes about bilaterally between God and humanity).
171 In other words,
anything with which humanity is involved must come about bilaterally and,
hence, cannot be foreknown by God in a definite way. Accordingly, Sanders
uses the image of God being a divine “risk-taker.” Yet, despite this partial
openness and partial indefiniteness of the future, Open theists still maintain
that God will “win” in the end, although the end may not be in the exact detail
desired by God. Pinnock writes, “We can be sure that God, as a kind of master
chess player, will win, but we cannot be sure exactly how the end game will
play itself out.”
172 Sanders writes,
Open theism has no difficulty affirming the core beliefs of
Christian eschatology … There is nothing in the openness model
incompatible with these claims or the assertion that God can bring
these about. God is omnipotent and can act unilaterally. Moreover,
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the great eschatological promises are not highly detailed. Rather,
they are rather general, leaving God room to bring them to fruition
in a variety of ways. We should not be so confident that we know
exactly how God must fulfil his promises.
173
Indeed, though not overtly an Open theist, Fiddes critiques his own view of
sovereignty as persuasion by asking, “Can God ever be sure of fulfilling his
divine purposes?” His response is to “think of the risk as real, but not total.”
174
He also writes that there is, “the real potential for God to reap a ‘tragic
beauty’” in that, “God may feel the tragedy that the world has not fulfilled all
the divine aims for it, or has failed to realise them in the way that would bring
about the maximum beauty and value.”
175
However, some would question the coherence of Sanders and others, on the
one hand, affirming that God is a divine risk-taker while, on the other hand,
affirming that there is no question that God will “win” in the end – a sort of
theological version of having your cake and wanting to eat it too. Picirilli, for
example, queries this aspect of Sanders’ proposal of a God who takes risks and
so can have his plans thwarted. He senses an inconsistency and writes,
“Lurking behind his insistence that God fails is this almost hidden
acknowledgement that God will succeed.”
176 Frame also asks that if the future
is genuinely open, should this not also mean that God’s victory over Satan is
similarly open?
177 Carson states that, “the particular god being advanced in
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this case cannot guarantee the future.”
178 This concern about inconsistency
within Open Theism derives from statements or exegetical comments from
Open theists that seem to allow God an inordinate amount of control from
within a system that states that God does not control all things. For example,
Basinger writes that, “God retains the power and moral prerogative to inhibit
occasionally our ability to make voluntary choices to keep things on track.”
179
We find similar in Boyd’s discussion of Peter’s denial of Christ in which he
writes of God arranging parameters or orchestrating circumstances which
squeeze Peter
180 or of God using “special divine influence”
181 to ensure that
three times people would inquire about his association with Jesus. Such
language not only stretches the bounds of plausibility but it leads Nash to state,
“My advice to open theists is please don’t cheat and talk in ways that suggest
God can know future contingents.”
182 Helseth’s assessment is that both the
God of Open Theism and Open Theism’s views on the future are “hopelessly
conflicted.”
183
My view is that a trinitarian perspective on the nature of divine sovereignty
and how it relates to the future points us toward a bi-dimensionality in that
God both stands outside of and over time, and yet chooses to enter into our
time and allow us to accompany him through its successiveness. In the same
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way that a trinitarian perspective points us toward understanding God as both
apart from as well as with the created order, it also points us toward
understanding him both standing apart from human history as well as with
human history. Hence, we are able to affirm a robust confidence in God’s
consummation of all things under his lordship as well as a robust awareness
that the same God walks with us through the perceived uncertainties and
challenges of everyday human living. In the grammatical metaphor of Oden,
human history exists “as if in a parenthesis within a sentence spoken
eternally.”
184 In a sense, then, we are to be bifocal regarding the future –
keeping one eye on the future glory that has been promised to us by the risen
Christ, the one who is the Alpha and Omega (Revelation 22:13), as well as
keeping our other eye on our present day lives, knowing that the same risen
Christ has also promised to be with us to the very end of the age (Matthew
28:20). As Augustine put it, we are to deny neither our sense of freedom nor
God’s prescience,
But we embrace both. We faithfully and sincerely confess both.
The former, that we may believe well; the latter, that we may live
well. For he lives ill who does not believe well concerning God.
185
Certainty and Mystery
Although I argue that there are significant theological and scriptural reasons
for holding divine sovereignty and human responsibility in an explicable
though mysterious embrace, the fact that we may not fully understand how or
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why this is so should not deter us. Indeed, Talbot observes that though we may
not fully understand, “we can understand why we cannot understand it.”
186
Even though God has revealed himself sufficiently to us, supremely in Jesus
Christ, we do not know nor, I would argue, could we know all that there is to
know about him. God, as God, will always remain ultimately beyond the
comprehension of limited, though redeemed, humanity. Difficulties in
understanding the divine/human relationship often derive from a failure to
appreciate the ontological distinction that continues to exist between each and
therefore the inevitable presence of some level of mystery. When such failure
occurs, one often detects an inclination away from the acknowledgement of
some level of mystery and an inclination toward seeking to reconcile or to
rationalise. Hence, I wonder if theological and philosophical attempts to
reconcile or rationalise such biblical emphases as divine sovereignty and
human responsibility are, in reality, reflections of a theological system with
such an inclination toward rationalism. Certainly, some see in the Open
Theism proposal just such a rationalist bent. For example, Ware’s review of a
philosophical assessment of the Open Theism proposal
187 includes the
comment, “It is one thing for positions to be vindicated as philosophically
viable; it is another for them to be true, wise, and biblically defensible.”
188
Similarly, Bloesch sees in the Open Theism proposal a “part of the legacy of
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evangelical rationalism, since it tries to make revealed mysteries too
transparent.”
189 He goes on to state,
One of the strengths of freewill theists is their incisive critique of
classical theism. They rightly show that traditional theology needs
to be rethought if the biblical view of God is to be intelligible to
searching people. But when they claim that their view is
‘superior’ to all others in the sense that it is demonstrably the
‘most plausible, appealing conceptualization’ of the complex
relation between God and the world, one must ask whether they
have made logic or reason rather than biblical revelation the final
criterion, despite their well-meaning attempts to relate their
position to Scripture. Practical human wisdom and experience
also weigh heavily in their deliberations, but experience can be
very deceptive, and human wisdom is only relatively trustworthy
because of both human sin and finitude.
190
Similarly, Hall detects a rationalist bent in Sanders’ thinking and believes that
his “attempt to encompass providence within a consistently coherent, rational
framework necessarily leads openness advocates down a blind alley.”
191 As an
alternative, Hall argues that God’s providential ordering of history will always
include aspects that are incomprehensible – that is, aspects that are beyond our
present ability to comprehend or explain coherently. He acknowledges that,
“At times … we will have to affirm logically contradictory truths as we think
about providence, thinking thoughts side by side in a sense, much like biblical
writers do.”
192 His view is that, though there is a logical consistency in Open
Theism, as a proposal it ultimately reduces the full biblical portrayal of God
and his actions toward the world in Providence.
However, Open theists dispute the charge of a hyper-rationalism. Sanders
states emphatically, “Although the doctrine of the Trinity is a mystery that
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cannot be fully grasped, I see no formal logical contradiction in it. So, I’m no
rationalist – I just want intelligible conversation.”
193 Indeed, “Perhaps your
underlying concern is that in our theology we need to leave room for the fact
that none of us fully comprehends God and that there will always be areas of
mystery. I affirm that this is the case.”
194 Similarly, Boyd argues that his
methodology as an Open theist affirms that, “Scriptural revelation goes beyond
reason, but I do not believe it ever goes against reason. Scripture may lead us
to accept paradoxes (such as the incarnation and the Trinity), but it never
requires that we accept contradictions, which are devoid of meaning.”
195
Indeed, Open Theism sees a hyper-rationalism existing in some of the more
extreme versions of Calvinistic thought. Pinnock writes,
What I oppose is the proof-texting method of evangelical
rationalism which disregards narrative but plucks texts out of
context in support of traditional notions and a system already in
hand. Loraine Boettner declares it is his purpose to lift up the
Calvinistic system and prove it biblical and rational. Can you
imagine Calvin saying that? Surely he would have said that it is to
Scripture alone that we must be responsible.
196
Whatever the case may be as to the alleged rationalist bents in either Open
Theism or Calvinism, my view is that a trinitarian perspective points us toward
and illuminates the idea of holding divine sovereignty and human
responsibility in a theological tension with each being understood in the
context the other provides. My argument is that texts affirming both a
meticulous sovereignty as well as human responsibility are to be found in
scripture and this fact needs to be faced. To somehow subsume one under the
other, or to give priority to one over the other, in my view, is to elevate a
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human theological system above the scripture. My thesis is that it is far better
to hold truths in tension rather than seek to accommodate either to the
demands of the other. Hence, when we speak of divine sovereignty within
Providence, we must avoid caricature and take careful note of its portrayal in
the full narrative of scripture and, in particular, its focus in the economy of
salvation. As Oden comments,
It is no easy task for Christian teaching to keep all these
affirmations in a proper balance. The community of faith implicitly
has them already in practical balance. It is the teaching pastor’s
task to try to explain how they can be in balance. Anything short of
this steady balance is a fragile solution, a way of solving the
problem prematurely. A more finely woven and satisfying solution
will try to hold on to all these necessary affirmations
simultaneously and in good balance: the sovereignty of God, the
goodness of God, the intelligence of God, the involvement of God
in the world, human freedom, the intelligibility of the natural
order.
197
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CHAPTER SEVEN
DIVINE IMMUTABILITY AND
IMPASSIBILITY
In Chapters Five and Six above, we discussed our first two identified issues
relating to the doctrine of divine Providence – divine transcendence and divine
sovereignty. I argued that a trinitarian perspective on these issues provides a
basis for holding divine transcendence in tension with divine immanence and
divine sovereignty in tension with human responsibility. Rather than
emphasizing either to the detriment of the other, both are held in theological
tension and each is to be understood in the context the other provides.
Furthermore, a trinitarian perspective provides helpful and constructive ways
of conceiving and explicating these tensions in more detail. In this present
chapter, we turn to discuss our last two identified issues of Providence – divine
immutability and impassibility.
McKim defines immutability as, “God’s freedom from all change, understood
to emphasize God’s changeless perfection and divine constancy,” and
impassibility as, “The traditional theological view that God does not change
and thus is not affected by actions that take place in the world, particularly in
terms of experiences of suffering or pain.”
1 Consequently, my combining of
both issues in this present chapter derives from the fact that both are connected
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to the idea of change, or more specifically the absence of change, in how we
might conceive of God and how he relates to the world in Providence. In the
words of Fiddes, “Traditional theology bound together the immutability of
God with his impassibility; it insisted that to suffer meant to change, and
therefore God could not suffer.”
2
CHANGE AND HELLENIC PHILOSOPHY
In the context of the Open Theism debate, much of the discussion and some of
the disagreement have revolved around the twin concepts of divine
immutability and impassibility. This is so for Open Theism detects in the
classical or traditional concept of God a certain inertness in that God is
portrayed too often “as unchangeable substance or an all-controlling power:
too seldom as a triune communion of love, internally relational and involved
with creatures.”
3 Although Pinnock appreciates the “magnificence of Thomist
and Calvinist thought,” he nevertheless wants us “to distance ourselves from
the tendency to see God too much as a solitary, narcissistic being who suffers
from his own completeness.”
4 Rather than describing and understanding God
in ways that seem predisposed toward images of divine passivity and inertness,
Pinnock states,
This is a God who loves being in covenant partnership with the
creature and longs to draw us into a community of love, both with
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God and among ourselves. God’s perfection is not to be all-
controlling or to exist in majestic solitude or to be infinitely
egocentric. On the contrary, God’s fair beauty according to
Scripture is his own relationality as a triune community. It is God’s
gracious interactivity, not his hyper-transcendence and/or
immobility, which makes him so glorious.
5
However, what particularly characterizes Open Theism’s concerns about
traditional or classical theology, particularly in relation to divine immutability
and impassibility, is the extent to which it believes theology has been
negatively influenced by Hellenic or Greek philosophy. Consequently, it
would be helpful to engage more closely with this debate to identify the main
issues at stake and, particularly for our concerns, to what extent a trinitarian
perspective might provide illumination of them.
Claims of negative Hellenic influence
Open Theism’s concerns about negative Hellenic influence upon traditional
theology are stated forcefully by Pinnock when he argues,
The God of the gospel is not the god of philosophy, at least not of
Hellenic philosophy. The God and Father of Jesus Christ is
compassionate, suffering, and victorious love. The god of
philosophy is immutable, timeless and apathetic. We must speak
boldly for the sake of the gospel: Augustine was wrong to have
said that God does not grieve over the suffering in the world;
Anselm was wrong to have said that God does not experience
compassion; Calvin was wrong to have said that biblical figures
that convey such things are mere accommodations to finite
understanding. For too long pagan assumptions about God’s
nature have influenced theological reflection.
6
Sanders believes that the alleged inertness in the traditional understanding of
God derives from the fact that the “Greek metaphysical system ‘boxed up’ the
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God described in the Bible” and the result is a “biblical-classical synthesis.”
7
Indeed, Philo is singled out as the leading figure in forging such a synthesis.
8
Sanders argues that Philo adopts a Hellenistic three-tiered cosmology. At the
top level is the utterly transcendent and unknowable super-essence – the true
God. This is the God whom Philo names as “that which is” rather than “He
who is.”
9 At the lower level is the realm of matter – the knowable, sensible
realm. In between lies a knowable realm of intermediary beings, including the
Logos. It is in this knowable realm that the biblical God is named and
described. However, “the true God is anonymous while the biblical God is
named, and so the biblical God must refer only to God’s activities and not to
the essence of God. Hence, the God revealed in the Bible is subordinated to
the ‘true’ God of Greek thought.”
10 This leads Philo to posit that this “true”
God must be immutable and impassible. In relation to the former, he asks,
“For what greater impiety could there be than to suppose that the Unchanging
changes?” For the latter, he states, “God is not susceptible to any passion at
all.”
11 Sanders’ point is that “these ideas and many more Philo passed on in the
development of classical theism.”
12
These comments by Pinnock and Sanders are illustrative of both Open
Theism’s general dissatisfaction with traditional or classical theology and its
contention that it has been and is influenced by Greek philosophy to the extent
                                                   
7 C. H. Pinnock et al, The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional
Understanding of God (Downers Grove: IVP, 1994), p. 60.
8 C. H. Pinnock et al, The Openness of God, p. 69.
9 Sanders believes Philo derives this from oJ w‡n (He who is) of Exodus 3:14 in the LXX (“I am
who I am” NIV). However, Philo uses the neuter to ojn (that which is), “thus further
undermining the personal God of the Bible” – C. H. Pinnock et al, The Openness of God, p.
183, n. 31.
10 C. H. Pinnock et al, The Openness of God, p. 70.
11 Philo as cited in C. H. Pinnock et al, The Openness of God, p. 70.
12 C. H. Pinnock et al, The Openness of God, p. 72.299
that God is too often presented as an inert, non-dynamic, non-engaging, non-
relational, non-suffering and non-empathic deity. Indeed, Pinnock follows the
thought of Tertullian’s famous, “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” with
his own, “Jesus spoke Aramaic, not Greek, and the Bible was written in
Jerusalem, not Athens.”
13 Although not strictly true, we understand the point
he is seeking to make. Furthermore, it is important to note that Open Theism is
not alleging a total Hellenization of Christian theology. For example, Pinnock
states, “Please notice that I am not levelling a crude charge of the
Hellenization of Christian doctrine.”
14 In fact, Open Theism believes the
influence went both ways. In the words of Sanders, “Yet we must
acknowledge that what transpired was just as much the Christianization of
Hellenism as Christian writers, brought up in the Hellenic tradition, worked
out how to be a Christian in that context.”
15
Yet, on balance, Open Theism would perhaps allege that the Hellenistic
influence is greater than perhaps previously thought and has largely been a
negative one. Certainly, it must be acknowledged that Open Theists like
Pinnock and Sanders are not alone in their suspicion of Hellenistic thought
influencing Christian theology. Olson comments, “The story of Christian
theology was deeply influenced by philosophy – especially Greek (Hellenistic)
philosophy.”
16 Bloesch states that there is an “unmistakable imprint” of a
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biblical-classical synthesis.
17 In the context of discussing the nature and
destiny of humanity, Niebuhr believes that such a biblical-classical synthesis
reached its high point in medieval Catholicism with the “Thomistic synthesis
of Augustinian and Aristotelian thought.”
18 As such, it can perhaps be said that
the discussion provoked by Open Theism fits within what Gilkey calls
contemporary theology’s “war with the Greeks.”
19
Responses to the claims of negative Hellenic influence
Certainly, it appears to be the case that terms such as immutability and
impassibility, which have some derivation in Greek philosophy, are utilized
and staunchly defended in the Christian tradition. Indeed, in relation to the
latter, one may simply note the blunt warning given by the Council of
Chalcedon in 451CE in which, “The synod deposes from the priesthood those
who dare to say that the Godhead of the only-begotten is passible.”
20 Yet, it is
also true that some are questioning the accuracy of this notion of negative
Hellenistic influence upon Christian theology and, in particular, the
conceptions of divine immutability and impassibility. In fact, there are those
who feel that the questioning of impassibility and other classic conceptions of
God is really a misunderstanding of the best ways in which the Fathers and
others utilized and articulated the terms and, in the view of some, really an
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Theology (Downers Grove: IVP, 1992), pp. 212-220.
18 R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1941), p. 5
19 L. Gilkey, “God,” in P. C. Hodgson and R. H. King (eds), Christian Theology: An
Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2
nd ed., 1994), p. 105.
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effort to domesticate God – a move toward what Johnson and Huffman call
“this friendlier, anthropocentric God.”
21
Consequently, when Pinnock describes the God of classical theism as an
“aloof monarch, removed from the contingencies of the world, unchangeable
in every aspect of his being, as all-determining and irresistible power, aware of
everything that will ever happen and never taking risks”
22 and lays the blame
for this largely at the feet of Greek philosophy, Frame wonders which specific
Greek philosophers Pinnock has in mind. He goes on to question whether any
Greek philosopher conceived of God as a “monarch” or whether any Greek
god was seen as “aloof.” In fact, Greek religion included “personal” gods who
were not aloof, unchangeable or irresistible. For example, Plato’s Demiurge
was not “all-determining” for his divine Good determined only good and not
evil and Aristotle’s Prime Mover was totally unaware of what happened in the
world and not “aware of everything.”
23 Indeed, Frame turns the tables on Open
Theism and argues that it “owes at least as much to Greek philosophy as
classical theism does,” particularly over its affirmation of libertarian, as
against compatibilistic, freedom.
24 Bray, also, questions Open Theism’s
argument by highlighting what he sees as the fundamental difference between
Greek philosophy and Christian theology. He writes,
… no Greek god, not even Zeus, was the Supreme Being; and when
pagan philosophers began to talk about the latter, they did not think
of it as personal. That is one of the major differences between any
form of Platonism and Christianity, and it raises major questions
                                                   
21 D. S. Huffman and E. L. Johnson, “Should the God of Historic Christianity Be Replaced?”
in Huffman and Johnson (2002), p. 13.
22 C. H. Pinnock et al, The Openness of God, p. 103.
23 J. M. Frame, No Other God: A Response to Open Theism (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P and
R, 2001), p. 32.
24 J. M. Frame, No Other God, p. 31, but see also pp. 27-30.302
about the nature and extent of the influence that the former is
supposed to have had on the latter. However similar the two beliefs
may have been in some respects, they differed radically at this
point, and that essential difference has immense implications for
the way in which their mutual relationship developed.
25
Although it should be acknowledged that no theological reflection occurs in a
philosophical vacuum – it is always done in the context of what Carson calls
“antecedent thought”
26 – it is perhaps questionable whether classical theism
was and is as undiscerning about Greek philosophy as Open Theism is
alleging. Certainly, there appears to be general agreement that some aspects of
classical theism have perhaps presented a God who is more transcendentally
inert than the biblical portrayal. However, some theologians, for example
Carson, remain unpersuaded that “the best of the classic tradition was unaware
of the dangers [of Greek philosophy],” for they “often raised some powerful
grids to screen out the worst influences.”
27 Indeed, Frame notes that Open
Theism itself must ensure that it recognizes the potential for philosophical
influence upon its own position.
28 As Blocher comments,
Indeed, we become easily critical of past generations: we are
amazed that they could imbibe so naively Platonic prejudices –
obvious axioms to them … [but] Too zealous an attempt to remove
the ontological speck from our fathers’ eyes should make us
suspicious of ourselves! We are in danger of falling into the same
trap – on the other side.
29
                                                   
25 G. L. Bray, “Has the Christian Doctrine of God Been Corrupted by Greek Philosophy?” in
Huffman and Johnson (2002), p. 114.
26 D. A. Carson, “How Can We Reconcile the Love and the Transcendent Sovereignty of
God?” in Huffman and Johnson (2002), p. 310.
27 D. A. Carson, “How Can We Reconcile the Love and the Transcendent Sovereignty of
God?” in Huffman and Johnson (2002), pp. 310-311.
28 J. M. Frame, No Other God, pp. 36-38. See also C. O. Brand, “Genetic Defects or
Accidental Similarities? Orthodoxy and Open Theism and Their Connections to Western
Philosophical Traditions,” in Piper, Taylor and Helseth (2003), pp. 63-73.
29 H. Blocher, “Divine Immutability,” in N. M. de S. Cameron (ed.), The Power and Weakness
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The question of Hellenic influence in the light of the development of trinitarian
thought
In my view, there does appear to be a case for arguing that the Fathers did not
simply assume Greek philosophical constructs but, to a significant extent,
critiqued and refined them and my basis for saying this derives primarily from
observation of their development of the doctrine of the Trinity. Earlier, in
Chapter Four, I noted the revolutionary way in which the Fathers developed
Greek philosophical terms such as oujsi÷a and uJpo/stasiß to describe the unity
and multiplicity of the triune God.
30 They knew that the God of the Bible was
a living and personal God who, as perfect triune relationship, had created
human persons in his image who were to walk in relationship with him. Such a
conception had no place or basis in Greek philosophy. Hence, philosophical
words such as uJpo/stasiß, and its Latin companion persona, were utilized but
not in a univocal sense. Rather, they were critiqued and refined – indeed, in
some cases, redefined – so that they more adequately reflected and described
the reality of God as Trinity. Gunton’s comment on Basil of Caeserea’s letter
concerning paradox is pertinent here. For example,
The writer realizes the implications of what he is doing: he is
changing the meaning of words and so the way we understand the
reality of God. It is, he says, ‘a new and paradoxical conception of
united separation and separated unity.’ The being of God consists
in the community of hypostaseis who give and receive their reality
to and from one another.
31
                                                   
30 Indeed, as was noted in Chapter Four, oujsi÷a and uJpo/stasiß were almost synonymous but
took on divergent meanings as the Fathers sought to articulate God as triune. Lienhard
comments, “The history of the formula [of one oujsi÷a and three uJpo/staseiß] is the history
of the growth of a distinction in meaning between them” – J. T. Lienhard, “Ousia and
Hypostasis: The Cappadocian Settlement and the Theology of ‘One Hypostasis’,” in Davis,
Kendall and O’Collins (1999), p. 103.
31 C. E. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1991), p. 96.304
Bray highlights this linguistic flexibility by noting that, “throughout this
process, what we notice above all is that the reality being described defines the
parameters of meaning appropriate to the terminology used to describe it.”
32
In other words, the technical theological or philosophical terms utilized were
shaped by the nature of the subject being described and not the other way
around.
It is therefore not surprising that Zizioulas, LaCugna and Fiddes highlight the
revolutionary development in which the early church Fathers conceived
ontology in terms of relationality. In other words, rather than the situation
being primarily if not exclusively the Hellenization of Christianity, is it not
possible that such a revolutionary development was evidence of a continuing
process in which the Fathers made use of appropriate Greek philosophical
concepts and words and modified or redefined them in the light of scripture
and the God they had experienced as Father, Son and Holy Spirit? It is for this
reason that Zizioulas comments that such a development was in fact the
reverse of what some are alleging – it was, “significant progress towards an
ontology founded on biblical premises, a decisive step towards a
Christianization of Hellenism.”
33 Hence, it appears difficult to accept that the
Fathers, in the light of having articulated a conception of ontology that was
dynamic and relational, to have therefore intended related concepts such as
immutability and impassibility to mean unchanging and apathetic inertness. As
Kaiser comments,
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The latter ideas [of immutability and impassibility] have come to
suggest an unfeeling, inert deity far removed from the concerns of
human beings. But this certainly was not the sense of the concepts
for the fathers themselves.
34
This is not to suggest, however, that all of traditional theology is somehow
blameless in sometimes under-emphasizing or ignoring dynamic aspects of
how we might conceive God and his relationship with the world. In those
cases in which there appears to be obvious and detrimental philosophical
influence, then this should be appropriately noted. Yet, this must be balanced
with an equally appropriate noting of the reasons why various Greek
philosophical terms were utilized and, most importantly, how they were
articulated in the context of biblically informed Christian faith.
Perhaps a case in point is the familiar utilization of via negativa by the Fathers.
Although it may be the case that the utilization of apophatic language is
suggestive of an unhelpful imitation of Greek philosophy, an alternative and
perhaps more generous interpretation might also see in it a desire to avoid
idolatry. In other words, it could be argued that the early church’s designations
of God as incomparable, inexpressible, immutable, impassible and so on are
simply indicative of its recognition of God’s distinction from the gods of the
Greek and Roman pantheons and from created reality.
35 For example, Justin
Martyr affirms the immutability of God in order to distinguish him from the
Stoic view that, “God Himself shall be resolved into fire, and they say that the
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world is to be formed anew by this revolution.”
36 Later in his First Apology, he
contrasts the “unbegotten and impassible God” with the Greek gods who were
begotten through sexual intercourse.
37 As Gunton states, “God must be
impassible if he is to be morally credible.”
38
Indeed, Bray comments that in the view of the prevailing Greek philosophical
systems, “the Christian notion that the Supreme Being was not merely
personal but three distinct persons, one of whom had become a human being
(thereby mixing the spiritual good with the material evil), was not just totally
unacceptable – it was ludicrous.”
39 As such, it is perhaps unlikely that the
utilization of Greek philosophical terminology should be interpreted solely as
evidence of compromise or accommodation to pre-existing philosophical
connotations or understandings. Consequently, it is perhaps possible that the
relationship between Greek philosophy and Christian theology, in general
terms, was one in which the latter borrowed from the former and yet gave new
meaning to many terms in accordance with the nature of the subject under
discussion.
In addition to this, the borrowing or utilization of Greek philosophical terms
and constructs appears perfectly acceptable if one accepts that the Fathers,
particularly the Apologists, were simply seeking to address their
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contemporaries in language that provided a basis of mutual understanding.
Hence, the Cappadocians spoke of oujsi÷a and uJpo/stasiß, which were terms
likely to be understood by their hearers, but they critiqued and refined them in
the light of the revelation of God as a triune being. The biblical precedent of
such an approach can be found in Paul’s address to the Stoic and Epicurean
philosophers at the Areopagus in Athens (Acts 17:16-34). Rather than
referring to Jewish history or Jewish scripture, as he did in the synagogue at
Pisidian Antioch (Acts 13:16-41), Paul engages the philosophers on their own
ground and finds a point of contact via their altar inscription, ∆Agnw¿stwˆ qewˆ◊.
Later, he utilizes quotations from two Greek poets, a Cretan named
Epimenides and a Cilician named Aratus.
40 Such an approach would appear to
be the application of Paul’s desire to “become all things to all people, that I
might by all means save some” (1 Corinthians 9:22 NRSV). In the same way,
it can perhaps be argued that the early church sought common ground upon
which to articulate and advocate Christian belief in the triune God and,
therefore, this desire to be relevant in articulation should not necessarily be
interpreted as indicating the presence of compromise or distortion of Christian
belief.
Indeed, it does appear that the traditional conceptions of divine immutability
and impassibility have, on occasion, been misinterpreted or misunderstood.
Fiddes recognizes this and, though he personally finds the doctrine of
impassibility lacking in many respects, he nevertheless states that, “the
massive criticism of this portrait [of an unchanging and a-pathetic God] in
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recent years has perhaps tended to parody it.”
41 Certainly, when considered in
the light of the Fathers’ development of trinitarian dogma and its further
development in traditional or classic theology, it is difficult to imagine that
immutability was intended to designate an inert or immobile deity or
impassibility to designate an unfeeling or cold-hearted deity. Indeed,
Vanhoozer, who writes from within the traditional view, is nevertheless able to
comment, “This is a most important analytic point: impassibility no more
means impassive than immutability means immobile.”
42 If Vanhoozer is
correct, which from a trinitarian perspective I would suggest appears more
than likely, then it is an arguable point as to what extent traditional or classical
theology could be said to have been negatively influenced by Greek
philosophical constructs.
Of course, Open Theism’s highlighting of this issue cautions us to be aware of
any detrimental effect, but some believe that the situation is more nuanced
than Open Theism would perhaps have us believe. If there are aspects of
traditional or classical theology that have presented or could be rightly
construed as presenting God as immobile or impassive, then Open Theism’s
highlighting of this imbalance is a service for which we can be grateful and
our thanks should not be understated. However, my observation of trinitarian
theological development leads me to wonder whether traditional or classical
theology is infected to the extent that some suppose and I am not alone in
stating this. For example, Picirilli comments in relation to Sanders,
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The God who is revealed in Jesus Christ is by no means impassive.
We must not permit our philosophy to sit in judgment on the
Scriptures in this regard. So far, Sanders is right. But he is wrong, I
believe, to think that the wineskin of classic theism cannot contain
this understanding.
43
TRINITY AND ACTIVE CONSTANCY
This debate concerning Hellenic influence upon Christian theology, which has
been prompted anew by the Open Theism proposal, will no doubt continue.
However, it provides a helpful vehicle for my research for it is provoking
questions pertinent to how we might conceive immutability and impassibility
in the context of divine Providence. In particular, it highlights the fact that
many believe that there are significant reasons for predicating both an
existence of change and an absence of change in God. In other words, many
appear to want to maintain a balance or tension in that God is said to change in
some sense/s and not to change in others. What both sides of the debate seem
desirous of avoiding is an absolutization, in either direction, of the idea of
divine change – that is, that God changes in all senses or that God does not
change in any sense. For example, Pinnock, an Open theist, makes distinctions
in how we might conceive both the existence and absence of change in God. In
particular, he distinguishes between God’s character and God’s relations with
others. He argues that God is “unchangeable in character, but is not
unchanging in his relations with us” and “God’s steadfastness will not be seen
as a deadening immutability but constancy of character that includes
                                                   
43 R. E. Picirilli, “An Arminian Response to John Sanders,” Journal of the Evangelical
Theological Society 44/3 (2001): 468.310
change.”
44 Ware, a critic of Open Theism, also seeks to make distinctions in
that he argues that God is ontologically and ethically immutable and yet is
relationally mutable.
45 This similarity in distinctions prompts Pinnock to state
that both perspectives “share a common cause”
46 – that is, there are sense/s in
which God is both immutable and mutable – unchangeable and changeable.
It is my view that a trinitarian perspective on this issue of change may provide
a constructive step forward in the debate. My argument is that a trinitarian
perspective provides solid theological grounding for affirming what both sides
of the debate appear to desire. In other words, it both illuminates and
explicates a theological tension – God changes in some sense/s and does not
change in others. As Cottrell states, “A consensus seems to be emerging that
we should say that God changes in some ways but not in others.”
47 To bring
this tension into clearer view, we will treat each aspect in turn.
The Absence of Divine Change
It would appear that the utilization by the Fathers and others of the terms
immutability and impassibility is highly suggestive of the fact that they
believed they had significant biblical, philosophical, apologetic and pastoral
reasons for doing so.
48 Consequently, it is understandable that many argue that
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the Fathers, generally speaking, never intended to convey by these terms the
idea that God is immobile or apathetic. Although I recognize that, at times,
some of the Fathers’ language can appear intemperate or inconsistent,
49 there
does seem to be significant evidence to suggest that the Fathers were seeking
to articulate a tension – that God, in one sense, cannot change and yet, in
another sense, does change. For example, Ignatius’ letter of encouragement
and instruction to Polycarp carries this tension. He writes, “Look for Him who
is above all time, eternal and invisible, yet who became visible for our sakes;
impalpable and impassible, yet who became passible on our account; and who
in every kind of way suffered for our sakes.”
50 In the light of this, then, why
was it perceived to be so important to predicate so strongly the absence of
change in God?
What I would like to suggest is that the utilization of terms such as
immutability and impassibility was done for a number of reasons. From one
perspective, and as was mentioned in the preceding discussion, it is possible
that the Fathers were seeking to contrast the Christian and biblical God from
changeable created beings and from the fickle gods of the Roman and Greek
pantheons. Hence, apophatic language was able to denote such a distinction
and preserved the notion of God’s unchangeableness – that he is ontologically
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secure and ethically faithful. Indeed, Oden comments that what the Fathers
were seeking to preserve was the divine reliability or constancy. It is only
when immutability is divorced or treated in isolation from the other attributes,
such as mercy, love and justice, that it becomes caricatured.
51 Yet, from
another perspective, there are further reasons for affirming the divine
unchangeability and that is that the apophaticity of the language utilized
affirms the divine perfection. In other words, if God were to change, then it
can only be from perfection to imperfection. Hence, God cannot change.
This latter line of argument is posited by Aquinas and has received a recent
articulation and development in the work of Weinandy. Weinandy argues that
apophatic language primarily states what God is not, rather than what he is. As
such, it primarily states negatives – that God does not change in the way that
creatures or the pagan gods often do; that he can neither diminish nor increase
in his goodness and perfection; and is distinct from the created order and
therefore from the time which marks these changes. Yet, the positive side of
apophatic language is that it, by implication, makes affirmations concerning
God. If God cannot change in that he cannot be more or less perfect in his
love, holiness, goodness and so on, then this affirms his comprehensive and
consummate love, holiness, goodness and so on. Weinandy’s argument is that
immutability and impassibility were never meant to denote God as immobile
or apathetic. Rather, they actually establish the fact that God is perfectly
loving, perfectly good, perfectly dynamic and so on.
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Interestingly for our discussion, Weinandy seeks to base this understanding of
immutability and impassibility upon a consideration of God as triune. This is a
creative approach to take for, as he himself notes, considerations of
immutability and impassibility almost invariably receive treatment under the
rubric of the one God and his attributes.
52 What he notes from this trinitarian
perspective is, firstly, that as the “persons of the Trinity only subsist as distinct
subjects in relationship to one another, they are fully, completely, and
absolutely relational.”
53 Secondly, he argues that since they subsist only in
relation to one another, they are relations in act and only relations in act.
Hence, the designations Father, Son and Holy Spirit need to be understood as
verbs – “for they refer to, define, and name, solely and exclusively, the
interrelated acts by which all three persons are who they are.”
54 This is not to
negate the subjectivity of each of the persons though, for he argues that,
“because the acts (the verbs) that completely define and constitute the Father,
Son and the Holy Spirit are personal or subjective acts (and not impersonal
acts), the very acts themselves constitute the subjectivity or personhood of the
Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.”
55 This, we may recall, has great similarity
with Fiddes’ argument, discussed in Chapter Four, that the divine persons are
not in relationship but are the relations themselves and that their subjectivity,
their “this-ness,”
56 derives or is constituted by their existence as relations.
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This then leads Weinandy to the heart of his thesis. Since the divine persons
are subsistent relations fully in act, they are immutable and impassible – “they
are immutable not because they are static or inert in their relationships, but
precisely for the opposite reason.”
57 In other words, because each of the
persons are subsistent relations fully in act, and as the names for each person
designate a perfect or pure act (actus purus)
58, “they do not have any relational
potential which would need to be actualised in order to make them more
relational – more who they are.”
59 As the divine persons are fully and perfectly
in act, the divine triunity is completely and utterly dynamic, relational and
active and cannot be more so – there is no potential in that which is perfect or
pure. Again, immutability does not mean immobile but actually denotes the
complete opposite – perfection in dynamic, perichoretic relationship.
Furthermore, and by following a similar line of argument, impassibility means
that, “as subsistent relations fully in act, the persons of the Trinity are
completely and utterly passionate in their self-giving to one another and cannot
be more passionate for they are constituted, and so subsist, as who they are
only because they have absolutely given themselves completely to one another
in love.”
60 Again, if God as triune is indeed perfect relationship or perfect
community, it follows that there must be a sense in which God cannot change.
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The alternative is to allow the possibility of potential in God that would then
question the perfection or purity of the divine relationality.
61
Two extended quotations from him are instructive in relation to his
conclusions. He writes,
Thus, there is little, if any, ground for the familiar criticism that the
attribute of divine immutability transformed, within the teaching of
the Fathers, the living and dynamic God of the Bible into the static
and inert God of Greek philosophy. The problem is that
contemporary critics of the Fathers consistently give to the attribute
of divine immutability the positive noetic content of being static,
lifeless and inert, something which the Fathers never argued for nor
even contemplated. The Fathers grasped, as the contemporary
critics do not, that to say that God is immutable is to deny those
aspects of his nature – changes of a diminishing or of a
developmental kind – which would jeopardize or render less than
perfect his dynamic vitality as the one who truly is. While the
Fathers may have snatched the attribute of immutability from the
Greek philosophical vocabulary and tradition, they radically altered
it so as to assert, in a philosophical manner, God’s unconditional
goodness and unqualified love as revealed in the scriptures.
62
Furthermore,
As we have noted … the contemporary critics invariably accuse
those Fathers who uphold the impassibility of God as well as his
love, compassion, mercy and anger of being inconsistent. This
accusation is founded upon the false premise that to be impassible
is to be devoid of passion. This, again, the Fathers never argued for
nor even countenanced. The Fathers denied of God those passions
which, they believed, would imperil or impair those positive
attributes which were constitutive of the divine nature – his
goodness and love. And equally then, such a denial amplified the
intensity of these same unchangeably perfect passions. The Fathers
wished to preserve the wholly otherness of God, as found in
scripture, and equally, also in accordance with scripture, to profess
and enrich an understanding of his passionate goodness and love
that was truly in keeping with his wholly otherness.
63
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In addition, Weinandy is careful not to construe this sense of divine
unchangeability in absolutist terms. To be immutable does not rule out the
possibility of action, dynamism, relationship, mutuality, passion and
partnership but actually establishes God as the perfect and fully actualised
expression of each. Change need not be predicated of God to ensure that he is
dynamic or engaged with the world.
Indeed, to negatively absolutize the notion of divine unchangeability – that is,
that God does not change in any sense – would be to posit that God is
immobile. Barth, in particular, is under no illusions as to the implications of
this. He writes, “For we must not make any mistake: the pure immobile is –
death. If, then, the pure immobile is God, death is God.”
64 Yet, Barth argues
that this is not what is meant by divine immutability. Rather, immutability is
God in his “eternal actuality” as God – he is not God “only potentially” or “at
any point intermittently” but, “always at every place He is what He is
continually and self-consistently.”
65 Furthermore, since immutability does not
mean immobility then there can be a relationship between God and a reality
distinct from himself. Weinandy argues similarly when he states that God, as
actus purus, is able to reflect extrinsically the perfect relationality that he is in
himself. He argues that since the divine persons have no self-constituting
relational potential that needs to be actualised, since they are fully or perfectly
in act, this “gives to the persons of the Trinity absolute positive potential, that
is, they have the singular ability to establish relationships with others other
than themselves whereby the persons of the Trinity can relate others to
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themselves as they are in themselves as a trinity of persons.”
66 Therefore, to be
related to the triune God is to be related in a most intimate and dynamic level –
“no other relationships could exceed their intimacy and vitality.”
67 Hence,
arguing from this trinitarian perspective, it can be said that God does not
change and this lack of change in no way compromises the triune relationality
but rather establishes it as perfect triune relationality.
The Existence of Divine Change
As the above discussion has contended, there are senses in which the absence
of change may be predicated of the triune God without compromising the
triune relationality. In other words, absence of change can be predicated in the
context of recognizing the non-potentiality of the perfect triune relationality.
As such, God is perfectly relational, perfectly dynamic, perfectly mutual and so
on. Indeed, this essential relationality – this ontology that is relational – was
seen in our earlier study of three theologies of Trinity that were drawn from
the Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant communities of the Christian church. As
we noted, Zizioulas’ exposition highlights for us the relational ontology of the
triune God – in which divine being is communion. LaCugna’s emphasis upon
the triune economy cautions us against any construal of triune ontology that
underemphasizes this triune God’s intervention in and dynamic engagement
with human history – God is for us and has demonstrated this supremely in the
economy of salvation. Fiddes’ emphasis upon the essential relationality of God
– in which he argues for understanding the divine persons as relations rather
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than persons in relationship – highlights for us the perichoretic interweaving
and mutual engagement that characterizes the triune divine life and the
invitation to humanity to “participate” in God.
The cumulation of these insights presents us with a God of perfect triune
relationality who invites created humanity into relationship with himself.
Certainly, each of these trinitarian formulations would preclude any notion of
immutability conceived in terms of inactivity or immobility – as though God
were an “unblinking cosmic stare.”
68 Rather, immutability should incorporate
notions of perichoretic dynamism or activity. Similarly, these trinitarian
proposals would also preclude any notion of impassibility portraying God as
radically unmoved by emotion within his own triune life or as aloof to human
pain and suffering – as though God were a “solitary metaphysical iceberg.”
69
Rather, impassibility should incorporate the idea that each of the divine
persons perichoretically impact the others and so each experiences, to some
extent, what the others experience. Furthermore, as the ad intra triune divine
life is reflected authentically, though not exhaustively, ad extra in Providence,
humanity is invited to participate in God – to walk in relationship with him.
Certainly, if we are to retain the use of the words immutability and
impassibility (the appropriateness of which will be discussed shortly), we must
make certain that their articulation guards against construing them in
negatively absolutist ways – that is, that God does not change in any sense –
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for this is contrary to the nature of the triune God who is pure relationship. As
Jüngel puts it, “God is active.”
70 On the other hand, if we are to posit a sense
or senses in which change can be appropriately predicated of God, then we
must similarly make certain that our articulation guards against construing
change in positively absolutist ways – that is, that God changes in every sense.
Indeed, and as was noted earlier, it is interesting that both Open theists and
their critics recognize the non-absolutist ways in which immutability should be
understood. Pinnock, for example, distinguishes between divine character and
divine relating and predicates an absence of change in the former and the
existence of change in the latter.
71 Similarly, Ware makes distinctions by
arguing that God is ontologically and ethically immutable while being
relationally mutable.
72
Yet, a trinitarian perspective does provide further illumination of how and to
what extent it may be appropriate to predicate the existence of change in God.
Certainly, our interaction with the trinitarianism of Zizioulas, LaCugna and
Fiddes in Chapter Four highlighted the notion of ontology being relational.
Indeed, Erickson posits a relational divine ontology by arguing that ultimate
reality is spiritual in that God, who is spirit and not matter, is the ultimate,
uncreated reality. Hence, there is no metaphysical dualism of spiritual and
material, for material is dependent, derivative and contingent.
73 He then
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concludes that, from a trinitarian perspective, “reality is primarily social.”
74 In
other words, ultimate reality – that is, God – is primarily relational. However,
if that is the case, is it not the nature of personal relationship that persons, to
some extent, both impact and are impacted by others persons? In other words,
this person-to-person connectivity and interactivity would appear to suggest
the possibility – and this needs to be carefully articulated – of some sense of
change. Fiddes puts it like this – “To love is to be in a relationship where what
the loved one does alters one’s own experience.”
75 Therefore, in the context of
the perfectly loving, perfectly interconnected, perfectly relational community
that is the triune divine life, is it appropriate to say that the divine persons are
changed by their perichoretic interaction?
Of course, care is needed that our language does not move us into the process
concept of the becoming God. Yet, the trinitarian notion of perichoresis is
strongly suggestive of movement, of changeability, in the triune divine life.
What must be guarded against is to predicate change in the sense that God is a
becoming God – that is, in the one sense that he is less than perfect and is
moving toward perfection or in the other sense that he is perfect and therefore
any movement is toward imperfection. Conversely, we must also guard against
refusing the idea of change or moveability to the extent that God appears
immobile or inert. It is in the light of these considerations that Jüngel advances
the thesis that God’s being is in becoming. Concerned that his thesis not be
misconstrued or misunderstood, he writes, “You may be put off by the title of
this book. Yet I ask you to read it again carefully. It is not about a ‘God who
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becomes.’ God’s being is not identified with God’s becoming …”
76 Rather,
what he argues for is a recognition that the being of God is a oneness of three
modes of being differentiated from each other. Hence, God’s being is a self-
related being and, as such, “it is structured as a relationship.”
77 He then
concludes,
But this relational structuring of God’s being constitutes God’s
being not in the sense of an independent impersonal structure in
relation to this being; indeed, the modes of God’s being which are
differentiated from one another are so related to each other that
each mode of God’s being becomes what it is only together with
the two other modes of being. The relational structuring in God’s
being is the expression of varying ‘original-relations’ and ‘issues’
of God’s being. God’s being as the being of God the Father, Son
and Holy Spirit is thus a being in becoming. The doctrines of
perichoresis and appropriation within the three modes of God’s
being differentiated from each other and united as ‘threefold’
defined this knowledge: God’s being is in becoming.
78
Jüngel’s point is not that God becomes another, but that “the concrete unity of
the being of God” is defined and formulated relationally, in that the divine
persons are “meeting one another in unrestricted participation.”
79 Hence, the
divine persons become who they are – their being – only in relation to the
other divine persons. God’s being is defined and constructed relationally, there
is constant movement in God – it is a being in becoming. Hence, in this
dynamically relational sense, Jüngel argues for a sense of change, a sense of
becoming, in God.
What is to be made of this proposal? Although one can note the careful
distinctions that Jüngel makes to guard against his proposal being construed as
affirming development or the realization of potentiality in God, I would still
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contend that the language of becoming remains problematic. The language of
becoming, in my view, conjures up more than an image of dynamism,
movement or relationality, but points to the idea of development or
potentiality, of moving from one state of affairs to another. Indeed, this
susceptibility for misunderstanding becomes more pronounced when we note
that Jüngel’s own efforts to affirm the “concrete unity of the being of God”
seem to be reliant upon a Hegelian construct. Jüngel comments that Hegel’s
use of the term “concrete” draws upon its Latin derivation concrescere which
means “to grow together.” Jüngel concludes, “for the designation of this
subject matter there could be no better word.”
80 If that is so, then this notion of
being as becoming would appear to be moving very close to ascribing growth
in God, which immediately calls into question the perfection of God’s
relationality. If God is perfect relationality, then any movement must be
toward imperfection. Conversely, if God grows in relationality, then he is by
definition imperfect relationality. Either way, the notion and language of
becoming remains problematic as a way of describing the unity and
multiplicity of the triune divine life.
A possible way forward here is found in the work of O’Brien who, after
surveying the history of the doctrine of impassibility, wonders whether a via
media may be found. On the one hand, he argues that to assert too strongly a
God who suffers will run the risk of having him depicted as weak and
ineffective.
81 On the other hand, to assert too strongly the absoluteness of God
will run the risk of having him depicted as aloof and indifferent to the misery
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of his creatures.
82 Consequently, O’Brien believes a way forward may lie in
drawing clearer distinctions between the effect of suffering, and therefore of
change, as it pertains to God and to humanity. Indeed, the reality of divine-
human relationship cautions us against conceiving divine immutability and
impassibility outside of the context of the ontological distinction that exists
between transcendent and holy divinity and limited and sinful humanity. For
example, although there may be some correspondence between divine and
human experiences of pain, this ontological distinction means that we should
not equate them directly.
83 Consequently, though we may be able to posit that,
from a trinitarian perspective, God is not invulnerable to pain, it is also
possible that he is not helpless within it as we often are – he is able to rise
above and transform it in ways that we cannot. In other words, there is a stark
difference between saying that God can be affected by suffering – something
to which the scriptures would appear to give significant assent – and saying
that God is somehow ontologically shaped or constrained by such suffering –
something which the scriptures would appear to deny. We will return to this
shortly.
But, at this point in our discussion, it is appropriate that we simply note that
from a trinitarian perspective it is possible that a sense in which change, in the
sense of mutual relating and constant dynamic relationality ad intra which is
then reflected ad extra toward humanity, may be predicated of God. From a
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trinitarian perspective, the attributes of divine immutability and divine
impassibility should not and cannot denote immobility and impassivity.
The Appropriateness of Apophatic Language
It is in the context of seeking to articulate truths in tension – that God changes
in some senses and does not change in others – that we now address the
question regarding the continuing appropriateness of the terms immutability
and impassibility. Even if one were to accept the dynamic way in which
Weinandy and others are articulating them, some would nevertheless question
whether they are the most helpful words to use. Certainly, I accept Weinandy’s
point that if immutability is understood as not standing in opposition to
vitality, then we need not “hold together in some dialectical fashion his
immutability and his vibrancy, as if in spite of being immutable he is
nonetheless dynamic.”
84 Yet, although I believe, along with Weinandy, Kaiser
and others, that these terms are often misinterpreted and misrepresented, I also
recognize that at face value they do appear to denote an unchanging and
unfeeling God. Indeed, it is also not surprising to hear calls for their
replacement when some do actually interpret them in absolutist ways – in that
God does indeed not change in any sense and is invulnerable to suffering in
any sense. For example, the 17
th century thinker Spinoza argues that since God
is impassible, he, “to speak strictly, loves no one nor hates any one. For God is
affected with no emotion of pleasure or pain, and consequently loves no one
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nor hates any one.”
85  Similarly, Pelikan notes that Apollinaris believed that to
predicate any change in God is “stupid and altogether wicked.” He comments
that, “In their doctrine of God, Alexandrians such as Apollinaris appear to
have stressed the notion of impassibility without compromise.”
86 Such
absolutist understandings are, in my view, alien to the intentions of the
majority of the Fathers who made use of the terms in Christian discourse.
In the light of these considerations, what then is the wisest way forward?
Should we retain the terms and yet seek to ensure they are articulated
accurately, or should we search for different terms that are perhaps not so
susceptible of misinterpretation? It is in the light of this that Barth argues for
the word constancy rather than immutability. He states, “God’s constancy –
which is a better word than the suspiciously negative word ‘immutability’ – is
the constancy of His knowing, willing and acting and therefore of His
person.”
87 Similarly, Fackre believes that though philosophical models of
passionlessness fall short of the meaning of immutability,
… it is important to understand what was intended. Ancient gods
were volatile and idiosyncratic … Çlassic theology was concerned
to distinguish its understanding of God from these tendencies, and
did so by seizing upon other metaphors in order to portray the
undeviating movement of God toward the fulfilment of the divine
Vision.
88
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Consequently, he utilizes the word steadfastness and states that this quality is
at the “heart of this ancient insistence on the unchanging nature of God.”
89
Pinnock, also, seeks to strike a balance by opting for “changeable faithfulness,
a better term for God’s immutability.”
90 He writes,
God is completely reliable and true to himself and, at the same
time, flexible in his dealings and able to change course, as
circumstances require. God is mobile and able to make moves but
is not in any way capricious. He is unchanging amidst changing
encounters.
91
Although I am uncertain which is the best option to take, and believe that there
must be great justification before changes are made to long-held and deeply-
valued theological vocabulary, I nevertheless would have a preference for a
word or expression that states something about God in a positive rather than
negative way – that is, this is what God is like rather than this is what God is
not like. In the view of Gunton, the alternative would be to run the risk of
being nudged toward a largely agnostic theology.
92 In his view, the Christian
tradition allowed itself to be determined, to a large extent, by its negative
method – “Instead of defining God from revelation, it defined him as that
which the world is not.”
93 Indeed, he believes that Kant’s theology, in certain
essential respects, is but a radicalized version of Aquinas in that it
demonstrates what happens when a negative theology is transposed into a
mechanistic worldview. In a number of senses, then, there may be a case for
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opting for language that states who God is, based upon divine revelation,
rather than what God is not.
The Notion of Active Constancy
Yet, whatever the case may be, the conception of God that lies behind words
such as immutability and impassibility, and which provided the reasons for
their original theological utilization, is of value and should be preserved. In my
view, a way forward is to recognize that there are both unchangeable and
changeable aspects in God. What must be guarded against is inappropriately
ascribing change to aspects that do not and cannot change, and lack of change
to aspects that appropriately demand the notion of change. Much disagreement
appears to derive from confusion over these very issues. My thesis is to argue
that a trinitarian perspective provides theological grounding for conceiving
notions of change and lack of change in a form of theological balance – of
tensional truths about God. Negative absolutist conceptions of immutability
and impassibility have an impoverishing effect upon both for they seem to
disallow any form of dynamism or engagement. Yet, alternatively, positive
absolutist conceptions also impoverish for they seem to disallow any form of
engaged faithfulness, constancy and perfection in God.
94
What is needed is a carefully articulated tension that gives appropriate
emphasis to each and that does justice to what Blocher describes as the two
“shocks” from scripture. The first shock is “the liveliness of the biblical God.
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He is the mobile God who acts and reacts, the God who utters threats and
withdraws them, the God who turns from wrath to grace.”
95 Yet, the second
shock, however, “comes, in contrast with much modern writing, when we
realize that the affirmation of God’s unchangeableness spreads its roots far and
wide in all Scripture. It is a biblical theme, and not a minor one at that!”
96
Similarly, Lewis and Demarest argue that the divine title of “Rock” points to
“the stability, unchangeableness and reliability of Israel’s God.”
97 Yet, they
also argue that God experiences authentic emotions of regret (Genesis 6:6),
anger (Numbers 11:10), hatred (Deuteronomy 12:31), jealousy (Exodus 20:4-
5) and vengeance (Deuteronomy 32:35). Hence, in their view, immutability
and impassibility do not mean that God does not experience a “healthy and
controlled emotional life.”
98
In seeking to illuminate immutability and impassibility from a trinitarian
perspective, Gunton has helpfully provided some ways in which this tension
might be approached. He writes in relation to immutability,
An interesting test case here are those twin negatives, immutability
and impassibility. As we have seen, we do need to be able to affirm
that God is immutable, in the respect that his being is ontologically
secure, so that his promises can be relied on. But the tradition has
sometimes turned this into something more abstract and
impersonal. What is immutability trinitarianly construed?
Immanently speaking, God cannot but be love; economically
speaking, he will not but see to it that his purposes for the
perfection of the creation come to be fulfilled.
99
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In relation to impassibility, he states,
Impassibility, as we have seen, is more problematic, for at the heart
of the economic action of the triune God is the Father’s sending of
the eternal Son to suffer and die on the cross. As we have also seen,
however, it does not follow that the suffering of the cross can be
used to generate a doctrine of general divine passibility. Rather, we
must say that God’s historical action in the Son’s suffering
demonstrates that he is not ‘passive’ in the face of history. Rather
the cross is the Father’s relentless action in shaping history to his
reconciling will.
100
Again, what he is seeking to articulate are senses in which God is both
unchangeable and changeable.
Furthermore, and as we have seen in Chapter Four, Fiddes’ appropriation of
the trinitarian insights of East and West also give grounds for affirming
theological tension in that there are senses of both changeability and
unchangeability in God. Put another way, the dimensions of activity and
engagement that so characterize the triune divine life are placed alongside and
are informed by dimensions of divine constancy and dependability. The
activity and engagement can be seen in what Fiddes identifies as the
reciprocity and mutuality of the divine life (deriving from the Western
emphasis of the interrelationship of the divine persons within the one divine
essence). There is dynamic, moving, perichoretic reciprocity of the divine
persons who subsist in the one essence and who invite human persons to enter
into relationship – to enter the divine dance. Yet, it is important for us to
realize that this dynamic relationality, as Weinandy argues, is fully actualised
– there is no potential for God to be more relational – he is pure relationship.
Hence, on the other hand, there is also steadfast constancy in God, and this can
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be seen in what Fiddes identifies as the uni-directionality of the triune divine
life (deriving from the Eastern emphasis upon the arche of the Father). There
is a secure and dependable direction to the dance. The consequence of this is
that the divine trinitarian dance is both dynamic and directional.
Consequently, a trinitarian perspective leads us to posit a God who engages
and interacts with the world in history and yet is able also to transcend and to
guide history. Similarly, he is able to experience suffering and pain and yet is
able to transcend and transform them. In other words, we may say that
although there is activity and dynamism in God, there is also a sense of
constancy and dependability in him – this is a God in whom we can trust.
101
Hence, I would argue that a trinitarian perspective points us toward a
conception that can be encapsulated in the expression active constancy. Not
only does active constancy characterize the triune divine life, it also marks the
way this triune God acts toward the world in Providence. Although the actual
expression adopted is important to an extent, far more important is the
conception it denotes – that there are senses in which God is both changeable
and unchangeable, yet the former does not compromise his faithfulness nor the
latter his dynamism. Indeed, Dodds coined a particularly attractive expression
when he writes of the “dynamic stillness” of God’s immutable love.
102 His
point is the same as mine – God is active in one sense and constant in
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another.
103 Indeed, Erickson argues that Process philosophy fails at this point
for it assumes an either-or situation – that is, God is either dynamic and
therefore changeable or passive and therefore unchanging. By contrast, he
writes, “Yet there is no real proof, only an assumption, that there cannot be an
intermediate condition, namely, stable dynamism, or dynamism that follows a
regular pattern, neither diminishing nor increasing in what it is.”
104
In a similar way, when applied to the doctrine of divine impassibility, the
conception of active constancy presents us with the tension that God is active
in that he is touched by suffering, yet is constant in that he is not overwhelmed
or ontologically shaped by suffering. As Gunton states, “the point of the
patristic doctrine of impassibility is that it shows that God cannot be pushed
about.”
105 Indeed, Bloesch believes that this is the particular difficulty in
Moltmann’s conception of a suffering God. He writes,
The notion of impassibility can be retained so long as it does not
mean that God is impassive and unfeeling … The impassibility of
God must not be confused with imperturbability (ataraxia) or
apathy (apatheia) … God remains above pain and suffering even
while descending into the world of confusion and misery. He is not
invulnerable to pain and suffering, but he rises above them …
Against Moltmann I contend that a theology of the cross must be
completed in a theology of glory … Suffering is not inherent in
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God, but God freely wills to enter into our suffering so that it can
be overcome.
106
Indeed, if we negatively absolutize the idea of impassibility – that is, that God
is unaffected by suffering in any sense – then we are potentially left with a
God who may be able to help us but cannot empathize with us. But, it must be
asked, would such a God want to help us? Yet, if we absolutize in the opposite
direction, then we are potentially left with a God who may be able to
empathize with us but cannot help us.
107
Lewis sees this clearly and writes,
We do indeed have to be careful here and make necessary
distinctions. If God is to understand us and identify with us he must
enter into our pain and sufferings. But if God is to help us, he has
to be more than the God who suffers, he has to be the God who
saves; and to be the Saviour God amid so many contradictory
forces, he has also to be the Sovereign God.
108
Similarly, Bray argues for this tension by making a distinction between divine
presence – which is untouched – and divine persons – who are moved. He
utilizes the image of a medical doctor and a patient to make his point –
The persons of the Trinity are indeed moved by our suffering, but
… God’s presence is untouched by it. If this appears to be heartless
and cruel, we need only to look to the analogy of the doctor and his
patients … a hospital patient would not be greatly comforted by a
doctor who got into the next bed and assured him that he
understood the patient’s sufferings because he had the same disease
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himself; the patient wants someone who understands but who can
also heal. Over-identification does not help in this; it only destroys
the healer’s credibility.
109
In other words, if God is nothing more than a co-victim with humanity, how
can we hope in him for healing and an ultimate end to suffering? Even Fiddes,
who argues strongly against the idea of impassibility, recognizes that God
must have victory over suffering. He writes, “If it is essential that a God who
helps us should sympathize with our suffering, it is also essential that he
should not be overcome or defeated by suffering.”
110
It is my view that a trinitarian perspective points us toward this tensional
conception of active constancy in that there are different senses in which God
is both unchangeable and changeable. In one sense, the triune God does not
change for he both defines and is perfect relationship; there is no potential in
him that suggests that he is less than perfectly dynamic and perfectly
relational. Furthermore, his divine constancy means that he remains true to
himself; he is one in whom we can hope and trust for he remains faithful and
true to his own revealed nature – he is the Father of lights “with whom there is
no variation or shadow due to change” (James 1:17b RSV). However, in
another sense, the triune God does change in that the triune divine persons
continue to relate – to originate, to breathe, to beget, to be begotten, to be
breathed and so on – ad intra and this relational perfection is reflected ad extra
toward humanity in Providence.
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Hence, we see a God who engages with and identifies with humanity, indeed
who actually took on humanity through the incarnation of the Son.
Consequently, he knows intimately the reality of human existence, with its mix
of nobility and weakness, dignity and struggle, and yet is able to engage with it
redemptively. The writer to the Hebrews articulates one aspect of it like this –
“we do not have a high priest who is unable to sympathize with our
weaknesses, but we have one who has been tempted in every way, just as we
are – yet was without sin” (Hebrews 4:15 NIV). Accordingly, we have a God
in whom we can trust and to whom we can bring our petitions, for although he
knows what it is like to experience the struggles that we experience, he is yet
able, on our behalf and for our benefit, to transcend and overcome them. And,
indeed, supremely in the event of the cross and resurrection, he experiences
the depths of pain, suffering and death, and yet transcends, transforms and
translates each. Consequently, it is appropriate that we now turn to look more
closely at the triune economy of salvation and how it might illuminate how
God relates to the world in Providence, particularly in regard to immutability
and impassibility.
CHANGE AND THE ECONOMY OF SALVATION
The focal point of the absence and existence of divine change
As the above has demonstrated, God should not be conceived as unfeeling or
unaffected – as though his relational perfection makes him inert and apathetic
toward us. He is the God who experiences change in that he engages with us335
and suffers with us and for us. Yet, he also remains beyond change for he is
trustworthy and faithful – he is the eternal Rock upon whom we can place our
trust (Isaiah 26:4
111). Yet, we must ask to what extent the birth, life, death,
resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ in the economy of salvation informs
us in relation to this notion of the active constancy of the triune God. This is so
for when divinity took on humanity in Christ, there must be some sense in
which change can be predicated of God.
112 However, such an affirmation must
be articulated carefully. Blocher highlights the connection between Trinity,
incarnation and change when he writes, “At the centre of the economic Trinity,
the incarnation: God (the Son) became man! If ever there was an event which
implied change for God, it must have been the incarnation.”
113 Similarly,
Rahner, whom Blocher quotes approvingly,
114 states, “If we face squarely the
fact of the incarnation … we must simply say: God can become something, he
who is unchangeable in himself can himself become subject to change in
something else.”
115 Rahner goes on to argue that this sense of divine change in
the unchangeable God must not be understood to be limited to the human side
of the incarnation only. He states, “But if one sees the event as taking place
only on this side of the boundary which separates God and the creature, one
has seen and said something which is true, but missed by a hairsbreadth and
omitted what is really the point of the whole statement: that this event is that of
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God himself.”
116 In other words, God himself experienced change – he who is
unchanging in one sense can change in another. Rahner’s efforts to articulate
this binary affirmation lead him to a dialectical tension. He concludes,
The mystery of the incarnation must lie in God himself: in the fact
that he, though unchangeable ‘in himself,’ can become something
‘in another.’ The immutability of God is a dialectical truth like the
unity of God … In the same way we learn from the incarnation that
immutability (which is not eliminated) is not simply and uniquely a
characteristic of God, but that in and in spite of his immutability he
can truly become something. He himself, he, in time. And this
possibility is not a sign of deficiency, but the height of his
perfection, which would be less if in addition to being infinite, he
could not become less than he (always) is. This we can and must
affirm, without being Hegelians. And it would be a pity if Hegel
had to teach Christians such things.
117
Consequently, what we have in the central event of the economy of salvation –
the birth, life, death, resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ – is the
supreme focal point in which the unchanging God could be said to experience
change. But, again, we must be careful not to absolutize in either direction. On
the one hand, we must not absolutize in one direction and say that this means
that God changes in all senses. The fact that the incarnation is the focal point
and the supreme example of an unchanging God experiencing change must not
be construed to suggest that God needs to experience change to be God – as in
the process conception of the becoming God. This would be to absolutize
mutability and, in the words of Brunner, leaves us with “a changing God [who]
is no God to whom we can pray, but a mythical being who provokes our
sympathy.”
118 On the other hand, we must not absolutize in the other direction
and suggest that God cannot change in any sense. Indeed, it can be argued that
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some of the early christological controversies are really examples of the
absolutization of God’s unchangeableness. To suggest that God only seemed to
become human in Christ (as in Docetism); or that he only became partially
human (as in Apollinarianism); or that Christ was not simultaneously divine
and human (as in Nestorianism) are all examples, to differing degrees, of
absolutizing in this other direction – of attempting to protect God from the
notion of change in any sense.
What the incarnation of Jesus Christ appears to lead us toward is a theological
tension – the triune God who cannot change (in that he is perfectly relational,
perfectly loving, perfectly dynamic and so on) is yet able to change (in that the
perfection of his relationality, love and dynamism overflows towards humanity
in the incarnation). Hence, while perfection of triune relationality and
dynamism may, in one sense, preclude change (in that there is no potential in
God to be more relational and dynamic), it is perhaps also the case that, in
another sense, perfection of triune relationality and dynamism actually enables
change in that it overflows in love to those who are other. In essence, one
could argue that the incarnation is an expression, indeed the pre-eminent
expression, of the overflow of the perfect relationality of the triune God.
This, we may recall, links with Weinandy’s point that since God is actus purus
he has no self-constituting relational potential that yet needs to be actualised.
Each divine person is, by definition, already fully or perfectly in act. However,
this does not preclude the persons of the Trinity from having “absolute
positive potential, that is, they have the singular ability to establish338
relationships with others other than themselves whereby the persons of the
Trinity can relate others to themselves as they are in themselves as a trinity of
persons.”
119 In other words, perfect triune relationality – which has no internal
relational potential and therefore cannot change – overflows in the economy of
salvation toward human beings who are other. Furthermore, this overflow
finds its focal point in the incarnation – God himself became human. In this
sense, then, Rahner states that God, “though unchangeable ‘in himself,’ can
become something ‘in another.’”
 120
Indeed, Torrance describes the incarnation as a divine act of freedom in which
God does what he has never done – “it took place in the sovereign ontological
freedom of God to be other in his external relations than he eternally was, and
is, and to do what he had never done before.”
121 This is not to be understood as
God surrendering his transcendence, compromising his freedom or
imprisoning himself in the space-time dimensions of the world. Rather, the
nature of God’s triunity is that the incarnation “flowed freely, unreservedly
and unconditionally from the eternal movement of Love in God.”
122 The triune
nature is perfectly loving, dynamic, relational and faithful – there is no
potential yet to be actualised – and, as such, it overflows toward we who are
“other.”
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Divine change and the hypostatic union
Indeed, the incarnation can be said to speak to the issues of immutability and
impassibility in the context of Providence. In many ways, the hypostatic union
found in Christ provides us with both an example and focal point of the
tensions implicit in immutability and impassibility. This is so for it is the point
at which divine and human dimensions most directly and profoundly intersect
and intertwine. Consequently, we have in Christ the nucleus – the mysterious
embrace – of both divine and human experiences of change and suffering and,
therefore, it has implications for how we might conceive of divine
immutability and impassibility in the context of Providence.
In particular, Christ provides us with an example of how we might conceive of
God being actively constant – both dynamically engaging with humanity and
yet remaining faithful and true; both experiencing and being impacted by the
reality of pain and suffering and yet transcending and transforming each. As an
illustration of how this might be so, Vanhoozer draws a parallel between how
we might understand divine impassibility and the doctrine of the impeccability
of Christ. Firstly, he argues, as I do, that impassibility “means not that God is
unfeeling but that God is never overcome or overwhelmed by passion.”
123
Therefore, he argues, God can both experience human sorrow and yet be
apathetic (understood in the strict sense that this experience does not
compromise his reason, will or wisdom).
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However, he then draws a parallel with Christ’s impeccability by pointing out
that the writer to the Hebrews affirms both that Christ was truly tempted just
as we are (Hebrews 2:18) and yet was sinless (Hebrews 4:15). Certainly, some
may feel that Jesus’ sinlessness means that he could not have felt the force of
temptation. Alternatively, others might claim that if Jesus did feel the force of
temptation, he must have sinned. However, my view is that the NT rules out
either option – it affirms both that he felt the force of temptation and yet was
sinless. In a similar way, he concludes, we can see how God can genuinely
experience the full-force of sorrow or pain and yet not be overwhelmed or
constrained by it. In Vanhoozer’s words, “As Jesus feels the force of
temptation without sinning, so God feels the force of the human experience
without suffering change in his being, will or knowledge.”
124 His point is that
Christ, in particular his sinlessness, gives us an example of how we might
conceive of divine impassibility. If Christ is able both authentically to
experience temptation and yet transcend it, is it not possible that God can
authentically experience other things, such as pain, sorrow or suffering, and
yet be able to transcend them? In this way, then, Christ is the prime example of
how we might conceive God being both active (in that he engages with,
experiences and is impacted by human experiences) and constant (in that he
transcends and brings transformation to human experiences).
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Perichoresis and the economy of salvation
However, the trinitarian economy of salvation – in that the Father sent the Son
into the world to bring humans, by the Holy Spirit, into a right relationship
with God and with each other – provides further illumination of how we might
conceive of God relating to the world in Providence. In particular, in the
context of the salvific economy, the nature of intra-trinitarian perichoresis
gives us a window into how we might conceive of God both entering into
human suffering in an authentic way (active) and yet not being constrained or
ontologically shaped by suffering (constancy).
Earlier, in Chapter Five, I made note of some of the earlier trinitarian heresies
– in particular, Modalistic Monarchianism. Modalism, also known as
Sabellianism, received arguably one of its earliest articulations through
Praxeas and only later reached its high point in the teaching of Sabellius.
However, what marks out Praxeas’ teachings, and why they incurred the
opposition of Tertullian, is his insistence that the Son does more than just
reveal the Father but is himself the Father.
125 Indeed, when Tertullian wrote
his major treatise on the Trinity, Against Praxeas, it appears that the intention
of Praxeas (who is unknown apart from Tertullian’s work) is the preservation
of the deity of Christ. As such, and as seems to be the case with many heresies,
the intention behind Modalism would appear to have been largely honourable.
However, the problem arose that, if the Son is in reality simply a form or mode
of the Father, then it must mean that it was the Father who suffered in Christ
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during the Passion.
126 Consequently, Modalism received the alternative names
of Patripassianism or Theopassianism. However, when Praxeas realises that
his conception logically entails patripassianism, which was perhaps deemed
inappropriate for deity, his response is to draw a distinction between Jesus, the
man, and Christ, the uJpo/stasiß or personification of the Father. Hence, only
the man suffered but God did not. However, splitting the hypostatic union in
such a way was ultimately found unsatisfactory by orthodoxy in general and
Tertullian in particular.
Yet, this early trinitarian dispute does raise the question as to the
appropriateness or otherwise of conceiving how the suffering of the Son might
be connected with the Father and Holy Spirit. Indeed, Erickson argues that
there is a sense in which patripassianism is actually true and he wonders
whether its rejection in the early centuries was primarily on Greek
philosophical grounds rather than biblical grounds.
127 He writes,
Clearly, the Son died in a way in which the Father and the Spirit
did not, for only the Son had been incarnate. Yet Scripture has
numerous indications of the part of the Father in sending the Son
… Both the act of the Father in sending the Son and in receiving
the sacrifice were part of the total picture of redemption. And
although only the Son actually died personally and physically on
the cross, any loving parent can testify that the parent is not
unaffected when the child suffers. Given the closeness of the Father
and the Son – they are ‘in’ one another, and can be said to be ‘one’
– that effect would be accentuated, if anything. This, then, is the
sense in which ‘patripassianism’ is true – not that the Father was
the Son, but that he felt what the Son was feeling. It should be
noted, also, that the Spirit was involved in this redemptive work …
the Spirit came on Jesus and indwelt and empowered his ministry.
Even his emotions were in the Spirit, so that we read in Luke that
‘in that hour he rejoiced in the Spirit.’ It is therefore safe to
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conclude it was by the Spirit within him that Jesus was able to offer
his life as a sacrifice.
128
The point that Erickson is making is that trinitarian perichoresis – “the
permeation of each person by the other, their coinherence without
confusion”
129 – points to the possibility that both the Father and Holy Spirit, in
some sense, suffered along with the Son.
What is to be said of this proposal? Firstly, it is important to note that it is not
suggesting, as Erickson makes clear, that the Father is the Son, for that would
be to confound the persons. Indeed, it was this confounding of the persons by
Praxeas, in that he argued that the Father is the Son, which Tertullian and
orthodoxy found so unconvincing in the light of scripture. Rather, this
proposal is suggesting that the Father and the Holy Spirit, as subsisting divine
persons with the Son, to some extent authentically experience that which the
Son experiences. In other words, if perichoresis does mean that the divine
persons mutually interpenetrate each other, then there must be a sense in which
the Father and the Holy Spirit experienced what the Son experienced on the
cross. Of course, we are dealing with mystery here and, hence, human
language will be stretched to accommodate it. Yet, though we might debate
over semantics – for example, that the Father and Holy Spirit suffered
indirectly while the Son suffered directly – the reality of trinitarian
perichoresis appears to be strongly suggestive of the idea that the Father and
Holy Spirit experienced authentically what the Son experienced on the
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cross.
130 Thus, Jüngel, though not arguing for patripassianism in the sense
argued by Praxeas, nevertheless states, “Thus the Father, too, participates in
the passion along with the Son, and the divine oneness of God’s modes of
being thus shows itself in the suffering of Jesus Christ.”
131
Secondly, however, although the Father and Holy Spirit may experience, to
some extent, what the Son experiences, this is not to be construed as though
the Son loses his particularity as the Son – as though what he experiences is
somehow subsumed into some unified divine experience. Rather, the nature of
perichoresis simply means that each of the divine persons experiences
authentically what the other persons experience yet without compromising
their own distinctiveness – their own particularity. In other words, the Son
experiences suffering as the Son. Though he may perichoretically share that
suffering with the Father and the Holy Spirit, and so there is a sense in which
God suffers in his oneness, it still simultaneously remains uniquely his own,
and so there is a sense in which God suffers in his threeness. In other words,
although the experience of the Son is not exactly the experience of the Father
and the Holy Spirit, it is equally true that the Son’s experience is not other than
the experience of the Father and the Holy Spirit. We must hold in tension the
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oneness and threeness of God – his unity and his particularity – neither
dividing the substance nor confounding the persons. As Augustine argues,
Hold fast then what you have heard. I will recapitulate it briefly,
and entrust it to be stored up in your minds as a thing, to my
thinking, of the greatest usefulness. The Father was not born of the
Virgin; yet this birth of the Son from the Virgin was the work both
of the Father and the Son. The Father suffered not on the Cross; yet
the Passion of the Son was the work both of the Father and the Son.
The Father rose not again from the dead; yet the resurrection of the
Son was the work both of the Father and the Son. You see then a
distinction of Persons, and an inseparableness of operation. Let us
not say therefore that the Father doeth any thing without the Son, or
the Son any thing without the Father.
132
In my view, this understanding of how trinitarian perichoresis sheds light upon
the suffering of Jesus Christ gives us a paradigm for illuminating how God
relates to humanity in Providence, particularly in relation to the issues of
immutability and impassibility. My argument is that a trinitarian perspective
points us toward positing that God authentically or genuinely experiences
suffering. At one level, God can be said to experience pain or suffering as a
result of human attitudes and action. Indeed, this idea may be behind the
writer’s comments in Genesis 6:5-6, for example, in that God “saw how great
man’s wickedness on the earth had become, and that every inclination of the
thoughts of his heart was only evil all the time” and that he was “grieved that
he had made man on the earth, and his heart was filled with pain” (NIV).
133
But, at a deeper level, the reality of trinitarian perichoresis means that when
the Son took upon himself humanity, and therefore experienced all that we
                                                   
132 Augustine, “Sermons on Selected Lessons of the New Testament,” in P. Schaff (ed.), A
Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church Series I, Vol. VI
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956), p. 262 (II.14).
133 See textual comments in J. H. Sailhamer, “Genesis,” in F. E. Gaebelein (ed.), The
Expositor’s Bible Commentary Vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), p. 81.346
experience, the other persons of the Trinity could be said to experience what is
human experience. In this sense, then, it could be said that God is able to
suffer alongside humanity and to experience authentically what is our
experience. Rather than remaining aloof to human experience, in particular
human experiences of suffering, a trinitarian perichoretic perspective on the
hypostatic union means that God is authentically touched by human suffering
and, in a mysterious sense, suffers with us. Furthermore, to say that God
suffers with us is not to say that God suffers merely at the level of empathy or
identification. Certainly, the fact that God became human in Christ means that
his suffering with us must at least mean that he is empathic with us and
identifies with us. Yet, I would suggest that the notion of trinitarian
perichoresis discussed above is suggestive of a divine experience of suffering
at a deeper and more profound level. Just as God himself suffered in the Son,
for the divine persons subsist in each other, so God himself can be said to be
authentically touched by human suffering, and in that sense suffers with us, for
the Son became human in Christ.
Furthermore, to say that God suffers or that he suffers with us is not to be
understood as compromising the particularity of human experience. When a
human person suffers, it is uniquely their experience and no sense of personal
empathy or identification undermines that reality. In the same way that I might
grieve with a couple over the death of their child, my grief cannot and does not
somehow supplant or compromise the particularity of their grief – their
experience remains uniquely theirs while it is simultaneously shared, to
differing extents, with those around them. Similarly, trinitarian perichoresis347
suggests to us that the Father and the Holy Spirit, as subsisting persons who
perichoretically intertwine with the Son, are thus able to experience what the
Son experiences and yet do not compromise the particularity of his experience
– it remains uniquely the Son’s experience whilst being shared. In a sense,
then, we might say that though their experience is not identical to the Son’s, it
is also not other than the Son’s. In the same way, God suffering with us is not
to be construed as compromising the particularity of our suffering, but it does
affirm that he, though remaining distinct from us, is yet able to connect with us
at a deep and profound level.
Indeed, just as the Father and the Holy Spirit are deeply and profoundly able to
connect perichoretically with the suffering of the Son, the uniqueness and
particularity of the Son’s sufferings means that the Father and Holy Spirit are
also able to stand distinct from them, not be overwhelmed or constrained by
them and bring transformation to them. Similarly, just as God is deeply and
profoundly able to connect incarnationally with human sufferings, the
uniqueness and particularity of human sufferings means that he is also able to
stand distinct from them, not be overwhelmed or constrained by them and
bring transformation to them. Again, we are brought back to the tensional truth
of active constancy. God is active in that he both meets and engages with
humanity and does so at a deep and profound level. Indeed, the incarnation in
Christ is the pre-eminent example of a triune God meeting us where we are
and as we are. Hence, he knows human experience, including suffering, for he
became one of us. Yet, simultaneously, he remains constant for he is not348
ontologically shaped or constrained by such suffering and so is able to bring
transformation to it.
Certainly, the proposals that I am seeking to commend here are challenging to
articulate for we are dealing with profound mystery. Yet, it is my view that a
trinitarian perspective on the issues of immutability and impassibility in the
context of Providence leads us to such a position and, hence, the language we
use is, by necessity, full of tension and paradox. However, this is perhaps
acceptable when we realise that God himself lies at the centre of our
deliberations. As Weinandy puts it, “The mystery, by the necessity of its
subject matter, remains.”
134
Finally, I have argued in Chapter One that theology in its truest and deepest
sense is fully integrated. In other words, we seek an integration of head, heart
and hand – a unified whole between what is thought and believed and what is
practised and lived. Consequently, we turn now to a consideration of the
practical or pastoral implications of what can be termed trinitarian Providence.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
TRINITARIAN PROVIDENCE
AND THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
TOWARD AN INTEGRATED THEOLOGY OF PROVIDENCE
– THE EXAMPLE OF PRAYER
In Part Three above, I articulated a trinitarian perspective on divine Providence
at what is primarily a cognitive level and this was elucidated under the
heading, “Tensions in Thinking.” In this present chapter, which forms Part
Four, I move to articulating the same perspective at a primarily practical or
pastoral level and my treatment receives elucidation under the heading,
“Tensions in Living.” As I outlined in Chapter One, the assumption that lies
behind this approach is that theology at its best is fully integrated – we strive
for a correlation between head and heart, theory and practice. Just as theologia
should not be divorced from oikonomia in trinitarian reflection, so also should
what is thought in theology not be divorced from what is applied in theology.
Understood correctly, theology is not a narrow intellectual discussion but a
fully orbed engagement with God, his relationship with the world and ours
with him.
Indeed, McGrath finds the reduction of theology to a mere intellectual exercise
particularly perplexing. In relation to the theology of the twentieth century, he
writes,351
One of the more puzzling aspects of academic theology during the
twentieth century has been its tendency to see Christianity simply
as disembodied ideas, and theology as a purely intellectual pursuit.
Theologians such as Augustine and Aquinas are often treated as
disembodied minds, generating ideas which can be dissected in the
lecture halls of western seminaries. There is often little awareness
that these theologians were passionately committed to a holistic
vision of the Christian life, embracing heart and mind, imaginations
and emotions. Too often, academic theology focused only on the
mind, dismissing the heart, imagination and emotions as irrelevant
to theological analysis, perhaps also to Christianity.
1
In earlier times, Thomas á Kempis writes, almost with an air of exasperation,
concerning those who would divorce Christian thought, whether it be about
Providence, Trinity or whatever, from Christian living. He states,
Of what use is it to discourse learnedly on the Trinity, if you lack
humility and therefore displease the Trinity? Lofty words do not
make a man just or holy; but a good life makes him dear to God. I
would far rather feel contrition than be able to define it. If you
knew the whole Bible by heart, and all the teachings of the
philosophers, how would this help you without the grace and love
of God? … Everyone naturally desires knowledge, but of what use
is knowledge itself without the fear of God? A humble countryman
who serves God is more pleasing to Him than a conceited
intellectual who knows the course of the stars, but neglects his own
soul.
2
Indeed, in Webster’s view, this intellectualist tendency in theology is
indicative of the presence of a deeper and flawed assumption. In the context of
discussing the theology of Tillich, he identifies it as the “intellectualist
assumption that ‘understanding’ the divine is superior to practice.”
3 As a result
of concerns such as these, some theologians are led to ponder and seek for
ways in which theology can be “concretised” – that is, meaningfully connected
with and applied to the concrete world of human existence. Moltmann, for
example, is one who explicitly states his preference in this area when he
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writes, “I am not so concerned with correct but more with concrete doctrine;
and thus not concerned with pure theory but with practical theory.”
4
Of course, one must maintain a healthy balance here and not overcompensate
in either direction – whether it be toward intellectualism or pragmatism. On
the one hand, the content of faith is vitally important and we should constantly
strive, by scripture and Spirit, to think rightly about God. However, right
thinking is not an end in itself and is impoverished if it is not completed and
authenticated by right practice. Indeed, there is a sense in which theological
contemplation and application complete and authenticate each other. Certainly,
theological contemplation has a form of priority in that it should both lead to
and guide the nature of the application. As Piper comments, “right thinking
shapes right living.”
5 However, the experiences derived from the application
of theological constructs in the so-called “real” world often provoke further
questions and the need for further theological reflection and contemplation. In
this sense, then, there is a constant and mutual completion and authentication
between theory and practice – between contemplation and application. What
we hope to gain from this interaction is a “theology close to life.”
6
The Nature and Practice of Prayer in Providence
It is therefore in the pursuit of a fully integrated theology that we turn from a
primarily intellectual or cognitive discussion of trinitarian Providence to
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concern ourselves in this present chapter with the distinctly pastoral or
practical dimensions. My task is to elucidate how the theological affirmations
in tension, that I have argued are intrinsic to consideration of Providence and
which receive clarification and illumination when viewed from a trinitarian
perspective, might be “worked out” in the realm of practical Christian living.
In many ways, this chapter seeks to grapple with the dialectical tension, the
concurrence, that is explicit in Philippians 2:12-13 (NIV) – “Therefore, my
dear friends, as you have always obeyed – not only in my presence, but now
much more in my absence – continue to work out your salvation with fear and
trembling, for it is God who works in you to will and to act according to his
good purpose.”
However, due to length constraints, my investigation of the practical
implications of my thesis must be significantly limited. Consequently, I have
elected to apply my thesis concerning a trinitarian perspective on Providence
to one particular aspect of Christian living. Although this dissertation has so
far indirectly highlighted ways in which my thesis might impact upon different
aspects of Christian living – such as upon our experiences of freedom,
suffering and so on – I will more directly apply its implications to the single
area of prayer. As such, I am utilizing prayer as a particular application and
am investigating how a trinitarian perspective on issues of Providence – divine
transcendence, sovereignty, immutability and impassibility – might impact
upon and be worked out in the context of humanity communing with God in354
prayer. As Pruyser comments, “Abstract doctrinal definitions of Providence
are one thing – coming to terms with its personal import is quite another.”
7
Certainly, it would appear to be the case that prayer and Providence are closely
related. Lewis states that, “The biblical doctrine of prayer is not in
contradiction of its doctrine of providence but in correspondence with it.”
8 In
fact, Bounds goes so far as to state that, “so closely connected are they that to
deny one is to abolish the other.”
9 In his view, those who prayed in the
scriptures understood this connection very well – “They took all things to God
in prayer because they believed in a divine providence which had to do with
all things.”
10 Yet, despite this, it appears to be the case that the nature and
efficacy of prayer in the context of Providence is a point of some contention in
the Open Theism debate. For example, Pinnock states that conventional or
traditional theism has a “streak of existential irrationality” running through it
in that it posits that God has ordained and made certain all that will come to
pass. He believes the implications of this are that,
Prayer would be undermined because it cannot change anything.
People could not be held responsible for what they do. God would
have to be considered the author of evil.
11
By contrast, he argues that a particular strength of the Open view is that
“prayer changes things because God allows it to influence him so that prayer
becomes an effective contributor to the flow of events.”
12 Hence, “It appears
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that God’s actions can be conditioned by our praying and that our not praying
may thwart God’s will.”
13 Indeed, he asks, “Why pray if nothing depends on
our praying or not praying?”
14 He concludes,
Prayer makes sense in the context of personal relationships and the
open view of God. It is less meaningful for conventional theists,
because either God cannot respond to the creature (Thomism) or
prayer cannot change what has already been decided (Calvinism).
15
Yet, despite this, he wants to avoid “extremes” – “we are not suggesting that
God needs our counsel and has no ideas of his own to implement, only that
God values relationships and wants to take prayers into account.”
16
However, the critics counter that Open Theism’s own view on prayer is itself
“practically and existentially unworkable.”
17 Indeed, when considered in the
light of the Open understanding of divine omniscience (that is, that God knows
exhaustively the past and the present only), Ware argues that it is beset with
problems. In particular, he notes that Open theists present as an attractive part
of their model the idea that God does not know what we will pray and,
therefore, prayer actually matters – humanity genuinely contributes to what
God brings about in response to our prayers.
18 Yet, Ware points out that if it is
true that God exhaustively knows the present, then in what way can prayer
really matter? In other words, what genuine contribution does prayer bring,
                                                
13 C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, p. 172.
14 C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, p. 172.
15 C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, p. 174.
16 C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, pp. 174-175. See also Basinger’s section on “Petitionary
Prayer,” in C. H. Pinnock et al, The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional
Understanding of God (Downers Grove: IVP, 1994), pp. 156-162; J. Sanders, The God Who
Risks: A Theology of Providence (Downers Grove: IVP, 1998), pp. 268-274; and, G. A. Boyd,
Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy (Downers
Grove: IVP, 2001), pp. 226-241.
17 B. A. Ware, God's Lesser Glory: A Critique of Open Theism (Leicester: Apollos, 2000), p.
178.
18 B. A. Ware, God's Lesser Glory, p. 166.356
assuming the Open model, if God exhaustively knows our hearts and minds at
that moment of prayer? He comments, “It is strictly speaking impossible for
human beings to inform God of their thoughts, concerns, longings, feelings
and requests.”
19 If “God knows fully their thoughts and attitudes of heart” and
if “God anticipates fully every possible state of heart or mind we might have,”
then “God can gain no knowledge through prayer.”
20 This, in his view,
undermines Open Theism’s emphasis upon the dynamic interactivity – the
genuine relationship – that exists between God and humanity. Indeed, Ware
believes that the Open model of prayer logically leads to denying God’s
knowledge of the present and the past also. In other words, “For the sake of
commending what amounts to a largely human model of personal relationship,
the openness approach, if consistent, leads towards a view in which God is
brought down increasingly to our level.”
21 The implication of this is that the
divine transcendence is compromised and we end up with what has been
termed “this friendlier, anthropocentric God.”
22 Ware finds further problems in
the Open model of prayer in the areas of divine wisdom, love and power.
23
Therefore, in the context of these sorts of concerns being raised by the Open
debate, what light does the trinitarian perspective I have been advocating bring
to the issue of prayer?
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PRAYER AND DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE
Earlier, in Chapter Four, I engaged with the trinitarianism of LaCugna and
noted that one of the main benefits of her contribution was to highlight the link
that exists between oikonomia and theologia – the God who does is not other
than the God who is. Although I find aspects of her treatment problematic, I
agree that contemplation of God “in himself” should not stand divorced from
God’s revelation of himself in the triune economy.
24 Hence, she writes that
Christian spirituality as expressed in prayer denotes communication with the
God who “is not consigned to heaven but [who] lives with us and for us.”
25
Indeed, “Filled with the Holy Spirit, the Christian prays constantly that heart
and mind may be disciplined to perceive ever more acutely the glory of God as
it passes before us in the economy of redemption.”
26 In the context of prayer,
then, we recognize that when we address ourselves to the God who has
revealed himself in the economy as Father, Son and Holy Spirit (oikonomia),
we are also addressing God as he is ontologically in himself (theologia).
27 As
Fiddes puts it, “God in himself is holy mystery, but we can be confident that
the being of God corresponds to his self-revelation.”
28 Hence, in prayer we are
connecting the immanent with the economic – we are addressing the divine
persons in their eternal being in relation with each other as well as their being
in relation to us. As Jewett puts it, not only is the triune God the “One-who-is-
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for-Others in himself,” but he is the “One-who-is-for-others-outside-himself”
(creation) and the “One-who-is-for-sinful-others” (redemption). Hence, “the
eternal fellowship of the divine, trinitarian life grounds God’s fellowship with
us to whom he gives himself in love as our Maker and Redeemer.”
29
Consequently, when we commune with the triune God in prayer, we are not
praying to a distant and disinterested deity but with one who is perfect
relationship; who has economically revealed that relationality as Father, Son
and Spirit and who has created humanity to share in that relationship.
30
In the light of this, I argued in Chapter Five that a trinitarian perspective points
toward understanding the concepts of divine transcendence and immanence, in
part at least, as describing dimensions of relationship. The structure of my
argument was firstly to contend that there is both “apartness” – or dimension
of transcendence – as well as a “withness” – or dimension of immanence –
within the intra-trinitarian divine life. The second step of my argument was to
contend that this intra-trinitarian distinction and unity – or ad intra dimensions
of transcendence and immanence – provides some grounding for and is
reflected ad extra as God relates with the world in Providence. In other words,
God’s providential relationship with the world is one that is characterized by
transcendence and immanence and a significant ground for this tension is
found in God himself. Furthermore, neither side of this dialectic is to hold
sway over or compromise the other – both are to be held in creative tension.
                                                
29 P. K. Jewett, God, Creation and Revelation: A Neo-Evangelical Theology (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1991), pp. 299-300.
30 Bloesch comments, “Belief in the Trinity has far-reaching implications for the spiritual life.
It means that the God we worship is not a solitary, detached being but a living, personal God
who can enter into meaningful relations with us” – D. G. Bloesch, God the Almighty, p. 191.359
In the context of prayer and Providence, then, it can be argued that our
experience of prayer should be characterized by this same creative tension.
When we pray to God we are communing with the one who both stands over
and distinct from us and yet alongside and within us. In one sense, then, God
stands apart from us in that he is distinct from our situation or experience and
hence is not controlled or constrained by it. Yet, in another sense, he enters
into our experience, standing alongside and in us by his Spirit. Just as Jesus
Christ – as Immanuel – stands pre-eminent as the demonstration of “God with
us” (Matthew 1:23 NIV), so now do we have the Holy Spirit sent by the Son
from the Father as the para¿klhtoß – the one who draws alongside as our
counsellor, mediator, encourager and helper (John 14:16, 26; 15:26; 16:7).
31
Indeed, the fact that we pray to God emphasizes the fact that we are petitioning
one who stands distinct from us. Yet, this distinction is not one of remote and
aloof isolation, for Jesus commands us to address his Father as “Our Father”
(Matthew 6:9 NIV). Although he is in heaven, he is our Father – the one who
personally relates to us as a father to a child. Furthermore, the fact that we can
address him as our Father derives from the reconciliation brought about by the
Father through the Son (Romans 5:11
32 and 2 Corinthians 5:18-19
33), with
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whom we now stand as co-heirs (Romans 8:17
34). Also, Paul states that God,
though distinct from us, has sent us the Holy Spirit who indwells the believer
and enables us to call or cry out to him as “Abba, Father” (Romans 8:15 and
Galatians 4:6 NIV). Hence, though prayer is to God, the nature and practice of
it is intimate – we pray to the one who is both distinct from us and yet who is
also present to and with us. As such, prayer is itself an expression of – indeed
a reflection of – the transcendence and immanence of God.
The Trinitarian Pattern of Prayer
It is therefore not surprising that we find prayer taking on a trinitarian pattern.
O’Donnell states that, “authentic Christian prayer is of its very nature radically
trinitarian.”
35 Indeed, Miller writes of the “trinitarian character of Christian
prayer” and notes that, “what particularly marks the witness of the New
Testament on prayer is its movement toward a trinitarian shape.”
36 In his view,
this trinitarian shape in almost all instances is marked by prayer to God the
Father, through Christ and in the Spirit.
37 As such, this pattern of praying
reflects God’s distinction from us – in that we are praying to a distinct entity
from us – simultaneous with his presence with us – in that we address him as
Father; approach him as such through the ministry of the Son; and all of this
done by or in the power and presence of the Holy Spirit.
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However, some question whether such a trinitarian pattern necessarily entails
the notion that prayer should exclusively be directed to the Father. For
example, Erickson wonders whether our trinitarianism is in fact deficient if we
do not likewise address prayer to the Son and the Spirit. In outlining his
argument, he identifies “two major schools of thought regarding this issue” –
what he terms the “Father only” view and the “All Three” approach.
38 In his
investigation he makes note of the various instances in which the NT records
what appear to be explicit prayers to Christ (for example, Acts 7: 59-60)
39 or
instances in which the language used is strongly suggestive of Christ-directed
prayer (for example, 1 Corinthians 1:2).
40 He concludes that, “it is both
appropriate and desirable to worship and pray to Jesus Christ.”
41 Furthermore,
although there are no explicit commands or descriptions of prayer to the Holy
Spirit in the NT, he argues that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, which is drawn
from the witness of scripture as a whole, infers that we are to pray to him. In
fact, in his view, “our failure to do so is a failure to carry through on the
practical implications of our belief.”
42
Bloesch also recognizes that prayers in the NT are usually to the Father and so
acknowledges that it can be argued that this should hold true for the church
through the ages. Similarly with Erickson however, he does point out that the
NT also gives examples of prayers to Jesus and of the Holy Spirit engaging in
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prayer with the believer.
43 Furthermore, he notes that the early church often
applied the word “Father” to the divine oujsi÷a rather than the first uJpo/stasiß.
Hence, he argues that it is right and appropriate that prayer be also directed to
Christ and the Spirit and, indeed, to the Trinity itself. In essence, Bloesch’s
concern with praying to divine persons exclusively – for example, to the Father
only – is that it seems to deny the fact that God has related economically to us
in different ways and under different names. In other words, it seems to move
toward tritheism rather than trinitarianism and such imbalance may have
unhelpful implications. For example, if one were to pray exclusively to the
Father, he fears this “might then lapse into a patriarchal monotheism.”
44
Alternatively, if one were to pray exclusively to Jesus, we might “come to see
God primarily as a suffering companion and no longer as Lord and Master.”
45
Finally, if one were to address prayer exclusively to the Spirit or the Spiritual
Presence (for example, in Tillich), “we might lose sight of the personal nature
of God and reduce God to a creative force in nature, an élan vital.”
46
Consequently,
We do not pray to the Father over the Son or to the Son and Spirit
apart from the Father, for this again is to verge toward tritheism.
We pray to the Father in the Son and through the power of the
Spirit. We pray to Christ who proceeds from the Father and who is
made available to us by the Spirit. We pray to the Spirit through the
intercession of Christ and by the grace given to us by the Father.
Because of the perichoresis (mutual indwelling), each member of
the Trinity is fully present in the being and acts of the others. A
prayer to Christ is also a prayer to the Father and vice versa.
47
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In his view, our prayer life should be free to reflect the fact that God has
revealed himself to us in multiform ways and images – for example, as Rock,
Fortress, Sun, Light and Fire. Furthermore, he argues that the Holy Spirit
guides the church into deeper perceptions of the mystery of God and so we
should appreciate the views of theologians of the church as well as the
scriptures, “though the latter should always have precedence.”
48 Hence,
although our spiritual life should be controlled by biblical norms, this does not
necessarily “abrogate the possibility of using language about God that deepens
rather than subtracts from his Lordship and Fatherhood.”
49 He concludes,
The trinitarian formula – Father, Son and Spirit – must never
become an idol that directs us only to words and rites as opposed to
the reality that encompasses this name. On the other hand, the
trinitarian definition will always be the ruling criterion that
regulates the life of worship and prayer, one that keeps us on the
biblical path and prevents us from projecting on God our own
vision of what God should be like. We are free to draw from
cultural resources in explicating the nature and activity of God, but
we must never be led by the spirit of the culture (Zeitgeist), which
will invariably controvert the claims of biblical and apostolic
faith.
50
Certainly, our trinitarian discussion in Chapter Four cautions us against
praying in such a way that the divine persons are confounded or the divine
substance is divided. On the one hand, we must avoid confounding the persons
by treating seriously what might be termed the normative pattern of prayer,
derived from the NT, in that prayer is usually to the Father, through the Son
and in or by the Spirit. Hence, we acknowledge that there is a sense of the
Father being the appropriate person to whom prayer is addressed and that such
a pattern also appropriately recognizes the “privileged affinity” or “significant
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correspondence” that the Son and the Spirit have with particular roles.
51
Earlier, in the context of discussing the doctrine of appropriations (Chapter
Five), I noted how 1 Corinthians 8:4-6 gives us a trinitarian pattern or
sequence in which all things are from or for the Father (e˙x ou∞ ta» pa¿nta and ei˙ß
aujto/n) and through the Son (di∆ ou∞ ta» pa¿nta and di∆ aujtouv). Furthermore,
Ephesians 2:18 presents us with a sequencing or pattern in that “through him
(di∆ aujtouv) [the Son] we both have access by one Spirit (e˙n e˚ni« pneu/mati) to the
Father (pro\ß to\n pate÷ra)” (my translation). The point is that, in very general
terms, there are aspects of God’s triunity that primarily, if not exclusively, are
thought more appropriate to a particular divine person than another.
52 I noted
that some describe this doctrine the following way: the Father is the source,
originator and goal (from/out/to/for); the Son is the agent or mediator
(through) and the Holy Spirit applies, completes and energizes (in/by). Others
might phrase it as follows: the Father is “over us” in that he purposes; the Son
is “for us” in that he accomplishes; and the Holy Spirit is “in us” in that he
applies. Hence, in the light of this doctrine, it would appear appropriate that
we address our prayers to the Father, through the Son and in or by the Spirit.
Yet, on the other hand, we must avoid dividing the divine substance. Such
division may occur if exclusivity – a type of prayerful prioritisation – is
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ascribed to one divine person apart from the others. Indeed, such exclusivity
not only denies the notion of trinitarian perichoresis but also would appear to
be particularly prone to subordinationist tendencies. For example, Bloesch
notes that, “Origen held that we should pray not to Jesus but to God the Father
alone.”
53 However, on occasion, this emphasis by Origen on the monarchy of
the Father led to some questionable statements – although these are
frustratingly inconsistent. In some instances, Origen would affirm that the Son
is God just as much as the Father and yet, in other instances, would describe
Christ as the “second God” or would describe the Son and the Spirit as
creatures to the extent that they depend on the Father for their existence.
Perhaps not surprisingly, many of his writings were declared heretical at the
Second Council of Constantinople in 553CE.
54 The point is that it can be
argued that Origen’s emphasis upon the Father, on occasion to the point of
exclusivity, led to language that tended to subordination. Certainly, the
emphasis upon the monarchy of the Father, and the ontological subordination
of the Son, received a more consistent articulation during the Arian
controversy (discussed in Chapter Five) and so was declared out of bounds at
Nicea in 325CE and this position was reaffirmed at Constantinople in 381CE.
However, again, it would appear that an over-emphasis in prayer upon one
divine person to the exclusion of the others not only divides the substance but
may be susceptible to subordinationist imbalance.
Hence, it appears to be the case that prayer, conceived from a trinitarian
perspective, recognizes and respects both the unity of and the distinction
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between the three divine persons. In an effort to strike this balance between the
One and the Three, Erickson writes,
We will pray to the Triune God. Even when we pray regarding one
of the works that is the distinctive special responsibility of one of
the three, and direct it to that person, we will retain the
consciousness that the whole Trinity is involved in that work, and
that it is one of those persons especially doing that work on behalf
of the triunity of person, or of the triunity doing that work through
that one person. Our belief is in one Triune God, not in three gods,
and we will want to be careful to preserve that distinctness in our
belief and experience.
55
Trinitarian prayer, then, recognizes the relational distinction and perichoretic
unity of the divine persons. Prayer acknowledges and gives expression to this
intra-trinitarian apartness and withness. Though we may pray, for example, to
the Father in distinction from the Son and the Spirit, we recognize that all three
persons stand perichoretically united with each other and so our prayer is as
much to all three as it is to the Father. As such, the pattern of trinitarian prayer
reflects the ad intra distinction and unity – the dimensions of transcendence
and immanence – that exist in the intra-trinitarian divine life. Furthermore, the
pattern of trinitarian prayer also reflects the fact that this triune God’s
relationship to the world in Providence is one also marked by both
transcendence and immanence – we pray to the one who is distinct from us
and yet who relates to us as our Father and who indwells us by the Spirit of his
Son.
                                                
55 M. J. Erickson, God in Three Persons, p. 328.367
PRAYER AND DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY
Tiessen states, “We need to pray, we want to pray, and because we want to
pray effectively, we need to struggle through to an understanding of God’s
action in the world that will ground our practice of prayer and all other aspects
of our life.”
56 Consequently, it would appear to be the case that the nature of
divine sovereignty in the context of Providence will have implications for how
we conceive the nature and practice of prayer. In earlier chapters, I have
discussed the nature of divine sovereignty in the context of the Open Theism
debate. Cole summarises the debate, and its relevance to prayer, in the
following way. He writes, “… the Classical Theistic tradition has been strong
on God as proactive (God really is sovereign) but weak on God as interactive
and reactive. That is to say, it has been weak on the personal nature of God
and God’s responsiveness to prayer.”
57 Yet, he also argues that the possible
imbalance goes the other way when he states, “However, the openness of God
critique, though strong on God as interactive and reactive (God really does
answer prayer) is weak on God as proactive (He does really accomplish his
purposes).”
58 What adds to the difficulty is that, as was noted earlier,
proponents of either position consider the alternative, from the perspective of
its application, to be problematic (at best) and unliveable (at worst). For
example, Ware highlights what he considers to be the,
… conflicted position of open theism regarding petitionary prayer.
Either … God will almost always do what is best regardless of
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whether people pray, in which case the efficacy of prayer is
eliminated, or he will refrain from acting until others pray, in which
case the genuineness of his love is challenged.
59
By contrast, Pinnock argues that the Open view is in fact, “hard to refute on
the existential level” and that, “In prayer, the practicality of the open view of
God shines.”
60 Indeed, he argues that conventional theists, “have to live as if
their view of God were different than it is, i.e. they live as if it were, in fact,
the open view.”
61
I have argued at length, particularly in Chapter Six, that the trinitarian divine
life gives us a pattern or paradigm for affirming that God’s sovereignty is such
that it does not breach the reality of human freedom and responsibility; and
that human freedom is such that it does not place limitations upon divine
sovereignty. If God’s action toward the world in Providence is characterized
by these tensional and complementary truths, then it is reasonable to expect
that our experience of prayer should reflect the same tension. On the one hand,
the reality of divine sovereignty should never be perceived as stifling human
freedom and thereby fostering an “uncaring fatalism.”
62 In other words,
sovereignty correctly understood should never serve as a disincentive to pray –
indeed, quite the opposite. On the other hand, the reality of human freedom
and responsibility should never be perceived as diluting God’s sovereign
purpose, as though God’s purposes will be thwarted according to whether or
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not humans pray.
63 God’s sovereignty and human responsibility stand in a
mysterious embrace – neither one limited nor diluted by the presence of the
other but each, in fact, informing our understanding of the other.
As we saw from Chapter Six, when considered from a trinitarian perspective,
both sovereignty and freedom are to be understood relationally. Hence, our
understanding of prayer should be such that it underscores rather than
undermines the essential relationality of the triune God. Prayer to the
sovereign God is an acknowledgement that this God is actively and personally
sovereign – we call on him to act and to interact. Sovereignty, conceived in
trinitarian terms, is marked by the relational and personal dimension of other-
person-centredness – “that is, genuine interest in the other person and his
welfare and the forwarding of that welfare by every appropriate means at one’s
disposal.”
64 In other words, divine sovereignty is positively disposed toward
those who are “other” and seeks to enhance rather than restrict their
particularity and uniqueness as persons. The other side of this relational
conception of divine sovereignty is that human freedom is also understood
relationally. A free human being is not an autonomous and distinct individual
– separate and undetermined by God. True freedom is located in relationship
rather than outside it – humans are only free when they are in right relationship
with the Father through the Son and in the Spirit and thereby in his sovereign
will.
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Prayer grounded in and submitted to divine sovereignty
The implications of such tensional truths are that, firstly, prayer is grounded in
and guided by God’s sovereign purpose. As the example of Jesus himself
shows, rather than praying that our will be done, we pray that his will be done
(Matthew 6:9 and Luke 22:42
65). We find the same principle instructing and
guiding the prayers of Paul. For example, Carson notes that Paul’s prayer in
Ephesians 1:15-23 contains thanksgiving, intercession and review that are all
given in the context of God’s sovereign and gracious purpose. Since and
because God is sovereign, Paul “offers thanksgiving for God’s intervening,
sovereign grace in the lives of his readers,”
66 “offers intercession that God’s
sovereign, holy purposes in the salvation of his people may be
accomplished,”
67 and “offers a review of God’s most dramatic displays of
power.”
68 Indeed, the petitionary prayers of Paul are given “in line with God’s
purposes.”
69 In other words, recognition of God’s sovereignty should lead us
to pray according to his revealed will.
Similarly, Turner notes that Jesus’ promise in John 14:14 – “You may ask me
for anything in my name, and I will do it” (NIV) – would appear to be
“embarrassingly open-ended.”
70 Yet, it is given in the context of Jesus doing
the works of the Father – “And I will do whatever you ask in my name, so that
                                                
65 “Your kingdom come, your will be done on earth as it is in heaven” and “Father, if you are
willing, take this cup from me; yet not my will, but yours be done” (NIV).
66 D. A. Carson, A Call to Spiritual Reformation, p. 170.
67 D. A. Carson, A Call to Spiritual Reformation, p. 172.
68 D. A. Carson, A Call to Spiritual Reformation, p. 177.
69 D. A. Carson, A Call to Spiritual Reformation, p. 199.
70 M. M. B. Turner, “Prayer in the Gospels and Acts,” in Carson (1990), p. 81.371
the Son may bring glory to the Father” (John 14:13 NIV). In other words, it is
in the context of the economy of salvation particularly – this “salvation-
historically defined sense”
71 – that the promise is made. Furthermore, the fact
that prayers are uttered in Jesus’ name means that they are uttered “in a way
that is consonant with the character, wishes or revealed goals of the person
whose name is appealed to.”
72 Also, since the Son has come in the Father’s
name (John 5:43
73) and to do the will of the Father (John 14:31
74), “To ask
something in Jesus’ name is to ask as one who is bound up with his purposes,
and for something that reveals, and so glorifies, him.”
75 In other words, the
depiction of prayer given here is one that is undergirded by a robust divine
sovereignty. As Clowney comments, prayer is “zealous concern for his glory
and for the accomplishment of his purposes.”
76
Secondly, a corollary of this relationship between divine sovereignty and
prayer is that our prayers should ultimately bow before God’s sovereign
purpose. In other words, a distinction is made, as Tiessen puts it, between
submission to God’s will and prayer according to God’s will.
77 In the latter, as
we saw above, our prayers stand explicitly in line with God’s sovereign
purpose when they are in accord with his revealed will. However, there are
instances in prayer in which the presence of our own human limitedness is
compounded by a degree of divine mystery and so we are sometimes unsure as
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to what we should pray. In other words, although we acknowledge that God
will do what is right and in accord with his gracious sovereign purpose, we
may be unsure what that will look like in the particular situation with which
we are faced. As Tiessen puts it, “This is not a lack of faith; it is a lack of
knowledge.”
78 Hence, when faced with this mix of revelation and mystery, we
may find ourselves praying in a way that, though it may not be in direct accord
with God’s sovereign purpose, is nevertheless in submission to God’s
sovereign purpose. Though God has revealed himself to an extent sufficient
that we might know him and his intentions toward us, we also recognise that
we do not know him or his intentions exhaustively or totally. Our prayers,
then, though in accord with the light that has been given to us, nevertheless are
marked by our recognition that it is God alone who sees circumstances as they
truly are.
79 One of the prayers of Jesus is particularly pertinent here – “My
Father, if it is possible, may this cup be taken from me. Yet not as I will, but as
you will” (Matthew 26:39 NIV).
This sense of both revelation and continuing mystery is reflected in the
theological concept of divine revealedness and hiddenness. In other words,
although we might recognize that God has revealed himself sufficiently that
we might be reconciled to him (Deus revelatus), God nevertheless remains
hidden behind or within his revelation (Deus absconditus). This is not, of
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course, to suggest that the presence of mystery means that God is somehow
absent from us and our concerns and circumstances. As Baelz states, “A
hidden God he may be, an absent God never.”
80 But, nor is it to suggest that
the hidden God is categorically different to the revealed God – as though some
ontological disjunction exists between the two.
81 Rather, it is simply an
acknowledgement that though we may know him truly, we will never know
him totally. As Jewett comments, “God remains free in his revelation,
transcendent in his condescension … God has revealed himself and
consequently we know him; but though we know him truly, we do not know
him fully, as he knows us.”
82 Hence, though our prayers to God ought to
reflect God’s revelation of himself to us, they will nevertheless also reflect a
sense of God’s hiddenness – of divine mystery.
83
The implication of this tension of divine revealedness and hiddenness is that
our prayers ought therefore to be marked by both a sense of obedience as well
as trust. On the one hand, since God is the Deus revelatus, we recognise that
God has revealed to us his nature and will and calls us to worship and obey.
Hence, when we pray in accordance with and in submission to his revealed
purposes, we demonstrate this sense of obedience. For this reason Adeney
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argues that God’s revealed purposes and promises ought constantly to inform
our prayers and so, “Prayer and the study of the Scriptures can never be
separated.”
84
Furthermore, the presence of such obedience in our prayers reminds us that it
is God who is sovereign and not us and guards us against leaning toward an
unhealthy anthropocentricity. Indeed, in relation to anthropocentricity, Gunton
argues that it is ultimately a self-defeating conception. He points out that
God’s triune nature is one that is “intrinsically other-directed” and that this
other-directedness – in that the trinitarian persons give glory to one another –
overflows ad extra toward created beings. These beings, in turn, are
themselves “created in order to return God’s goodness and giving in joyful
praise, praise of words, works and life.”
85 Hence, he concludes that the
“paradox of anthropocentrism is that that which seeks human glory denies both
it and God’s.”
86 Similarly, Gerrish points out the characteristics of
anthropocentricity when he, in the context of outlining what he considers are
the broad symptoms of Pelagian thought, states, “The symptoms appear when I
would sooner tell my story than the story of redemption; when I am more eager
to insist on my freedom than the freedom of God; or when I imagine that I can
use God to promise my happiness or success instead of acknowledging that I
exist for God, not God for me.”
87 As we found in Chapter Six, a trinitarian
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perspective on divine sovereignty in the context of Providence points to the
truth that we are caught up in his purposes, not he in ours.
Yet, on the other hand, since God is also the Deus absconditus, we recognise
that there ought also to be a place for trust in our prayer lives. This trust,
however, should not be caricatured as a blind acquiescence, but as prudent and
reasonable since it is given in the light of the truth that God though hidden is
also revealed. In other words, there is a basis upon which our trust rests.
Although there will be aspects of reality and of life that will remain hidden
from our limited sight – in other words, there will always be a sense of
continuing mystery
88 – God has nevertheless revealed his nature and will to us
in a manner and to an extent sufficient for us to trust him. In the words of
Farmer,
As we shall maintain in the discussion of providence, in God’s
education of the human spirit into a rich personal sonship to
Himself there is a place for darkness and mystery. What is required
is not that God should reveal Himself in all situations, but
sufficiently for all situations, and that we may believe He does.
89
When prayer is characterised by such trust, it will be marked by a settled
composure even when the content of such prayer is uncertain – that is, when
circumstances are such that we are unsure of what action or direction might be
best or wisest in a given situation. What enables such settled composure is
that, even though the content of our prayers may be uncertain, the intent of our
prayers is certain – that is, we are confident that God will bring about his
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gracious purposes for “we know that in all things God works for the good of
those who love him, who have been called according to his purpose” (Romans
8:28 NIV). Rather than succumbing to a sense of hopelessness or helplessness,
we instead trust in the God who is graciously outworking his sovereign
purposes – for Providence is “an affirmation of faith and not of sight.”
90 Lewis
articulates the place in Providence for trust when he writes,
The harsh realities of life, especially when they are on the scale of
events we see today, do indeed make mincemeat of selective,
sentimental and ideological philosophies of life, whether they are
religious, political or social. Neither naïve humanism nor an
unbiblical ‘faith’ can stand before the rigorous inquisition of
blasted hopes, failed civilizations, and deeply flawed humanity. On
what basis then can we speak of God’s presence in human affairs
and his government in human history, what has traditionally been
called his providence and sovereignty? My own reply would be: on
a biblical basis with biblical realism, and, at the end of the day,
with the humble confession that trusts where it cannot track the
ways of God in the world of the fall.
91
In many ways, the presence in prayer of both obedience and trust is not only a
reflection of the reality of the Deus revelatus and Deus absconditus but is also
the simple outworking of the fundamental recognition that we live our lives, in
the language of the Reformers, coram Deo (see Hebrews 4:13
92). It is before
him alone that we live; it is before him alone that we stand or fall. Hence, we
are to recognize that prayer to him is to be in accordance with and in
submission to his sovereign purposes, even when aspects of those purposes
may be shrouded in mystery, and will therefore be characterized by both
obedience and trust.
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Prayer as an expression of human freedom
However, though prayer is grounded in, guided by and in submission to God’s
sovereign purposes, it is also paradoxically an expression of genuine human
freedom and enhances rather than diminishes our uniqueness and particularity
as personal beings. In a sense, then, though prayer has a divine dimension in
that we pray to God the Father, through the Son and by the Spirit, such prayer
also expresses and enhances our own God-imaged humanness. Indeed, Fiddes
draws attention to this human dimension when he states that there is “profound
truth” in the idea that, “We who pray are transformed through our own
prayers, brought more into line with God’s purposes, brought to a deeper
knowledge of ourselves.”
93 Indeed, this is why he argues that,
Intercessory prayer is an experience of connectedness and
mutuality, because it is praying ‘in God’ who lives in relationships.
In intercession we meet others in the perichoresis, the divine dance
of the Father, Son and Spirit … We enter into the life of prayer
already going on within the communion of God’s being; we pray to
the Father, through the Son and in the Spirit.
94
In a sense, then, when we pray we are caught up and attuned to the divine life.
Just as there is a dialogue in the trinitarian divine life, so does this dialogue
turn outwardly to encompass us and transform us as we pray. In a sense, then,
prayer is for us. As Farmer writes, “Petitionary prayer is part of the soul’s
response to God’s challenge and invitation to it to become through co-
operation with Him a personality more and more fitted for co-operation with
Him.”
95
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Similarly, O’Donnell, working from the theological reflections of Balthasar,
states that, “the Father’s I meets his perfect response in the Thou of the Son,”
and, yet, “the dialogue which the Father initiates within the divine life is not
closed in upon itself.”
96 Rather, it is “essentially open” to humanity in that he
has determined in his own eternal freedom to be our God.
97 Yet, O’Donnell
argues that such divine openness to us is actually grounded in God’s gracious
sovereign purpose in that he elects us to be his children through his election of
the Son (and quotes, for support, Ephesians 1:4-6
98). In other words, the
human dimension that is present in prayer is not seen as oppositional to God’s
sovereign purpose but as complementary. As we pray, we are transformed –
we begin to think God’s thoughts after him as our purposes are aligned with
his purposes. Indeed, it is only as we pray in ways that are informed by and in
submission to God’s sovereign purpose that our own freedom and particularity
is expressed and enhanced. As I argued in Chapter Six, freedom is a relational
category and when we are in right relationship with the Father through the Son
and in the Spirit, and thereby in his sovereign will, we are truly free. From this
perspective, then, prayer is an example of and draws together the dual
affirmations of divine sovereignty and human freedom/responsibility.
In an interesting section of the Institutes, which looks at the nature and
efficacy of prayer, Calvin draws together both of these dimensions – divine
sovereignty and human responsibility. He notes the human dimension in
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prayer when he comments that God has instructed us to pray and has ordained
it, “not so much for his own sake but for ours.”
99 In other words, the
experience of prayer brings direct benefits to those who pray and he lists six
reasons why “it is very important for us to call upon him.”
100 In fact, the final
of these reasons is explicitly connected to Providence in that he states that the
“use and experience” of our prayers, “may, according to the measure of our
feebleness, confirm his providence.”
101 Yet, Calvin is conscious that some
might see this as rendering prayer largely superfluous in that it appears that
prayer can only bring about change in us and cannot bring about change in
God. Yet, he steadfastly rejects any fatalistic undertones and completes his
discussion in a way that appears very much to hold in tension God’s
sovereignty and our responsibility. He writes,
Quite like this is what others prate: that it is superfluous for them to
petition for things that the Lord is gladly ready to bestow, while
those very things which flow to us from his voluntary liberality he
would have us recognize as granted to our prayers. That memorable
saying of the psalm attests this, and to it many similar passages
correspond: ‘For the eyes of the Lord are upon the righteous, and
his ears toward their prayers’ … This sentence so commends the
providence of God – intent of his own accord upon caring for the
salvation of the godly – as yet not to omit the exercise of faith, by
which men’s minds are cleansed of indolence. The eyes of God are
therefore watchful to assist the blind in their necessity, but he is
willing in turn to hear our groanings that he may better prove his
love toward us. And so both are true: ‘that the keeper of Israel
neither slumbers nor sleeps’ … and yet that he is inactive, as if
forgetting us, when he sees us idle and mute.
102
In prayer, then, divine sovereignty and human responsibility live, in a sense,
side by side. Packer, also, expresses concern over those who would deny or
reduce the full significance of either – “They are not content to let the two
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truths live side by side, as they do in the Scriptures, but jump to the conclusion
that, in order to uphold the biblical truth of human responsibility, they are
bound to reject the equally biblical and equally true doctrine of divine
sovereignty, and to explain away the great number of texts that teach it.”
103
If prayer were nothing more than human utterings, then it would appear to be
weak, ineffective and futile. But, when prayer is understood to be an
expression of a human freedom that stands in an embrace with divine
sovereignty, then it is empowered by the divine response – “it finds its power
in the strength of his love, as the power of the baby’s cry lies in the devotion
of the baby’s parent.”
104 Indeed, James writes of the righteous person whose
prayer is “powerful and effective” (James 5:16b NIV). What makes the person
righteous, and their prayer so powerful and effective, is the confession and
forgiveness of sin (James 5:15-16a NIV). Hence, prayer is not to be
understood as an act of a human freedom that stands distinct from and
undetermined by God – from a trinitarian perspective, that is not freedom but
unfreedom (see Chapter Six). Rather, the true freedom of which prayer is an
expression derives from within and not outside of relationship. When we stand
relationally aligned with God through repentance and are thereby in and
submitted to his sovereign purpose, our prayers are rendered powerful and
effective. As Lewis states, “For in prayer we practise the sovereignty of God
and address ourselves to him as responsible moral agents praying to a
sovereign God about other responsible moral agents!”
105
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For example, Jesus himself spoke of the relationship between prayer being
both an expression of submission to divine sovereignty – “If you remain in me
and my words remain in you” – as well as an expression of human freedom –
“ask whatever you wish, and it will be given you” (John 15:7 NIV). Just as the
branch cannot bear fruit unless it remains connected to the vine (John 15:5-6),
so also is prayer rendered futile if it is not in submission to and empowered by
God’s sovereign purposes. Yet, the surprise of such submission – since it is a
submission to the purposes of a relationally other-centred triune God – is that
it rebounds to our own benefit. Spurgeon writes,
Abide in Him. Never remove your consecration to His honour and
glory. Never dream of being your own master. Refuse to be the
servant of men, but abide in Christ. Let Him be your object as well
as the source of your existence. If you get there and stop there in
perpetual communion with your Lord, you will soon realise a joy, a
delight, a power in prayer such as you never knew before.
106
PRAYER AND DIVINE
IMMUTABILITY AND IMPASSIBILITY
In Chapter Seven, I argued that a trinitarian perspective on the Providential
issues of divine immutability and impassibility means that the former should
not be construed as indicating a form of divine immobility nor the latter a form
of divine impassivity. Rather, the immutability and impassibility of God are
intended to designate the perfection of his essential relationality – in that he
cannot be any more or any less relational, any more or any less passionate, any
more or any less dynamic, any more or any less faithful and trustworthy.
Consequently, if it can be said that God changes it can only be in the sense that
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he authentically impacts and is impacted by other persons in relationship; his
own relational perfection precludes change in his relational ontology – he is
ontologically secure and faithful to himself. In other words, to absolutize in
either direction – that is, that God does not change in any senses or that he
does change in all senses – is to be guilty of reductionism and runs the risk of
caricaturing God as being either detached, distant and aloof or fragile,
unreliable and inadequate. What a consideration of God from a trinitarian
perspective leads us to is the tensional truths that God is both dynamic and
dependable and to a conception that I named active constancy.
Prayer and Active Constancy
At its most fundamental level, our prayers to this actively constant God ought
to be reflective of the relationality of God’s triunity. Consequently, they
should be characterised by a posture that is primarily and positively
predisposed toward others. On the one hand, this means that we can pray for
ourselves – our needs, our desires, our circumstances, our health and so on –
for we recognise that we are “other” from God and that his triune nature is one
that is inclined toward us. This means that our prayers to God, though
characterised by worship, thanksgiving and confession, should also contain
supplication for ourselves and this would appear to be entirely appropriate for
the prayer Jesus taught his disciples carries within it the refrains of, “give us
…,” “forgive us …,” “lead us …” and “deliver us …” (Matthew 6:11-13383
NIV).
107 Yet, on the other hand, we should recognize the plural “us” of the
Lord’s Prayer also points beyond an unhealthy individualism and is
characterised by an inclination toward those “other” from our individual
selves. To that end, and drawing on the Christ Hymn in Philippians 2:5-11,
Letham argues that believers are to shape their lives according to Christ – that
is, according to “the faithful, obedient and self-giving second Adam in contrast
to the grasping, self-interested first Adam.”
108 Furthermore, he argues that
Jesus acted like this because that is the way the Son has always been – “being
(present participle) in the form of God” – and also because “this is the way all
three persons of the Trinity always are.”
109 The implication for us is that,
We are to live like this – looking to the interests of others –
because that is what Christ did and also since this is what God is
like. The contrast is stark – the whole tenor of fallen man is the
pursuit of self-interest. Instead, God actively pursues the interests
of the other.
110
As we saw above, this is not to suggest that one cannot pray for oneself, and
the scriptures are full of examples of such prayers, but it does remind us that a
truly trinitarian pattern of prayer will also take seriously the relational other-
centredness which so distinguishes the trinitarian divine life. God as triune is
one who is fundamentally for others and our prayers should reflect that same
inclination or trajectory.
Yet, since God is actively constant, we recognise that our supplications,
whether for ourselves or for others, are to someone who can both comfort and
help. As the one who is active, he is able to enter into our experience, to
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understand intimately our situation and to comfort us in it. He communes and
engages with us on a profoundly personal level, for he is perfect relationship.
Yet, as the one who is constant, he is able to stand distinct and unconstrained
by our experience and is therefore able to see our personal history within the
context of cosmic history. His activity is undergirded by his constancy – he is
not ontologically shaped or constrained by our circumstances or our requests
and is therefore able to bring transformation to both. This is a God who can
both empathize and empower.
Prayer and Suffering
Earlier, I noted that although there is a correspondence between divine and
human suffering, for we are created in his image, the ontological distinction
that exists between us nevertheless necessitates a similarly clear contrast.
Kitamori’s view on this distinction is that human and divine pain are
qualitatively different in that human pain is unproductive, “it is darkness
without light.” However, God’s pain is productive, “it is darkness with the
light of salvation.”
111 O’Brien also senses a need to articulate clearly the
distinction between divine and human suffering to ensure that “the idea of a
suffering God is to be protected against the idea of a weak and ineffective
God.”
112 This leads him to seek a via media for,
To assert too strongly the capacity of God to experience suffering,
is to run the risk of ‘depicting God as an emotional hostage to
recalcitrant sinners.’ On the other hand, to assert too strongly the
absoluteness of God and thus his incapacity for sharing in our
sufferings, is to run the risk of depicting God as an aloof and
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indifferent absentee God, a Deus Absconditus, blissfully
unconcerned with the misery of his creatures. It seems then, that in
neither direction is the problem of evil rendered more acute. Each
approach creates its own set of questions.
113
Consequently, he argues that, “Greater distinctions between human passion
and divine passion must be developed, in order to make sense of a God who
feels, but is not ruled by, feelings.”
114
The conception of active constancy, which is drawn from a trinitarian
perspective, seeks to hold in tension both a connection and distinction between
divine and human suffering. As I argued in the previous chapter, the triune
divine life displays dimensions of both activity and engagement – particularly
in the reciprocity and mutuality that derives from the Western emphasis upon
the interrelationships of the divine persons in one divine essence – as well as
of constancy and dependability – particularly in the Eastern emphasis upon the
arche of the Father which gives a uni-directionality to the divine dance.
Hence, when we experience suffering, we are able to pray to a God who both
enters into and transcends our pain and, as such, is able both to experience the
pain with us as well as bring transformation to it. By not absolutising in either
direction, whether toward God being unaffected by suffering in any sense or
affected by suffering in all senses, we hold together the tensional truths of
God’s connection with and distinction from our suffering. As Bloesch puts it,
“a theology of the cross must be completed in a theology of glory … Suffering
is not inherent in God, but God freely wills to enter into our suffering so that it
can be overcome.”
115 While the cross points to the fact that God can and does
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enter into our suffering and authentically experiences with us its reality, the
resurrection points to the fact that God can and does rise above our suffering,
overcoming it and transforming us through it.
Indeed, Brunner notes what he calls a “dangerous popular misunderstanding of
Providence … which seems to suggest that those who trust in God ‘will always
escape disaster’.”
116 By contrast, he refers to Jesus’ statement, given in the
context of future suffering and persecution, that the disciple is not above his
master (Matthew 10:24; Luke 6:40; John 13:16; 15:20). He argues, therefore,
that Providence has never meant immunity and that we should avoid, “an
exaggerated eudæmonistic idea of the experience of faith or of the divine
promise.”
117 But, on the other hand, “this does not mean that there are no
visible signs of divine help and guidance,” and so we should avoid the
opposite extreme of “a purely ascetic and heroic conception of divine
Providence.”
118 Instead, the experience of believers that should be reflected in
prayer is that of tension in which we recognise that though suffering will be a
part of our experience, for we are not above our Lord Jesus, that same Lord
Jesus has promised us power to sustain us through it and assurance of a divine
purpose overruling it.
Indeed, in the light of the co-existence of power and suffering in the believer’s
life, Dowd’s study of prayer in the gospel of Mark leads her to note that prayer
functions as, “the practice in which the tension between power and suffering is
                                                
116 E. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption (Dogmatics, Vol. II;
London: Lutterworth Press, 1952), p. 158.
117 E. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 159.
118 E. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, p. 159.387
faithfully maintained.”
119 On the one hand, prayer is the soul’s call for God to
intervene, often miraculously so, in our lives and is therefore a recognition of
God’s power and of our access to that power. Indeed, Mark records the many
miracles of Jesus that demonstrate such divine power. But, on the other hand,
Dowd notes that prayer is also the believing community’s practice in times of
persecution and suffering – “these experiences also are to be brought before
the trusted abba in prayer.”
120 This also was the experience of Jesus, who
came to the Father in prayer in times of travail (for example, Mark 14:32-42).
Since prayer is presented in Mark, both for Jesus as well as his followers, as
the practice that encompasses both powerfully miraculous divine response as
well as trust in the seeming absence of such response, the implications for
believers are that,
Like Jesus, those who are persecuted are to pray for divine
deliverance; like Jesus, they are to be prepared to lose their lives if
that should be God’s will. At such times they may, like Jesus, feel
deserted by God, but the evangelist assures them that to lose one’s
life in this way is really to save it.
121
Dowd concludes, “Prayer is the context for the community’s experiences of
power, and prayer is the context for the community’s experiences of suffering
and martyrdom.”
122 The point is that prayer encompasses both dimensions –
that God is active and engaged in and with our concerns and circumstances
and, yet, stands distinct from them and sees them in eternal perspective. In
many ways, our prayers are human responses to this trinitarian tension of
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active constancy. Since God is active, we petition him to intervene and
demonstrate his power and, since he is constant, we trust him when he appears
to withhold his hand of power.
It is important, therefore, that a distinction be drawn between what may be
termed the empirically perceived situation and the situation perceived by
faith.
123 Prayer is an expression, indeed some might say the pre-eminent
expression, of trust in God and in the gracious outworking of his purposes,
often in spite of appearances. Indeed, McGrath notes that Luther’s theology of
the cross leads him to argue that, “God works in a paradoxical way sub
contrariis: his strength lies hidden under apparent weakness; his wisdom under
apparent folly; his opus proprium under his opus alienum; the future glory of
the Christian under his present sufferings.”
124 Even though Luther contends
that God is indeed at work in the world, and supremely in the cross of Christ,
this work nevertheless “lies concealed from the senses” and so, “the Christian
life is characterised by the unending tension between faith and experience.”
125
In other words, though actual and existent, the hand of Providence is often “the
invisible hand”
126 and we are called to trust when we cannot track its course.
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CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION
In the introduction to this dissertation, I outlined my intention both to consider
and illuminate the doctrine of the Providence of God, in particular the nature
of the divine-human relationship, by treating it from the distinctive perspective
of God as triune. As such, this dissertation engages in an ongoing discussion
concerning the nature of God’s interaction with the world in Providence and,
in particular, with a contemporary debate centred on the proposal known as
Open Theism. The adoption of a trinitarian perspective, particularly upon
issues that have been points of some contention and which seemingly have
differentiated understandings of Providence, is this dissertation’s specific
contribution to that debate and I have argued that it provides a compelling
avenue for its advancement.
Indeed, more than just contributing to the present debate, I would also suggest
that a trinitarian perspective shows potential to further illuminate and progress
our understandings of Providence in other significant ways. In particular, the
question of theodicy, particularly in the context of those world events that
would fall under what Berkouwer calls the catastrophic motif of Providence;
1
the articulation of the doctrine of Providence to worldviews influenced by
postmodern thought; and the divine call to world mission in the context of
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divine Providence, are areas that would appear to show identifiable promise if
they were to be treated from a specifically trinitarian perspective.
The central or fundamental thesis, which I outlined in Chapter One and for
which I have argued throughout this dissertation, is that a trinitarian
perspective on Providence both suggests and provides us with a theological
conception in which varying emphases and issues that are characteristic of
consideration of this doctrine and which mark those areas of much contention
in the contemporary debate are best understood in a form of theological
tension and are best articulated in a binary form of language – that is, utilising
language of both-and rather than either-or. Rather than affirming one
emphasis and either explicitly or implicitly denying the other, my central
thesis is that a trinitarian perspective gives legitimate theological grounds for
affirming tensional truths about God and that each side of the tension, as it
were, provides the context for understanding the other. To that end, in Chapter
Two, I outlined and argued for the appropriateness of my adoption of a
methodological approach in which a perspective from a related theological
area is directed toward a distinct, though related, theological doctrine – in this
case, a triune perspective upon Providence.
The application of this approach and the development of my argument in
support of my thesis received structure in the following way. In Chapter Three,
I surveyed and discussed definitions and explanations of Providence that have
come from the Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant communities of the church.
This was done to provide some context and structure to my discussion and to392
identify those issues that both unite and divide understandings of divine
Providence. I concluded that there was significant agreement both within and
between these communities of faith in that individual and creedal statements
reflected both a rejection of deistic, pantheistic or fatalistic constructs and an
affirmation of the continuity, universality, dimensionality and intentionality of
divine Providence. This agreement is encapsulated in this dissertation’s
adopted definition of the doctrine of Providence – “The Christian
understanding of God’s continuing action (continuity) by which all creation
(universality) is preserved and governed (dimensionality) by God’s purposes
and plans for that creation (intentionality).”
However, my investigation also identified some issues in which there were
some divergences of understanding – particularly concerning the nature of
divine transcendence, sovereignty, immutability and impassibility – and I
noted that these same issues have, perhaps not surprisingly, come to the fore in
the contemporary debate on Providence concerning the Open Theism proposal.
My utilisation of the Open Theism debate not only provided a context for
addressing these issues but also starkly illuminated the extent to which
differing models of understanding Providence derive most if not all of their
posture from differing conceptions of God’s being and nature. In other words,
the assumption behind much of the debate is that because God is like this, he
therefore acts in Providence like that – there is a correlation between God ad
intra and God ad extra. Consequently, Chapter Three also included a more
detailed examination of the Open Theism proposal in which I argued that its
emphasis upon a dynamic and engaged concept of God’s relationship with393
humanity in Providence derives, to a significant extent, from an emphasis upon
God as love and a highly relational understanding of God’s nature as a triune
being. The chapter was concluded with an excursus in which the centrality of
God to understandings of Providence was discussed, thereby providing a link
to the following chapter in which the nature of God’s triunity was explored as
a potentially illuminating perspective upon my identified issues of Providence.
Consequently, Chapter Four addressed the triunity of God by evaluating three
recent trinitarian theologies that have come from the three main communities
of the church – Zizioulas (Orthodox), LaCugna (Catholic) and Fiddes
(Protestant). In each, I explored ways in which trinitarian concepts might
illuminate how we understand the identified issues of divine transcendence,
sovereignty, immutability and impassibility in the context of Providence for if
the nature of God is central to how we might understand Providence, as
Chapter Three demonstrates, then it is evident that God’s triunity ought to be
foundational in our deliberations. This investigation and discussion of
trinitarian theologies led me to my fundamental thesis outlined earlier in this
present chapter. In other words, a trinitarian perspective leads us to conceive
of divine transcendence in tension with divine immanence; divine sovereignty
in tension with human freedom and responsibility; divine immutability and
impassibility as indicating the tensional truths that God changes and
experiences suffering in some senses but does not change and does not suffer
in others. Rather than affirming one emphasis and thereby denying the other, a
trinitarian perspective gives a legitimate theological grounding for affirming394
both in tension and for understanding each emphasis in the context that the
other provides.
Having completed Chapter Four by outlining how a trinitarian perspective
might illuminate my identified issues of Providence, I turned in Part Three to
justify and explicate in detail my fundamental thesis by addressing each of
these issues in turn. In the first section of Part Three, Chapter Five, I argued
that a transcendence-immanence tension in Providence is a reflection of and
finds some basis in a tension in God’s triunity in which we see, to some extent,
dimensions of transcendence and immanence. In other words, just as there is a
tension ad intra or “within,” so there is one ad extra or “without” – the God
who does is not other than the God who is. The fact that we experience the
tension of transcendence-immanence in God’s providence toward us is to
some extent reflective of how God is within himself. I concluded that this
understanding, in its simplest form, recognises a triune dimension of relational
transcendence in that a clear distinction – a sense of relational “apartness” – is
drawn between each of the divine persons which is reflected in the Athanasian
Creed’s, “nor confounding the persons.” Yet this perspective also recognises a
triune dimension of relational immanence in that a clear unity – a sense of
relational “withness” – exists between each of the divine persons. That is, each
person subsists in the other in a perichoretic embrace that is reflected in the
Athanasian Creed’s, “neither dividing the substance.”
In Chapter Six, I addressed the issue of divine sovereignty and argued that it
ought to be understood in tension with human freedom and responsibility. In395
support of this, I argued that a trinitarian perspective indicates that true
freedom is to be understood relationally – that is, we are truly free when we
are relationally aligned with God and thereby in his sovereign will. For
example, in an intra-trinitarian context, I argued that it is true both that the
Father sent the Son to fulfil his sovereign purpose and that the Son freely
chose to give himself. As such, this intra-trinitarian tension of complementary
sovereignty and freedom provides a divine ontological grounding for how God
acts toward humanity in Providence. In a similar way, the divine-human
relationship in Providence is marked by a human freedom that is seen as
complementary with divine sovereignty. As such, we are caught up in his
sovereign purpose and the paradox is that it is only then that we experience
genuine freedom.
To further explain and support my argument, I engaged with the concept of
divine concurrence and concluded that the notion of perichoresis provides us
with a trinitarian paradigm of concurrence. That is, the perfect relationality
that is the triune God means that the three divine persons so interpenetrate
each other that the action of one is, in a mysterious and yet profound sense,
also the action of the others. Hence, we are able to say that the sovereign will
of the Father to send the Son is concurrent with the freedom of the Son to give
himself. In a sense, then, the action of the Father is also the action of the Son,
yet without compromising the distinction and distinctiveness of either.
Although one could conceivably argue that there is a sense of primacy or
initiation in the Father’s action and a sense of response in the Son’s, the
distinctiveness or authenticity of each action is not obscured by their396
concurrence. Although perichoresis or coinherence points us toward seeing a
unity of sovereign divine purpose, such unity neither obscures nor negates the
distinctiveness or freedom of each divine person in such action. The will of the
Son remains the will of the Son whilst existing concurrently with it being the
will of the Father and Holy Spirit. In a similar way, I argued that this intra-
trinitarian understanding provides support for and illuminates my argument
that human action is caught up by and stands in an embrace with divine
sovereignty and is neither compromised nor minimised by such concurrence.
The final stages of Chapter Six engaged with the relationship of divine
sovereignty with the future and I concluded that a trinitarian perspective points
toward a bi-dimensionality in that God both stands outside of and over time,
and yet chooses to enter into our time and allow us to accompany him through
its successiveness. In the same way that a trinitarian perspective indicates an
understanding of God in which he stands both apart from as well as with the
created order, it also points us toward understanding him both standing apart
from human history as well as with human history. Hence, we are able to
affirm a robust confidence in God’s consummation of all things under his
lordship as well as a robust awareness that the same God walks with us
through the perceived uncertainties and challenges of everyday human living.
In the grammatical metaphor of Oden, human history exists “as if in a
parenthesis within a sentence spoken eternally.”
2
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In Chapter Seven, I concluded Part Three by engaging with the issues of
divine immutability and impassibility in the context of Providence. I evaluated
the contemporary critique, from Open theists and others, of the Fathers’
utilization of these concepts and the alleged influence of Hellenic philosophy
upon the development of Christian theology. I concluded that the Father’s
development of trinitarian theology in which they conceived a divine ontology
that is relational and dynamic casts serious doubts upon the assertion that
immutability and impassibility are to be understood as designating unchanging
and apathetic inertness. Rather, I argued that a trinitarian perspective leads us
to a conception that I named active constancy in that there are aspects in which
it could be said that God does not change and that he does change. What
should be avoided is a conception that absolutizes in either direction, either
toward ascribing change in God in all senses or denying change in God in all
senses.
After a consideration of intra-trinitarian perichoresis and the nature of the
hypostatic union, I concluded that a trinitarian perspective points toward
recognising that God, for example, does enter authentically into our suffering
(active) and yet is not ontologically shaped or constrained by suffering
(constancy). Consequently, in Providence we have a God in whom we can
trust and to whom we can bring our petitions, for although he knows what it is
like to experience the struggles that we experience, on our behalf and for our
benefit he is yet able to transcend and overcome them. Hence, a trinitarian
perspective points to a God who, in Providence, dynamically engages with
humanity in a genuine personal relationship for he is perfect relationship that398
overflows toward those who are “other” from him, yet who remains constant
and faithful in his promises and the fulfilment of his purposes.
In Chapter Eight, which forms the entirety of Part Four, I moved from a
consideration of tensions in thinking toward the application of such tensional
truths – tensions in living. As Pinnock asks, “Every generation needs to think
about its conception of God – is it true to the gospel, does it communicate and
is it adequate for living?”
3 To that end, I utilized the example of prayer as a
particular application of my thesis and discussed how and to what extent my
thesis might affect the believer’s understanding and experience of prayer. I
concluded that the intra-trinitarian dimensions of relational transcendence and
immanence, which provide some grounding for and are reflected ad extra as
God relates to the world in Providence, receive specific application in prayer
in a number of ways. Firstly, we experience the tension of apartness and
withness as we pray to the Father who is distinct from us and yet recognise
that he is our Father and our access to him is through the mediating work of
the Son and in or by the power and presence of the Holy Spirit who indwells
us. In other words, although prayer is to a God who is distinct from us, a
trinitarian perspective suggests that the nature and practice of it is intimate –
we pray to one distinct from us and yet who is present to and with us.
Secondly, the application of this tension to prayer receives further elucidation
in how the NT presents what may be termed the normative pattern of prayer –
that is, that we pray to the Father through the Son and in or by the Holy Spirit.
Yet, the NT also presents occasions of prayer to the Son and includes the Holy
                                                
3 C. H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness (Carlisle, UK:
Paternoster, 2001), p. 1.399
Spirit in the context of prayer. Consequently, I argued that our pattern of
praying ought to recognise and give articulation to these relational dimensions
of transcendence and immanence in that we recognise appropriate distinctions
between the divine persons concurrent with the divine unity.
In relation to prayer and the divine sovereignty-human responsibility tension
in Providence, I concluded that prayer receives its grounding in and is an
expression of submission to divine sovereignty. Yet, paradoxically, prayer is
also an expression of authentic human freedom for, from a trinitarian
perspective, freedom is relationally defined and regulated. It is only as we pray
informed by and in submission to God’s sovereign purpose that our own
freedom and particularity is expressed and enhanced. Indeed, prayer as an
expression of human freedom is not seen as oppositional to divine sovereignty
but as complementary – as we pray we are transformed and our purposes begin
to become aligned with his purposes. Consequently, prayer is an example of
and draws together the dual affirmations of divine sovereignty and human
responsibility.
The application of my arguments regarding immutability and impassibility to
the issue of prayer, particularly in relation to suffering, led me to note the
tensional truths of God’s connection with and yet distinction from our
suffering. In other words, in prayer we experience communication with a God
who authentically enters into and experiences with us our suffering, while also
rising above that suffering, overcoming it and transforming us through it – that
is, in the words of Bloesch, a theology of the cross must be completed by a400
theology of glory.
4 Though suffering will be a part of our experience since the
servant of Jesus Christ is not above his master, we also recognise the divine
power that is promised to us to sustain us through suffering and acknowledge
that we are assured of a divine purpose – a sense of divine ultimacy – that
overrules it. I concluded that our experience of prayer will be marked by the
trinitarian tension of active constancy – since God is active, we petition him to
intervene and demonstrate his power and, since he is constant, we trust him
when he appears to withhold his hand of power or when we cannot track its
course.
Yet, alongside my thesis in relation to these issues of Providence and my
discussion concerning the nature of God’s triunity, I have consistently noted
that the certainty of any conclusions we might draw must be tempered by the
knowledge that we are in the presence of ultimate divine mystery. In other
words, my research led me time and again to conclude that, although God has
revealed himself and his purposes in Providence to the extent that we have
firm grounding for confidence and trust in him, this revelation though
sufficient is not exhaustive. Just as there is both revelation and yet ultimate
and continuing mystery in God’s triunity, so also are his purposes and actions
toward us in Providence marked by both revelation and continuing mystery.
As Blocher states, “God incomprehensible, yet God intelligible by means of
his revelation: both are vital.”
5 In my view, to argue that we are in the presence
of total mystery would perhaps run the risk of a retreat into an escapist
                                                
4 D. G. Bloesch, God the Almighty: Power, Wisdom, Holiness and Love (Downers Grove: IVP,
1995), p. 95.
5 H. Blocher, “Immanence and Transcendence in Trinitarian Theology,” in K. J. Vanhoozer
(ed.), The Trinity in a Pluralistic Age: Theological Essays on Culture and Religion (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), p. 107.401
agnosticism. Alternatively, to argue that we are the recipients of an all-
encompassing and exhaustive revelation would perhaps run the risk of a
movement toward an unhealthy and perhaps conceited dogmatism.
6
Acknowledgement of the presence of both revelation and continuing mystery
is simply to recognise that though God has spoken, it is emphatically God who
has spoken. In other words, and as Weinandy reminds us, since it is God who
cannot be fully comprehended who is at the heart of all theological inquiry, the
theological task is less the solving of a series of problems than the illumination
and discernment of the most profound mystery.
7 Indeed, when the moment
arrives, as surely it must, that our human capacities are exhausted in
contemplation of God’s being and actions, it is perhaps appropriate at that
moment to remind ourselves that God is in heaven and we are on earth. When
this realisation is refreshed in our consciousness, we may also be led to note
that, “Sometimes it is more important to worship such a God than to
understand him.”
8
                                                
6 Carson notes that, “Certainly there are great mysteries connected with the being of God, but
that should not be surprising to any except those who want to be God themselves” – D. A.
Carson, The Gagging of God: Christianity Confronts Pluralism (Grand Rapids: Zondervan,
1996), p. 235.
7 T. G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000), p. 32.
8 D. A. Carson, A Call to Spiritual Reformation: Priorities from Paul and His Prayers (Grand
Rapids: Baker Books, 1992), p. 160.402
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